



Emotions as Feelings Towards Value

Mitchell, Jonathan | University of Manchester

This research project will examine how emotions connect us with our environment. I will argue for a novel theory, according to which emotional experiences can be understood as feelings towards values, in that they present evaluative properties of their objects (e.g. the dangerousness of a dog) through attitudes of favour and disfavour. The project will therefore elucidate the important connection between emotions and evaluative properties of objects in our environment. Further, it will emphasize, in a way often overlooked by emotion theorists, the need for a substantive account not just of what emotions represent, but how they represent. The account will also be used to provide new perspectives on long-standing debates in philosophy of emotion, with connections to philosophy of mind. My approach is to treat emotions as sui generis states, not to be modelled on more familiar mental states, but given their own analysis within our mental economy.

Funding sought
Project start/end

£ 
3 Sep 2018 - 1 Sep 2021

1. Eligibility

Primary Subject

Please indicate the subject most relevant to your research:

Philosophy

Primary Subject Detail - Philosophy

Please select the detail(s) of your primary subject:

Philosophy of Mind

Secondary Subject

If your application is more interdisciplinary, you may choose to indicate a secondary subject to which your application might also be relevant:

Time Period

Please select your time period(s) from the list below:

20th Century to 1945

20th Century from 1945

Contemporary

Audiences

Please select your audience(s) from the list below:

Other funding bodies in the UK (e.g. AHRC, Leverhulme)

Policymakers at local or institutional level (e.g. membership of Research Ethics Committee)

Journalists, broadcasters and other media

General Public

Regional Interests

Please select your regional interest(s) from the list below:

- England
- Scotland
- Wales
- Ireland
- Southern Africa
- Central Europe
- Northern Europe
- Southern Europe
- Western Europe
- USA and Canada
- Australia and New Zealand

Employing Organisation

Please select the Organisation at which you wish to be based for the BA Postdoctoral Fellowship, if successful:

University of Manchester

University

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Oxford Road, Manchester , M13 9PL, United Kingdom (Work)

2. Lead Applicant Details

Lead Applicant Contact Details

Dr Jonathan Mitchell

Primary Applicant

Professor Christopher Daly

Contributor

Department of Philosophy, Manchester University, Manchester, , United Kingdom (Work)

Mrs Elena Goncharova

Contributor

Oxford Road, Oxford Road, Manchester , M13 9PL, United Kingdom

Fabrice Teroni

Contributor

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

University of Geneva, Department of
Philosophy, 2, rue de Candolle , Geneva,
1211, Switzerland (Work)

PhD Awarding University

Please state the university from which your doctorate was awarded:

University of Warwick

Please only give the name of the University and the country in which it is based if outside the United Kingdom. If further explanation is needed about your eligibility, please use the personal statement field on the Lead Applicant Career Summary page

Nationality: You must select one but you may select up to three if applicable.
Please state your nationality:

[REDACTED]

Nationality: You must select one but you may select up to three if applicable.
Please state your nationality:

Nationality: You must select one but you may select up to three if applicable.
Please state your nationality:

3. Lead Applicant Career Summary

Statement of Qualifications and Career

Please give dates of your academic qualifications and career.

Qualification:	Date:
Ph.D in Philosophy	01/02/2016
Masters in Philosophy (Distinction)	01/09/2009
BA in Philosophy (1st Class)	01/09/2008

Please enter up to 4 qualifications in reverse chronological order. Please use the 'Other Academic Experience' field below to add other information about your academic career to date

Present Appointment

Please state your present appointment.

Post-doctoral Fellow

If doctoral student please say so. If no current academic post, please indicate if employed in a non-academic post

Present Employing Institution

Please state the institution at which you are currently employed.

University of Johannesburg

Present Department

Please indicate the Department or Faculty (or equivalent) in which you are based.

Department of Philosophy

Personal Statement

Please enter your personal statement:

I received my doctorate in philosophy from the University of Warwick in February

2016. My areas of specialization are Philosophy of Emotion, Value, Mind and History (specifically Nietzsche). My research is now focused on points of intersection between philosophy of emotion, value and mind. This grew out of my dissertation topic on Nietzsche's philosophy of value, which included detailed chapters on his theory of emotion and value. I am now interested developing a new theory of emotional experiences, based on the idea that emotions are constituted by what I call feelings towards value. Moreover, I want to examine how distinctions from contemporary philosophy of mind can be applied to emotion theory (e.g. conceptual vs. non-conceptual content; phenomenal intentionality; the attitude-content distinction). I continue to have an interest in history of philosophy, specifically Nietzsche and the early phenomenologists, with a view to their ideas about affectivity, value and emotions.

Applicants are invited to include any information relating to their professional career which they may wish to be taken into account in assessing this application. For example, details of a career break, or the effect of working on a part-time contract may be relevant. This is an optional field.

PhD Awarded Date

Use this option if your PhD has already been awarded. Please enter the date of the viva voce examination in this field:

21/12/2015

PhD Submitted Date

If your PhD has been submitted but it has not yet been examined, please enter the date of submission in this field:

PhD Expected Date

If your PhD has not yet been submitted or examined, please enter the expected date of submission, which must be sufficiently before 1 April 2018 to enable the viva voce examination to be held by then, in this field:

Name of Doctoral Supervisor

Please state the name of your doctoral supervisor(s):

Peter Poellner (University of Warwick)

Name of Examiners

Please state the name of your internal and external examiners:

If not yet known, please state not known.

My doctoral thesis was examined by two external examiners: Professor Aaron Ridley (University of Southampton) and Professor Beatrice Han-Pile (University of Essex).

It was passed with no corrections.

Quotes from externals: "this strikes me as an unusually good thesis" (Ridley); "It is one of the best Ph.Ds on Nietzsche that I have read so far" (Han-Pile).

Other Academic Experience

Please provide details of all academic posts held prior to your present position (with dates), including any teaching experience gained during the course of doctoral registration.

Please include details of any experience in organizing conferences, workshops and wiki-based discussions.

If none, please state none:

University of Johannesburg (Department of Philosophy), Global Excellent Stature Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, January 2018 – Present

Warwick University (Department of Philosophy), Associate Tutor, March 2016 – December 2017

I am the (joint) editor of the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion, which aims to be an internationally recognized, philosophy journal specializing in the publication of high-quality, peer-reviewed papers on emotion. The editorial role aligns with my proposed project.

Teaching Experience:

Principal Instructor – Writing Centre in Philosophy at University of Warwick
Guest lecture – Mackie's Error Theory (for Ethics 2015)

Associate Tutor (University of Warwick):

Sartre and Existentialism (2014)

Ethics (2015)

History of Modern Philosophy II, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (2016)

Elements of Scientific Method (2016)

Introduction to Symbolic Logic (2017)

History of Modern Philosophy I, Locke, Berkeley, Hume (2017)

Philosophy of Religion (2017)

Professional Service:

Editor for Journal of Philosophy of Emotion

Referee, Journal of Nietzsche Studies

Organizing committee for Inaugural Conference Society for the Philosophy of Emotion (Washington DC)

Organizing committee for Future Minds Conference at University of Warwick, March 2017 (funded by the British Academy)
Referee for papers submitted to Future Minds Conference at University of Warwick (Intentionality category), March 2017
Chair for 'Intentionality' session, Future Minds Conference at University of Warwick, March 2017
Lead organizer of Nietzsche Reading Group for 3 years at University of Warwick, 2012-2015

Affiliations :

Invited member of the International Society for Nietzsche Studies
Member of the Early Career Mind Network
Member of the Society for Philosophy of Emotion

The limit on this field is 500 words

Publications

Please list your principal and/or relevant publications in reverse chronological order, to a maximum of six:

Publications: Peer Reviewed Journal Articles:

1. 'The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology', under revision at Erkenntnis
2. 'The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods', under revision at European Journal of Philosophy
3. 'A Nietzschean Critique of Metaphysical Philosophy' in Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48(3), 2017
4. 'The Epistemology of Emotional Experience', in dialectica 71(1), 57-84, 2017
5. 'Nietzsche on Taste: Epistemic Privilege and Anti-Realism', in Inquiry 60(1-2), 31-65, 2017
6. 'Nietzschean Self-Overcoming', in Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47(3), 323-350, 2016

If you have no publications to date, please enter none in the first row. Only row 1 is mandatory. If you have more than 6 publications to date please enter the most relevant 6.

File name	Date uploaded
<u>MITCHELLSAMPLE.pdf</u>	24/02/2018 13:12:15

Please upload as a pdf file an example of your written work - suitable examples normally include one of the following - a short published article, an article submitted/accepted for publication, or an extract from a doctoral thesis. The submission should not exceed 35 pages. When uploading PDF documents, please add your name and a heading at the top of every page to show what the document is, e.g. second-stage PDF example of written work.

When uploading PDF documents, please add your name and a heading to the top of every page to show what the document is. E.g. Personal statement, list of publications, etc. Please avoid uploading documents containing illustrations with fine details or colour, as this can cause problems when creating a PDF of the application. Please note, we will only print your applications in black and white. Each PDF should not exceed 3mb in size.

Unpublished Research

Please list any extant unpublished projects funded by the Academy or any other agency, and their expected publication date (or other explanation):

1. 'On the Non-Conceptual Content of Affective-Evaluative Experience' under review at
Nous
2. 'The Psychosemantics of Emotions' under review at Philosophers Quarterly
3. 'Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account' under review at dialectica
4. 'A Nietzschean Theory of Emotion' under view British Journal for the History of Philosophy
5. 'Affective Representation and Phenomenal Consciousness' under review at Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Previous Support Dates

Please give details of any research application submitted to the British Academy within the last five years:

Please note that only one British Academy research grant may be held, or applied for, at any one time.

Where did you hear of this scheme?

Please indicate where you heard about this scheme:

Philos List

This field is optional. It helps the British Academy to target appropriate resources towards the promotion of the scheme to know where an applicant hears about it. As appropriate please state BA website; BA literature; PhD supervisor; University Research Office; Twitter, Other Colleague etc

4. Research Proposal

Subject Area

Please select the subject most relevant to your research:

Philosophy

Subject Area Detail - Philosophy

Please select the detail(s) of your Subject Area:

Philosophy of Mind

Title of Research Proposal

Please state the title of your proposed research:

Emotions as Feelings Towards Value

Abstract

Please provide a short abstract summarising your proposed research in terms suitable for an informed general audience, not one specialised in your field:

This research project will examine how emotions connect us with our environment. I will argue for a novel theory, according to which emotional experiences can be understood as feelings towards values, in that they present evaluative properties of their objects (e.g. the dangerousness of a dog) through attitudes of favour and disfavour. The project will therefore elucidate the important connection between emotions and evaluative properties of objects in our environment. Further, it will emphasize, in a way often overlooked by emotion theorists, the need for a substantive account not just of what emotions represent, but how they represent. The account will also be used to provide new perspectives on long-standing debates in philosophy of emotion, with connections to philosophy of mind. My approach is to treat emotions as sui generis states, not to be modelled on more familiar mental states, but given their own analysis within our mental economy.

Proposed Host Institution

Please indicate here your choice of host institution, including the appropriate Faculty, Department, Research Institute or College where you propose to work:

University of Manchester, Department of Philosophy

Please only state the name of the university or research institution and relevant Faculty, Department, etc. Use the next field to state reasons for this choice. Please ensure that you also select this institution as the approving institution (and

not your present institution, if different). Note that the application must be approved by a relevant authority in this institution as part of the application process. Without such authorisation, the application will not be eligible for consideration. If you are invited to the Second Stage of the process, the Head of Department is also required to provide a supporting statement as part of that application.

Reason(s) for choice of host institution

Please explain the reason(s) for your choice of UK host institution (the university/research institute, department):

My project is an excellent fit with the philosophy department at the University of Manchester for the following reasons. It falls within the scope of the Mind and Language research cluster, and will benefit from supervision and collaboration with Joel Smith (proposed mentor) and Catherine Abell, who have worked extensively in emotions, and related areas. The project also builds on previous work under the projects 'Knowledge of Emotion' (AHRC 2012-15), and 'Architecture of Consciousness' (ERC 2013-16); I will draw on the outputs on these projects. My project is also informed, as the title suggests, by the late Peter Goldie (previously at the University of Manchester). My idea of feelings towards value is an extension of his distinctive notion of feelings towards, and I will be engaging with his work in detail. Finally, I will be attending regular meetings at the Emotional Cognition Lab at Manchester, headed by Deborah Talmi (<http://research.bmh.manchester.ac.uk/emotionalcognitionlab/>).

