

Report on the Comparative Analysis of European Counter- Radicalisation, Counter-Terrorist and De-Radicalisation Policies



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Dialogue About Radicalisation and Equality

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a critical overview of security policy, legislation and procedures on preventing radicalisation and extremism from a comparative European perspective. It is based on the analysis of a total of 100 documents including: strategies (13), policies (4), legal documents (12), programmes (33), action plans (25) and existing research studies of policies (13). Documents were collected from 16 countries: 12 EU members (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom); and 4 non-EU but European countries (Norway, Russia, Turkey, Switzerland). 13 documents refer strictly to the EU level. The study also draws on interviews with 25 international experts in the fields of radicalisation, counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism from 13 countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, the Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey, Spain, the United Kingdom and Israel). The study was primarily qualitative and took place from 1 May 2017 to 10 February 2019.

The key conclusion to be drawn from the expert interview element of the study is that radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism are processes inherently social in nature. A societal and educational approach to countering these threats is thus essential. Current security, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies do not sufficiently take into account long-term and socio-economic factors either at the national or European level. A focus on the local community level is also crucial when countering radicalisation and the study identified a number of locally-oriented programmes being adopted to address radicalisation, which employ a bottom-up logic rather than centralised and top-down logic. Countries are increasingly investing in training programmes for schools, teachers, police officers and security professionals to work at the community level. There is an agreed need among stakeholders for reliable evaluation of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies and programmes. It is crucial therefore to include in all counter/de-radicalisation policies and programmes impact assessment measures that ensure rigorous and fair evaluation by the practitioners themselves, as well as by funders, states and civil society representatives.

The analysis of policies, supported by the insights from expert interviewees, generated a series of recommendations for EU institutions, Member States and NGOs. These include: encouraging states to incorporate impact assessment measures in their prevention and de-radicalisation policies and fund projects with monitoring mechanisms and an evaluation component; promoting a European 'bank of ideas' compiling solutions to address radicalisation developed at national and local levels that can be used as benchmarks and models for adaptation to other legal and cultural contexts; developing a multi-agency approach when designing and implementing prevention and counter-radicalisation policies, taking more specific account of issues at the local level and including (but preserving the autonomy of) NGOs where appropriate; and focusing counter-radicalisation narratives on building a 'shared future' rather than simply recognising and respecting differences.

1. Introduction

The aim of the policy analysis detailed in this report was to provide a critical overview of security policy, legislation and procedures on preventing radicalisation and extremism from a comparative European perspective. This involved, first of all, identifying and analysing relevant official and operative documents at the EU institutions and individual countries level (national and local) designed and implemented to counter radicalisation in order to draw out the similarities and differences in national approaches in countering violent extremism. Subsequently, adopting a synthesis approach, findings from these different national contexts were analysed to reveal recent dynamics both in the process of radicalisation and in designing and implementing policies to counteract it. This synthesis of knowledge in the field will allow us to understand better the current situation and the direction(s) in which we are heading.

A second, more specific, aim was to draw analytic conclusions on the development of current policy recommendations for the prevention of radicalisation in particular at the EU level. In current times of rising polarisation and radicalisation of European societies, comprehensive, comparative and up-to-date knowledge about the state and trends in counter-radicalisation, de-radicalisation and counter-terrorist policies is essential to improve the process of designing and implementing such policies. The summaries and recommendations included at the end of this report are designed to contribute not only to academic but also policy debates on the current dynamics of the threat of radicalisation and tools to counteract it. Thus, this report formed the basis for preparation of two policy briefs on *The Effectiveness of Counter-radicalisation Policies in Europe: what the evidence shows* (July 2019) and *The Effectiveness of Counter-radicalisation Policies: Preliminary Research Findings and Recommendations from European Experts in De-radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism* (April 2018)¹.

2. Method

The comparative analysis of counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorist policies was conducted using the following two research instruments:

- Interviews with 25 international experts on radicalisation and counter-terrorism² conducted between January and March 2018. Our interviewees came from 13 countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, the Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey, Spain, the United Kingdom and Israel. The interviews were dynamic and in-depth exchanges with - in the vast majority of cases - practitioners from the field of radicalisation, counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism. The interviews informed the policy analysis in a number of ways. They supplemented the search for policy documents (at all levels) and informed the development of the analytical criteria according to which all examined documents were grouped and thematically ordered. The interviews also allowed the testing of initial working hypotheses, helped establish additional ones and contributed significantly to formulating our final recommendations.
- Compilation and comparative analysis of a total of 100 documents including: strategies (13), policies (4), legal documents (12), programmes (33), action plans (25) and existing research studies of policies (13). Documents were collected from 16 countries: 12 EU members (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden,

¹ These documents can be found at: <http://www.dare-h2020.org/publications.html>

² The list of experts interviewed can be found in Appendix 8.1.

United Kingdom); and 4 non-EU but European countries (Norway, Russia, Turkey, Switzerland). 13 documents refer strictly to the EU level. These are all listed and described briefly in the DARE Database of Documents in Appendix 8.2. This study was primarily qualitative and took place from 1 May 2017 to 10 February 2019.

This final report is structured to detail findings from each of these two data sets in turn.

2.1 The policy database

This policy analysis aimed to identify and analyse counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorist policies/documents in relation to three specific foci of the DARE research project: 1) young people; 2) radicalisation milieus and trajectories; 3) and societal and long-term approaches to countering radicalisation. To this end, we employed a multi-method and staged process of comparative analysis:

Figure 1. Policy database analysis process



2.1.1 Stage One

The initial compilation of counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism policies generated more than 150 policy documents designed and/or implemented mostly between 2000 and 2017. The choice of this time period reflects the fact that it is since the al-Qaeda coordinated terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 that the process of becoming a terrorist has become referred to as ‘radicalisation’ and radicalisation research has constituted a core element of terrorism studies.

The first version of the database was created drawing on policies and documents at the national level recommended by consortium partners and constructed according to the following criteria:

- Document title and date;
- Geographic level (local, national, EU, international);
- Type of document (strategy, policy, legal, programme, action plan, study);
- Country of origin (if applicable);
- Main policy area, goal or means.

2.1.2 Stage Two

The second stage of developing the database drew on the provisional analysis of interviews with experts and consortium-level discussions. This led to the establishment of a database that focused more specifically on the core themes of the DARE project and which reflected the most recent trends in policy-making signaled by interviewed experts. This generated a more targeted and coherent database. Importantly, at this stage it was decided to remove 'international' level policies from our scope in order to concentrate on the EU and the wider European level (including Norway, Turkey and Russia which are represented within the DARE consortium). To facilitate the targeting of the database towards the key themes of the DARE research agenda, we established a narrower set of inclusion criteria. For inclusion in the database, policies had to meet (a minimum of one of) the following additional criteria:

- 1) Be concerned with long term causes/solutions as evidenced in: a societal (including economic, cultural, moral, ideological or religious) or educational approach; attention to social and territorial differences/inequalities, integration frames or social and cultural cohesion; or concern with the, role (negative or positive) of the internet.
- 2) Have a focus on youth.
- 3) Have a focus on strengthening communication/relationships with European citizens, in particular with youth.
- 4) Be concerned with localities, neighbourhoods, communities, family, schools, religious or civic networks, youth organisations, sports centres, gangs, paramilitary organisations or prisons.
- 5) Be concerned with external (or global) threats/factors, the influence/actions of non-EU countries (mainly in the Middle East and Africa), returning foreign fighters or the spill-over effect of tensions into European countries through diaspora from conflict-torn regions.
- 6) Reflect collaboration with other states, mostly within the EU, in relation to counter-terrorism but, especially, prevention of radicalisation.

