

RADICAL MILIEUS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Greece



ALEXANDROS SAKELLARIOU



DARE: Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality

Radical milieus in historical context
Country level reports

Greece

**Alexandros Sakellariou, Panteion University of Social and
Political Sciences, Greece**

This project has received funding from the European Union's H2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 725349.



This publication reflects only the views of the author(s); the European Commission and Research Executive Agency are not responsible for any information it contains.



Contents

<i>Executive Summary.....</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>1. Introduction.....</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>2. Setting the scene.....</i>	<i>6</i>
2.1 Historical context of fascism and the extreme-right in Greece: The role of historical memory	6
2.2 Contemporary context.....	9
<i>3. Sources, Data collection and Analysis.....</i>	<i>10</i>
3.1 Data collection	10
<i>4. Key Findings.....</i>	<i>12</i>
4.1 Establishing Golden Dawn: The National-Socialist background and the role of humiliation and grievances	12
4.2 Conspiracy theories.....	15
4.3 The role of violence	17
4.4 From paganism and anti-Christianity to Orthodoxy	19
<i>5. Conclusions.....</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>6. References.....</i>	<i>22</i>

Executive Summary

This report traces the evolution of the radical-right milieu in Greece, focusing on the formation and rise of the neo-Nazi party of Golden Dawn (GD), in the aftermath of the military dictatorship. The selection of this case study was informed by the observed phenomenon of GD's electoral rise as well as its involvement in violent attacks against immigrants, refugees and political opponents. There are three main reasons for this focus on GD. The first concerns the party's interest in, and appeal to, young people, whose radicalisation is the main focus of the DARE project. A related criterion is GD's active online presence, given that young people are particularly likely to use the Internet. The second reason is the party's turn during the mid-2000s from attacks and hate speech against immigrants from the Balkans and Eastern Europe, especially Albanians, to targeting Islam and Muslims, without, nevertheless, dropping its general anti-immigrant and xenophobic discourse, agenda and practice (Sakellariou 2020). This concern with the rise in prominence of anti-Islamist agendas among the extreme right is also central to the wider DARE project. The final reason for selecting GD is the party's turn from (neo-) paganism and anti-Christianity in the 1980s and 1990s to a pro-Orthodox Christian agenda and close relationship with Orthodox priests and bishops. This is closely related to the second reason because this turn to Orthodox Christianity is interwoven with the anti-Islam(ist) shift and the rhetoric of protecting Orthodox religion. The main objectives of the study were: to examine how historical memory and narratives of grievances and humiliation might have influenced the rise of GD; to understand the development, nature and legacy of the rise of GD; and to analyse the historical context of its rise and violent activism.

In terms of historical origins, development and ideological positioning of GD, the findings of this study indicate that GD is a fascist, neo-Nazi party. This differentiates it from other extreme-right parties across Europe. The study also establishes the central role in the broader extreme-right milieu in Greece played by GD, and its leader, from the early 1980s through to the current day. In terms of the role of grievance, humiliation and conspiracy theories, the study finds that all three play a central role in GD's ideology, political agenda and discourse. The study also finds that the party's turn towards another religious paradigm, more mainstream and distant from the group's initial paganism, imitates similar cases of other extreme-right parties in hijacking religion in order to attract voters and support. This change during the party's successful years (2010-2019) managed to get partial support from the Orthodox Church, which appears to maintain close relations with authoritarian regimes and the extreme-right. The question of whether GD has contributed to the growth of cumulative extremism remains unresolved. From the group's inception, violence was at the core of its organisation and purpose. However, initially the main target was political opponents of the left. This has not changed over the years but other targets have been added; immigrants from the Eastern bloc in the 1990s and Muslims since the 2000s. It is true that clashes between GD members and leftists and anarchists have been recorded from the very first weeks of GD's emergence and activism and this continued even after the party's electoral success in 2010. Such clashes, however, could not be described as an escalation of violence and it would be unwise to do so, even when this relates to clashes with Anarchists and Leftists as mentioned in the section on the role of violence. Indeed, it could be argued that in this case, despite the rise of violence against Muslim immigrants from mid-2000s and especially since 2009-2010, there is a notable absence of violent reactions on the part of those subjected to such violence.

1. Introduction

The long period of austerity, recession, and social turmoil, from 2009-2010 until 2017-2018 has led to profound realignments in the Greek political system. One of the most salient developments was the remarkable electoral success and entry into the Greek parliament of a formerly marginal political formation, Golden Dawn (hereafter GD). This electoral success allowed the party to promote an extreme anti-leftist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist and authoritarian discourse focused on anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic scapegoating (Sakellariou, 2015a: 54–57; Sakellariou, 2016) and the clear rejection of the democratic political system.¹

This unexpected electoral success of an extremist political organisation, that, since its foundation in the early 1980s, had been identified with National Socialism and the systematic use of violence, initially against left-wing opponents and from the early 1990s onward against immigrants as well, (Psarras, 2012) evoked serious concern. GD's impressive electoral leap forwards in 2012, as well as its constantly rising influence particularly among young people (Koronaïou et al., 2015: 231–249; Koronaïou, Lagos and Sakellariou, 2015: 193–123) and its penchant for extremist discourse and violent activism (Georgiadou, 2013: 75–101), has attracted the attention and concern of both the media and the public as well as of academia (Christopoulos, 2014; Tsiakalos, 2015; Paraskeva-Veloudogianni, 2015; Vassilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015; Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2016).

GD's power and electoral success erupted at the peak of the economic crisis in 2012, but the first signs were obvious earlier, in the 2010 local elections, when the party gained 5.29 per cent of the vote and elected a city councillor in Athens; in some areas it achieved up to 8.38 per cent. In the 2012 June elections, GD succeeded in capturing 6.92 per cent of the vote and gained 18 seats in the Greek Parliament, compared to the first elections in May when it won 6.97 per cent and 21 seats. In January 2015, GD captured 6.28 per cent and 17 seats, and in September 2015 it won 6.99 per cent of the vote and 18 seats. In the European elections of 2014, GD scored its highest percentage with 9.39 per cent and three seats in the European Parliament. In addition, in the 2014 local elections for the Attica region GD's candidate received 11.13 per cent and for the municipality of Athens GD's candidate received 16.12 per cent. These successes must be set against GD's starting point of just 0.29 per cent in the 2009 national elections.

However, in the national elections of 7 July, 2019 GD failed to enter the Parliament by a few thousand votes; having received 2.93 per cent of the vote they had no MPs returned to parliament (the threshold is 3 per cent). As a consequence of this failure, many members of GD left the party accusing the leadership of nepotism and of implementing the wrong political strategy. This followed the resignation of other members during the ongoing court proceedings, in which GD was accused of being a criminal organisation. However, it might be premature to argue that GD has disappeared. In the May 2019 European elections, it received 4.87 per cent of the vote and elected 2 MEPs, while in the May 2019 local elections in Athens GD received 10.53 per cent and in the prefecture of Attica² 5.59 per cent.

Moreover, GD's growing influence, from 2010 to 2019, demonstrated in subsequent opinion polls, made clear that there was an expanding audience for what was widely recognised to be a fascist ideology and political agenda. The GD debate became more intense when voter analyses revealed the party's success in attracting a high proportion of the youth vote, in fact, the second or third highest among all parties. In the May/June 2012 exit polls, the youth and the young adult (18-24 and 25-34) vote for GD ranged from 10 to 14 per cent for the 18-24 age group and from 13 to 16 per cent for the 25-34 group. This sparked

¹ Golden Dawn rejects democracy as a political system *per se* and, in particular, the restoration of democracy in Greece after the fall of the Dictatorship of 1967-1974.

² The prefecture of Attica is the largest region of Greece. Almost half of the country's population (4 million people) live there and it includes the country's capital, Athens.

questions and anxiety about the extent and depth of young people's receptivity to fascism; such concerns were further intensified when subsequent opinion polls revealed that the proportion of the 18-34 vote gained by GD was considerably higher than the party's average vote in the national elections.

Moreover, young people voting for GD have a very close ideological identification with the party, supporting almost all of its extremist and authoritarian views and policies with regard to democracy, immigrants, Muslims, Jews, etc. (Koronaïou et al. 2015; Sakellariou 2015b) Furthermore, Greece has a history of fascist and dictatorial regimes as well as a dark past of Nazi collaboration during the Second World War. As a consequence, any explanation that tries to directly connect the rise of GD with the crisis in a linear and deterministic way seems is superficial. The crisis was not the single cause, but rather a pretext and one needs to seek the deeper reasons behind the party's success, especially its appeal to young people (Sakellariou, 2015b: 12–14).

In this context, questions and concerns about the causes and the consequences of a part of youth's receptivity toward fascist ideology were raised in a public debate about 'the GD phenomenon' in Greek society. The concerns about the interest shown by a section of young people in GD rhetoric and political practice escalated when the party's influence became evident within the educational system, particularly in secondary schools. Groups of school students appeared to openly express their support for GD, displaying the party's symbols (including swastikas and the Nazi salute), intimidating and attacking political opponents, teachers and classmates of non-Greek origin, and recruiting fellow students. The situation quickly took the form of fierce antagonism and conflict between groups supporting GD and anti-fascist groups that were formed in reaction to the party's aggressive presence in schools. This youth aspect is very important for the DARE project which has, as its main focus, the radicalisation of young people, and this is a fundamental reason for the selection of GD as one of the case studies in the study of the historical context of contemporary radicalisation phenomena.