This is expected to be a brief paragraph setting out the main reason(s) for the choice of host institution. The limit is 150 words.

Previous Research

Please give a description of research already undertaken, normally referring to the doctoral thesis:

My doctoral thesis (2012-2016) was concerned with an exploration of an exemplarist approach to ethical, and more broadly evaluative, thought, using Nietzsche as an example of this approach. I argued that Nietzsche's thought involves various exemplars, who represent his favoured evaluative, often emotionally informed, practices. The thesis was structured around three chapters, each examining a different exemplar. Taking the Free Spirit first, I argued that this exemplar represents an affective attitude to metaphysics called metaphysical indifferentism. The ethical ideal, represented by Zarathustra, was taken to epitomize Nietzsche's concept of self-overcoming, as a distinctive emotional commitment, which I argued is the central concept of his normative ethics. Finally, the Future Philosopher was taken to represent a meta-ethical ideal, built around emotions as the source of value. Overall, I argued these exemplars reflect Nietzsche's central insights about what we should value and the way we should value, with emotions and affective attitudes being central. The project was funded by the Warwick University Chancellor's Award and allowed me to develop philosophy of value and 19th century German philosophy as a research specialty, and keenly explore related issues in philosophy of emotion and mind.

On the basis of this doctoral research I published three articles (and three book reviews). The first article 'Nietzschean Self-Overcoming' (Journal of Nietzsche Studies) argued against dominant interpretations of Nietzsche's normative ethics, suggesting an alternative based around an ideal of 'self-overcoming'. The second article, 'A Nietzschean Critique of Metaphysical Philosophy' (Journal of Nietzsche Studies), argued for a new reading of Nietzsche's attitude to metaphysics as centered around the affective attitude of 'metaphysical indifference'. The third article, 'Nietzsche on Taste: Epistemic Privilege and Anti-Realism (Inquiry)', argued that by viewing Nietzsche's affects as conscious emotions, and seeing that 'taste' for him depends on the affects, a particular 'taste' can have correctness conditions, and so enjoy epistemic privilege over its rivals. It was on the basis of this research on Nietzsche's philosophy of value, and the role of emotions therein, that I developed an interest in philosophy of emotion and mind both during my doctoral studies and after, which is now my primary research focus.

My previous research exclusively in emotion theory has been based around two central themes. The first was showing that emotions serve as reasons for evaluative beliefs, analogously to perceptual experiences providing reasons for empirical belief. This research resulted in the publication of an article titled, 'The Epistemology of Emotional Experience' (dialectica). The second strand of my previous work on emotion theory has been defending the view that moods are intentional states, as contrasting with those who claim that moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. This research has resulted in two papers, the first titled 'The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods' (under revision at European Journal of Philosophy). The second, titled 'The Varieties of Mood Intentionality' (forthcoming in Mood – Aesthetics, Psychology, Philosophy, Warwick Series in the Humanities: Routledge, 2017), explores the different respects in which moods are intentional states.

This previous work provides me with the necessary expertise for the proposed research project in philosophy of emotion, value and mind. I have also demonstrated the ability for detailed engagement with the history of philosophy (in the case of the proposed project, I will look at historical philosophers who have detailed views on emotions, specifically Brentano, Scheler and Sartre). Finally, the outputs of previous research (6 articles, a book chapter, and 3 book reviews) demonstrates my ability to turn research into high quality publications within a fixed time frame.

Proposed Programme

Please give a detailed description of the research programme, including methodology.

Applicants should be aware of the importance that assessors place on the viability, specificity and originality of the research programme and of its achievability within the timescale, which should be specified in the Plan of Action.

Understanding how emotional experiences connect us with our environment is central to a philosophical account of those states. Predominant perceptualist theories claim that emotional experiences are constituted by perceptions of evaluative properties, as typically instantiated in the subject's environment (see Tappolet 2016). Yet such views have been subject to criticism, suggesting that emotional experiences are

disanalogous to perceptual experiences. For example, perceptions are not sensitive to rationality in the way emotional experiences seem to be – recalcitrant perceptions are not irrational in the way recalcitrant emotions are (see Brady 2013). However, to date, neither the perceptualists nor their critics have been able to defend a plausible account of how emotional experiences represent and what they represent. As a result, we do not have a persuasive explanation of how emotional experiences connect us with our environment.

My project, *Emotions as Feelings Towards Value*, remedies this by proposing a novel account of emotional experiences. I am applying for a BA postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Manchester, Department of Philosophy, to articulate this account, and use it to contribute to important debates in philosophy of emotion, with connections to philosophy of mind. I will argue that emotional experiences present evaluative properties of their objects (the what) on the basis of felt valenced attitudes of favour and disfavour (the how). The basic idea is that the felt response dimension of emotional experiences, the valenced affective response, serves as a personal level registering, and so representation, of the relevant evaluative properties of the particular object (e.g. disfavour toward the colleague's offensive remark; favour toward the funny joke). It is in this sense that emotional experiences are feelings towards values. Overall, I aim to show that to understand how emotional experiences connect us with our environment we should treat them as *sui generis* states, not to be modelled after other mental states, but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy.

Methods: I will be drawing on emotion and value theory, contemporary philosophy of mind, early phenomenological thinkers (Brentano 1874/1995, Scheler 1973), and empirical research in the affective sciences on emotional experience (Frijda 2009; Lambie & Marcel 2002). I will be using the methods of (a) examination of first-personal reports of emotional phenomenology, (b) the phenomenal contrast method, as a novel approach to thought experiments, which tests hypotheses about the contents of experience (Siegel 2010: 87-96), (c) logical and conceptual analysis, including analysis of emotion concepts, which places constraints on individuating different emotional experiences and explaining their behaviour with respect to their objects (see Teroni 2007) and (d) research in empirical psychology. I am particularly interested in the use of emotion diaries, and will set up a collaborative mini-project with experimental psychologists at the University of Manchester. On this, I will collaborate and exchange research ideas with Deborah Talmi, who runs the Emotional Cognition Laboratory at University of Manchester, and will be attending regular meetings at the Laboratory.

Objectives: The research will be developed over four articles (submitted to top generalist journals in philosophy), a monograph, titled *Emotions as Feelings Towards Value : A Theory of Emotional Experience* , and a co-edited special edition of a journal, as outlined below:

(Paper 1) *The Nature of Emotional Experience* : The first article, and starting point of my research, will be a defence of the view that emotional experiences are fundamentally feelings towards value, which can be theorized as felt favourings and disfavourings towards the evaluative properties of their objects. I will explain how this

felt component can be a representational vehicle for evaluative content, in that it can meaningfully represent evaluative information to the subject of those experiences. Furthermore, I will argue that to admit feelings towards value into the class of mental states we need to reject the sharp distinction between the felt component of emotions and their non-affective (evaluative) intentional aspects (see Goldie 2000). The account will also stress the importance of valence as present in emotional experience. A folk psychological understanding of experiential valence approximates to a conscious orientation toward or away from features of one's environment, as a felt comportment which makes us aware of things which seem significant for us. I will argue that feelings towards values are this experiential correspondence of significance.

(Paper 2) The Content of Emotional Experience : A central debate in emotion theory concerns whether emotional experiences have evaluative content. In this article, I argue that two prominent methods for fixing the content of experience from contemporary philosophy of mind, namely introspection (as conscious attention) and naturalistic (or externalist) theories, underdetermine emotional content. I argue that the method of phenomenal contrast fares better. The phenomenal contrast method begins with a target hypothesis – say that a certain property is represented in experience – and reaches a verdict on it by reasoning about pairs of experiences. We hypothesize a 'target experience' in which the property is represented, and a 'contrast experience' in which it is not. Given the experiences non-controversially exhibit a phenomenal contrast, we examine whether that contrast is best explained by the target hypothesis (see Siegel 2010: 87-96). On this basis, I will argue that emotional experience has evaluative content, and that it is this content which, along with the relevant attitude component, plays an essential role in individuating different emotions.

(Paper 3) Different Approaches to Emotional Phenomenology : Much study of emotions can be characterized by attempts to reduce emotions to more familiar states. One frequent criticism is that such theories fail to capture the distinctive phenomenology of emotional experience. In this article, I will explain how that distinctive phenomenology can be captured by positing sui generis feelings towards values, and that this creates problems for certain approaches to emotional phenomenology. I will argue that recent attempts in philosophy to capture emotional phenomenology by claiming that cognitive, conative, and other phenomenologies combine to constitute emotional phenomenology fail (see Kriegel 2015). This research will build substantially on my paper 'The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology' under revision at Erkenntnis.

(Paper 4) Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude-Content Distinction : Typical intentional states, such as belief, desire and perception, admit of a distinction between their attitude and content. One reason this distinction is important is that if we can individuate content separately from attitude, then the same content can be entertained by different intentional attitudes (see Searle 1983). This article will show how, by understanding emotions in terms of feelings towards value, the attitude-content distinction cannot be applied to emotions (see Goldie 2000). Further, I will examine implications for the epistemology of emotions, arguing that the attitude-content distinction is not necessary for emotional justification. This will draw on analysis of evaluative concepts, showing they include reference to affective attitudes, and so the attitude arguably goes 'upstream' into the judgements in which those evaluative

concepts figure.

Monograph, *Emotions as Feelings Towards Value : A Theory of Emotional Experience*. This monograph will include two of the most theoretical of the above articles (1 and 2), three additional chapters, an Introduction surveying previous theories of emotional experience, and a Conclusion. The three additional chapters will address the following issues: (a) the rational intelligibility of emotional experiences, specifically in relation to emotional actions; (b) connections between emotions and other affective states, such as moods, and affective dispositions, and (c) epistemological questions arising from my account. This will build on my previous research on rational intelligibility, affective states and the epistemology of emotions).

In addition, I am planning to co-edit a special edition of a journal with Joel Smith (University of Manchester), which will include papers given at conferences I will be organising at UOM.

The above research will contribute to debates in philosophy of emotion and value, and play an important role in shaping understanding of how emotional experiences connect us with our environment. The British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship will establish my scholarly reputation as a significant new voice in emotion theory, and as having important contributions to make in drawing connections between the study of emotions and value, theory of mind, and emotion psychology.

Brady, M. (2013) *Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brentano, F. (1874/1995) *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* , trans. A. C. Rancurello, D. B.

Terrell, and L. McAlister, London: Routledge, 2nd ed.

Fridja, N (2009) 'Emotional Experience and its Varieties' in *Emotion Review* 1(3): 264-271.

Goldie, P. (2000) *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kriegel, U. (2015) *The Varieties of Consciousness* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marcel, A. J., and Lambie, J. A. (2002) 'Consciousness and the Varieties of Emotion Experience: A

Theoretical Framework', in *Psychological Review* 109 (2), 219-59.

Scheler, M (1973) *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* , trans. M. S. Frings and R. L.

Funk. Evanston, IL: Northwestern, University Press.

Searle, J. (1983) *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Siegel, S (2010) *The Contents of Visual Experience* , Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tappolet, C. (2016) *Emotions, Values and Agency* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

If there is a need to include a short bibliography to help a reader understand the context, this should be included here and is counted within the word limit of the field. Applicants should be aware of the importance that the assessors place on the scholarly importance of the project and on its feasibility, especially in terms of the proposed methodology and timescale. The limit on the 'proposed programme' field

is 1500 words

Plan of Action

Please indicate here a clear timetable for your research programme.

Try to be as realistic as possible, but keep in mind that research programmes will develop over time and this plan of action is not something that is expected to account for every minute and is not unchangeable. But your chances of award will be affected by the assessors' perception of how viable and realistic this plan is.

During the first two years, the research output will be four articles (8000-10,000 words), submitted to top generalist journals in philosophy. On average the research, writing, and submission of each article will take 6 months. This allows time for presenting these papers conferences (at which I will gain valuable feedback), the planning of workshops, and other aspects of the project.