In addition, in order to establish the relevant significance (or robustness) of policies/programmes, data were gathered also relating to:

- 7) The degree to which policies transverse policy fields, departments/offices and ministries, at what hierarchical level they are discussed and implemented and how they relate to key specificities in legislative frameworks and historical-political contexts.
- 8) The budgets provided for implementation.
- 9) Evidence as to whether the policies or programmes have been evaluated, and, if so, by whom.

At this second stage of database compilation and analysis, the opportunity was taken to identify recently adopted policies (up to the end of 2018). At this stage, policies that did not meet at least one of the additional inclusion criteria above were removed from the database. This adjustment to our established criteria allowed us to generate a database of the most recent policies but focus on those of most interest to the DARE research agenda, that is those concerned with long term causes of, and solutions to, radicalisation. This resulted in a total of 100 counter-radicalisation and, counter-terrorism policies and de-radicalisation programmes which do not exhaustively reflect the counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism policy field, but are tightly linked to key DARE research questions (see DARE Database of documents, Appendix 8.2).

It should be noted also that the analysis of policy presented in this report focuses on counter-radicalisation, counter-terrorism policies and prevention of radicalisation policies, strategies and programmes rather than on de-radicalisation programmes since the latter was the specific object of another deliverable report - the *Stand-alone de-radicalisation programme evaluation tool for stakeholders* – within the same package of work (D3.1). In contrast to those programmes – which are focused on reversing radicalisation processes at either/or both the behavioural and attitudinal level (Schmid, 2013) - our comparative analysis focuses on policies and programmes aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path to terrorism. ‘Counter-radicalisation’ is used here therefore broadly to refer to a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists (UN/CTITF, 2008).

2.1.3 Stage Three

The final stage was the analysis of the 100 policies finally selected as meeting our criteria set out in the DARE Database of documents (see Appendix 8.2) as well as the 25 expert interviews.

To facilitate analysis, both policy documents and interview transcripts were thematically coded. Coding was undertaken manually by three researchers. Analysis was conducted in three steps. First, both the policy documents and the interview transcripts were analysed according to all our criteria but differentiated by European, national or local level. Subsequently, a comparative analysis of national contexts was undertaken including between EU and non-EU countries. Finally, data from the study of the policy documents was tested against findings from interviews with experts as part of a process of data triangulation.

It is also important to note the limitations of the policy analysis, which arise firstly, from the particular foci of attention determined by the original DARE research focus and, secondly, by the selection of the nine analytic categories listed above. A third limitation is that the database of policies consists of many legal documents that are key elements of national policy but are quite disparate in nature (since they may meet only one of the nine criteria); this makes statistical generalisation on the basis of the study difficult. Finally, the results are limited by the language competences of the research team; policies in five languages - English, German, Spanish, Dutch and Polish - were analysed.

2.2 The expert interviews

A total of 25 interviews with international experts³ from policy and practice in fields related to counter-radicalisation, counter-extremism and de-radicalisation were conducted, transcribed and analysed. The interviews helped to explore the initial research question, which concerned the presence or absence of a long-term, societal approach in counter-radicalisation policies. Each interview lasted about 50 minutes, during which interviewees were asked nine questions about radicalisation and how to counter it. The interview transcripts were coded manually using a thematic coding strategy. Experts expressed a wide range of views and described very different methods of combating radicalisation. Three of the 25 interviewees preferred to remain anonymous and thus the information provided by them is included in the analysis, but not attributed to named individuals.

³ As noted above, as the research design was refined, the scope of the analysis was narrowed to the EU/wider European level. However, two extra-EU expert interviewees – both from Israel - had already been included in this part of the research and their interviews were included in the interview data analysed.

Almost all interviewees were practitioners of counter-radicalisation, countering violent extremism (CVE) and de-radicalisation – representing a range of institutions at the national (including local) and the EU level (RAN, Europol). The interviewed experts came from Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, the Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey, Spain, the United Kingdom and Israel. Interviews were conducted between January and March 2018.

All interviews were conducted using a common interview guide, developed in collaboration with consortium partners. The partners also helped to generate the list of experts for potential interviews, facilitated their recruitment and, in some cases, conducted interviews with experts in their native languages and provided analysis in English. The selected experts provided not only their assessment on current dynamics of radicalisation processes in Europe and on the strategies to counter or prevent them but also, in the course of discussion, information on new or recent policies at the national or European level.

This part of the research resulted in a 60-page working report of findings (in English) including key quotes from interviews. Section 3 of the current report provides a much shorter summary of the findings.

3. Experts' views on radicalisation and counter terrorism policies in EU and wider Europe

Below we set out, first, an overview of the professional backgrounds of the selected interviewees before summarising the interview analysis according to eight key themes which emerged.

3.1 Experience in the area of counter/de-radicalisation and security policies

Despite a diverse range of backgrounds, trajectories and current positions, all interviewees had expert knowledge in the field of radicalisation and terrorism. In terms of current positions, the largest group among our interviewees were those who worked as public servants (n=14), while academics and professionals from NGOs constituted the smallest represented groups. A large proportion of the interviewees had academic/think-tank backgrounds, mostly related to radicalisation issues, prior to taking up current positions as policy makers in this field (for more details see Appendix 8.1). Included in the interviewee sample were four police personnel who worked at EU, national and local level. Of the total number of interviewees, five operate at the EU level, specifically in the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and EUROPOL.

3.2 Current dynamics of radicalisation (terrorism) processes in Europe and policies to counter it

The first theme emerging from the interviews concerns the societal relevance of radicalisation. Interviewees agreed that **there is a growing threat from both Islamist and nationalist violent extremism in Europe**, as an outcome of radicalisation and a new dynamic of interaction between them which co-produces tensions. Interviewees expressed a particular concern with the latter tendency of so-called 'cumulative radicalisation' - generally defined as 'the way in which one form of extremism can feed off and magnify other forms [of extremism]' (Eatwell, 2006).

I do see a growing reciprocal radicalisation in both fields, so basically in all fields: far right and jihadi extremism, I see growing tendencies to be more extreme, to be more violent. [...] We can see in virtually all statistics the number of intercepted or carried out jihadi terror attacks in the last years went up very intensively and the same is true for far-right terror attacks or far right extremism and violence. Forms of violent organisation in Germany for example, the AFD [Alternative für Deutschland] party entered the Federal Parliament. We saw sky rocketing of violent attacks against refugee homes, asylum seeker homes. I do see a lot more dynamics between these groups, really increasing each other's perception of the enemy. There is a strong tendency of Western populations to shift more to extreme forms of politics. (Expert on counter-radicalisation, DE⁴).