Having said that, the relatively recent rise of the fascist³ party of GD does not imply that fascist and extreme-right groups and ideas did not exist in Greece previously. As it will be discussed below, such groups and ideas existed and were active in the first decades of the twentieth century, the interwar period, the Second World War and the post-World War II era, and of course in the post-dictatorship period (from 1974 onwards). This means that in order to understand GD's rise and success it is important to go deeper and study the history of fascism and the extreme-right in Greece.

This case study focuses on the evolution of radical-right milieu in Greece, focusing primarily on the formation of the neo-Nazi party of GD, in the aftermath of the military dictatorship (1970s-1980s). Although, the main focus in this case is GD, the research starts from late 1970s when right-wing extremists committed terrorist bomb attacks in Athens. Among the people that were arrested for these attacks was Nikolaos G. Michaloliakos who later founded and still leads GD. The selection of GD was based on the observed phenomenon of the party's electoral rise and also of its activism which included violent attacks against immigrants, refugees and political opponents including the murder of a Pakistani immigrant by GD members in January 2013 and of a Greek anti-fascist musician in September 2013. These events led to the arrest of almost all of the party's leadership and MPs, who were put on trial accused of being members of a criminal organisation.⁴

GD was selected as the main focus of this case study for three main reasons. The first, as noted above, is its interest in, and appeal to, young people, whose radicalisation is the main focus of the DARE project. A related criterion is GD's active online presence given that young people are particularly likely to use the Internet. The second reason is the party's turn during the mid-2000s from attacks and hate speech against

³ As explained elsewhere (Koronaïou et al. 2015) GD is a considered a typical fascist party based on Griffin's (1991) typology and analysis of fascism.

⁴ The trial is still running and is expected to end in the first months of 2020. For more info on the trial, see <https://goldendawnwatch.org/?lang=en> (last accessed 26 March 2019).

immigrants from the Balkans and Eastern Europe, especially Albanians, to targeting Islam and Muslims, without, nevertheless, dropping its general anti-immigrant and xenophobic discourse, agenda and practice (Sakellariou 2020). This concern with the rise in prominence of anti-Islamist agendas among the extreme right is also central to the wider DARE project. Finally, the third reason for selecting GD is the party's turn from (neo-) paganism and anti-Christianity in the 1980s and 1990s to a pro-Orthodox Christian agenda and close relationship with Orthodox priests and bishops. This is closely related to the second reason because this turn to Orthodox Christianity is interwoven with the anti-Islam(ist) turn and the rhetoric of protecting Orthodox religion.

The main questions addressed through this historical study of GD are:

- How, in which social and political circumstances, and within which context, has GD emerged in the Greek public sphere?
- What are the main components of GD's ideology since its emergence?
- What role have grievances and conspiracy theories played in GD's formation and development?
- What role does violence play in GD's ideology and activism? Is there any evidence that cumulative extremism can be documented?

2. Setting the scene

2.1 Historical context of fascism and the extreme-right in Greece: The role of historical memory

Before moving onto the recent developments and the description of the extreme-right milieu in Greece after the restoration of democracy in 1974, it is important to briefly outline the history of fascist ideologies in Greece. This is considered crucial for the overall analysis for two reasons. First, because it reveals that the rise of fascist or neo-Nazi ideas is not something new and just the outcome of the crisis (Koronaïou et al., 2015:239-240).⁵ That said it needs to be underlined that other countries undergoing economic crisis like Portugal, Ireland or Spain did not see the rise of such groups and political parties. Second, because GD regularly refers to this past, especially to the 'positive' contribution of dictatorship regimes. Tellingly, the party has never renounced the collaboration of some Greeks with the Nazi occupation during WWII. History plays a central role for GD in shaping its current politics and vision for the future, since the party's principal goal is to establish, at some point, a genuine nationalist society, based on models from a range of historical examples such as Spartan society, the Nazi regime and the Greek dictatorship regimes. There is no space here to discuss the role of history in depth, but clear evidence of its significance is that GD ran their own history classes during years 2012-2014.⁶ These classes were specifically targeted towards children and young people. Emphasis was put on the ancient glory and the victories of ancient Greeks in wars. They like to refer to militaristic and oligarchic Ancient Sparta. As far as recent Greek history is concerned, of great importance is the emphasis on the condemnation of 'atrocities of Bolshevism', as well as the attempt to give positive meaning to the periods of the 1936-1941 dictatorship and the 1967-1974 dictatorship.

As documented (Marketos, 2006: 61-96; Bochotis, 2003), fascist ideas originally emerged in Greece in the first decade of the twentieth century, while some first fascist experiments and groups emerged during the

⁵ Although extreme-right parties have been present and, in many cases, successful in Greece after the 1974 restoration of democracy it is the first time that an openly racist, violent and fascist political party was so successful and attracted so many voters and supporters. This is another reason that makes the GD case interesting and almost unique even on a European level.

⁶ Due to the general reaction of pictures of children being instructed by GD members and giving the Nazi salutation the party stopped posting texts and images on this activity, but no one is sure if these classes ended or still running in secret.

1920s (Marketos, 2006: 117-143). Some authors view this as a period in which right-wing and conservative thinking was not at all marginal (Papadimitriou, 2006). A monumental expression of Greek modern nationalism with fascist characteristics was the 1936-1941 period, widely known as the '4th of August Regime'. It was formed on 4 August, 1936 by General Ioannis Metaxas, a prominent Greek military figure who entered politics and assumed power during troublesome national and parliamentary times (Hatzivasileiou, 2010). He established a regime that was openly authoritarian and although the police, not the army, were used to control all aspects of life it was clearly a dictatorial regime. Scholars and journalists argue about the complex political identity and ideology of the regime, linking it with several aspects of fascism (Psiroukis 1974; Kofas 1983; Linardatos 1988). The regime promoted nationalistic ideals and a strong cultural connection to the historic heritage provided by the ancient Greek classical period. This is common for nationalism, because the past serves as a cultural reason for national pride and justification for a sense of superiority over other nations (Chapoutot, 2012).

A glorious past is supposed to feed the present; this is especially useful if the present is lacking in glory. Yet, there are important differences between the '4th of August Regime' and the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini, the most important being the lack of a strong organised political party. However, the leader, Metaxas, was presented to the population as a heroic figure and as the first worker, the first farmer, the first soldier, etc. working hard for the good of the nation (Petrakis, 2005: 32-62). The Metaxas regime (1936–1941) has been continuously and systematically propagated by GD not as an oppressive one, but as a government that achieved a series of positive goals (e.g. the initiation of a social security system) and, ultimately, fought Italian Fascism and German Nazism. However, they deliberately omit concentration camps and mass persecution of communists and leftists, the violence perpetrated, the censorship exercised, and the anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary character of the regime.

Other than praising the Metaxas regime there are also direct or indirect references to historical Nazism. Here the Greek fans of Adolf Hitler express their faith in National Socialism as well as their hope for its revival and ultimate victory. They also strive to rehabilitate Greek Nazi collaborators during the German occupation of the country (1941-1944) (Roumpanis, 2013). Such examples accurately summarise GD's historical revisionism regarding the role of Greek Nazi collaborators. Here they are heroically presented as fighting against communism in order to protect Greek Macedonia from communist control, while the Greek resistance (ELAS guerrillas, i.e. the Greek Communist Party and its partisans) is identified with the black marketeers, who controlled the market, and characterised as treasonous. This is a common GD historical distortion that seeks to challenge the relationship of black marketeers with Nazi collaborators in order to remove the stigma of the traitor and to present them as patriots and nationalists who in fact opposed communism. Moreover, its goal is to challenge the Communist Party's actual national struggle and final victory against the Nazi occupation and to undermine the wide social recognition of its fight against GD's ideological and political predecessors.

Neo-Nazi historical revisionism has great importance for GD as a political party, since it is only through such heroisation of the Greek Nazi collaborators and the corresponding devaluation and dismissal of the anti-Nazi struggle during the WWII in Greece that turns the Nazi collaborators into the 'real National Resistance', and the Greek neo-Nazis into 'patriots' and the nation's defenders. This is precisely the reason why GD organises and participates in commemorative public events for Nazi collaborators in which the latter are represented as nationalist martyrs who were murdered by the communists because of their determination to protect the country from communist control. In its effort to diffuse this brand of revisionism, GD has extensively applied the term 'National Resistance,' aspiring to reach wider electoral audiences. Thus, they invite Greek citizens to join and vote for the Party that is presented as the 'only National Resistance' against traitors, immigrants, Zionism, capitalist speculators and Marxist internationalists.

Such views can be found in other areas of the Greek extreme-right scene, like the White Power Music Scene. Indeed, the development of the Greek White Power music scene has been directly connected to,

and promoted by, GD members and MPs (Koronaïou, Lagos, Sakellariou, 2015). Youth music, the Internet, and social media, as well as football fan culture were targeted by GD in its effort to recruit young people. Drawing on the weakly developed skinhead culture, that had been marginal to right wing politics in Greece, GD adopted a strategy from the British far right/neo-Nazi parties and organisations of the late 1970s and 80s aimed at reaching young people through youth music subcultures. The formation in the late 1990s of the Party's youth division ('Youth Front') and the issuing of its magazine *Antepithessi* ('Counterattack') were GD's first moves in reaching a wider youth audience that had become more susceptible to the nationalist discourses that dominated the Greek public sphere in the 1990s. This had been a crucial period for GD's development; a period during which nationalist and xenophobic discourses were established in the Greek public sphere following the first large wave of immigration to Greece (after the collapse of the Albanian political system and economy) and FYROM's claiming of 'Macedonia' as its official name in the early 1990s. As the Party's main ideological instructor explained in 1999, '...Youth Front was formed as an attempt to exploit, ideologically and politically, the already very positive climate that existed among the majority of youth. From the first moment we felt that penetration into these circles would become much easier if we used spheres such as music and football stadiums which have a high presence of young people.'⁷ GD succeeded, through Blood and Honour Hellas (B&HH), in establishing a White Power music scene that houses and supports bands, record companies, and live concerts, publishes magazines and fanzines, sells CDs and ancillaries (t-shirts, hats, badges, etc.), connects with their international counterparts, uses the Internet extensively, and produces music that is not simply a means of entertainment, but a means of spreading the group's ideas and values (Koronaïou, Lagos, Sakellariou, 2015).