Year 1:

During the first year, I will principally be working on two research papers (1-2 above). Research for 'The Nature on Emotional Experience' will begin in October 2018. This will involve connecting with the latest research on emotional experience, and detailed examination of the key concepts in the philosophy of mind (e.g. vehicles, representation, information). I will have a draft of this paper by January 2019, and a final version submitted by March 2019. I see this paper as the ideal starting point for my research insofar as we need to gain clarity on how emotions could represent, not just what they represent.

Research for the second paper, 'The Content of Emotional Experience', will begin in April 2019. This will involve examining the range of theories of content in philosophy of mind, and applying them to emotional experience, also making use of the phenomenal contrast method. I will have a draft by July 2019, and a final version submitted by September 2019. This paper will draw on the emotion diary mini-project I will set up in collaboration with experimental psychologists at the Emotional Cognition Laboratory at University of Manchester, which I will begin plans for at the outset of the fellowship. The results will feed into to an analysis of emotional content.

Over the course of the year I will present drafts of these papers at seminars and conferences (3 in total). I will also co-organize and host a one-day workshop at the University of Manchester (Summer 2019), inviting international researchers across affective science, philosophy, and psychology (John Lambie [Anglia Ruskin University] and James Russel [Boston College], to contribute on the theme of 'Interdisciplinary approaches to Emotional Experience'. The papers delivered at the workshop will provide invaluable insights for the papers outlined above.

Year 2:

During the second year, I will again principally be working on two research papers (3-4 above). Research for the third paper, 'Different Approaches to Emotional Phenomenology', will begin in October 2019. This will involve connecting with the latest research on emotional phenomenology, and recent work under the heading of phenomenal intentionality which argues we should recognize a range of different kinds

of phenomenologies. I will have a draft by January 2020, and a final version submitted in March 2020.

Research for the fourth paper 'Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude-Content Distinction', will begin in April 2020. This will involve examining how the distinction is applied in philosophy of mind, and then consider why some theorists have thought it problematic for emotions. I plan to have a draft by July 2020, and a final version submitted by September 2020.

Over the course of the second year, I will present two drafts of these papers at international conferences. There will be no organizing of conferences or workshop activity during this year, to ensure I have the time to deal with potential resubmissions, revise and resubmit verdicts, and proofing, on papers.

Year 3:

In the third year of the fellowship, I will principally be working on a monograph titled *Emotions as Feelings Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience*. This will comprise two of the most theoretical articles completed in Years 1 and 2, three additional chapters, a detailed Introduction on theories of emotional experience, and a Conclusion (to be written in Autumn 2020 and Spring 2021). Once these additional chapters, Introduction, and Conclusion are in draft form, I plan to spend the Summer of 2021 polishing the manuscript, which will be submitted to Oxford University Press in August 2021.

As well as this primary research objective, I will organise and host a two-day international conference for philosophers, on 'New Directions in Emotion Theory' at the University of Manchester. Plans for this will begin, alongside research, in Autumn 2020, with the conference to be held in Summer 2021 (to offset the organizational work load I plan to involve graduate students at the University of Manchester in some of the administrative work). This conference will improve existing links between the study of emotions at the University of Manchester, and international researchers (I will invite Fabrice Teroni [University of Geneva], and Christine Tappolet [University of Montreal]). Some of the papers from this conference will be selected for the co-edited (with Joel Smith) special edition of a journal on the theme of the conference. This conference will also provide me with the opportunity to share my research outputs with fellow philosophers of emotion.

Planned Research Outputs

Please indicate here what the expected output(s) from your research programme might be.

As appropriate, please indicate as follows: monograph, journal article(s), book chapter(s), digital resources, other (please specify).

Please outline your plans for publication under Plans for publication/dissemination below:

The planned research output is as follows:

- (1) 4 articles, ranging from 8000-10,000 words, submitted to top international philosophy journals.
- (2) A monograph, approximately 60,000-70,000 words, comprising of 5 main chapters, a detailed Introduction and Conclusion.
- (3) Five presentations at national and international conferences and workshops - I will present at the the 'International Society of Research on Emotion' (EPSSE), 'The Consortium of European Research on Emotion' (CERE), and the 'European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions' (EPSSE).
- (4) A special edition of a journal, co-edited with Joel Smith (University of Manchester Philosophy), drawing on papers from the conference 'New Directions in Emotion Theory'.
- (5) A one-day international workshop on 'Interdisciplinary approaches to Emotional Experience' - invited speakers (John Lambie [Anglia Ruskin University] and James Russel [Boston College]).
- (6) A two-day international conference for philosophers on 'New Directions in Emotion Theory' (invited contributions and peer reviewed contributions) - invited speakers (Fabrice Teroni [University of Geneva], and Christine Tappolet [University of Montreal]).
- (7) A website (emotionandexperience.wordpress.com – at present unregistered), with linked twitter account (@emotionexperienceJM) providing updates on the project and events related to it.

Plans for Publication and Dissemination

Please state in more detail here what plans you have for publication or other dissemination of your research, including potential publishers, journals, conferences etc that are appropriate for your research subject:

Plans for Publications:

- (1) The Nature of Emotional Experience, submitted to Australasian Journal of Philosophy in March 2019
- (2) The Content of Emotional Experience, submitted to Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in September 2020
- (3) Different Approaches to Emotional Phenomenology, submitted to European Journal of Philosophy in March 2020
- (4) Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude-Content Distinction, submitted in September 2020 to dialectica.
- (5) Monograph Emotions as Feelings Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience, submitted to Oxford University Press in August 2021.
- (6) Journal, co-edited with Joel Smith (University of Manchester Philosophy), drawing on papers from the conference 'New Directions in Emotion Theory'.

I have chosen the above journals on the basis that they (a) fall within the top-20

generalist journals in philosophy (and are regarded as the most prestigious places to publish philosophy), (b) have a record of publications in philosophy of emotion, specifically that which is informed by philosophy of mind, and (c) have quick turnaround times from submission to decision, which will allow for the research to be published in timely fashion if accepted, or submitted elsewhere if necessary. I am also committed to Open Access, and will apply for funding through the University of Manchester to secure Gold Open Access. Failing that I will ensure that all publications will be Green Open Access.

Plans for Dissemination:

Aside from dissemination of research by securing publications in journals and presses, I also plan to present my research on emotional experience across a range of national and international conferences during the British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellowship (e.g. at the 'International Society of Research on Emotion' [EPSSE], 'The Consortium of European Research on Emotion' [CERE], the 'European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions' [EPSSE]).

I also expect the planned workshop and conference, 'Interdisciplinary approaches to Emotion Experience' and 'New Directions in Emotion Theory', to allow me to share the research undertaken during the fellowship, and further build links between researchers (philosophers, psychologists and affective scientists). These meetings will also facilitate an enlarged network between myself, emotion researchers in philosophy and psychology at the University of Manchester (e.g., Deborah Talmi's team), and international researchers (e.g., Julien Deonna [Geneva], James Russell [Boston College]), building on networks already established during Joel Smith's 'Knowledge of Emotion' project.

I will also set up a website (with a linked twitter account) documenting my research on emotions, and the important work done by philosophers at the University of Manchester on emotions. This will serve as the online presence for the project, and include regular updates about conferences, events, seminars, readings group etc. relating to my project and the study of emotions at the University of Manchester.

I will also co-organize a series of online podcast interviews with leading figures in emotion theory in which they discuss the state of the field and their current research. In particular, I will ask questions relevant to those being pursued by my research (e.g. the nature of emotional phenomenology, emotional actions, and more broadly the connection between emotions and our environment).

Digital Resource

If the primary product of the research will be a digital resource have you obtained guidance on appropriate standards and methods?

No

Deposit of Datasets

Please provide details of how and where any electronic or digital data (including datasets) developed during the project will be stored, along with details on the

appropriate methods of access.

It is a condition of award that all data be freely accessible during, and beyond, the lifetime of the project.

N/A

Project Start Date

Please state the start date of the proposed research:

03/09/2018

Project End Date

Please state the end date of the proposed research:

01/09/2021

Language Competence

Please indicate here, if relevant, your level of language competence, or otherwise explain how the objectives of the research will be met:

N/A

Endangered or Emerging Subject Area

Applicants should be intending to pursue original, independent research in any field of study within the humanities or social sciences. There are no quotas for individual subject areas and no thematic priorities. The primary factor in assessing applications will remain the excellence of the proposal. The Academy will, however, where appropriate, take into account the aim of providing particular support for certain important fields, either emerging areas of scholarship or areas of research that are endangered or under threat.

N/A

Ethical Issues

Are there any special ethical issues arising from your proposal that are not covered by the relevant professional Code of Practice? You must answer yes or no:

☒ No

Have you obtained, or will you obtain ethical approval from your employing institution or other relevant authority? You must answer yes or no:

☒ No

If the answers are yes to special ethical issues and no to having obtained prior approval, please describe here the non-standard ethical issues arising from your research and how you will address them:

If the answer is no to special ethical issues please enter N/A

N/A

5. Financial Details

The Postdoctoral Fellowship is expected to be held full-time over a period of 3 years. The Academy will receive requests for part-time working sympathetically only in the event that an award has been offered.

Period Group	Period	Item Type	Item	Field	£
Year 1	Year 1 - Quarter 1	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost	
		Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
		Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Year 1 - Quarter 1 Total			Proposed Cost
	Year 1 - Quarter 2	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost	
		Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
		Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Year 1 - Quarter 2 Total			Proposed Cost
	Year 1 - Quarter 3	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost	
		Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
		Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Year 1 - Quarter 3 Total			Proposed Cost
	Year 1 - Quarter 4	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost	
		Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
		Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Year 1 - Quarter 4 Total			Proposed Cost
	Year 1 Total	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost	
		Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
		Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Year 1 Total			Proposed Cost
Year 2	Year 2 - Quarter 1	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost	
		Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
		Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Year 2 - Quarter 1 Total			Proposed Cost
	Year 2 - Quarter 2	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost	
		Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
		Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	

		Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
Year 2 - Quarter 2					
Total				Proposed Cost	
Year 2 - Quarter 3	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost		
	Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost		
	Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost		
Year 2 - Quarter 3					
Total				Proposed Cost	
Year 2 - Quarter 4	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost		
	Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost		
	Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost		
Year 2 - Quarter 4					
Total				Proposed Cost	
Year 2 Total	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost		
	Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost		
	Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost		
Year 2 Total					
Total				Proposed Cost	
Year 3	Year 3 - Quarter 1	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost	
		Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost	
		Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
		Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
Year 3 - Quarter 1					
Total				Proposed Cost	
Year 3 - Quarter 2	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost		
	Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost		
	Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost		
Year 3 - Quarter 2					
Total				Proposed Cost	
Year 3 - Quarter 3	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost		
	Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost		
	Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost		
Year 3 - Quarter 3					
Total				Proposed Cost	
Year 3 - Quarter 4	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost		
	Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost		
	Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost		
Year 3 - Quarter 4					
Total				Proposed Cost	
Year 3 Total	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost		
	Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost		
	Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost		

	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
	Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
Year 3 Total			Proposed Cost	
Total	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Staff (Directly Incurred)	Proposed Cost	
	Travel Costs	Travel Costs	Proposed Cost	
	Other Costs	Other Costs	Proposed Cost	
	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Directly Allocated Costs (100%)	Proposed Cost	
	Indirect Costs	Indirect Costs	Proposed Cost	
Total			Proposed Cost	

Please note especially that the financial details should be recorded at 100% of the Full Economic Costing. Please note that the Academy will, however, only pay 80% of the costs of the Directly Incurred Salary (the salary of the Postdoctoral Fellow), the Directly Allocated Costs (including the time of the mentor for up to 36 hours, or the equivalent of 1 hour per month) and the Indirect Costs. The Academy will pay 100% of the research expenses which can be claimed directly as part of the award at up to a maximum of £6,000 over the three years (equivalent to £2,000pa).

Grand Total

Please enter the grand total of funding requested, at 100%.

Justification

Please refer to the scheme guidance notes for full details of eligible costs.