As indicated by the expert from Germany above, this process of radicalisation is also referred to as 'reciprocal radicalisation' or 'co-radicalisation' (Knott et al., 2018) and is important because it does not reduce violent extremism to the outcome of isolated psychological variables or socio-economic demographics but understands it as a situated and relational phenomenon which needs to be located, contextualised and understood within a wider interactional frame (Malthaner, 2017; Alimi, Bosi and Demetriou, 2012). However, as Busher and Macklin (2015) have demonstrated, it is also important not to allow the notion of 'cumulative radicalisation' to conflate a narrow process of interactions between individual groups with a more generalised deterioration of community relations or to reduce the dynamics of radicalisation to specific movement-counter-movement relations and thereby ignore the important influence of the wider political, social and cultural environment (and its actors including the state and the media) on radicalisation trends.

Another dynamic of the threat noted by interviewees is related to **the growing pace and scale of radicalisation and terrorism linked to global terrorist network operations**. This is illustrated by the following observation by one of our experts from the UK:

For the UK the main, the challenge for us at the moment is the pace and scale of the threat. And counter terrorism policing is at record levels in terms of demands upon it. Both in terms of our investigations and in terms of the work that's coming into Prevent. [...] The demand is higher now than it has ever been. The game changed when al-Qaeda in Iraq split from al-Qaeda and became Daesh. Then you saw a new movement with a completely different set of rules, with a significant reach, backed up through social media, across the globe that attracted people into its narrative. We started to see a change in pace when the Arab Spring started [...] but that certainly picked up, as Daesh started to take more ground, and were able to demonstrate that they control land. The methods by which they did that, through the use of social media, were a significant challenge and that issue still endures. [...] and I think what we're seeing now an increase in far-right activity in the United Kingdom. (David Wells, North West Regional Prevent Coordinator, UK)

⁴ Expert interviewees are cited using their name or area of expertise (if they chose to remain anonymous as in this case) and country. Countries are referred to using ISO 3166-1 country codes.

However, in other countries, such as Poland, the scale of violent extremism - either far-right or Islamist – has been much smaller. In spite of the significant rise of ultranationalist and anti-Semitic tendencies, including racist violence, there is no comparable dynamic of the mobilisation of far-right activists as, for example, in Germany or, recently, in France where increasing numbers of terrorist plots and attacks organised by far-right groups have been observed.

If we take four countries - Israel, France, Germany and Russia – and consider the number of radicalised attitudes, then the scale of radicalism in Poland is tiny in comparison with each of these countries. In Poland, there has never been a demonstration under the slogan of killing Jews, which took place in Germany. In Poland, cars are not burned in the cause of socio-cultural warfare. (Andrzej Zybertowicz, Social Adviser to the President of the Republic of Poland, PL)

The increase in radicalisation in prisons was identified by the experts as a particular problem. This phenomenon, they said, had two distinct dimensions. First, prisons have become one of the main milieus for recruitment of supporters of extreme ideology, in particular Jihadist ideology. Secondly, in the EU, a considerable rise has been observed of cases of individuals with criminal backgrounds - often after imprisonment for minor crimes – becoming radicalised (recruited into Islamist or terrorist organisations) and going on to commit violent acts. This nexus between crime and radicalisation is an increasingly regular focus of national debates, both in academic circles and in policy and practitioner communities. Although this increased attention might suggest this issue is new, in fact the entwinement of criminal and terrorist/extremist networks is well established. The context in which this intersection plays a role in defining the threat to our national security, is however subject to change.

The typical dynamics of the radicalisation process is first and foremost vulnerable people, who struggle to create an identity and who struggle with belonging, either in their local communities or in the country as a whole. Many have criminal backgrounds [or] a past involving drugs or other criminal activity. (Linda Noor, General Manager Minotent - Minority Policy Think Tank, NO)

Given the potential for radicalisation within prisons noted above, however, Soraya Amrani Mekki, deputy president of the French National Committee for Consultancy on Human Rights, warns against imprisonment in the fight against radicalisation and terrorism. In France, she argues, too many individuals have been imprisoned in an attempt to solve the problem of radicalisation when this may in fact be a factor in producing the problem.

One of the most important factors in the current dynamics of radicalisation is the spill-over effect of tensions into European countries, through diaspora from conflict torn regions (Syria, Iraq) and particularly, influence and actions of the so-called ISIS foreign fighters. The majority of interviewed experts - but in particular two experts from the Netherlands, two from the UK and one from Russia underlined the rising challenge - even threat - presented by returnees (EU citizens - adults and children) from Syria. Magda Rooze of ARQ Dutch Psycho-trauma Expert Group says her biggest concern is the attempt to return home of individuals – but especially families - from territories formerly held by ISIS:

In the Netherlands, we are also especially worried about returning families, families who will return with children. [...] We know that at the moment there are some 80 children still there in refugee camps in Northern Syria and Iraq, and they want to come back, and some have come back. And then the question is what do these families need? Are they a security risk? What are their needs in psycho-social support? So, these are really, let's say, new challenges for us. (Magda Rooze, ARQ Psycho-trauma Expert Group, NL)

The returnees issue is only one part of the challenge. The heightened flow of refugees since 2015, alongside the rising terrorist threat in relation to ISIS, brings new pressures. Despite his significant professional experience of managing community issues, including housing of migrants and asylum seekers, prior to joining counter-terrorism police, UK expert interviewee David Wells, viewed the current situation – when individuals and groups of immigrants are arriving from complicated conflict zones – as particularly demanding. It required, he said, not only knowledge of the profiles of those arriving but a real understanding of the wider context of the Middle East, including the activity of extremists and terrorist groups that operate in the region.

Alexander Verkhovsky, from the Sova Center for Information and Analysis in Moscow (Russia) is also afraid that the recent slight decline in Islamist violence in the country – because many jihadists had left for Syria and Iraq – might be reversed now that 'ISIS is almost done'. He also points to concerns about 'excessive' counter-extremism measures that are not commensurate with the level of threat:

The measures of counter extremism which we see in our country, I would say are somewhat excessive, and, of course the problem is that measures of counteraction, the intensity in their approach, do not relate much to the dynamics of radical activity itself. It's like two parallel trends that are not much related to one another. (Alexander Verkhovsky, Sova Center for Information and Analysis in Moscow, RU)

Another crucial external dynamic of radicalisation that emerges from our interviews is a sense of injustice among Muslim communities in Europe as a result of how their 'brothers in faith' are treated in various parts of the world. Linda Noor – from the Minority Policy Think Tank, Norway – stated that one of the drivers for radicalisation among some European Muslims is the feeling that Western countries are standing by, not intervening, when Muslims are being killed in war or are the victims of mass murder such as that in Myanmar. Thus, while ISIS has been defeated as an organisation, she argues, ideologically it is alive and active and takes advantage of this sentiment of injustice. In this context, returning foreign fighters who still support jihadi ideology constitute an additional threat not only for the 'hard' security system but because they can be very active in recruiting new supporters. For this reason, Linda Noor argues, security strategies in the EU should have a greater focus on countering ideological (especially Islamist) influence on European youth.