The first decade of the twenty-first century was very successful for B&HH and the Greek White Power scene. The general trend toward a strengthening of nationalist and xenophobic discourses in Greek society and in the political system aligned also with GD's growing visibility and influence. Consistent with this trend, the Greek White Power scene demonstrated considerable growth. Bands, musical styles, live concerts, and recordings multiplied while the Internet and social media opened the scene to a wider youth audience. During this decade Greek White Power stopped being confined to Oi/RAC (Rock Against Communism) and skinhead culture. Although these remained at the heart of the scene, hard core, thrash metal, black metal, and even hip hop music were also added. Besides, GD itself strongly benefited from the Greek White Power development, as the latter operated under the Party's absolute control through the B&HH. It is worth noting that four prominent Golden Dawn members, two of whom were elected MPs in the June 2012 elections, are members of White Power bands that have been systematically promoted by B&HH. Thus, the ideological identification between the official GD dogma and the song-writing production of White Power bands, as well as their participation in GD events, particularly the annual Greek Youth Festival should cause no surprise (Koronaïou, Lagos, Sakellariou, 2015).

For example, Hellenic Stompers, the White Power band of a GD member, glorify Greek Nazi collaborators and close one song shouting, 'Sieg Heil' ('Hail Victory'), the famous Nazi salute and slogan that prominent members of GD as well as its leader use quite frequently (in its Greek translation as 'Zito i Niki') when they conclude their texts and speeches: 'It came at last this moment that the bloody earth will be purified/ [...] Hellenic SS greet the sun/ [...] war and horror prevail.' In the same spirit, but evidently keen to absolve of Nazi collaborators from their historical condemnation as traitors, No Surrender, a popular GD and B&HH⁸ band, sing about a grandfather who was an SS trooper: 'In my house you can see a photo of my grandfather/ Totenkopf, boots and black uniform/ proud he was, proud I am too, one nation and people, one leader.' Subsequent verses reveal that the grandfather had joined the Greek Nazi collaborationist troops (often called the 'Greek SS') killing communist guerrillas in order to protect Greek Macedonia from

⁷ Giorgos Mastoras, 'Η Πορεία μας' (Our Course), *Antepithessi*, 3 (1999), quoted in Psaras 2012: 309.

⁸ B&HH is a part of the international Blood & Honour white power music network.

communist control. Fighting against the Greek resistance he was fighting to liberate Greece from communism (Koronaïou, Lagos, Sakellariou, 2015: 202-203).⁹

The last historical period praised by GD is the dictatorship of 1967-1974; a military junta (Meynaud, 2002: 269-703) with no direct relation to fascism or National-Socialism, but very close to GD (Katsimardos, 2013). GD members and MPs regularly argue that the regime saved Greece from communism and that it had a very positive impact in terms of the economy and infrastructure. However, as has been documented, such approaches are not based on real evidence (Eleftheratos, 2015). Since this is the regime historically closest to GD's founding, one can find the group openly supporting it. Indeed, when one GD MP was criticised for the party's connection to, and embracing of, the dictatorial regime, he stated, in the Greek Parliament, that he was not willing to renounce his own family past (his father served the Dictatorship) or his fascist views. He has even displayed the regime's flag in one of the party's gatherings - an act considered a direct threat to democracy by other political parties and the media, since it suggested open praise for one of the cruellest dictatorship regimes in Greece's history. In other instances, GD MPs have expressed their gratitude to survivors of the regime like the Brigadier Stylianos Patakos¹⁰ and their sorrow when he died.¹¹

From the above, it is clear that extreme-right and fascist and/or National-Socialist ideas are not novel in Greek society but have a significant history. Moreover, this historical background and memory is still present and openly supported by GD nowadays viewing itself as the heir to this tradition. That is why it is of significant importance to be aware of this past and of the ideological and political relations GD maintains with it. Without this context, the analysis of the social and political phenomenon of GD becomes a somewhat one dimensional and ahistorical understanding of its relationship to the contemporary 'crisis' or so called 'immigration problem'.

2.2 Contemporary context

After the restoration of democracy in July 1974 an effort was made to purge vestiges of the dictatorship from every aspect of public life. However, despite imprisoning the protagonists of the regime and many of their collaborators, a large number of ideological supporters remained active in Greek society. These actors sought to organise themselves in political groups and parties in order to take part in the elections. Such efforts failed. The National Democratic Union party, for example, received only 1 per cent of the vote in the elections of November 1974. Other groups of that period included: the '4th August party' (the date the Metaxas regime was established in 1936); the National Faction, which gained 6.82 per cent of the vote in the 1977 national elections and elected 5 MPs (later absorbed by the conservative party of New Democracy); the Greek Youth of the National Faction (ENEP); and the Greek Nationalist Movement (ENEK) founded in 1979 and which shifted ideologically between Greek-centre nationalism and National-Socialism. The 'National Political Union' was formed in 1984. Its leader was the imprisoned dictator Georgios Papadopoulos. In the European Parliament elections of 1984, it received 2.3 per cent of the vote and gained one seat. Although it was marginalised, due to the successful pressure imposed by the dominant conservative party (New Democracy), it remained active until the parliamentary elections of 1996. 'Popular Orthodox Rally' (LAOS) was formed in 2000 and achieved electoral success in the parliamentary elections of 2007 (3.8 per cent) and 2009 (5.63 per cent) and elections of the European

⁹ The Greek webpage of B&HH is now longer functioning, but one can see the webpage of RAC, Rock against Communist and oi! music here <http://rac88hellas.blogspot.com/> (last accessed 10 August 2019).

¹⁰ Stylianos Pattakos was a Greek military officer. Pattakos was one of the principals of the Greek military junta of 1967-1974 that overthrew the democratic government in a coup on 21 April 1967 claiming political anomaly and the communist threat as the main reasons.

¹¹ 'The hero General Stylianos Pattakos passed away', Xryssi Avgi, 8 October 2016, <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/efuge-o-hrwas-strathgos-stulianos-pattakos-pou-thn-stolh-tou-kosmoun-epta-p> (last accessed 8 April 2019).

Parliament in 2004 (4.12 per cent) and 2009 (7.15 per cent) (Psarras, 2010; Ellinas, 2012). Its leader, Giorgos Karatzaferis, a former MP of the conservative party managed to form one of the most successful extreme-right parties in Greece. However, the party's participation in a coalition government in 2011, at the peak of the economic crisis, had a huge impact on the party's influence and led to its dissolution. Despite this, three of its MPs found political shelter in the conservative party of New Democracy, one of them becoming the party Vice-President and today a Minister, another also became a Minister and the third remained an MP. Finally, in 2016 another former MP of the Popular Orthodox Rally established his own pro-Russian extreme-right party. In the European elections of 2019, the party gained 4.18 per cent and one seat and in the 2019 national elections 3.7 per cent and 10 seats in the Greek Parliament.

In the broader milieu, we find also other extreme-right or even neo-Nazi groups, which either want to be part of mainstream politics and participate in elections or are violently active on the margins of the society. Some of these groups have been characterised as terrorist organisations by the Greek police and intelligence services. The most well-known ones are Combat 18 Hellas, Independent Maendrian Nationalists and Crypteia. The first follows the British Combat 18 and some of its members have been arrested as terrorists. The second appears to have close ties with Combat 18, as they themselves have admitted. Crypteia was an ancient Spartan state institution consisting of young Spartan men. Its goal and nature are still a matter of discussion and debate among historians, but some scholars consider the Crypteia to be a kind of secret police and state security force organised by the ruling class of Sparta, whose purpose was to terrorise the servile helot population. That said it is no surprise that it has been claimed that Crypteia was formed by ex-GD members, renowned for their love of the Spartan way of life and military organisation. More recently, former members, former MPs and a current MEP of GD established a new political party under the name 'National Popular Consciousness'. In this way GD continues to influence the extreme-right milieu albeit sometimes indirectly via GD members who have distanced themselves from the party and its leader and formed their own groups and parties, either to avoid any association with GD in the light of the criminal trial or because they genuinely have moved away from the party in terms of ideology and practice.

3. Sources, Data collection and Analysis

3.1 Data collection

In order to approach and study the rise of this radical milieu in Greece and more particularly the development of GD, the main research tools used were those of literature review, archival research, and Internet research. The selected material was analysed through the method of thematic content analysis.

Searching for and collecting the relative literature was the first step because it was important not only to put this case in the more recent historical context but also take into consideration the history of fascism in Greece dating back to the first decades of the twentieth century and the interwar period (Bochotis, 2003; Aggelis, 2006; Marketos, 2006; Kousouris, 2014). For that purpose, a wide literature was collected and studied relating to the presence of fascist groups in early twentieth century, the Metaxas dictatorship (often praised as a genuine fascist regime by GD), the Second World War period and the collaboration of fascist groups with the German occupation, the post-WW II period and the civil war (1946-1949), and finally the Colonels' dictatorship of 1967-1974. All these sources were related to the pre-1974 period but it was necessary to make such a historically contextual connection before moving forward, since the rise of GD did not take place in a political and ideological vacuum. The second part of the literature focused on the rise of extreme-right groups and parties after the restoration of democracy in 1974, because the remarkable presence of extreme-right parties in Greece and in Europe is not an issue that has suddenly emerged in the last few years (Psarras, 2012: 11-51; Georgiadou, 2019: 26-131).