Please provide details of funding related to the relevant fields set out in the financial details table above.

Applicants should prepare accurate costings for the proposed research expenses, and should be particularly careful not to overestimate the resources required. Costs should be clearly itemised and justified in terms of the research programme for this application.

Directly Incurred Staff

Directly Allocated Costs

Indirect Costs

Research Expenses -loquax.doc

Year 1

In Year 1 the total research expenses requested are [REDACTED].

Travel Costs

Travel costs will cover first, travel, accommodation and subsistence for attendance at 3 conferences (2 international, and one national), the total sum of which is £1,015. Second, research expenses will also be used to provide travel, accommodation and subsistence for 2 keynote speakers at a 1-day conference organized by the Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Manchester, the cost of which will be £680.

Other Costs

Research expenses will also be used to cover registration fees for 3 conferences; hosting of a website and linked twitter account; and venue hire, catering, and evening meal for Postdoctoral Fellow and 2 keynotes for the 1-day conference at the University of Manchester. Total of other costs for the first year is £690.

Year 2

In Year 2 the total research expenses requested are [REDACTED].

Travel Costs

Travel costs will cover travel, accommodation and subsistence at 2 international conferences, the total sum of which is £750.

Other Costs

These will be funded for the hosting of a website and linked twitter account and registration fees for attendance at two conferences, the total cost of which will be £160.

Year 3

In Year 3 the total research expenses requested are [REDACTED].

Travel Costs

Research expenses will be used to provide travel, accommodation and subsistence for 2 keynote speakers at a 2-day conference organized by the Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Manchester, the cost of which will be £950.

Other Costs

Research expenses will also be used to cover venue hire, catering and evening meal (for Postdoctoral Fellow and 2 keynotes) for the 2-day conference at the University of Manchester and the cost of hosting of a website and linked twitter account. Overall total of other costs for year 3 is £1,795.

Please note that Research Expenses have been allocated to the Quota for each

year to allow for flights, accommodation and early bird registration fees for conferences etc to be booked in advance to secure the cheapest option.

Please give full detail to explain the financial summary in the table above. Specifically, please indicate the Postdoctoral Fellow's starting salary and increment date. Please give the name of the mentor and cost of mentoring (expected to be equal to 36 hours of time, 1 hour per month for the 36 months of the award) - note that the mentor's salary does not need to be stated as this counts as 'other directly allocated costs'. Please also give details of the research expenses requested, broken down by year, including information about the types of purpose for which the research expenses will be used, e.g. travel and maintenance, project planning and development costs, travel to conferences, organisation of workshops, consumables and specialist software, cost of interpreters in the field etc.

6. Equal Opportunities

Gender

Please indicate your gender:

Age

Please indicate which age group you are in:

Date of Birth

Please state your date of birth:

Ethnic Origin

Please state your ethnic origin:

Disabilities

The Disability Discrimination Act defines disability as *"A physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term effect on the person's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities"*. If this applies, please specify the nature of the disability:

7. Head of Department Statement

HOD Statement of Support

Please upload your statement of support for the applicant here.

File name	Date uploaded
<u>HoD%20statement%20Mitchell.docx</u>	09/03/2018 14:35:30

The Epistemology of Emotional Experience

Published in *dialectica* 71 (1), March 2017, 57-84

Jonathan MITCHELL¹

ABSTRACT

This article responds to two arguments against “Epistemic Perceptualism”, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience (Section 1), and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and *prima facie* vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View (Section 2). It then challenges two arguments which purport to show that emotional experience is not a source of reasons for evaluative belief (Sections 3, 4 and 5). The first argument claims that because normative why-questions are always appropriate in the case of emotions, then emotions can never be conclusive reasons for corresponding evaluative beliefs. The second purports to show that appeal to emotional experience as a source of reasons for evaluative beliefs renders emotions problematically self-justifying, and since emotions cannot be (even provisionally) self-justifying, they cannot provide any sort of reason for corresponding evaluative beliefs. This article responds to these arguments, and in doing so shows there is still much to be learned about the epistemology of emotional experience by drawing analogies with perceptual experience.

Recent work in philosophy of emotion has cast doubt on whether emotions can justify, in the sense of providing reasons for, corresponding evaluative beliefs. Much of this scepticism has been channeled through criticism of perceptual views, according to which emotional experience involves something like a perception of value (e.g. fear involves a perceptual experience as of something dangerous). The putative analogy between emotional and perceptual experience seems to provide one way of defending a justificatory role for emotions, since sense-perceptual experience is often taken to constitute reasons, and so justification, for corresponding empirical beliefs.²

This article responds to two arguments against “Epistemic Perceptualism”, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief.³ The first claims that because normative why-questions are always appropriate for emotional experience this

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² For some defenders of the perceptual view with an epistemological emphasis, see Johnston 2001; Deonna 2006; Poellner 2007; 2016; Tappolet 2000; 2012; Döring 2007; 2014; Pelsner 2014; Wringe 2015. For criticism of the perceptual view along epistemic lines see Goldie 2004; Brady 2010; 2011; Salmela 2011; Deonna and Teroni 2012. For a detailed survey of the perceptual view, along with some recent criticisms of it, see Döring and Lutz 2015.

³ For this label see Cowan 2016, see Section 2 for clarification of this view.

highlights a disanalogy between the epistemological roles of emotions and sense perceptions, such that emotions can never be conclusive reasons for corresponding evaluative beliefs. The second purports to show that appeal to emotional experience as a source of reasons for evaluative beliefs renders emotions problematically self-justifying, and since emotions cannot be (even provisionally) self-justifying we should give up the claim that emotions can be any sort of reason for corresponding evaluative beliefs (Brady 2010; 2011).

My aim is therefore primarily defensive and explicative; responding to arguments which purport to show that Epistemic Perceptualism is not a live option. Section 1 provides a basic account of emotional experience. Section 2 introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and *prima facie* vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View (Section 2). Section 3 then considers the above arguments, with Sections 4 and 5 responding to them. Section 4 argues there are emotions for which normative why-questions are inappropriate, and explains how considerations relating to the opacity of emotions and defeating situations accounts for the prevalence of such questions. Section 5 then argues that a more nuanced understanding of emotional experience, as involving a kind of content externalism, and relatedly an awareness of epistemic appropriateness, can meet the challenge set by the second, “auto-justification” argument.

1. A Basic Account

It is commonplace to think emotions typically involve (1) a first-personal qualitative character and (2) an object at which they are directed, and so some form of intentional or representational content. For example, as the subject of anger I typically experience a feeling of disapproval along with certain bodily sensations, such as muscle tensing and increased heart rate – there is something it feels like to experience anger – and moreover, there is usually something I am angry about; for example, the inconsiderate individual who just barged into me.⁴ However, emotions are not states that assail us *ex nihilo*. Rather, often this affective phenomenology is (3) experienced as caused by – as an apparent effect of – the object it is directed towards. In certain cases, the actual cause of the emotion and its object can come apart, although this typically does not show up in the emotional episode, yet it might in reflective judgements about what caused the emotion. In this sense, what matters for the basic account is apparent, experienced, intentional causality. We should add that (4) emotional experience is typically pre-reflective, since although I can reflect on my emotions, reflection is not an essential part of

⁴ See Deonna and Teroni 2012.

emotional experience.⁵ Relatedly, the discussion in what follows pertains to occurrent emotions, understood as emotions consciously experienced by individuals at particular times, rather than emotional or affective dispositions, or long-lasting emotional states.⁶

Moreover, there is a close connection between emotions and values, in that emotions (minimally) seem to involve (5) evaluative appraisals of their objects. For example, admiration involves an appraisal of its object as of value, as admirable; likewise disgust involves an appraisal of its object as of disvalue, as disgusting.⁷ In this sense the priority thesis – the view that emotions are reactions to temporally prior evaluations – is a misunderstanding of the way evaluative appraisals are part of emotional experience.⁸ Relatedly, the values that typically figure in the appraisals characteristic of emotional experience are thick (determinate) values, such as the disgusting, fearsome, admirable, and sublime, rather than thin (determinable) values such as the good, bad, or (dis)valuable.⁹

2. Epistemological Clarifications and the PJV

Given this account, could emotional experience provide us with reasons for holding evaluative beliefs about their objects? For example, could my disgust at a scene of public execution – my felt evaluative appraisal of the public execution as of determinate disvalue – provide me with reasons, and so justification, for the evaluative belief, “this execution is disgusting”? Before presenting a version of the perceptual view which offers an affirmative answer, and in doing so modifies the evaluative dimension of the basic account, a number of issues relevant to the epistemology of emotions need clarifying.

First, we need some conception of a reason. As T. M Scanlon (1998, 17) puts it, a reason is “a consideration that counts in favour of something”. So, in the case of a reason for belief, what is required is a consideration in the light of which someone would be rationally justified in holding the belief. Given this, we might think two requirements are necessary for a subject to have a reason for belief; (1) an awareness or recognition on the part of the subject of what her reasons for belief are, and in virtue of this (2) the subject having been in a prior mental state apt to make available some such reason.¹⁰ (1) and (2) are necessary insofar as reason-giving explanations are, as Bill Brewer (1999, 165) puts it, “explanations of certain transitions which a person makes in thought”, and as such they must be rule-

⁵ The term pre-reflective is intended to distinguish between emotional experience as lived through, and emotional experience as reflected upon. See Marcel and Lambie 2002.

⁶ See Lyons 1980: 53-7.

⁷ This is not to claim there is always a one-to-one relation between emotion-types and evaluative properties. For the purposes of this article I overlook this complication (for discussion see Mulligan 1998).

⁸ See Teroni 2007 (cf. Mulligan 2007; 2010).

⁹ There are other basic features of emotional experience which are sometimes highlighted but which do not concern me here (on valence see Section 4 and 5).

¹⁰ These conditions are typically thought of as epistemically “internalist” (cf. Burge 2003).

governed. Yet, to speak of a person's reasons as their reasons for belief, as the kind of things which they could cite to rationally justify holding the relevant belief, what is required is an awareness of oneself as being guided, in making the transition, by the relevant reasons; so, not merely following a rule, but a self-awareness of being guided by what one takes to be normative reasons.¹¹

The prior mental state in question, which might serve as, or make available, a reason for evaluative belief, is an emotional experience. We are asking whether an emotional experience can ever be a consideration in favour of holding the corresponding evaluative belief, where the subject is aware that her emotional experience (or some part of it) is that in the light of which it would be the right thing to do to hold the belief.¹²

Second, at least in the basic case, we should not think emotional experience involves, even if only in part, an evaluative belief or judgement (cf. Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 1976).¹³ The rationale for this claim comes partly from cases of emotional recalcitrance, which show that an emotional episode can persist even when it directly contradicts the content of a (conscious) belief held simultaneously; much like typical perceptual illusions, the emotion persists even after one has been appraised of the relevant fact, and sincerely holds the relevant belief (e.g. the stick is *not* bent, the spider is *not* dangerous). If emotional experiences were constituted, at least in part, by evaluative beliefs or judgements then emotional recalcitrance would be structurally identical to holding logically contradictory propositional contents, e.g. "the spider is dangerous and it is not the case that the spider is dangerous". Yet, there seems to be a difference between the kind, or severity, of conflict when someone is entertaining directly conflicting beliefs or judgements, and when someone's emotions are not in line with their sincerely avowed better judgement.¹⁴ So, we do best to think of emotional experience as not typically involving evaluative beliefs or judgements.

On the basis of the above, can emotional experience, which is not constituted by evaluative belief, ever be a source of reasons for evaluative belief? Answering in the affirmative suggests the following view:

Justificatory View (hereafter JV): an emotional response to O (where O is the object of the emotional experience) is a reason to believe that O is E (where E is a determinate evaluative property).

¹¹ See McDowell 2011, 17; 2013a: 149. By providing reason-giving explanations in this sense it is sometimes said the subject is in the logical space of reasons – of justifying and being able to justify what they say (see Sellars 1997, §36).

¹² This view of what can serve as a reason for belief overlooks complications, however for the purposes of this article it is all that is required. For some problems with experiences serving as reasons for belief in this way see Burge 2003; Ginsborg 2006; Roessler 2009.