This recognition that counter-radicalisation work needs to appreciate that jihadist ideology builds on a real sense of injustice among some populations speaks to a widely held view among our expert interviewees that **there is a need for a more long-term, socio-cultural approach in counter-radicalisation policies, reflecting the profound, long-term nature of the causes of radicalisation (including social inequalities, geo-political conflicts and ideology)**. According to many of our interviewees, one of the main causes of radicalisation is the economic crisis. In particular, the 2008

financial and socio-economic crisis was attributed to having led to limited labour market prospects for the most vulnerable people. This was cited as a 'major trigger' for radicalisation (right wing and Islamist), for example, by an expert interviewee from EUROPOL. This expert recognised the importance of macro (societal) level, meso (network) and micro (individual) levels of radicalisation and considered the expansion of access to radical content and peers via the internet and geopolitical factors such as the conflict in Syria (which created the opportunity for participation in jihadist conflict) to be, alongside economic crisis, the three key societal level factors driving radicalisation in Europe (Europol expert, DE). In many cases our experts noted a growing political and social polarisation which was increasingly leading to violent extremism. Links between the lack of economic stability and an increase in radicalisation was a particular concern in Greece.

In contrast, two expert interviewees from Israel emphasised the profoundly cultural dimensions to countering Islamist radicalisation. They stressed the need for state institutions dealing with this type of radicalisation to pay more attention to the cultural and religious identity - not only of those radicalised, but of the European Muslim population more widely - in designing and implementing preventive policy. In this context, they criticised specifically the French so-called 'pure republican' approach according to which radicalised French Muslims should be simply re-socialised according to the French social, institutional and cultural model without any reference to the Muslim community and Islamic system of values. Our interviewees stated that these 'republican educators' whether from state institutions or the NGO community – will never gain the confidence of radicalised citizens of Muslim culture. Therefore, effective counter-radicalisation policy should include a long-term strategy to gain the trust of European Muslims in order that Muslim communities themselves take the lead in subduing narratives of radical ideology (Boaz Ganor, Eitan Azani, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, IL).

A number of interviewees, however, suggested that the root causes of radicalisation were to be found outside Europe. For Sebastien Boussois, researcher in political sciences from Brussels, the priority was to improve relations between Europe and the Arab world and gain a better understanding of the problem by looking at it from the other side. Similarly, Hamit Bozarsan from Turkey - an International Scholar on Islamist movements and the Kurdish issue in Turkey - suggested that the main problem is in the Middle East, not in Europe. Since the sources of radicalisation lie there, he argues, then only if the problem is addressed in that region, can we understand, and successfully counter, the processes taking place in Europe. However, Maarten Van de Donk, Manager at the RAN Centre of Excellence in the Netherlands, warned against talking about Europe as a whole and emphasised that every country should be treated as an 'individual case' requiring contextualised understanding of the concerns people have, the groups that emerge and the solutions that are needed. This was reiterated by two Polish experts who pointed to the relatively small scale of Islamist radicalisation in Poland in comparison with other countries although, in Poland too, the impact of the rise of the Islamic State on radicalisation could be felt.

Experts recognised that **social media has a particularly strong impact on young people's vision of the world and thus contributes to the generation of their radical – both Islamist and far-right – beliefs.** Peter Knoope, a Dutch expert from the International Centre for Counterterrorism, for example, noted that the amount of time spent on the internet (not least as a consequence of unemployment) meant increasing encounters with radical content, and radical peers, which could lead to 'echo chambers'. However, interviewees suggest it is important also not to overestimate the influence of such new media. Experts noted a growing lack of trust in content and tools encountered on the internet among youth.

This suggests that other milieus where radicalisation processes take place require equal attention. These include: families, schools, religious networks and facilities, political parties, youth organisations, sports centres, clubs, gangs, neighbourhoods, paramilitary organisations, demonstrations or prisons. The potential positive effects of the internet should however also not be underestimated (e.g. providing a forum for public debate). With a view to reducing the risk of radicalisation (both Islamist and far-right), experts highlighted the need to invest more in strengthening communication/relationships with younger cohorts of Europeans, including through the use of social media.

We have to distinguish between several levels: the societal level, individual level and in between we have the network level. So, this is another factor, societal you can say, the rise of the internet, access to radical content, and radical peers, which lead to, well, sort of echo chambers, where people amplify each other's anger and they also can look up only information that confirms their prejudices. (Peter Knoope, International Centre for Counterterrorism, NL)

Finally, expert interviewees also pointed to the importance of recognising the equal role of men and women in current radicalisation dynamics. In the interviews, it was suggested that female radicalisation, or radicalisation from a gendered perspective is under-researched:

Framings of radicalised women are often stereotyped and outdated, usually implying that women are first and foremost victims rather than active agents and presenting women as having personal rather than political motives for becoming involved. This may impact researchers, politicians and others working on implementing preventative measures against radicalisation. There is a need for more research on the topic, and to make sure that we can study both male and female radicals and terrorists through nuanced and updated lenses. (Linda Noor, Minority Policy Think Tank, NO)

3.3 New approaches to countering radicalisation: local, national and European levels

Expert interviews revealed that the best, recent policies often operate at municipal and regional level. The fight against radicalisation remains focused on the local, community level, in particular through local efforts to improve social cohesion and policing.

Expert interviewees see building resilience within communities as one of the basic pillars of counter radicalisation and thus they envisage counter-radicalisation processes as being, to a large degree, led by communities. This community approach is not a new one of course as demonstrated by the longstanding RAN recommendations on this as well as the experiences of countries such as the Netherlands. Nonetheless, locally based social work and investment in human capital have been neglected in the EU over the last 10 years as a consequence of the 2008 economic crisis. This – as articulated by Soraya Amrani Mekki from the French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights – has come back to haunt us in the form of different processes of radicalisation:

In order to fight terrorism effectively, we need to focus on social work, on educators, on social workers that will establish and keep the connection with a new generation of Muslim citizens in social difficulty in our societies. If we leave them without any support they will abandon our values, our society and they will harm us, taking revenge on us via radical and terrorist acts (Soraya Amrani Mekki, National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, FR)

The role of communication between individuals, groups and different types of institutions as a mechanism for producing and/or coproducing radicalisation also emerged as a key concern in the interviews. This is linked not only to the role of communication strategies and tools used by recruiters for extreme groups but also to the lack of good quality social communication and dialogue between societies and representatives of social order.

What happens in the Netherlands on the municipal level, on the local level, is that people that work at the municipality, some of the police people, law enforcement, they reach out to communities and try to sit down with the people and communicate with them in order to understand what is happening and why people are upset and how you can fix some of the grievances, some of the issues. [...] Trust building, understanding the issues from both sides, and reaching out, have the debates, open the space for connection and show people that you're genuinely interested to hear what is taking place. It works and it's going on while we talk in many places in the Netherlands, and it works. (Peter Knoope, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, NL)

This 'good quality' communication could be also an effective way to counteract extremism by exchanging views between young people in the risk group and former activists or supporters of radical ideology:

My impression is that the most practical way to turn these young guys away from violent attitudes and behaviour is through communication with people who, more or less, share their views, so they can communicate, but who have had negative experience in such violent action before, or just can persuade them anyhow to follow non-violent ways in propagating their ideas. Even if they think that their ideas are bad, it's better if they talk about that, not kill somebody. (Alexander Verkhovsky, Sova Center for Information and Analysis, Moscow, RU)

Our exchanges with experts suggest that the family provides a key place to explore the potential for improving communication between individuals as a means of improving prevention of radicalisation.