Internet research and collection of material was inspired by a slogan GD used to have on its previous website: ‘turn off your TV, you can find us on the internet’. This differentiates GD from other extreme-right parties and their use of the media (Ellinas, 2010). GD criticises the mainstream media for excluding the party’s MPs and representatives and preventing their attempts to express their views and ideas. To a certain extent this is true. The majority of TV channels, radios and newspapers try not to give GD members the opportunity to present their ideology to the general public especially since the legal indictment of GD and its MPs in 2013’. Of course, there are many exceptions to this stance on the part of the media. Especially during the first months after the elections of 2012, the mainstream media gave a platform to many of the party’s MPs and spokesmen, creating a very mild and friendly profile of the party and transmitting it to the people. The internet, in contrast, is a very productive and friendly field for the reproduction of fascist, neo-Nazi and racist speech and the propagation of ideologies of the same kind. It is also a tool that is used by the vast majority of young people in their everyday lives, which is why GD focuses on the internet and the social media, targeting, mainly, the age group of 15 to 35 years old (Koronaoui et al., 2015: 34-240; Sakellariou, 2015b).

It is a truism to say that the internet is a basic tool of people’s everyday life, especially of youth. However, what has made the internet a very interesting subject for social scientists is its influence on people’s lives in many, sometimes harmful, ways. The internet nowadays, is not just a simple communication tool. It shapes people’s identities and constructs a virtual world which, sometimes, diverges from the real one and creates a virtual reality which people take as real. Thus, although for some researchers, fieldwork is necessarily an embodied activity since the researcher’s body and the bodies of the others are central to practical accomplishment of fieldwork (Coffey, 1999: 59) the virtual body/self is taking an increasingly central place in social research. In addition, the role of the Internet and social media in violent extremism has been a burning issue since the time of Al-Qaida (Rogan 2006), but especially after the rise and expansion of the so-called Islamic State (von Behr et al 2013; Conway 2012; Pearson 2015; Klausen 2015; Alava, Frau-Meigs, and Hassan 2017; Conway 2017; al-Rawi 2017; Awan 2017; Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai 2017). Moreover, the rise of the extreme-right in Europe and elsewhere (e.g. the U.S. and Latin America) has also attracted much attention with regard to use of the internet and social media in particular (Neudert, Kollanyi, Howard 2017; Medina-Serrano et al 2018) as well as its role in the self-radicalisation process (Koehler 2014).

In this case study, two main webpages of GD were studied: the official party website, www.xagr.net; and the two webpages of the youth division. The first youth webpage was: <http://resistance-hellas.blogspot.gr>. It was functional until 6 February 2012, when, for no apparent reason, news and activities stopped being uploaded to it. The main content of the website included: the periodical ‘Counter-Attack’; Ideology; Activities-demonstrations; Nationalist Music; Announcements; Activist Material (photos, leaflets, etc.); Youth Festival and Videos. Almost a year later, on 15 March 2013, and after the party’s electoral success, the youth division’s webpage restarted under another form and name: www.antepithesi.gr. Some articles from the previous webpage were also uploaded to the new one, but news and texts are very actively uploaded on almost a daily basis to the new site.¹² Some of the categories of articles uploaded are: Historical texts, Ideological texts, Commenting, Audio-visual, Activism, Demonstrations, Announcements, Lessons from History and Myth, Nationalism in Art, Nationalist discourse, Fire and axe, Change, The Fighter of the Dawn, The spirit of the immortals, Political soldier. Some of these website columns make direct mention to conspiracy theories, grievance and humiliation, as well as indirect mentions to violence. Further to that, the role of history is dominant either through

¹² According to GD, after the July 7, 2019 elections, the party’s website crashed following a web attack. The party opened a new domain <http://www.xrisiavg.com/> but the website for the youth branch remains out-of-order. In reality, the website stopped functioning due to inter-party conflicts between the leadership and the administrator of the site. For more on this see the news report https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/207050_i-teliki-lysi-toy-nikoy-mihaloliakoy (last accessed 12 August 2019).

references to the national-socialist history of Germany and fascism in Italy, or through praising the ancient Greek past and the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas. The material derived from these sources offered interesting insights relating to the questions tackled in each of the key findings sections in particular for the most recent period, primarily after the party's entrance to Parliament.

The third tool used was archival research either through digital archives or in libraries and institutional research centre archives. This included ASKI (Contemporary Social History Archives), the National Library of Greece and the Library of Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences. Such research revealed interesting material including: the memoirs of ex-Golden Dawn members describing their trajectories into the party and the reasons of their exit; newspapers, periodicals and other publications of GD from the 1980s to the present day (e.g. translations of fascist books in Greek) which offer a quite revealing picture of the party's ideology and goals from its beginnings. Especially, the historical periodical, titled *Golden Dawn*, published in 1980 found in the National Library of Greece was of significant importance. Finally, a series of newspaper articles - in newspapers such as *Rizospastis*, *Macedonia*, *Ta Nea*, *Eleftherotypia*, and *Ethnos* - describing the extreme-right attacks of the 1970s, those following the 1974 restoration of democracy and the violent activism of GD in the 1980s were also useful for documenting the rise of the milieu in the post-dictatorial Greek society.

Among the most important documents collected one could mention: the memoirs of an ex-GD member under the title 'Demolishing the myth of Golden Dawn'; the original GD's 'declaration of ideological principles'; GD's National-Socialist publications like 'National-Socialism: The Biological Worldview' by Povl Riis-Knudsen and parts of George Lincoln Rockwell's 'White Power' (1967) (e.g. *In hoc signo vinces*); the party's original statutes; exchanging letters with other extreme-right groups; a Greek translation of the Barcelona declaration on the 'New European Order', a meeting of extreme-right and fascist groups originally published by the *Nouvelle ordre européen* based in Lausanne, Switzerland; and of course the first two year original periodical of GD under the same title.

Since the material collected and the available sources were quite rich in information it was decided that further methods, e.g. interviews with journalists were not necessary, especially since most of the journalists working in the field have published extensively on the topic (Psarras, 2010; 2012; 2013; 2018). After an initial reading of the empirical material for overall familiarisation, the material was analysed employing classic thematic analysis (Guest, 2012; Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; Grawitz, 2001; Maingueneau, 1991). The categories that emerged from the analysis relevant to the questions asked in this study and framed in the theoretical approach set out above (Mason, 2002; Gibbs, 2007) are: 1) the role of humiliation and grievances; 2) conspiracy theories; 3) the role of violence; and 4) the religious transformation. Truth real

4. Key Findings

4.1 Establishing Golden Dawn: The National-Socialist background and the role of humiliation and grievances

The content of this section focuses on the ideological background and identity of GD, but at the same time tries to answer one of the main questions with regard to the historic context of current rise of the extreme-right. This has to do with the role historical memory and 'grievance' or 'humiliation' narratives play within radical milieus and how they might shape any radicalisation processes. GD appeared in the public sphere in December 1980 through the periodical, *Golden Dawn*, published by Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the GD leader. In the first editorial, it is stated (p.3):

Amidst the publications of the Marxist plague and of the capitalist eudemonia, a brave and honest voice rings out; a genuinely Greek and decisive voice. From today, we will use this space to present a range of philosophical, ideological, historical and sociological subjects.

Our basic ambition is to keep this publication apart from any political struggle. While we are not indifferent to the contemporary tragedy of our people, we consider ourselves too pure to intervene in this dirty political sphere.

We will try with all the power we have to fight back the Zionist domination that for centuries suffocates and suppresses our people.

We will try with all the power we have to become stronger, to participate and to transform the contemporary global STATUS QUO into a global spiritual Revolution, which is an essential condition for a new Golden Dawn of humanity.

A Golden Dawn that will once again lead Man to nature and the Greek ideal of civilisation.

A Golden Dawn that will become the start of a new civilisation of the White Race.

A Golden Dawn that will be the start of the new Life, a life in which there will be no place for Zionists, their products and their agents.

While further below it is openly stated that the group's goal is an interstate National-Socialism of all the white peoples (p.5), meaning a pan-European or even worldwide association of the white race. This is something that GD regularly repeats asking for a collaboration of the white people against all other races. The first issues of the periodical published in the years 1980-1983 are extremely important in terms of defining the group's ideology and goals. Amongst other things, it clearly states that 'We, Fascists, do not have theoretical prejudices, our theory is reality' (*Golden Dawn*, issue 2, p.18), admitting their fascist identity. In another part of the same issue (*Golden Dawn*, issue 2, p.6) a saying of Julius Evola¹³ is cited, 'We are granted with the courage of radicalism, the "NO" that needs to be said to all the forms of political decadence either of the left or of the right'. This connects them directly with fascist radicalism, a connection they do not seem to deny.

There is also a clear and undeniable connection between GD and Nazi Germany which is highly admired. This includes: praising Nazi Germany and Hitler as leaders; reproducing excerpts from *Mein Kampf*; anti-Semitic and racist texts; ideological texts relating ancient Greece with National Socialism; texts and images of and about Alfred Rosenberg, Leni Riefenstahl, Rudolf Hess and others. From its first years, GD openly declared that it is a National-Socialist group without any hesitation and it is important to underline that GD MPs never retracted such views and ideas, even when they entered the Greek Parliament after 2012.