¹³ This is not to deny there can be belief-based emotions, but to stress these are not the basic cases.

¹⁴ For further discussion, see Tappolet 2012; Helm 2001; Brady 2007; Döring 2014.

The JV would say my aesthetic admiration for a painting, which (minimally) involves a felt evaluative appraisal of it (its being admirable), is a reason for me holding the evaluative belief “this painting is admirable”.

However, we need to understand how the rational transition to evaluative belief works. Here an analogy between emotional and sense-perceptual experience can be drawn. Typically sense-perceptual experiences are taken to provide reasons for holding the relevant empirical beliefs non-inferentially: in paradigmatic sense-perceptual experience there need be no epistemic intermediary between a subject’s having the experience and their being in a position to assent to the corresponding empirical belief.¹⁵ These beliefs are, as Marie McGinn (2011, 1) puts it, ones we are in a position to make straight off: there is no reasoning required on the part of the subject, and no antecedent belief on the basis of which I would need to make an inference, to be in a position to state the belief. Note, the claim about non-inferentiality is not merely a phenomenological one, that it just happens to be the case that we typically take such experiences as reasons for empirical beliefs in this way, but that there is a significant epistemic connection – a non-inferential one – between sense-perceptual experience and *justified* empirical belief. Given this, it is often claimed sense-perceptual experience is an epistemically direct representation or presentation of its object.¹⁶ For example, my visual experience of this table in front of me as red and rectangular is a direct perceptual (re)presentation of it, on the basis of which I would be (non-inferentially) justified in believing the proposition “this table is red and rectangular”.

Adam Pelser (2014, 114) claims the same characteristics for emotions; “the reason some emotion-based beliefs are justified is, plausibly, that emotions are direct experiences (perceptions) of thick, particular values...and that, as such, emotions function as justifying reasons for corresponding evaluative beliefs”.¹⁷ We can expand on this by saying it is on the basis of the claim that emotional experience is a direct perceptual (re)presentation of value – emotions (re)present their objects as being a determinate evaluative way – that they can constitute reasons for non-inferentially formed *justified* evaluative beliefs. It is claimed emotional experience can play this epistemic role, and so a perceptualist

¹⁵ For the view that lack of inferential structure suggests that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual see Crane 1992.

¹⁶ I include the disjunction to signal that nothing in this article turns on whether one is committed to direct representationalism or naïve realism about perceptual experiences or emotional experiences. I signal this by using (re) before each instance of presentation. For some of the challenges faced by representationalism in emotion theory see L. Schroeter, F. Schroeter and K. Jones 2015.

¹⁷ See also Johnston 2001; Döring 2007; 2014. This overlooks a complication, since one might ask what the perceptualist should say about those cases where the object of the emotion is *not* perceptually present (e.g. fear about a doctor’s appointment I have booked for the following day). See Poellner 2016, 1-2, and 23, fn. 18, for discussion of such “derivative” cases in a way sympathetic to the perceptual model.

version of the JV can be offered, once we see that emotions (re)present evaluative properties in a way analogous to how sense-perceptual experience (re)presents empirical properties. Rephrased with this perceptualist gloss we get the following view:

Perceptualist Justificatory View (hereafter PJV): an emotional response to O (where O is the object of the emotional experience), given it involves an epistemically direct (re)presentation of O as E (where E is a determinate evaluative property), is a reason to believe that O is E.¹⁸

However, there is ambiguity. The PJV does not make explicit whether the reason for belief provided by (perceptual) emotional experience is always *prima facie* – only providing provisional justification – or *ultima facie* – providing sufficient justification (what I call conclusive reasons). If it was the latter then the belief would not be merely provisionally well-grounded, but at present undefeated, and so in need of no further support.¹⁹ Epistemic Perceptualism, as Robert Cowan (2016) frames it, claims emotional experience only provides non-inferential *prima facie* warrant for evaluative beliefs; this is the most prevalent view in the literature (Elgin 2008; Döring 2007; Pelser 2014). The motivation for similar views in philosophy of perception stems from a claim about the fallibility of the capacities involved, since solely on the basis of what is given in sense-perceptual experience we cannot rule out the possibility of falsehood; we might, and sometimes do, turn out to be wrong in our perceptual beliefs. By extension, it is claimed even absent defeating conditions – in situations where a perceptual capacity provides us with knowledge (sufficient justification) – we could only ever take ourselves, “from the inside”, to have *prima facie* warrant. This is because of the supposed soundness of the highest common factor argument. This argument tells us that the grounds we possess for perceptual belief can only be what is shared by both non-deceptive and subjectively indistinguishable deceptive perceptual experiences, and since the deceptive cases seem to provide us with such conclusive reasons but do not, then we only ever possess *prima facie* warrant for belief on the basis of what is given in experience. Even in so called good cases we cannot, “from the inside”, rule out that we are in one of the bad cases.

Should Epistemic Perceptualism, as framed through the PJV, adopt this caveat and say the reasons emotional experience provides are only ever *prima facie*? We might think it should, since if we can imagine deceptive emotional experiences which are subjectively indistinguishable from non-deceptive

¹⁸ Note, the perceptualist gloss on the JV is only one way of attempting to vindicate an epistemological role for emotional experience. Although for reasons highlighted evaluative judgement theories should be avoided, Deonna and Teroni’s attitudinal theory preserves a positive epistemological role for emotional experience (see Deonna and Teroni 2012). But see Section 5 for some worries about this view.

¹⁹ See Senor 1996 on the distinction.

cases, then the highest common factor argument also applies to emotional experience.²⁰ However, such highest common factor arguments have been resisted in philosophy of perception, most prominently by John McDowell (McDowell 2013b; Soteriou 2016, 135f): McDowell defends a form of epistemological disjunctivism according to which, in “good cases”, sense-perceptual experience provides conclusive reasons, and so sufficient justification, for perceptual beliefs about our environment.

Here is not the place to adjudicate between competing positions in philosophy of perception, but which of the above views of perceptual justification should the PJV opt for? Aligning the PJV with McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism is more ambitious, since if transposed correctly (and if it turns out to be the most plausible view of perceptual justification), we could claim that in the “good cases” emotional experience provides conclusive reasons for evaluative belief. In that sense, emotional perception would be a (fallible) capacity for evaluative knowledge. However, while it is worth bearing both views in mind throughout this article, the PJV need not choose, since the two arguments considered target both the claim that emotional experience provides conclusive reasons and/or *prima facie* reasons for evaluative belief. In this sense, the first move for Epistemic Perceptualism as considered here is a defensive one of responding to arguments which purport to show that the PJV is not a live option under either view of perceptual justification.²¹

3. Objections to the PJV

Michael Brady (2010; 2011) argues against the PJV, claiming that emotional experience, understood along perceptualist lines, does not provide reasons, either conclusive or *prima facie*, for evaluative belief (see also Deonna and Teroni 2012, 69). Brady’s arguments attempt to sever the link between the epistemology of sense perception and putative emotional perception of value. As we saw, the PJV trades off a well-established model of the connection between sense-perceptual experience and reasons for empirical belief; a model we are then invited to apply to emotional experience given certain putative similarities.

The arguments Brady puts forward are as follows: (1) Normative why-questions are always appropriate in the case of an emotional experience but are not in sense-perceptual experience. This

²⁰ As we shall see in Section 5 it is plausible to think emotional experience involves what Cowan (2016, 63) calls a “robust phenomenology”, in that “it both makes it seem to the subject that P and makes it seem to them as if the experience makes them aware of a truth-maker for P” (see also Chudnoff 2013).

²¹ Brady (2013, 81-2) claims that since emotional experiences are not the only sources of evaluative belief, then a key motivation for this kind of epistemological disjunctivism in the sense perceptual case – namely the sceptical problem of what other than perceptual experiences could provide us with knowledge about our environment – does not carry over for emotional experience. In other words, emotional experiences do not seem to be epistemically indispensable for evaluative knowledge in the way sense perceptual experience might be for empirical knowledge. For criticism of this claim see Cowan 2016.

arguably shows that emotional experiences can *never* be conclusive reasons for evaluative belief. (2) Appeal to emotional experience as a source of reasons for belief renders emotions problematically self-justifying, and since emotions cannot (even provisionally) justify themselves, we should give up the claim that emotions can be any sort of reason for corresponding evaluative beliefs.

Taking (1) first, consider a standard sense-perceptual experience. For example, say I was in the park looking at an oak tree in my field of vision. It would normally be inappropriate, and perhaps even nonsensical, for someone to ask “why do you see that as a tree”, except if they were in search of an empirical story about neurophysiology and physical objects. In this sense, normative why-questions, where what we are questioning is the justifying role of our experiences, seem surplus to requirements in sense-perceptual experience. However, Brady claims in the case of emotional experience, it always makes sense to ask questions of the kind “why are you afraid of that dog” or “why are you in awe of that painting”. This suggests the epistemological roles of sense-perceptual experience and emotional experience are not analogous, as we require reasons for the response in the case of the latter in a way we typically do not in the former, which supposedly shows that emotional experience cannot be a conclusive reason for evaluative belief.

Moving on to (2), Brady claims that even appealing to emotional experience as a source of *prima facie* reasons for belief renders emotions problematically self-justifying. To explain why he draws on neo-sentimentalism (hereafter S-theories): a view in meta-ethics which specifies what is involved in being a competent user of evaluative concepts (Wiggins 1987; McDowell 1985; D’Arms and Jacobson 2005).²² According to S-theories the use of evaluative concepts (e.g. dangerous) should be understood as making a necessary reference to the merit of a specific emotional response to the evaluatively predicated object. So, to judge that O is E is, in part, to judge that it is appropriate to feel A (a specific emotion) in response to O. For example, to judge that rabid dogs are dangerous, and so correctly apply the concept dangerous to rabid dogs, is (in part) to say it is appropriate to feel fear in response to rabid dogs (see McDowell 1998, 221).

Brady (2010, 123) argues that if this view of evaluative concepts, and their application in propositional attitudes like beliefs and judgements, is correct, then emotional experiences cannot be reasons of any kind for evaluative beliefs:

My fear of the dog, for instance, cannot be a reason to judge that the dog is dangerous, for then my fear would be a reason to judge that fear in these circumstances is appropriate or merited or fitting – and we have good reason to doubt that fear can justify itself in this way. The very fact that I am afraid of the dog cannot, by itself, be evidence that it is fitting or appropriate to be afraid of the dog.

²² For a critique of certain aspects of sentimentalist views see Tappolet 2011.

The problem is that if I am entitled to cite emotional experience as a reason for evaluative belief, then it seems experiencing fear gives me a reason to believe (although not a conclusive one) that fear is appropriate; such that experiencing fear – awareness of fear – becomes identical to an awareness that fear is appropriate. We might put this by saying appropriateness cannot be part of the emotional experience, but requires a judgement about it. Whether or not my fear is appropriate is a normative why-question that cannot be even provisionally answered by appealing to fear without begging the question.

If these arguments are sound, we have grounds for scepticism about the epistemic role of emotional experience presented at the end of Section 2. What follows in Sections 4 and 5 provides reasons for resisting them.

4. Normative Why-Questions

(a) Are normative why-questions always appropriate?

First, we might ask whether normative why-questions are always warranted in the case of emotional experience. For example, say I see the bereaved crying at a funeral, which constitutes, given certain other conditions, an emotional expression. It seems the mere fact that someone expresses (or in certain contexts might report) an emotion does not necessitate such questioning. Second, and more importantly, are such questions always appropriate? Consider again the bereaved at the funeral. We might think in such a situation asking a normative why-question would be inappropriate, where the question takes the form “why are you sad about X dying”. Moreover, this does not seem just a case of arbitrary social convention (e.g. don’t ask such questions at funerals); such a convention might be in play, but the convention seems to partly stem from the way certain kinds of emotions independently render such lines of questioning inappropriate.