Our interviewees emphasised the role of family in building awareness and knowledge about radicalisation among its younger members in order to prevent radicalisation. Our interviews revealed that one of the most innovative interventions in this field over the last several years has been family counselling programmes dedicated to helping families in communities identify radicalisation as early as possible and empower them to counter these processes on their own. Our experts to a large extent agreed that there is a need to work with parents in order that they are better able to protect their children from the influence of extremist ideologies and particularly violent groups. Based on his work in an association engaging with families where children were at risk of radicalisation, Sebastien Boussois,

Scientific Collaborator at UQAM and PRACTICIES in Brussels, evaluated the role of family-based discussion groups in creating intergenerational trust very highly. The outcome of the intervention, he said, was the building of ‘really good trust between family members which helps in prevention work’.

To adequately respond to concerns shared about the role families should play in supporting the improvement of better communication between their members - it is important that a given country has an infrastructure in place to deal with (new) cases of radicalisation. With regard to family support, the Netherlands has developed multi-agency settings known as the ‘safety house’ system in which cases are assessed and discussed.

In my country, we have a structure we call the ‘safety houses’, which is a collaboration of different organisations - the local authorities, the police, public prosecutor, the council for child protection, probation officers and welfare organisations. And they are in place to deal with very difficult and complex cases, among others, when people are worried about persons who are at risk of radicalising. So, cases will be discussed in this. At the national level, we have a telephone helpline for families who are worried, and we have family support organisations for families who have a radicalised child or child who has travelled to join ISIS. In another project, we will develop a family care package, because we consulted some families and they really said, ‘We were worried, we felt very alone, we had nowhere to go for support...’ So, this has to change. We really have to empower families for this problem and support them (Magda Rooze, Arq Psychotrauma expert group, NL)

As is evident from this last quote, effective counter-radicalisation at the national level requires a solid partnership between communities and government initiatives. One negative example in this context was provided by our expert on countering-radicalisation from Germany, who pointed to a serious rift between communities and the government in the case of the United States, which leads, in effect, to the co-production of radicalisation. A key challenge at the national level, therefore, is how governments of the Member States co-operate with communities and civil societies:

German Federal Criminal Police counted more than 720 active counter-radicalisation programmes and half of them, more or less half of them, are governmental and the other half are civil society-based. There is a long tradition of central intelligence agencies actually running de-radicalisation or CVE projects. This is what we need - good quality standards of cooperation between governmental agencies and NGOs and generally local community (Expert on countering radicalisation, DE)

A similar line of thought is offered by Dutch expert Maarten van de Donk from RAN Centre of Excellence, who notes the specific need for cooperation between national and local police and intelligence services, local authorities and locally based NGOs:

There’s often a big divide between what the police and the security services might know about someone, and what the local council, for instance social services knows about them. Actually, that local council will probably know a lot more about those individuals, where the

vulnerabilities really are [...] So, doing more you know, innovative approaches is doing more to bring those two together in a safe and proportional way to share information, whether and how to release some of that secret information and share it at the local level, so that local authorities go in and intervene and help people with much better information. (Maarten van de Donk from RAN Centre of Excellence, NL)

With regard to innovative trends in counter-radicalisation, counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation at the European level, one of the new initiatives within the RAN network identified by interviewees aims to decentralise institutional efforts by introducing a special Member State expert with a view to developing RAN within each Member State.

3.4 Best practices in countering radicalisation

The interviews with experts indicated that it is difficult to determine which are ‘best or even ‘good’ practices due to the lack of robust measures of the effectiveness of counter radicalisation programmes and policies. As a consequence, what is considered to be ‘best practice’ is often determined by instinct rather than a comprehensive analysis of effects. However, based on the expert interviews, we can distinguish the following characteristics of programmes as indicators of ‘good practices’:

- **Working with young people**

The case of Germany’s differentiated legislation and comprehensive social welfare system is cited as good practice to follow. The key, for our expert, is the presence of specific provision for young people:

[...] there are specific legislation and laws focusing for example on juvenile justice or on the welfare of young adults and adolescents or protecting families. There’s a whole body of laws that only treat social issues, like finding a job or job training, or drug treatment, or anything like that. So, Germany has one of the most advanced systems when it comes to protecting equality or integration of young adults, and there are, of course in every state there are youth welfare agencies that basically are also responsible for protecting them against violence or abuse within their own families, and can arrange foster care homes for example. (Expert on counter-radicalisation, DE)

- **Promoting tolerance at schools**

Education is seen as a crucial tool in challenging extreme-right radicalisation, with the most effective work often being at the very local level – a single teacher in a local school:

These initiatives could be either organised from above e.g. from the Ministry of Education, but also from below, e.g. from school teachers who could prepare educational material confronting neo-Nazism, right wing extremism, etc., although the crucial point in the second case is that the Ministry does not put obstacles [in their way] and supports them [...] (Costis Papaioannou, school teacher-human rights activist, former Chair of the National Commission for Human Rights and former General Secretary for Human Rights, Ministry of Justice, GR)

- **Using intermediaries rather than government institutions**

As noted by our Tunisian expert, effective counter-radicalisation is often achieved by groups and individuals at the local level rather than government institutions. NGOs and local community figures often have more credibility among those who are radicalised, or vulnerable to radicalisation and thus are better placed to guide young people away from radical messages:

The control of mosques should be implemented by proper Imams and administrators. Vigilance in schools, on the internet and on teen internet accounts should be undertaken by parents. (Naifer Nouredine, Professor in security, TN)

- **Creating effective 'counter narratives' to provide alternatives to radical ideology**

Credibility of the messenger – as well as specifically targeted messaging - is seen as crucial in providing 'counter narratives' that work.