In 1983 GD inaugurated its first offices in Athens city centre, but in 1984 both the offices and the periodical closed (Psarras, 2012: 47). In 1987 the periodical began re-publication and the group moved into new offices in Athens. In the group's statutes it is mentioned that GD is a movement that 'investigates European cultural life under the prism of the National-Socialist worldview and bio-theory', while it is added that the Popular Association, the second branch of the group, takes action 'in the direction of ideological enlightenment and political organisation of modern Greek society, based on the principles of National Socialism and is tasked with fulfilling the corresponding political struggle'. In the same statutes there is a special part dedicated to the role of the leader who becomes the dominant figure within the group (Fuhrerprinzip). He is the highest leader of GD, he has full responsibility for all the final decisions and is in charge of the central council without participating in it. Finally, it is stated that the 'person of the

¹³ Julius Evola was an Italian philosopher, painter, poet, esotericist, and occultist. He has been described as a fascist intellectual, and as having been the leading philosopher of Europe's neo-fascist movement. As for many neo-Nazi groups Evola is considered an important figure for GD and his work and ideas have been regularly presented in the party's websites.

Leader is inviolable'. Similar ideological arguments can be found also in the group's Declaration of Ideological Principles. In this, it is clearly stated that GD is a National-Socialist group and that 'National-Socialism is not a simple political movement but a way of life and the guardian protector of the principles of the Western Civilization' (pp. 6, 20).

The experience of WWII and the defeat of National-Socialist powers is the main grievance and humiliation expressed by GD in its periodical and other publications and statements. This is clearly stated in the group's Declaration of Ideological Principles: 'We are the sons of the then defeated' (p.6), i.e. during WWII.

During these last heroic days of 1945 Dr. Goebbels stated: 'this was not a war between states, but a war between gods. We will return and the earth will be shaken'. And when the FUHRER was about to withdraw for his last duty he was asked whom National-Socialists should fight against now, he replied: 'FUR DEN KOMMENDEN MANN!' (For the Man who is about to come). For this Man We are fighting (Golden Dawn, Issue 8, p.31).

They not only practically deny that the Holocaust took place but they mention the existence of 'holocausts', as they call them, of the other side, the winners of the WWII, e.g. Dresden and Bleiburg and they argue that,

[...] Mourning and lamentation do not apply for national-socialists. As genuine continuators of the Aryan Race ideology, with our hand lifted up into the ancient Spartan salutation, in front of the black-red flags with the swastika, we take an oath with fanaticism: capitalists, Bolsheviks, Jews, we owe you a REVERSE NYREMBERG! (Golden Dawn, Issue 9, pp. 18-19).

From the above, it is clear that the main humiliation and grievance is that of defeat during WWII. However, another source of humiliation for GD is the ongoing (since the 1980s) situation faced by the white race in general and the Greek nation in particular. The very constitution of the white race, according to Great Replacement theory, is threatened by mixing with other races and the rise in the number of immigrants while, at the national level, leftist and Marxist ideology dominate the public sphere and love of one's nation has become stigmatised. The Greek nation, they believe, has been facing a long period of decadence and decay since the 1980s. This situation needs to be addressed and GD is uniquely positioned to do that (Golden Dawn, issue 8, pp. 4 and 18-20).

The analysis of GD's ideological texts reveals a political discourse structured around the central themes that contemporary academic research has highlighted as constitutive of, and peculiar to, the ideology of historical fascism. The revitalisation of the scientific research on fascism in the last two or three decades owes much to a sizeable body of work that treats fascism 'as a distinct 'genus' of political ideology' (Griffin, 2008a: 88) aiming to define it as a 'generic' term through the construction of a Weberian ideal type of fascist ideology. These debates on the ideological 'fascist minimum' (Griffin, 1991; Eatwell, 1996 and 2009; Copsey, 2004) located and analysed a set of ideas particular to fascism that constitute its 'ideological core' (Griffin, 2008b: 185). According to Griffin, fascism is 'a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a paligenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism' (Griffin, 1991: 26). Griffin's formulation conceptualises fascism as a political ideology characterised by the vision of a homogenous nation that is under imminent danger and in a state of decadence and needs to be salvaged through a people's revolution that will result in its rebirth. Here, fascism appears as the 'revolution of the right' (Payne, 1995; Griffin, 2000), the core mobilising myth for which is 'the vision of the nation's imminent rebirth from decadence' (Griffin, 2003: 107). Griffin's version of the 'fascist minimum' had significant impact on the study of fascism and has been used by or has influenced the work of scholars of different theoretical orientations. Thus, Robert Paxton includes Griffin's core conception in his own influential definition of fascism:

Fascism may be defined as a form of political behaviour marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and

purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion (Paxton, 2004: 218).

The ideology of GD conforms to such conceptualisations of fascist ideology. It is founded on a mythologised conception of the Greek nation as an organic (biologically unmixed and culturally homogenous) community that exists in a state of degeneration and decline confronting internal and external enemies that threaten its unity and survival. The enemies of the 'People's Community' - capitalists, international usurers, politicians, communists and internationalists, liberals and conservatives, immigrants, minorities of all types, neighbouring nations, and, of course, the Jews - are repeatedly denounced as being responsible for the nation's situation since the 1980s, for the recent social and economic crisis as well, and the dangers that it represents for the nation and the people. Thus, revolutionary national rebirth (palingenesis,) which redeems the nation from its present septic state of decline mobilising 'people's power' against internal and external enemies that are perceived to threaten the unity and the survival of a mythic organic community, emerges as the discursive core of GD's ideology placing the party at the centre of historical fascism's legacy.

As a consequence, it emerges that historical memory as well as the related grievance and humiliation have played a crucial role in the formation and rise of GD since the beginning of the 1980s. Being on the side of the defeated of WWII, GD felt that the time has come for revenge and in that sense such feelings have motivated the group and become central to its ideology. More recently, institutional grievances - complaints and lack of trust of people towards state institutions, democracy and mainstream political parties - have been the basis of support, including electoral support, for GD (Lamprianou and Ellinas, 2017).

4.2 Conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories are at the heart of the extreme-right and of GD in particular. From its inception, GD's periodical reproduced conspiracy theories that purported: Jewish domination of the world; collaboration between Jews and Marxists against the 'white race' and the Greek nation; the danger presented by Zionism, etc. Such conspiracy theory builds on the argument that Jews have managed to propagate the 'myth of the Holocaust' throughout the world, and at the same time managed to conceal the real 'holocausts' against Germans and the Aryan race. In addition, it is argued that Jews, together with the other races, have biologically poisoned the white race reducing it to a herd of sheep, blindly following the religion of Yahweh (*Golden Dawn*, issue 8, pp. 18-20).¹⁴ Such is the prevalence of reference in GD discourse to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*¹⁵ - a bestseller for GD as for the extreme-right generally¹⁶ - that GD could be nicknamed the 'Protocol Party' (Psarras, 2013: 278). Even after the party's electoral

¹⁴ Golden Dawn referred to Judeo-Christianity rather than Christianity in order to underline the Judaic character of the Christian religion; this explains the reference to Yahweh, the Jewish name for God.

¹⁵ The Protocols of the Elders of Zion is an anti-Semitic pamphlet published in Russia at the end of the 19th century. It purports to be the minutes of meetings held secretly by Jewish wise men plotting to control the world. Exposed many times as a forgery, the Protocols has nevertheless continued to be translated, published, and distributed all over the world, from the United States to Japan, from the Arab world to Latin America. Its legacy is alive and well today in the charter for Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, as well as among Holocaust deniers, and conspiracy theorists.

¹⁶ A. Konstantinou, 'Against conspiracy and deceit', Xryssi Avgi, 18 November 2018, <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/enantia-sthn-sunomwsia-kai-ston-dolo> and K. Alexandrakis, 'Zionist dictatorship: Soros will decide for you, without you, on what is true on the Internet', Xryssi Avgi, 19 December 2016, <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/siwnistikh-diktatoria-o-soros-tha-apofasizei-gia-esas-chwris-esas-ti-einai> (last accessed 29 March 2019).

success in 2012 MP, Ilias Kassidiaris, read part of them in the Greek Parliament and excerpts have been uploaded on the party's website.¹⁷

Such conspiracy theories are constructed around the dangers the Greek nation supposedly faces. According to GD:

Surrounded almost everywhere by enemies of different races [the Modern Greek man] is not anymore able to recognise the critical times that are coming and that mathematically will lead to his racial extinction from the face of the earth. In the North the Slavs, in the East Mongols [Turks], in the south the Semites, be they called Arab or Jews (Golden Dawn, issue 8, p. 4).

Moving towards the time of the party's success in 2012 such theories have been enriched by three new ones. The first is the conspiracy on the new pan-religion¹⁸ that the New Order, according to GD tries to implement around the world. That means that all other religions as well as nations will be eliminated. However, it is interesting to keep in mind that GD used to be a fundamentally anti-Christian, anti-Jewish and pagan party characterising Christianity as the religion of peace and cowards. Further details on the party's religious turn will be discussed in the following section. A second conspiracy theory relates to the economic crisis¹⁹ since, according to GD, foreign powers including Zionists, Jews and figures like billionaire Hungarian financier George Soros²⁰ wanted to destroy the Greek nation and the best way to achieve this goal was through the implementation of the severe austerity measures during the crisis. Finally, a third conspiracy theory is related to the immigration and refugee issue. According to this theory, clearly related to the economic crisis, the Western powers, together with the Jews and George Soros (again), have planned to fill Greece with thousands or millions of immigrants in order to alienate the Greek race and Islamise the country.²¹ This is considered the second 'weapon' that foreign powers and secret forces use, in order to attack and destroy Greece.

With regard to conspiracy theories, it emerges that similar to other extreme-right milieus GD builds upon and reproduces conspiracy theories which are very similar to those of National-Socialism with regard to Zionism and Jews. In this sense, the party continues the reproduction of such theories. Such theories are related to the grievance mentioned above since, according to the party, Jews and Zionists are responsible for the current situation of the white race. From this perspective, it could be argued that the reason for this grievance and feeling of humiliation is to be found in the conspiracy theories reproduced by the party.