Nevertheless, we need to say more about such cases. It could be that what is doing the work in blocking the appropriateness of a normative why-question here is the context rather than the emotion. Let’s assume after the funeral the bereaved takes a walk, and stumbles across an acquaintance who has no knowledge of the bereavement. The acquaintance, seeing that the bereaved is upset, asks “why are you sad”, and in this different context the question seems appropriate; the sadness seems to be subject to a question of justification.²³ However, when posed in this way we do not have a clear example of a normative why-question of the kind Brady highlights, for example “why are you afraid of that dog”, but rather a request for information about the object or event one is sad about. In contrast to the funeral which, in virtue of context, provides the answer to this question, what is required “out of context” is the

²³ I owe this example to an anonymous referee.

relevant intentional information, rather than justification. If, after specifying the object, our acquaintance then asked the bereaved, “why are you sad about X dying”, then again, we seem to have a case where the normative why-question would be inappropriate. This conclusion is supported by the related idea that in such cases, if the acquaintance had no evidence for thinking the emotional expression insincere (e.g. “wait a minute, didn’t they despise that relative”), then it seems they could be credited with an (albeit fairly commonplace) emotional understanding by not asking the question on the grounds that they know it to be inappropriate.²⁴

Perhaps part of the explanation for this case – where a normative why-question is inappropriate or at any rate unnecessary – is that it is difficult to imagine what further justificatory reason could be given by the emotional subject; they would most likely just provide a verbalized re-statement of what the emotional expression contained anyway, e.g. “because it’s sad”. If the facts of the case are true (the relative is dead) and the emotion is sincere (it is a genuine loss for them), then it is difficult to see what would further satisfy the normative why-question, “why are you sad about X dying”. One needs to be careful though, since the question is not inappropriate because the emotion is not the kind of thing to which justificatory predicates can be applied; say in the way no one would likely think it appropriate to ask a normative why-question about a physical pain they could see you were undergoing (“why are you in pain with that drill in your tooth”). Rather, in the case under consideration, the emotion’s expression or report seems to block the appropriateness of the normative why-question, in that the question of justification comes “pre-answered”. In other words, the emotion shows up for us, in the individual’s emotional expression, and in knowledge of the context, as sufficiently justified.

However, it might be objected that the reason we think it inappropriate to ask a normative why-question in such a case is because we know independently that the death of a close relative (usually) is a bad thing. So, it would not be anything about the emotional experience that was doing the justificatory work, but rather that independent evaluative knowledge. Yet, is this a fair description of what happens in the case under consideration? Do we see the bereaved is upset and think it inappropriate to ask a normative why-question, not because of anything about the emotion, but because of some independent evaluative knowledge we possess? Note, in such cases it does not seem correct that we have on the one hand awareness of an epistemically neutral emotional expression – say, crying indicative of sadness – and on the other knowledge of an impersonal evaluative fact, namely that “the death of a close relative (usually) is a bad thing”. Rather, even if there is some tacit evaluative knowledge in play,

²⁴ It is an interesting question whether there are other cases of emotions like these. Perhaps “being happy about passing your driving test”, or “being happy about a job promotion”. Note though, Brady says emotions are *never* conclusive reasons for evaluative belief, so all that is required to show this is not the case is one counter-example.

Jonathan Mitchell - second-stage PDF example of written work

the emotion seems to be (partly) expressive of a personally-indexed version of it, that “the death of Mary is bad for Jane”; the death of a close relative is a genuine loss *for them*. In this sense, it is not some separate or independent impersonal evaluative knowledge that makes the normative why-question inappropriate, but our awareness of a personal evaluative fact of which the emotion is partly expressive. That it is a genuine loss for them can hardly be divorced, at least in the first instance, from the emotion which is constitutive of their sense of loss.

In light of this, it might be maintained that what is doing the work in blocking the appropriateness of the normative why-question is tacit agreement about the epistemic status of the emotion – we all just accept it to be sufficiently justified. Of course, explaining the source of any such agreement (e.g. in evolutionary biological terms) would be a complex undertaking, but it seems an undeniable fact about this emotion that it has this feature; sadness or grief about a recent close bereavement is just the kind of emotion for which a normative why-question seems inappropriate, or at any rate unnecessary. Cain Todd (2014, 101-2) suggests a similar kind of explanation:

‘[C]onstruing the death of loved ones as a loss to which sadness is the warranted response may be so hardwired and universal, so immune to our ability to control it, that any failure to feel sadness, or any tendency to have another emotional response, will normally be explained...in terms of certain abnormal conditions. Abnormal conditions in such cases will just be any conditions that are appealed to in order to explain departures from the norm, and the norms just will be taken to be something like ‘all’ or ‘most’ human beings.

However, it should be clear not all emotions are like this, indeed most are not. For example, in a straightforward modification of the example, if we were at a funeral and saw the bereaved was buoyant during the service, we may think it appropriate to ask “why are you happy about X dying”. So, normative why-questions about emotions can and do arise. Therefore, even given the above, Brady is right to highlight that they are a feature in the epistemology of our emotional lives in a way they are not in ordinary sense-perception. Nevertheless, if we countenance the above case then it is no longer correct to say, as Brady does, that normative why-questions are *always* appropriate, even if we think they are in most cases. If this is right then it is also no longer correct to say emotional experiences can *never* be conclusive reasons for evaluative belief on the basis of that false antecedent.

What is now required is a different explanation of the prevalence of normative why-questions for emotions, yet one which does not advert to the claim that the reason such questions are a prevalent feature of their epistemology is because emotional experience can never be a source of conclusive reasons for evaluative belief. In what follows I argue that a set of considerations, which are epistemically

relevant to the justification of emotions, can explain this feature while allowing for so-called “good cases”.

In the following sub-sections my argument runs as follows. I first contrast reflexive and non-reflexive emotions, suggesting reflexive emotions have a specific kind of opacity. I then claim all emotions have a more generic opacity due to their valenced phenomenology. Both *reflexive opacity* and *valenced opacity* are said to extend the range of possible defeating situations in different ways, which accounts for the prevalence of normative why-questions for emotions. However, the prevalence of such questions due to the existence of a greater range of defeating situations does not, by itself, warrant the conclusion that emotional experience can never be a source of conclusive reasons. That is to say, it does not undermine the possibility of “good cases” – like in the example above – where for all we know, there are at present no defeaters.

(b) Opacity, reflexive and non-reflexive emotions

It is fairly well accepted that sense-perceptual experience is transparent: if asked to describe the content of a sense-perceptual experience we would just describe (apparent) features of the object of that experience. If asked to describe a sense-perceptual experience of seeing a red ball I would describe the redness as a feature of the ball, not as a feature of the experience; my experience is not *red*, but is *of* something that is red. As Micheal Tye (2008, 46) puts it, “when you try to attend to it, you “see” right through it, as it were, to the things and qualities outside that it represents”.²⁵ Further reflection motivates the conclusion that the subject of the experience does not, at least in successful and paradigmatic cases, figure in an accurate description of the experience. This might partly explain how normative why-questions can become apt in sense-perceptual experience when we have reason to doubt the presence of full transparency; when we have reason to think the subject’s perspective is having a distorting influence, potentially undermining veridicality.

But consider first, the way a certain class of reflexive (self-referential) emotional experiences are not transparent in this way. For example, in experiencing paradigmatic fear we are not just aware of a particular object as dangerous, but also of ourselves as threatened. Likewise, in certain kinds of material envy, we are not just aware of a particular object as worthy of possession, typically one which someone else has, but also of ourselves as lacking possession of that object. Accurate descriptions of reflexive emotions, since they presuppose an apprehension of self, involve a reference to the self-interest and

²⁵ See also Harman 1990. There is a distinction between “strong” and “weak” versions of the transparency thesis. The “weak” version claims an accurate description of the content of a perceptual experience would *mostly* describe apparent features of the object; the “strong” version claims such descriptions would be exclusively couched in terms of apparent features of the object, such that no non-object involving aspects of the experience would be referenced (see Kind 2003).

self-concern of the subject. More specifically, the subject's evaluative standing is at the forefront of the evaluative aspect of the experience, e.g. myself as threatened, myself as lacking X. As we shall see in what follows, this reference to self-concern has an important role to play in the epistemic context. Note, my claim is about the way evaluative self-concern figures in reflexive emotional experience "at the forefront". It is not equivalent to the claim that (perhaps all) emotions are in some way dependent on certain prior evaluative background conditions such as beliefs, motivations, cultural norms, character traits, etc. – what Cain Todd (2016, 97) calls "subjective evaluative conditions".

In the case of reflexive emotions, it is implausible there are, at least in typical cases, two distinct moments or perceptions. For example, in the case of fear, it seems implausible to think there is both a representation of an object as dangerous, and then a (temporally) distinct "objectifying" representation of myself as threatened, such that I might have to infer the former from the latter. In typical cases of fear, it seems phenomenologically incorrect to say I am aware of moving from a perception of danger to a perception of myself as in danger (or vice versa). Rather, it seems correct to say I often experience something as *dangerous for me*, such that in paradigmatic cases of fear the relevant intentional content approximates to *danger for me*.²⁶ Moreover, this avoids further worries which arise with a "double representation" view, such as how the same formal object (e.g. danger) can be appraised of two different material objects, both the object and myself. So, for the perceptualist at least, it seems right to say that in typical cases of reflexive emotions my self-concern is *embedded* in the intentional content of the emotional experience.²⁷

We might wonder how the "for me" component is revealed in the phenomenology of such emotions, and whether it can be explained in a way that does not embed the subject's self-concern in its intentional content. For example, consider Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni's (2012, 69) description of an episode of fear:

If you are to describe how it feels to be frightened by a spider, you would not do so in terms of the spider's qualities, but rather in terms of how it feels to experience a jolt up your spine, your hair standing on end, your teeth clenching, muscles freezing, heart jumping.

²⁶ Note, these considerations relate to the personal level of emotional experience; there might be a different story to be told about what happens at the sub-personal level. For a detailed examination of fear with sympathies for the perceptual view see Tappolet 2010.

²⁷ This aspect differs for some other, and often more complex, reflexive emotions. For example, the way my self-concern is embedded in the intentional content of a paradigmatic episode of fear, namely in the *dangerousness for me* of a typically externally present object, is different to the self-concern in the more complex reflexive emotions like embarrassment and shame. In the later cases, there is a distinctive kind of inward "self-objectification", which there typically is not in fear. I overlook such complications here, since what unifies the class of reflexive emotions more broadly is that the subject's self-concern is at the forefront, and this is as true of fear as it is of embarrassment, shame, or indeed guilt or pride.

At first glance it seems attractive to identify the “for me” component solely in terms of these somatic states. However, even in the case of a “hot” reflexive emotion like fear, the somatic state seems to be a reflection of my self-concern, rather than constituting it. In fact, in typical cases of fear the somatic state might be experienced as caused by a self-awareness which is already given in the intentional content; such that in fear I perceive an object as *dangerous for me*, and I experience this as causing the somatic state.²⁸ Further, it should be clear not all reflexive emotions are necessarily accompanied by such somatic states, for example conscious envy need not be accompanied by felt bodily qualia, but nevertheless involves an awareness of self-concern at its forefront. Indeed, they would not be the kinds of emotions they are without this kind of self-awareness. I label this *reflexive opacity*, to signal the specific way these kinds of emotions are not transparent.

Reflexive emotions can be contrasted with non-reflexive cases which, *prima facie*, might possess an analogous transparency to sense-perceptual experience, as they do not involve, or more accurately are not distinctly experienced by their subjects as having, the self-referential aspects of the above cases. For example, if I were to provide a description of my emotion of aesthetic admiration for a painting it is plausible that such self-referential aspects would *not* substantially figure in that report. Rather, typically the report would primarily consist of evaluatively relevant features of the object, for example the way the painting exhibits determinate beauty. Something similar might also be said of the non-reflexive emotion of empathy. In describing my empathy for a friend whom I saw to be suffering I might, in the first instance, just point to features of his situation as revealed in experience, e.g. that he is having a particularly bad time of it at the moment, such that my self-concern would not figure substantially in a report. Moreover, it is implausible to think these emotions are not transparent in virtue of involving somatic states, of the kind we considered above in the case of fear. As Peter Poellner (2016, 13) notes when considering admiration:

There may be somatic accompaniments, as when I feel my body opening up or relaxing, but it is hard to believe that I could not experience awe without something like these feelings...And even when I do have such bodily feelings, they seem to be effects of other components of the emotional experience, in particular, of the way the object is experienced anyway, without the putative contribution of those feelings.