We have noticed in the Netherlands that counter-narrative strategies will only work if you target a really specific audience, so people really should feel acquainted with it. And the other part is that you also have a messenger who is credible and very often, as a lot of ideologies are against the state, or against state NGOs, it's very important to have more kind of peer group, communication than do this by an official state body, who says radicalisation is not good because people will not believe a messenger if he is not credible. On the other hand, one of the most sensitive points relates to the role of former in countering radicalisation. We are discussing this issue not only in the Netherlands but at the EU level. In these debates, we are trying to avoid the situation that people end up being the eternal former and not getting on with this life because it's really important also for people who left the movement to get their new social life again. (Maarten Van de Donk, RAN Centre of Excellence, NL)

- **Providing effective exit strategies**

Those with experience of helping people who are ready to move away from radical thinking or leave movements emphasise that it is important not to assume 'one size fits all' with de-radicalisation programmes. In the experience of Jørgen Haavardsholm of the Ministry of Education and Research in Norway, it is important to have differentiated programmes depending on the needs of those seeking to exit and reflecting changing radicalisation dynamics:

Exit programs for instance in Norway have provided good results. We have police working with the people seeking to leave and the parents, and we have extracted them to a large extent from the far-right movements, with good results, over the past 20 years. What is important is that we have introduced different kinds of exit programmes over 20 years now - depending on needs. Twenty years ago, we were working with the Neo-Nazis, and now we are trying similar tools that are worked towards the extreme Islamists. (Jørgen Haavardsholm, Ministry of Education and Research, NO)

- **Understanding underlying factors of radicalisation and their individual dimensions**

This kind of individual, differentiated approach is also seen as best practice in working with those vulnerable to radicalisation. In the experience of David Wells, responsible for delivering national counter-terrorism Prevent strategy across the North West region of England, each individual vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism is likely to have a number of other vulnerabilities too. Thus, working in a multi-agency environment and at the individual level is crucial to effective counter-radicalisation:

[...] establishing some sort of mentoring arrangements is again, in my experience, probably the best way to intervene, establishing a professional one-to-one, long-term relationship with another individual, to talk about the issues in a confidential environment and to lead a person away from terrorism. (David Wells, North West Regional Prevent Coordinator, UK)

- **Establishing a proper training system for 'first responders'**

Another 'good practice' from the UK mentioned by Kelly Simcock, co-chair of the RAN Youth, Families and Communities Working Group lead and an elected representative to the Manchester City Council, is the so called WRAP – Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent – training package of the UK Home Office. This is a training programme for staff working in those 'specified authorities' with a statutory duty to deliver the government's Prevent strategy. These institutions include: local authorities; schools and registered childcare providers; further education institutions; higher education institutions; the health sector; prisons and probation (including under 18 year olds secure environments); and the police.

Its overall aim is to help make such front line staff aware of their contribution to preventing vulnerable people being exploited for extremist or terrorist purposes. This workshop improves the understanding of the processes used by those who radicalise individuals and ensures that staff are aware of whom to contact within their organisation to discuss any concerns.

- **More focus on long-term prevention strategies**

Expert interviewees also recognised the importance of policies and practice being oriented to the long term rather than focusing on on-going security dossiers. The experience of how this shift in focus had been made in France was described by Muriel Domenach, Secretary General of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalisation:

In France, when we realised around 2015 that radicalisation and Jihadist terrorism will represent a constant and long-term threat to French society, our public administration created a range of measures to counter radicalisation over the long term countering means also prepared for long-term struggle. This year of terrible terrorist attacks was a turning point for us and we started creating a system of regional structures of Prefectorial Structures for Accompanying Families. Once a month, in all regions, this new institution brings together local actors such as local authorities, intelligence and security community, prevention bodies and most of all NGOs. Since that time, we have managed to mobilise ourselves and the awareness and knowledge about what particular prevention and security bodies do is really helping to design a coherent local counter-radicalisation policy. Today this preventive tool contains around 25,000 practitioners and is targeting more than 2,600 youth and 800 families. (Muriel Domenach, Secretary General of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization (SG-CIPDR), FR)

3.5 Policies that adopt a long-term or societal approach: focus on prisons, youth identity and socio-economic inequalities

A fourth theme to emerge was the importance of root causes of radicalisation. Expert interviewees on the whole did not cite grievances as an underlying factor for radicalisation; some even stated directly that, in their opinion, social exclusion can be seen as a driver of radicalisation only at the subjective level (i.e. the level of individual perception). However, some experts did state that it is important to address publically (via media for instance) or politically the socio-economic issues related to vulnerable groups, without linking them directly with counter-radicalisation policies.

Notwithstanding this caution concerning grievance, several experts stressed that radicalisation - although rooted in individual socio-demographic characteristics - emerges mostly from the need for 'belonging' and being 'somebody important' at the collective level. Addressing this search for social identity, of course, requires a long-term approach. Thus, experts indicated that the integration of vulnerable groups and individuals into society is one of the most important measures for preventing radicalisation. Indeed, most interviewees stressed the importance of focusing counter-radicalisation measures on prevention rather than on short-term security based approaches.

The sad reality is that we don't work on prevention of radicalisation, and that we don't work on conflict resolution mechanisms, or on conflict transformation. What we do is we approach the issue with military means. That's what we do. And it hasn't worked for the last eighteen years. We learned that. So, we have been keeping on making the same mistake. We think that if we beat, in military terms, ISIS in Syria and Iraq, then that is the end of the story. But it isn't, and we know it isn't. So... the mistake we make is that we don't make the right choices, we keep on investing in the wrong approaches and we don't seem to learn from our mistakes. We should invest more in preventive and not security approaches. (Peter Knoope, International Centre for Counterterrorism, NL)

Prisons are specific milieus where long-term and societal approaches should be considered, practiced and/or tested in the form of reflective and innovative programmes and plans. The experience of the French authorities in countering Islamist radicalisation in prisons – where many of the country's most dangerous terrorists such as Mohammed Merah, Ameda Coulibaly, Chérif Khouachi and Mehdi Nemmouche were radicalised – is noteworthy here. One of the government's first de-radicalisation initiatives in prisons - an experimental programme to counter radicalisation of prisoners - was launched in February 2015, just a few weeks after the attacks on the weekly 'Charlie Hebdo', by the prison service. According to our French expert Muriel Domenach, Secretary General of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency, the aim was to update and improve the methods of identifying radicalised prisoners and to develop and implement a new programme for their reintegration into society. A review of this initial tool, in 2017, was followed by a number of improvements to the programme and the establishment of a new system of six prison evaluation bodies. This new approach in the French prison system centres on a system of evaluation of particular prisoners in terms of their radical attitudes and behaviours. Within four months, an interdisciplinary team of specialists (pedagogues, social workers, psychologists, prison employees specialising in the integration of prisoners in society), conducts an assessment of prisoners using also observation of them in prison. If radicalisation is identified, then the prisoner in question is directed to a de-radicalisation or - where necessary - disengagement programme dedicated to him.

Another example, from Tunisia, given in interview by Professor Naifer Noureddine, relates to the fight against the networks of Takfirists by supervising their cells, monitoring their Facebook and Twitter internet communications, their actions in mosques and their modes of recruitment of adolescents (15-19 year olds). This strategy is concerned with countering the recruitment to radical groups of excluded and vulnerable individuals in prisons. The process of such recruitment is set in the context of particular activities in prisons such as smuggling drugs and trafficking of arms. One example is cells from Manouba and Dandan (two neighbouring regions north of the city of Tunis) and their link with two cells located in Mornaguia Prison. Professor Noureddine's research on this subject revealed that the arms trafficking and terrorist recruitment processes are committed by the same individuals and groups:

The overall aim of this strategy is to respond to three questions: who offers the money, who offers the political coverage and who produces and disseminates the ideology of Daesh? This programme in prisons not only supports a more general strategy against money laundering at the national level, but also helps to control xenophobic and racist cultural products and activism within mosques and prisons and sometimes in academic institutions, in the peripheral, poor districts of Tunisian big cities. (Naifer Noureddine, Professor in Security, TN)

Expert interviewees also recognised the importance of addressing ideology and identity issues when formulating counter-radicalisation policy. A number of experts, from different countries, emphasised the challenge of understanding exactly why individuals become influenced by far-right or Islamist ideology. As David Wells (North West Regional Prevent Coordinator, UK) put it, 'the million dollar question is "why are people inspired by certain ideologies to the point where they will kill themselves and kill other people"?''