¹⁷ 'Israeli reactions about Golden Dawn's reference to the Zionist Protocols', Xryssi Avgi, 30 October 2012, <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/antidraseis-sto-israhl-gia-thn-anafora-ths-chrushs-aughs-sta-siwnistika-prw> (last accessed 29 March 2019).

¹⁸ 'Towards a new World Religion', Xryssi Avgi, 31 December 2012, <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/sto-dromo-pros-mia-nea-pagkosmia-thrhskia> (last accessed 29 March 2019).

¹⁹ Ch. Meidanis, 'The homicidal plan 'Greek Crisis'-Why Greece was selected?', Xryssi Avgi, 21 September 2013, <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/to-anthrwpoktono-schedio-ellhnikh-krish-giati-epilechthhke-h-ellada> (last accessed 29 March 2019).

²⁰ George Soros has become a central figure in the broader extreme-right milieu and the protagonist of the conspiracy theory arguing that he is behind the large waves of immigration targeting to the replacement of the white population in the West. The theory claims white people are being replaced by immigrants and will ultimately be eliminated. See for example <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/09/white-genocide-great-replacement-theory> (last accessed 5 November 2019).

²¹ 'Soros's propaganda fails: The vast majority of Greeks ask for the immediate deportation of all illegal immigrants', Xryssi Avgi, 23 March 2019, <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/apotugchanei-patagwdws-h-propaganda-tou-soros-h-suntriptikh-pleiopshfia-twn> and 'Ch. Pappas: The solution of the demographic problem-A national government of Golden Dawn now in order for our race to survive', Xryssi Avgi, 5 March 2019, <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/chr.-pappas-lush-dhmografikou-ethnikh-kubernhsh-chrushs-aughs-twra-gia-na-e> (last accessed 29 March 2019).

However, the party has ‘modernised’ its theories in order to influence people and attract voters and supports. This means that according to these theories it is not the world in general but Greece in particular, that has been at the epicentre of such conspiracies because everyone envies and conspires against the Greek nation. In this way, GD’s effort is to attract more supporters presenting Greece as a victim of Jews, the great powers, secret groups, like the Bilderberg club, and individuals like George Soros.

4.3 The role of violence

The third question asked in this study concerns the role of violence in GD’s ideology and activism and whether the radical milieu of GD has contributed to the escalation of violence. Violence has played a central role in GD’s history and organisation from its earliest period (1974-1980). At that time, Greek society was experiencing an escalation of extreme-right violence and terrorism. In January 1975, a group of 5-6 people writing fascist slogans near the Polytechnic University of Athens when they were challenged by some students. The students were attacked by the fascist activists who shouted ‘We will bury you all...’ (*Ta Nea*, January 28, 1975). In the same year, the fascist group ‘New Order’, inspired by the Italian *Ordine Nuovo* targeted a series of bookstores in Athens writing slogans like ‘Death to communists, freedom is the opium of anarchy’, etc. (*Avgi*, March 23, 1975). In December 1976, the funeral of a well-known torturer of the 1967-1974 dictatorship, E. Mallios, who was murdered by the terrorist organisation ‘17th November’, gave extreme-right supporters the opportunity to gather. Fierce speeches were made at the funeral and a group of mourners subsequently attacked journalists resulting in serious injuries, hospitalising five of them (*Ta Nea*, December 17, 1976). Through witnesses’ testimonies and photos, some well-known fascists were later identified and arrested. Among them was the 19-year old Nikolaos Michaloliakos, who became the founder of GD.

In the years 1977/1978 a series of bomb attacks rocked Athens. Although no group officially claimed responsibility for the attacks it later transpired that fascist groups were behind them. On 23 July 1978 - one day before the celebration of the fourth anniversary of the restoration of democracy - 13 bombs were placed in Athens and Piraeus. Five months later, on 23 December 1978, 39 bombs were also placed in Athens, in order to ‘commemorate’ the murder of E. Mallios. The most serious terrorist attacks, however, took place in March and June 1978. On 11 March, a bomb exploded in an Athenian cinema screening a Soviet movie injuring 18 people; one victim lost both his legs as the bomb had been placed under his seat. On 20 June, a bomb exploded in another central Athenian cinema also screening a Soviet movie and resulted in 15 people being injured. Similar attacks included the regular targeting of book shops selling Soviet books and vinyl, periodicals of a leftist ideology (*Anti*), the offices of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and its youth branch (KNE) etc. In July 1978, the police announced the arrest of a group of people belonging to the extreme right including Michaloliakos who was charged with being a member of a terrorist group and of committing crimes using explosives (*Macedonia*, August 1, 1978). Michaloliakos was tried and sentenced to 13 months in prison.

From the above it is all too clear that during these first years after the restoration of democracy a series of extreme-right and fascist groups sought to create a climate of fear and to destabilise democracy. But if their purpose was also to create a climate of tension provoking the violent reaction on the part of the left and the communists, this seem to have failed. Although clashes among GD members and anarchists regularly occurred, it never resulted in any serious escalation of violence and remained relatively marginal.

However, violence remains a central element of the group’s ideology. From the very beginning, violence in the sense of a form of war has been praised by GD. Adopting a quote of Heraclitus’ ‘War is the father of all’, they argue that:

[...] War is the primary virtue of the white man, and as a divine sense of iron on the flesh should dominate our existence. [...]

War is a wonderful paganist ideal; and peace is the quintessence of moral weakness of a Christian world [...]

[...] War is the ultimate symbol of life within a wonderful and harmonically moving universe; and peace is the eternal symbol of the death of our super-natural agony (Golden Dawn, issue 8, p. 2).

Leftists, communists and anarchists became one of the first targets of violence. The first editorial of GD's periodical declared that Marxism had become culturally dominant; this was used as the rationale for the publication of the *Golden Dawn* periodical. Left-wing and communist ideologies are regarded as deadly enemies because they promote class struggle and internationalism, which, it is claimed, weaken the unity of the People's Community that should be indivisible. Great attention is paid to the period of the Greek Civil War, which is regarded as the period when the 'criminal nature' of communism was demonstrated.

Following the group's formation, regular violent attacks against leftists and communists took place as well as clashes with anarchists on the streets of Athens. From one point of view it could be argued that *cumulative* violence/extremism (Busher and Macklin, 2015) developed in this case even though an *escalation* of violence was not observed. Since the late 1980s, but mainly since the 1990s, a series of lethal attacks have been recorded against political and ideological opponents using knives and bats, beating victims almost to death (Benekou, 2013:105-107). However, in many cases GD members have been attacked by anarchists also in a kind of non-declared war in the streets of Athens city centre (Kousoumvriss, 2004: 66-67).

However, violence against leftists and communists, which continued even after the party's electoral success in 2012, is only one aspect of the issue. Since the 1990s, immigrants and refugees have also been targeted by GD. During the 1990s, when Greek society started to host a large number of immigrants, who came mainly from Albania and other Balkan countries, GD decided to move from theory to action. This led to the targeting not only of political and ideological opponents, but foreigners as well. Albanians, Africans and Asians were among the main victims of GD members and supporters. On one occasion, a 23 year old Greek attacked immigrants in Athens indiscriminately, killing two and injuring seven of them around the city centre. In court it turned out that he held extreme-right views and a photo showed him holding a GD banner during a demonstration.²² In the 2000s, when immigrants and refugees from Africa and Asia started to arrive in Greece in greater numbers, they became the main targets of violent attacks. Attacks against Pakistanis, Afghans, Bangladeshis, Arabs and others were added to the 'usual' attacks against Albanians and leftists. Such incidents did not stop even after the party took up seats in the Greek Parliament in 2012. In fact, they escalated in 2013 leading to the murder of a Pakistani immigrant by GD members in Athens and the murder of a Greek anti-fascist musician, Pavlos Fyssas, who was fatally stabbed by a self-confessed member of GD in a working-class area of Athens in September 2013.²³ The last murder led to the arrest of the party's leadership and MPs and their prosecution for membership of a criminal organisation. Later the same year, two GD members were murdered outside the Party's offices

²² For this case see <https://www.mixanitouxronou.com.cy/egklimata-2/o-dolofonos-pantelis-kazakos-pou-pyrovoulouse-opion-metanasti-evriske-brosta-tou-2-nekri-ke-7-travmaties-sto-kentro-tis-athinas-i-schisis-tou-meti-chrysi-avgli/> (last accessed 12 August 2019).

²³ For these two cases see <https://jailgoldendawn.com/%CF%85%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%B8%CE%AD%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%86%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%AF%CE%B1-%CF%83%CE%B1%CF%87%CE%B6%CE%AC%CF%84-%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%85%CE%BA%CE%BC%CE%AC%CE%BD/%> and <https://jailgoldendawn.com/%CF%85%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%B8%CE%AD%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%86%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%AF%CE%B1-%CF%80%CE%B1%CF%8D%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%86%CF%8D%CF%83%CF%83%CE%B1/> (last accessed 12 August 2019).

in a region near Athens. The attack came almost two months after the abovementioned attack against an anti-Fascist hip-hop artist and was claimed by a previously unknown, self-proclaimed leftist organisation as a response to the murder of Fyssas. However, this was a one-off incident, with some very ambiguous aspects (i.e. this organisation subsequently vanished, no one was arrested and the whole case forgotten, apart from by GD itself) and it certainly did not lead to an escalation of violence on the part of GD.