²⁸ See Poellner 2016: 12 (see also Soldati 2008). Although see Prinz (2007, 56-60) who argues against the idea that the evaluative representation causes the somatic aspects.

However, although appealing, the view that at least non-reflexive emotions are transparent in the same way as paradigmatic sense-perceptual experience runs into a significant problem. Since even in the non-reflexive case there is a different kind of opacity in play, since emotions – on the perceptual model – involve what Goldie (2000, 58-83) calls “feelings towards”. Note, the issue here is not the alleged presence of a non-intentional somatic state, since such somatic states are not present, or at least not distinctly so, in at least some (“cool”) non-reflexive emotional experiences. Neither is it the presence of other subjective features of the experience; for example, awareness of expectations about features of the object that would come into view if I was to shift my physical location; expecting that if I was to look around the object I would see parts of it which I presently do not. Such expectations, if present at all, plausibly also feature in typical sense-perceptual experience (Siegel 2010, 175-82).

The problem is that in emotional experience (both reflexive and non-reflexive) there is always some kind of feeling of approval or disapproval in the uptake of the value content, and therefore the relevant kind of intentionality is, according to prominent versions of the perceptual model, affective intentionality (Döring 2007; 2014; Poellner 2007; 2016; Johnston 2001). This feeling of approval or disapproval is best described as a felt valenced attitude towards the particular object of the emotion which, although experienced as registering (as representing) the evaluative standing of that object, is neither presented in experience as a characteristic of the object, nor would a report of an emotional experience describe it as such. However, it is clearly an essential part of the phenomenal character of emotional experience, and is connected to that feature which is commonly characterized as *valence*. So, although in a description of the non-reflexive emotion of aesthetic admiration I might (mostly, perhaps sometimes exclusively) point to apparent evaluative features of the painting, I would also need to refer to my “feelings towards” the object. In other words, I would not just pick out value properties, but pick out those properties as experienced in terms of my felt valenced attitude (“approval”) toward the painting.

So, it seems for emotional experience, intentionality has an intrinsic link to a specifically *valenced* phenomenology, whereas in typical sense perceptual experience there is no valenced attitude of a “feeling towards” a “red and rectangular table” – it is right to say one does not necessarily approve or disapprove of anything in standard sense-perceptual experience. So, as Poellner (2016, 14) puts it, insofar as such valenced attitudes “are part of the phenomenal character of the emotion, that character therefore includes components that are not properties of the emotional target”.²⁹ If this is right, then all

²⁹ It might be objected that once spelled out in this way, the analogy between sense-perceptual experience and emotional experience seems weaker. While the presence of valenced attitudes in emotional experience is a central disanalogy with standard sense-perceptual experience, we need not assume that for the analogy to hold emotional perception of value has to be like standard sense-perception in every respect. Moreover, if there are types of perception, such as perceptions of universals or causal relations (see Siegel 2010), then they are likely to be certain

emotional experience is opaque in a different way to the opacity specific to reflexive emotions, the former opacity being intrinsically connected to its nature as a putative affective perception of value. I label this *valence opacity*, to signal the specific way emotional experience (at least on the perceptual model) is not transparent.

(c) *Normative why-questions and defeating situations*

This section explains why *reflexive opacity* and *valenced opacity* have a bearing on the epistemological standing of emotions, and how this has an impact on the prevalence of normative why-questions.

First, on *reflexive opacity*: I think because reflexive emotions lack the full transparency of (most) sense-perceptual experience, by involving self-concern at their forefront, they are more open to potentially distorting subjective factors in a way that significantly extends the range of possible defeating situations. For example, as discussed above, if fear involves an apprehension of an object as *dangerous for me*, then it involves an evaluative self-apprehension, such that one is taken to be in need of protection from the (apparent) danger. So, an awareness of a relation between the valued self and the object is part of the emotion – I specified this earlier as the claim that self-concern is embedded in the intentional content of the reflexive emotional experience. In virtue of this, there is an additional way fear, for example, can “get things wrong”. For I might not only misapprehend the evaluative qualities of the object of the emotion, its being dangerous or not, but also the potential danger the object poses to me, i.e. whether it can specifically do me harm.

We can explicate this point further by noting that meeting the satisfaction conditions for a reflexive emotion, where the evaluative content approximates to “X is dangerous for me”, requires getting right not only an objects’ evaluative standing, but one’s own evaluative standing in relation to it. For example, presumably one of the reasons a normative why-question concerning someone’s fear of a house spider is appropriate, is because while house spiders may well be dangerous for house flies, they are not usually dangerous for human beings, and so it seems the subject’s self-concern – perhaps relating to a certain pathology about spiders – is having a distorting effect on their ability to see this relation aright. In this sense, reflexive emotions – due to their specific kind of opacity – have a wider range of ways there might be mistakes, distortions, and deceptions, and as such the range of possible bad cases, or defeating situations, is more extensive than in (1) typical sense-perceptual experience and (2) non-reflexive emotions.

respects different from standard sense-perception of particulars, without therefore undermining the claim that they are kinds of perceptions, or at least analogous to them.

So, *reflexive opacity* has an epistemological impact, and we can see how this connects to, and explains, the prevalence of normative why-questions in these cases. Nevertheless, although we might be more sceptical about whether an emotional experience like fear, for example, can ever constitute a conclusive reason for evaluative belief, given the increased range of possible defeating situations, this does not license the conclusions that (1) reflexive emotions can *never* conclusively justify evaluative beliefs, and (2) all emotions lack the resources for such justification. A heuristic point is therefore worth bearing in mind. We do best not to take reflexive emotions as paradigmatic cases, and since Brady often appeals to fear, he moves too quickly from a specific disanalogy between sense-perceptual experience and reflexive emotional experiences (which involve *reflexive opacity*) to an alleged epistemological disanalogy in all cases.³⁰

However, as noted, there is a disanalogy between the intentional modes of sense-perceptual experience and emotional experience, with the latter being an affective kind of intentionality, and so involving *valenced opacity*. I think the presence of *valenced opacity* in emotional experience also has a role to play in explaining the prevalence of normative why-questions in the case of emotional experience.

Clearly, there is a sense in which due to involving a directed “feeling towards”, emotional experience is more complex than paradigmatic sense perceptual experience. We might put this by saying emotional experience involves at least one thing that standard sense-perceptual experience does not, namely felt attitudes of approval or disapproval. With this added dimension, there is the risk of additional ways things can go wrong, in other words, again a wider range of possible “bad cases” and defeating situations. In this sense, the prevalence of normative why-questions for emotional experience quite generally might be a reflection of this added complexity, of its involving a felt valenced attitude. Yet, as above, the possibility of more defeating situations does not, by itself, motivate moving from the prevalence of normative why-questions to the conclusion that emotional experience is *never* a conclusive reason for evaluative belief. Although it suggests such a thing is a rarer achievement in emotional experience than in standard sense-perceptual experience. In other words, there may be fewer good cases, and they may be harder to determine, but nonetheless the good cases still exist.³¹

Let me sum up the different strands of response to Brady’s first argument. First, I argued in sub-section (a) that we need not think normative why-questions are always appropriate, since there seem to

³⁰ This discussion points towards the broader point that we should not necessarily expect the epistemology of all types of emotions to be identical, in other words *not all emotions are created epistemologically equal*, since as we have seen the appropriateness of normative why-questions seems to have more traction in the case of reflexive emotions, specifically fear, than in other cases. For further discussion of this kind of disparity, see Todd 2014.

³¹ Adam Pelser (2014) develops a similar response to Brady, highlighting how the putative lack of trust we might have in certain emotions does not undermine their epistemic role in general (see also Poellner 2016, 20).

be cases where this claim is not true and the emotion shows up in experience as sufficiently justified. Secondly (b-c); one explanation for the prevalence of normative why-questions as a feature of our emotional lives is the various ways emotional experience, in being opaque in a reflexive and a valenced sense, extends the range of possible defeating situations – of so-called “bad cases”. This can be true without there being a disanalogy across all cases between the epistemic roles of sense-perceptual and emotional experience to the extent of there never being “good cases” for emotions – cases in which we currently possess conclusive (undefeated) warrant. In fact, section (a) seems to show that such cases can and do exist.

Nevertheless, a different explanation for the prevalence of normative why-questions for emotions is simply that emotional disagreement is more prevalent.³² However, we cannot leave it at that, since we need an explanation of this emotional disagreement. At least in the case of reflexive emotions, what has been said here provides one explanation of that phenomenon: in those emotions where self-concern is at the forefront, the range of possible defeating situations is extended along the vector of disagreement about whether or not we have misrepresented the relation between the emotional object and ourselves. In a more general way, the *valence opacity* of most emotional experience adds a complexity that is not present in sense-perceptual experience. And it is little more than a truism to say that when we increase complexity we should expect more possible defeating situations and, relatedly, more disagreement about those defeating situations and whether they do defeat the reasons in question.

5. Content Externalism and Epistemic Appropriateness

(a) Preliminaries

We are now in a position to consider Brady’s second argument against the PJV. He claims that if we appeal to emotional experience as a reason for evaluative belief then emotions become problematically self-justifying, and since emotions cannot (even provisionally) justify themselves we should give up the claim that emotions can be any sort of reason for corresponding evaluative beliefs.

A key component of Brady’s second argument is a version of S-theories about evaluative concepts. So, one might respond by rejecting S-theories. Yet, they arguably provide us with a plausible account of what it means to be a competent user of evaluative concepts. However, we can challenge Brady’s

³² This alternative was suggested by an anonymous referee. Another explanation might draw on the idea that values are higher-order properties, which are dependent on lower-order properties. Like other higher-order properties in perception that are dependent on lower-order properties, e.g. seeing a smile as malicious on the basis of certain facial features, it makes sense in those cases to ask a normative why-question, like “why do you see that smile as malicious”. This is because, as Poellner (2016, 20) puts it “we are [or can be] in doubt whether some of the relevant lower-level properties really are instantiated and, therefore whether the experience is veridical”. This is plausible, and suggests there may be various complementary explanations for the prevalence of normative why-questions with regard to emotions.

argument, and its reliance on S-theories, by noting the way they only give us part of the story when it comes to the notion of appropriateness. In what follows, I argue a certain kind of epistemic appropriateness can be part of an emotional experience, such that it is a mistake to think appropriateness is never part of the experience but always requires a judgement about it. However, seeing how requires a more detailed understanding of emotional experience and its evaluative content than has been given so far.

Sabine Döring (2014, 133) makes suggestive comments on this issue, claiming we can distinguish between an evaluative judgement like X is dangerous, which is assessable as true or false because “its content is regarded as true by the subject” and an emotional experience, the evaluative content of which is a non-propositional construal involving an appearance of truth; “it seems the gorilla is *in fact* fearsome, whether or not he would *affirm* the truth of his emotion’s content in judgement”. So, Döring claims emotional experience, in terms of its evaluative (re)presentational content, does involve some kind of awareness of epistemic appropriateness, which should be understood in terms of its putting “forward this content as true”.³³ This way of thinking about the evaluative content of emotional experience is significant because of the analogy with sense-perception, since sense-perceptual experience involves, in its default mode, an appearance of truth, or actuality, of its (re)presented objects (McDowell, 1998). However, these comments are primarily suggestive – in what follows I spell them out.

(b) *Content externalism*

It should be kept in mind that the representational evaluative content of emotional experience has, at the basic level, mind-to-world direction of fit.³⁴ We can gloss this by saying that emotions (re)present their objects as independently being a certain evaluative way. Therefore, the evaluative contents of those experiences are, at the phenomenological level, external; or as McDowell (2013a, 147) puts it in the sense-perceptual case, such experiences bring an “environmental [in our case evaluative] reality into view”. Hence it is at best imprecise to say that the fact I was afraid of the dog constitutes a reason for the evaluative belief that it is dangerous. This could be taken as just referencing some subjective internal psychological state I am undergoing as an explanation of my holding the evaluative belief, and when framed in this way Brady’s second argument seems compelling. That I am in a certain state, namely fear – so understood – does not seem like the kind of thing that could provide any kind of justification for the evaluative belief that something is dangerous. Yet, what might provide a *prima facie*

³³ Tappolet (2011, 130) also gestures towards this kind of epistemic understanding of appropriateness in her characterization of what she calls “epistemic neo-sentimentalism”.