In seeking answers to this, a number of experts, point to the primacy of ideology over socio-economic factors. Alexander Verkhovsky from the Russian Sova Center for Information and Analysis, for example, calls ideology the 'main factor'. This is based on his experience of conducting consulting and analytical projects in the field, which shows that in contemporary Russia, there are more and more people from the middle class who become radicals – in particular in the far right – than from marginalised groups. A similar argument is made by both Maarten Van de Donk and Peter Knoope (both from the Netherlands) in relation mainly to Islamist groups:

Not all poor people or people with the same circumstances as other foreign fighters or other extreme right people, who are in similar situations, also radicalise. So, this is fairly loosely connected and we are more talking about the feeling of being, feeling of inequality rather than having inequality in society. (Maarten van de Donk from RAN Centre of Excellence, NL)

Socio-economic inequalities are not always the problem. You cannot assume that socio-economic differences and inequalities are a problem. It's an assumption. Assumptions are dangerous. So, long term solutions will only be found if you understand the issue. And then the other thing that I really seriously think is that we pay too little attention to conflict

resolution mechanisms in having a debate between the state and violent actors – in particular in relation to radical Islam. I know it's not a very popular idea, I know it's not a very popular thought, but in a lot of places having a serious dialogue between violent actors and government representatives is based usually on a principle of non-violence. (Peter Knoope, International Centre for Counterterrorism, NL)

An interesting point in this context was made by our Polish interviewee - Andrzej Zybertowicz, Social Adviser to the President of the Republic of Poland. He stated that in preparing preventive policy towards radical individuals and groups from a long-term perspective much more emphasis should be put on different types of stereotypes than on one particular ideology – be that far-right or far-left or Islamist. The key effort should be to understand and react to the generalised polarisation of our societies, which is linked to a great extent with social media and the collapse of really serious public debate and also rising indifference towards intellectual development. However, he did not completely reject the socio-economic factor, recognising that in the context of economic collapse then we should expect a rapid downturn on world markets, a consequent negative impact on national economies including the withdrawal of foreign investments and thus the emergence of various conflicts. Economic turbulence triggers the rise of unemployment, which creates new tensions which will either be spontaneously attributed to a scapegoat, or be cynically redirected towards such a scapegoat by politicians.

3.6 National and international cooperation in countering radicalisation

The majority of interviewed experts agreed that radicalisation is a national or local issue and as such falls within the competency of the nation state and its internal security agencies. However, our European experts shared the view that both radicalisation and terrorism should be discussed and addressed simultaneously at the EU level through dedicated research programmes and platforms for exchange of experience and knowledge. Twelve of the 25 interviewed experts listed the European Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) as one such important mechanism for coordination and information exchange. RAN is a network of more than 4000 practitioners involved in preventive radicalisation programmes, as well as counter and de-radicalisation programmes organised in nine thematically related working groups and coordinated by the RAN Centre of Excellency. The focus on grassroots practitioners is highlighted as the strength of RAN and a model that might be usefully extended beyond the EU:

I think the RAN is a perfect example of a major success. I talked to people in a variety of places like Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Tunisia, that would like to join it, but there's no opening as yet, there's no capacity in the RAN as yet, but I think that expanding it is the way forward, because it's successful, it is grassroots people, people that know what is happening in the communities, people that exchange effectively best practices and lessons learned. So it's a very useful model. And it's not co-ordination in the real sense of the word, but it is exchange of best practices. (Peter Knoope, International Centre for Counterterrorism, NL)

In addition, most experts stressed the importance of the existence of coordination mechanisms at the national level between central government and local authorities as well as mechanisms of inter-departmental cooperation, primarily related to law enforcement structures:

Russia has a coordinating commission bringing government agencies together and, in terms of de-rad, then law enforcement bodies mainly collaborate with two ministries - Ministry of Education and [Ministry of] Culture. Both institutions are charged with promoting initiatives aimed to fight against radicalisation. (Alexander Verkhovsky, Sova Center for Information and Analysis in Moscow, RU)

Concerning law enforcement structures, Anton Weenink, from the Dutch National Police, gave an example of the Dutch National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, as a body which aims to coordinate policies at the local level as well as to provide advice to other services, including the intelligence service.

Cross-national actions (and analysis) are important in counteracting current forms of radicalisation/terrorism not least because of the international nature of terrorism, which means it cannot be tackled on a solely national level. The need for information exchange and knowledge sharing provides a further argument for international cooperation; since effective solutions are costly and take time to devise and implement, it makes sense that successful measures identified in one country are shared.

[...] you cannot find a French solution or national solution. I mean that we will be stronger together, and I think that the most important asset of union and of the European Union is to work together. [...] So, I think that cross-national action must be on the political aspect for sure, but most important is to connect associations, practitioners, politicians to give information, and to transmit the most recent and the most important information on returnees, on foreign terrorist fighters, on the various new kinds of radicalised people. We are all in different countries, so we cannot say that one solution is the best one. But I think that all the successful experience and all the good practices, which were successful, for example in Norway with the question of jails, can be something very interesting for us. (Sebastien Boussois, Scientific Collaborator at UQAM and PRACTICIES, BE)

I think these actions really are important. Also, because the fact is that actually extremism is also crossing borders. [...] Today there are so many residential areas characterised by free movement of individuals, circulation of people from outside Schengen zone, that monitoring and controlling radicalisation and terrorist threats does not really work. Some international cooperation is needed because also the extremist groups are working on a much more international basis, which by the way also applies for the extreme right. So here you have to exchange, here you have to talk about it and, for example, if you look at recruiting mechanisms, it's very good to have countries working together on this. (Maarten van de Donk from RAN Centre of Excellence, NL)

However, it was mentioned by our expert from EUROPOL that lack of trust between states and their institutions can act as an important barrier on the road towards such cooperation. He underlined that sharing experiences and findings from within the radicalisation field is more in evidence at the EU level (through RAN, for example) than sharing of operational information by Member States. This hinders European counter-terrorism:

The problem is that several national institutions of Member States too often don't share enough information with others. Like I said, I mean, we have at municipal level, the safety houses, and I think the approach is very good, but I cannot say that it works as well in every single unit or country. Sometimes, for example, when it comes to collaboration between national police forces you see some hesitation on both sides. So there is sometimes difficulty in finding out what information we can and cannot share [...] And of course, on the international level, police cooperation depends very much on trust as well, so when police organisations share information on suspects, they can do it in a formal way, through traditional cooperation, which is no problem, but there is also something like police-police sharing of information, which can be formalised later, but it's [that requires] special trust, and when trust is not there people will not share information. So... and there is also just initial bureaucracy, some agencies have information but some is stuck in the bureaucracy, and it's not delivered in time, at the proper place, but I think that's something you will never completely, well, get rid of. Information sharing is, in part, it's inherently difficult, but in part it's a bureaucratic phenomenon [...] (Expert from EUROPOL)

However, experts also noted the need for caution in implementing lessons learned from other countries, as there can be substantive differences in the sources and nature of radicalisation in various countries.