GD, like other extreme-right groups, has a long history of committing violence - from arson attacks against immigrant stores, Muslim prayer houses and anti-fascist organisations to physical attacks against immigrants, refugees, leftists, journalists and everyone considered an enemy in their eyes. We could add to this the continuous desecration of Jewish monuments, synagogues and cemeteries around Greece; clear proof of the group's anti-Semitism, which is also openly documented in its publications from the party's very first days.²⁴

4.4 From paganism and anti-Christianity to Orthodoxy

Finally, we consider the role of an important transformation of GD's culture and identity during its years as a parliamentary party, in terms of how it impacted on the exercising and constraining violence. This change relates to a fundamental change in its declared position on religion. While this shift appears to be a total turnabout, in fact traces of the roots of paganism in the party's discourse remain discernible, particularly in the youth branch. As a typical National-Socialist group, GD was closer to paganism than any other religion. Articles in the group's periodical in the 1980s on ancient Greek religion or Roman Emperors like Julian, who favoured paganism over Christianity are more than evident (issues 3 and 4). Moreover, the group does not only praise the ancient Greek religion as the true ancestral religion, but also expresses negative, polemical and infamous views against 'Judeo-Christianity' (as it usually calls Christianity).

Judeo-Christianism declares the Aryan man guilty and sinful and asks him to obey the commands of a despotic God, who creates a hell for violators. The Aryan was led to this contempt of life, worshiping a dark Jewish God, absent from the world, and he was also led to the expectation of vindication in a future life, after losing his ancestral faith in the pan-theistic conception of the universe (Golden Dawn, Issue 8, p. 18).

The critical moment for GD came when it entered mainstream politics after 2009-2010 and scored its first success in the local elections of 2010. Since then, and especially since 2012, the party has presented itself as the only protector of the religion of the ancestors, which now has become Orthodox Christianity. Members of GD have close relations with priests and Metropolitan Bishops²⁵ and appear at major religious services and holidays, are photographed holding holy relics in official ceremonies and miss no opportunity to describe themselves as genuine Orthodox Christians. This does not mean that they agree with the policies and strategies of the Holy Synod on the whole, but they stay away from criticising it or the Archbishop directly. Furthermore, they keep close relations with the True Orthodox Christians, a heretical group according to the Orthodox Church, which follows the old Julian calendar and holds quite conservative views on social issues as well as nationalist and racist opinions.

This development with the True Orthodox Christians is crucial to our understanding of the group for two reasons. First, because it shows how GD has been moving in the political field trying to attract followers and voters presenting itself as a 'good Orthodox party' as has happened in other cases worldwide (Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy, 2016). Secondly, because it is related to the party's anti-Islamic attitude

²⁴ For the anti-Semitic attacks see <https://www.in.gr/2018/05/08/greece/antisimitismos-mia-pligi-pou-paramenei-anoixti-motivo-ton-epitheseon/> and the report on antisemitism of the German Foundation Heinrich-Böll https://gr.boell.org/sites/default/files/antisimitismos_lr.pdf (last accessed 12 August 2019).

²⁵ Metropolitan is a title in the hierarchy of the Greek-Orthodox Church, it is a local bishop responsible for a specific geographical area.

dominant in some Church circles and especially in the circles of the True Orthodox Christians. In this way, GD appears as the political protector of Orthodox Christianity in Greece, which is the dominant religion in Greek society, against external enemies. Among such enemies are Islam and Muslims, who are considered by the party to be an existential threat to the Greek religion. This has resulted in opposition to the construction of an official mosque in Athens in which GD plays a leading role together with some Church officials and religious groups. As explored more explicitly elsewhere (Sakellariou, 2020), this turn played a crucial role in the broader extreme-right milieu as GD took up one of the leading roles in the Islamophobia industry. Finally, as noted above, this turnabout on religion is related to wider conspiracy theories, especially those connecting the Jews or figures like George Soros with the plan to fill Greece and Europe with Muslims in what has been called 'White replacement theory' or 'Great replacement'.

5. Conclusions

This study of the historical origins, development and ideological positioning of GD, indicates that it is a fascist, neo-Nazi party. This differentiates it from other extreme-right parties across Europe such as the National Rally in France (formerly the Front National) or the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany. Following Paxton's (2004: 218) inclusive definition of fascism as 'a form of political behaviour marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cultures of unity, energy and purity' (see p.18 for full definition), we conclude that GD is a fascist political organisation and party. This is substantiated by the well-known historian of ideas, Roger Griffin (2012), who argues that a 'new consensus' has been formed among specialists in fascist studies, which stresses the primacy of the regenerative myth in fascist ideology, the primacy of a revolutionary, palingenetic national rebirth which redeems the nation from decline. Our research identified the presence of almost all of the elements identified by Paxton and Griffin as characteristics of fascism at the core of GD's ideology and political programme. Social disease and 'community decline' (Paxton, 2004) are the most common descriptions of the state of society, which makes national revolution a necessity, in GD rhetoric. The culture of 'unity' is ensured through the pursuit of class collaboration, the culture of 'energy' in the longing for activism, the culture of 'purity' in the ideal of a homogeneous nation and the expulsion of immigrants. The rejection by GD of political parties constitutes a refusal of the right of different groups of people to be organised and to struggle for political power and the subsequent accomplishment of their special goals. It is thus a rejection of core political rights, which confirms also what Paxton (2004) calls fascism's 'abandonment of democratic liberties'. Moreover, the goals of internal cleansing and external expansion, combined with the upgrade of the tool (the armed forces) which is necessary for the fulfilment of these goals are also set. Finally, Griffin's emphasis on national revolution, on national palingenesis and rebirth, is also satisfied. The only missing element identified is the absence in GD of 'collaboration with traditional elites' (Paxton, 2004). Thus, the historical evidence suggests that GD is a product of the international Neo-Nazi milieu with which it has been directly engaged for at least three decades.

Turning, to the role of grievance, humiliation and conspiracy theories, we find that all three play a central role in GD's ideology, political agenda and discourse. First of all, GD presents itself as the heir to the WWII Nazi legacy at a European and national level. This comes with the expression of feelings of grievance and humiliation stemming from the defeat of National-Socialist Germany. GD incorporates the humiliation that followed WWII and the effort to persecute and eliminate National-Socialist ideas. This had clearly influenced, as stated by GD, its formation and establishment in 1980s. From this perspective the role of memory is very important and should not be neglected when studying the emergence of extreme-right milieus. History in GD's case plays a central role both in praising the historic fascist and National-Socialist regimes in other European countries or the dictatorships of Greek political history. Moreover, while GD emphasises that, although in the Greek political sphere, the Right won the civil war of 1946-1949 it is left-wing ideology that has dominated the public sphere from 1974 onwards both in politics and in the

educational system. This is another grievance expressed by GD and a reason for the preparation of the new Dawn according to the party. From this perspective these findings confirm and extend what has been argued already about the role of institutional grievances in relation to the rise of GD and support for it during recent years (Lamprianou and Ellinas, 2017).

Narratives of humiliation and grievance come with the identification of those responsible in the form of conspiracy theories. The humiliation and grievance felt by GD are blamed on Jews, above all else. According to GD, Jews are responsible for the international interest on the Holocaust after the end of WWII, for the defamation of National-Socialist ideas and for all the evils that European civilisation has faced (e.g. the rise of Judeo-Christianity, the domination of left-wing and communist ideas, even for conspiring against Greece and Europe through the support of immigration flows). This analysis, suggests that grievance and humiliation, combined with conspiracy theories, are important in the radicalisation process.

The study also finds that the party's turn towards another religious paradigm, more mainstream and distant from the group's initial paganism, imitates similar cases of other extreme-right parties (Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy, 2016). This shift effectively hijacks religion in order to attract voters and support for GD and achieve the party's goals. This change during the party's successful years (2010-2019) managed to get partial support from the Orthodox Church, which appears to maintain close relations with authoritarian regimes and the extreme-right (Sakellariou, 2019). This shift is important because despite GD's anti-Semitism, and initial arguments against Judeo-Christianity, it signifies the party's political opportunism and search for allies and also the need to create a common ground against Islam and Muslims. Conspiracy theories are central to this, since Jews - and other invisible powers - are considered to be trying to eradicate Greek-Orthodox religion and culture through the enforcement of immigration.

The question of whether GD has contributed to the growth of cumulative extremism remains unresolved. From the group's inception, violence was at the core of its organisation and purpose. However, initially the main target was political opponents of the left. This has not changed over the years but other targets have been added; immigrants from the Eastern bloc in the 1990s and Muslims since the 2000s. It is true that clashes between GD members and leftists and anarchists have been recorded from the very first weeks of GD's emergence and activism and this continued even after the party's electoral success in 2010. Such clashes, however, could not be described as an escalation of violence, even when this relates to clashes with Anarchists and Leftists as mentioned in the section on the role of violence. Indeed, it could be argued that, in this case, despite the rise of violence against Muslim immigrants from mid-2000s and especially since 2009-2010, there is a notable absence of violent reactions on the part of those subjected to such violence.

The historical research conducted for this study is important because it suggests that GD is not just one, of many, contemporary extreme-right parties prepared to abide by the rules of the democratic game and abandon political violence and its idealisation. In contrast to the shift of the extreme right in other countries away from fascist and national socialist ideologies, the example of GD confirms that a distinct fascist tradition, in line with current theorisations of fascism, lives on in the modern era. More specifically, with regard to the Greek context, historical research has been crucial because it further supports the argument that GD is not just the outcome of the 2010 economic crisis, but has deeper ideological and historical roots that should not be neglected when approaching the GD phenomenon. Moreover, it confirms existing literature on the role of grievances, humiliation - especially when it comes to immigration (Ravndal, 2018) and conspiracy theories (Psarras, 2013) - with regard to the rise of the extreme-right as well as the role of religion and its appropriation from the extreme-right for political purposes (Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy, 2016). As a consequence, it could be argued that the study of contemporary radicalisation should take into consideration the role of historical memory and narratives of grievance and humiliation as well as conspiracy theories, in order to understand its development, nature and legacy and explain the role and place of violence within radical milieus.