³⁴ See Searle 1983 on directions of fit.

reason is an experience of the object of one's fear as being a certain evaluative way, as (apparently) dangerous, which (re)presents an external evaluative-environmental reality.³⁵

Further reflection on this point yields the following view. It is plausible that for an evaluative property to be experienced as qualifying the particular object of an emotion, the emotion must necessarily (re)present its objects' evaluative standing as independent of that particular experience of it. In this way a certain kind of content externalism implies phenomenal objectivity with regard to that evaluative standing, and this is necessary if at least some emotional experiences have value properties as part of their intentional content.³⁶ To make this clearer, consider that on this view having an emotional experience of aesthetic admiration, for example, which has as its object an (apparently) beautiful painting, can count as a case of being presented with an evaluative property, beauty, that seems to be, in McDowell's (1985, 213) way of putting it, "there anyway – independent of the experience".³⁷ This mirrors how in sense-perception "an experience of something as red can count as a case of being presented with a property that is there anyway – independent of the experience", and therefore as available for re-presentation as the same on different occasions by myself and others (given suitable conditions).

(c) Epistemic appropriateness and rational intelligibility

With this understanding of the evaluative content of emotional experience in place we can make clearer sense of how emotional experience can (*contra* Brady) involve an awareness of epistemic appropriateness, and can do so without becoming self-justifying. To see how, we need to make a distinction based on the above, and one not made by Brady or S-theories, between judged appropriateness and awareness of the epistemic appropriateness of one's emotional response. The former is claimed by S-theories to be involved in the competent use of evaluative concepts, which is brought into play when we hold propositional attitudes, like beliefs, about the objects of emotions. The latter is an awareness as of epistemic appropriateness which arguably can be present in emotional experience, such that an emotional response can be experienced as merited by, as epistemically appropriate to, the way its object brings a specific evaluative-environmental reality into view.

However, what is the exact form of this experience of epistemic appropriateness? It does not seem typical of emotional experiences that they have an awareness of their own appropriateness "tacked on", as an awareness – distinct from the emotion – which indicates that the emotion is justified (even if not

³⁵ See also Deonna and Teroni 2012, 101.

³⁶ See Poellner, 2007 for more on phenomenal objectivity.

³⁷ Todd (2012, 99-102) suggests that this "apparent objectivity" may differ for different types of emotions depending on the degree to which "SEC sensitive" factors (see fn.26) are present. - subjective evaluative conditions

conclusively). Rather, given what was said above, the object of the emotion is its particular object evaluatively qualified – as instantiating the relevant determinate evaluative property – *not* the emotion itself. So, we might wonder how it is that an awareness of epistemic appropriateness is a feature of emotions as a first-order mental phenomena, rather than something which requires a reflective judgement or attitude, separate from the emotional experience, which does take the emotion as its object.

Section 4 argued that emotional experience involves *valence opacity*, such that it is an essential part of the phenomenal character of emotional experience that there is an affective feeling of approval or disapproval which serves as an uptake of the value content. This was understood as a valenced attitude towards the object, which although experienced as registering (and so representing) the relevant value, is not presented in experience as a characteristic of the object. In fact, what is arguably given as epistemically appropriate in some emotional experiences, as a first-order mental phenomenon, is this valenced attitude, the felt approval or disapproval; since this valenced attitude is felt to be appropriate to – is experienced as an epistemically appropriate uptake of – the content-external (apparent) evaluative standing of the emotion's object. In Poellner's (2016, 6) characterization, the valenced attitude is experienced as "*intelligibly motivated by features of the object itself*".³⁸

The claim is not that all emotions necessarily involve an experience of their felt valenced attitude as epistemically appropriate to their object's evaluative standing in this way. Consider a certain type of arachnophobic whose felt disapproval (repulsion) towards a spider might not be experienced as merited by evaluative features of the object – as epistemically appropriate to it in this sense – but merely as habitually caused by it. What is partly characteristic of such cases is that the felt valenced attitude – and so the fear – is rationally unintelligible to the subject with respect to features of the object – hence we tend to describe them as emotional pathologies, and this is due to that feature of the experience. So, the claim is that awareness of the epistemic appropriateness of one's felt valenced attitude, to what are experienced as content-external evaluative properties of the emotion's object, is essential to those emotional experiences which are *intrinsically* rationally intelligible to us. Without experiencing the relevant value property, say danger, and in virtue of this experiencing one's felt disapproval as epistemically appropriate – as a merited uptake or registering of that value property – that fear would not be immediately rationally intelligible; it would lack what Mark Johnston (2001, 181-214) calls ready intelligibility.³⁹ In other words, my experience of fear would not make immediate sense to me without an awareness of the appropriateness of the valenced attitude of felt disapproval as a response to the

³⁸ Poellner, 2016 attributes a version of this view to Max Scheler, and Jean-Paul Sartre.

³⁹ There might be "truncated" emotional responses which do not fit this model, however all that is required for the view is that *intrinsically* rationally intelligible emotional experiences admit of this characterization.

(apparent) danger of the object.⁴⁰ Naturally, there might be different ways the emotional experience could *subsequently* be made intelligible; for example, I could later tell a certain explanatory story, giving evolutionary reasons for the emotion. But the experience would not intrinsically and immediately make sense to me if I lacked awareness of epistemic appropriateness as part of the emotional experience.

However, this seems incompatible with the claim, put forward by Deonna and Teroni (2012, 70), that emotions presuppose cognitive bases (i.e. judgements, perceptions etc.) of non-evaluative properties.⁴¹ They argue against a central part of the above view, claiming that values are not part of the intentional content of emotions; they say (2012, 84) “evaluative properties are not what the emotions are about: these properties generally do not figure in the content of the emotions”. Rather, they claim emotions are felt bodily attitudes towards a non-evaluative content provided by their cognitive bases. Nevertheless, they claim an emotion can be correct *iff* the object of the emotion – accessed via the cognitive base – instantiates the relevant evaluative property and the subject is aware of the relevant subtending non-evaluative properties as a content apt to justify it (e.g. the painting, the brush work, the hues of colour etc.). Given this, they argue (2012, 76-87) for a strong supervenience relation between the non-evaluative properties, which the cognitive base makes present in emotional experience, and the relevant evaluative property, such that the relevant conjunction of those properties constitutes that evaluative property.

Yet on this basis, it makes sense to say (*pace* Deonna and Teroni) that in cases where the supervenience relationship holds, and the subject exercises the relevant recognitional capacity regarding all the non-evaluative (subtending) properties, the values do figure in the content of the emotion. This is because the latter are supposed to be constituted by those non-evaluative properties. If we are aware, through the relevant cognitive base, of the relevant complex conjunction of subtending non-evaluative properties, then we are also necessarily aware of the relevant supervenient evaluative property, since the evaluative property just is, for Deonna and Teroni, constituted by that complex conjunction of subtending non-evaluative properties (see Dokic and Lemaire 2015, 276-81).⁴² Indeed, it is this awareness that – according to Deonna and Teroni – allows us to say the emotion is justified *iff* the relevant evaluative property is in fact present. So, for all intents and purposes, the evaluative standing of the object is what the emotional experience is *about*, and so evaluative properties do figure in their intentional content.

⁴⁰ See also Tappolet 2011, 125.

⁴¹ See also Mulligan 1998.

⁴² This view of the connection between the emotion and its cognitive base is what Cowan (2016) calls the “complex” view, as opposed to the “simple” view according to which emotions are mediated states.

However, in qualification of the above picture, it is implausible to think, in all cases, I need be distinctly aware of all these subtending non-evaluative properties on which the evaluative property (putatively) supervenes in all the required specificity. Rather, I can often be distinctly aware of the presence of a determinate evaluative property as qualifying a particular object, say the beauty of a painting or the sadness of a particular scene in a film, without a corresponding distinct awareness of the specific conjunction of subtending properties. In other words, the relevant “formal object” of many emotions seems to show up in experience as an awareness of the supervenient evaluative property, *not* the specific conjunction of subtending non-evaluative properties.⁴³ Indeed, in many cases discipline-specific theory (art criticism, film criticism) is partly a matter of highlighting the relevant subtending properties of which we did not previously possess a distinct awareness, but nonetheless we did have a distinct awareness of the relevant evaluative property. In any case, there is no obvious barrier to thinking emotions are, in some sense, dependent on their cognitive bases – that there are such non-evaluative features, perhaps sometimes detected by sub-personal information processing systems of the subject – *and* holding that in many cases it is the *evaluative* content of the emotional experience that is presented as the external content, rather than just non-evaluative features. Indeed, given what was said above, it needs to be presented in this way to account for the intrinsic rational intelligibility of many emotional experiences.

Arguably, the presence of a sense of epistemic appropriateness, as characterized above, can also account (at least in part) for the intrinsic rational intelligibility of the motivational component of many emotional experiences. In a good number of cases there is plausibly a relation of dependence between my emotion being experienced as epistemically appropriate to evaluative features of its object, on the basis of my felt valenced attitude, and in virtue of this the experience providing me with reasons for action. In those cases where the emotion includes a motivational component, it makes sense to say the intrinsic rational intelligibility of being motivated to do something, to take action – regardless of whether one does, there might be other, more stringent, reasons for not acting – is dependent on one’s felt valenced attitude first being experienced as epistemically appropriate to evaluative features of its object.⁴⁴

⁴³ Poellner 2016, 9, makes a similar point.

⁴⁴ On “action readiness” in emotions see Deonna and Teroni (2012, 79), see also Kovach and Lancey 2005; Döring 2007. Tappolet (2011, 123-125) appears to agree with the view just stated when she says “values give us reasons to act” (cf. Scanlon 1998). The considerations voiced here might go some of the way to meeting the explanatory challenge set by Schroeter *et al* (2015, 373) when they say “we need to know what explanatory advantage there is in supposing that the phenomenology of fear functions as a vehicle that attributes [evaluative] properties to those targets”.

(d) *Response to Brady and summary*

The above discussion should persuade us that, *pace* Brady and S-theories, awareness of the epistemic appropriateness of an emotional experience is not the same as a reflective judgment of appropriateness. A sense of epistemic appropriateness can be part of emotional experience. Indeed, it is a necessary part of intrinsically rationally intelligible emotional experience as an experience of value.

Analogously with sense-perceptual experience, this distinction poses no barrier to emotional experience being appealed to, and understood as, a source of *prima facie* reasons for evaluative belief. There is no more problematic self-justification in an individual's citing their emotion as a *prima facie* reason for evaluative belief than an individual's citing their sense-perceptual experience as a *prima facie* reason for empirical belief. I have argued this is so insofar as emotional experience involves an awareness of the epistemic appropriateness of one's valenced attitude – a felt approval or disapproval – as picking up on content-external evaluative features of its object. It is this awareness which would provide provisional justification for the subject holding relevant evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experience.

In sum, appealing to emotional experience as a *prima facie* reason for evaluative belief only appears to be problematically self-justifying if we fail to understand the following. (1): emotional experience, in its default mode in which we do not question its veridicality, (re)presents evaluative properties as properties of objects, and so (re)presents those properties as independent of any particular emotional state the subject happens to be undergoing – as content-external. (2): in connection with (1), emotional experience involves an awareness of one's valenced attitude, the felt approval or disapproval, as an epistemically appropriate, and so intrinsically intelligible, uptake of those content-external (apparent) evaluative features of the object. Once we understand (1) and (2) as true of at least some emotions, the PJV is in much better shape.

Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that once understood along perceptualist lines we can make sense of how emotional experiences can provide reasons for evaluative belief (the PJV). However, this view was open to two counter arguments. I have articulated responses to these arguments, showing them to rely on misunderstandings about emotional experience. The hope is that this article has shown that despite recent criticism, there is still much to be learned about the epistemology of emotional experience by drawing analogies with perceptual experience.

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