6. References

Aggelis, V. (2006) *'Why people are happy and smile father?': Lessons of national education and youth propaganda in the Metaxas dictatorship years*, Athens: Vivliorama (in Greek).

Alava, S., Frau-Meigs, D. and Hassan, G. (2017) *Youth and violent extremism on social media: Mapping the research*, Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Al-Rawi, A. (2017) *Islam on You-Tube: Online protests, debates and extremism*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Awan, I. (2017) 'Cyber-extremism: Isis and the power of social media', *Social Science and Public Policy*, 54 (2): 138-149.

Busher, J. and Macklin, G. (2015) 'Interpreting 'cumulative extremism': Six proposals for enhancing conceptual clarity', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27 (5): 884-905.

Christopoulos, D. (ed.) (2014) *The deep state and the extreme-right*, Athens: Nissos (in Greek).

Conway, M. (2012) 'From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The emergence of the Internet as a new form of violent radical milieu', *CTX: Combating Terrorism Exchange*, 2 (4): 12-22.

Conway, M. (2017) 'Determining the role of the Internet in violent extremism and terrorism: Six suggestions for progressing research', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40 (1): 77-98.

Copsey, N. (2004) *Contemporary British Fascism: The British National Party and the quest for legitimacy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Eatwell, R. (1996) 'On defining the 'Fascist minimum': The centrality of ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1 (3): 303-319.

Eatwell, R. (2009) 'The nature of 'generic fascism': the 'fascist minimum' and the 'fascist matrix'', in C.Iordachi, (ed.) *Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives*, Abingdon: Routledge.

Eleftheratos, D. (2015) *Frauds in khaki: Economic 'miracles' and victims during the Junta*, Athens: Topos (in Greek).

Ellinas, A. and Lamprianou, I. (2016) 'How far right local party organizations develop: The organizational buildup of the Greek Golden Dawn', *Party Politics*, Online first published April 2016. doi:10.1177/1354068816641337.

Ellinas, A. (2012) 'LAOS and the Greek far right since 1974', in A.Mammone, E. Godin and B.Jenkins, (eds.), *Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational*, London: Routledge, pp.124-140.

Ellinas, A. (2010) *The media and the far right in Western Europe: Playing the nationalist card*, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Georgiadou, V. (2013) 'Right-wing populism and extremism: the rapid rise of Golden Dawn in crisis-ridden Greece', in R.Melzer and S.Serafin (eds.), *Right-wing extremism in Europe*, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp.75-101.

Georgiadou, V. (2019) *The Extreme-right in Greece: 1965-2018*, Athens: Kastaniotis (in Greek).

Griffin, R. (1991) *The nature of fascism*, London: Pinter.

Griffin, R. (2000) 'Revolution from the right: fascism', in D.Parker (ed.) *Revolutions and the revolutionary tradition in the West 1560-1991*, London: Routledge, pp. 185-201.

- Griffin, R. (2003). 'The palingenetic core of generic fascist ideology', in A.Campi (ed.), *Che cos'è il fascismo? Interpretazioni e prospettive di ricerche*, Roma: Ideazione editrice, pp. 97-122.
- Griffin, R. (2008a) 'Hooked crosses and forking paths. The Fascist dynamics of the Third Reich' in M. Feldman (ed.), *A Fascist Century. Essays by Roger Griffin*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 83-113.
- Griffin, R. (2008b) 'Fascism's new faces (and New Facelessness) in the 'post-fascist' epoch', in M. Feldman (ed.), *A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 181-202.
- Griffin, R. (2012) 'Studying fascism in a post fascist age: From new consensus to new wave?', *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies*, 1 (1):1-17.
- Klausen, J. (2015) 'Tweeting the Jihad: social media networks of western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38: 1–22.
- Koehler, D. (2014) 'The radical online: Individual radicalization processes and the role of the Internet', *Journal for Deradicalization*, 15 (1): 116-134.
- Koronaïou, A., Lagos, E., Sakellariou, A., Chiotaki-Poulou, I., Kymionis, St. (2015) 'Golden Dawn, austerity and young people: The rise of fascist extremism among young people in contemporary Greek society', in H. Pilkington and G. Pollock (eds.) *Radical futures? Youth, politics and activism in contemporary Europe*, Oxford: Willey-Blackwell, pp. 231-249.
- Koronaïou, A., Lagos, E., Sakellariou, A. (2015) 'Singing for race and nation: Fascism and racism in Greek youth music', in P.A. Simpson and H. Druxes (eds.), *Digital Media Strategies of the Far Right in Europe and the United States*, Lanham: Lexington, pp.193-213.
- Kousouris, D. (2014) *Collaborators' trials 1946-1949*, Athens: Polis (in Greek).
- Lamprianou, I. and Ellinas, A. (2017) 'Institutional grievances and right-wing extremism: Voting for Golden Dawn in Greece', *South European Society and Politics*, 22 (1): 43-60.
- Marketos, S. (2006) *How I kissed Mussolini: The first steps of Greek fascism*, Athens: Vvliorama (in Greek).
- Marzouki, N., McDonnell, D. and Roy, O. (eds.) (2016) *Saving the people: How populists hijack religion*, London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. and Kaderbhai, N. (2017) *Research perspectives on online radicalisation: A literature review 2006-2016*, London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London.
- Medina-Serrano, J.-C., Shahrazaye, M., Papakyriakopoulos, O., Hegelich, S. (2018) 'The rise of the AfD: A social media analysis', in *Proceedings of International Conference on Social Media and Society*, Toronto, ON, Canada, July 19–21, 2019 (SMSociety '19) [http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/3330000/3328562/p214-Serrano.pdf?ip=46.176.129.164&id=3328562&acc=OA&key=4D4702B0C3E38B35%2E4D4702B0C3E38B35%2E4004736D6F76EED6&_acm_=1564408441_998f70d19a025efa9b7280d557d2786b](http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/3330000/3328562/p214-Serrano.pdf?ip=46.176.129.164&id=3328562&acc=OA&key=4D4702B0C3E38B35%2E4D4702B0C3E38B35%2E4D4702B0C3E38B35%2E4004736D6F76EED6&_acm_=1564408441_998f70d19a025efa9b7280d557d2786b) (last accessed July 29, 2019).
- Mpochotis, A. (2003) *The radical right: Anti-parliamentarianism, conservatism and incomplete fascism in Greece, 1864-1911*, Athens: Vivliorama (in Greek).
- Neudert, L.-M., Kollanyi, B., and Howard, N.P. (2017) *Junk news and bots during the German parliamentary election: What are German voters sharing over Twitter?*, Data Memo 2017.7. Oxford, UK: Project on Computational Propaganda, <https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/junk-news-and-bots-during-the-german-parliamentary-election-what-are-german-voters-sharing-over-twitter/> (last accessed July 29, 2019).
- Paraskeva-Veloudogianni, D. (2015) *The Enemy, the blood, the avenger*, Athens: Nissos (in Greek).

- Paxton, R.O. (2004) *The Anatomy of Fascism*, New York: Knopf.
- Payne, S. (1995) *A History of Fascism 1914–1945*, London: UCL Press.
- Pearson, E. (2015) 'The case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for theory on online radicalization, ISIS women, and the gendered jihad', *Policy & Internet*, 8 (2): 5-33.
- Psarras, D. (2010) *The secret hand of Karatzafaris: The television rebirth of the Greek extreme-right*, Athens: Alexandria (in Greek).
- Psarras, D. (2012) *The black book of Golden Dawn*, Athens: Polis (in Greek).
- Psarras, D. (2013) *The best seller of hate: The protocols of the elders of Zion*, Athens: Polis (in Greek).
- Ravndal, J.A. (2018) 'Explaining right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances, opportunities and polarisation', *European Journal of Political Research*, 57:845-866.
- Rogan, H. (2006) *Jihadism online: A study of how al-Qaida and radical Islamist groups use the Internet for terrorist purposes*, FFI Report, Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.
- Sakellariou, A. (2015a) 'Anti-Islamic public discourse in contemporary Greece: The reproduction of religious panic', in A.Elbasani and O.Roy (eds.) *The Revival of Islam in the Balkans: From Identity to Religiosity*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.42-61.
- Sakellariou, A. (2015b) 'Golden Dawn and its appeal to the Greek youth', Athens: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/athen/11501.pdf> (last accessed August 13, 2019).
- Sakellariou, A. (2016) 'Islam and politics of fear in Greece: Migration, terrorism and 'ghosts' from the past', *Nationalities Papers*, 45 (4): 511-523.
- Sakellariou, A. (2019) 'Authoritarianism and the Orthodox Church of Greece: Historical and contemporary aspects', Paper for the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Office in Greece.
- Sakellariou, A. (2020) *Historical case studies of interactive radicalisation: Greece*, DARE Deliverable Report.
- Tsiakalos, G. (2015). *For the Nazi Extreme-Right and the Political Routine in Times of Crisis*. Thessaloniki: Epikentro (in Greek).
- Vasilopoulou, S. and Halikiopoulou, D. (2015) *The Golden Dawn's 'nationalist solution': Explaining the rise of the far-right in Greece*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Von Behr, I., Reding, A., Edwards, Ch., and Gribbon, L. (2013) *Radicalisation in the digital era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism*, Brussels and Cambridge: RAND Europe. Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf (last accessed July 29, 2019).