There is not so much coordinating of policies, because radicalisation takes diverse forms in different countries and it is often very much determined by local factors. It is hard to compare even the Islamist radicalisation problem in Western and Eastern European countries. This is a different problem in different countries. Like in our country there is this strong right-wing movement, but we don't have interaction with a strong Islamist community. Radicalisation is still a very local issue, or national issue, not so much an international issue. I mean, all countries have to deal with it, and you can share experiences and how to deal with things, but the dynamics of radicalisation are often very local. So, you have to, countries can learn from each other, but... I don't think, like for example, you could facilitate the sharing of information... it comes easier to share experiences and information like we do in the Radicalisation Awareness Network, but I don't see much [point] in a... well a very strong EU counter radicalisation programme. (Krzysztof Łaskiewicz, National Police HQ, Police Inspector - Head of the Human Rights Department at the National Police HQ at Warsaw, PL)

You need to be very careful, because the problems are different in different places, so be careful. [...] So don't export what happens in London to Nigeria. It doesn't work. [...] So, don't export one model into a different environment. Understand how Kenyans deal with issues, deal with problems, deal with conflicts, and then enforce, empower the local traditions of conflict resolution. Sometimes that involves talking, sometimes it involves harsh measures and very clear messages, but be in accordance, how do you say, in coherence with local, traditional ways of dealing. [...] So, you really need to look at how societies deal with their value system, their conflicts, how they normally solve their conflict and use that model in this specific environment to solve the issue. (Peter Knoope, International Centre for Counterterrorism, NL)

3.7 Barriers to countering terrorism and radicalisation

The themes and issues discussed so far are characterised by widespread agreement of the expert interviewees. In contrast, when discussing the main barriers to countering radicalisation, their responses varied widely. Interviewees identified a range of barriers from funding to potential or actual lack of political will to confront the problem of radicalisation. These two factors - funding and political will – were in fact the most frequently mentioned barriers to counter-radicalisation (mentioned by six and five interviewees respectively).

From my point of view, I think there's not enough financial resources to work. Because it's always difficult to, to... well, politicians often want quick results, and they are more interested in things that they can see a quick result from, because, from my point of view, things may take five, ten, fifteen years, before we see the results, and to get resources for that is, is a problem. (Expert from RAN, ES)

Another important issue, raised by more than one expert – but emphasised particularly by our three experts from the UK - **was a lack of trust between different government agencies as well as lack of trust among communities towards local authorities.**

The lack of practical expertise on Islamist radicalisation was mentioned by one expert as a barrier to tackling radicalisation. Alexander Verkhovsky noted that, in Russia, it had proved 'easier to find experts, academic experts, and to train police officers who could really understand what is happening inside the far right movement' than experts on radical Islamism. The issue was not lack of knowledge as much as lack of partiality. Such experts he said 'are not neutral but act to support or attack factions within Russian Islam and the government becomes a kind of a hostage to these experts'. While the Russian expert was the only one to frame the problem in this way, other experts also noted issues with understanding Islamist ideology.

This lack of expertise can fuel another barrier to effective counter-extremism work, which is the counter-productive stigmatisation of Muslim communities in the process of implementing counter-radicalisation in Islamist circles:

[...] we can lose good Muslim individuals and communities in our fight against terrorism. We should stop treating Islamist radicalisation in a very non-specific sense, if we do not do this in France, and in Europe in general, we will create - we have already done this to a great extent – a category of persons – marginalised Muslims - and a religion - Islam - that is singled out for imprisonment. Then we will forget about other crucial sources of current radicalisation processes like the white supremacists and other racists. And it is a consequence of such logic – and in my opinion, this is one of the main obstacles to tackling terrorism - the retention of the anti-terrorist logic which focuses on designing 'profiles' of groups or individuals of risk. (Soraya Amrani Mekki. Vice President of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, FR)

Lack of specialists and generally human resource in the field of radicalisation was another issue identified as an obstacle to counter-radicalisation efforts. This was said to stem from the fact that the field of counter-radicalisation is still quite a new policy area. Thus, it was a major problem to find the right people to engage in devising and designing more efficient policies.

Finally, the **lack of measures of effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies and programmes was mentioned as a significant barrier to effective work.**

Talking about standards and quality issues, this is something that Germany has recognised, that all these many, many projects have in most cases never been really evaluated and we don't have any good quality standards and definitions. And this is really a risk, because if you don't know what these programmes are doing, if the staff is adequately trained, or if they have risk assessment protocols for example, they can actually increase the risk of terrorism and extremism. [...] I think it's the lack of quality standards and evaluation in this field, so the whole countering violent extremism field, counter-radicalisation programmes, most of them have never been evaluated, so we don't know if they work or not, we don't know what their effects are, we don't know how to separate the good from the bad ones, we can't really tell where all the money is going that we're pouring into it. And I think this is the largest barrier that we simply do not know if there are any best practices, truly best practices, or not. And so, currently, we are simply blind, we're just putting a lot of money into this field and we're assuming that what we're doing helps to counter terrorism and radicalisation. But essentially, we do not know that. (Expert on counter-radicalisation, DE)

In Spain, there are local projects but with a lack of coordination, at the same time that we close the door to civil society engagement. We have to change the way of thinking, from fighting radicalisation (where we are really good) and terrorism to preventing it (where we have a lot to do). At international level, we could generalise that similar situation, and at the European level. [It] depends a lot on the country - there are countries that have been experimenting with [countering] radicalisation and terrorism for years, such as United Kingdom or Holland, and they are more open to these kind of projects (preventative ones), but for example France is more on the Spanish way. (Expert from RAN, ES)

3.8 Summary

A key conclusion to be drawn from our interviews is the **need for a more long-term, societal approach in counter-radicalisation policies.** Current security, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies do not take sufficient account of long-term and socio-economic factors, neither at the national nor at the European level. One of the reasons for this is that structural factors are more complex and data concerning them are gathered and analysed by different governmental agencies than those responsible for counter-radicalisation policies. This is even more complicated at the local level, because cities and local governments have limited leverage in terms of improving the economic environment.

A second area of agreement among interviewees was that the response to radicalisation needs to be global. Regional, national and international cooperation is stressed as an important step towards effective counter-radicalisation. Experts concurred that this cooperation is relatively well developed in

the sphere of counter-terrorism (i.e. at the level of intelligence-sharing) but less so when it comes to the prevention of radicalisation. Expert interviewees recognised both the benefits and challenges of sharing good practice with colleagues from other Member States. On the one hand, whilst recognising the success of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in facilitating the exchange of good practice among Member States, experts felt that the transfer of good practice between European countries was often inhibited, notably because of crucial differences in legislative frameworks or political contexts. On the other hand, experts noted that radicalisation processes are different according to country and region and that this meant it is important to proceed with caution in transferring solutions, even if they have been successful in other regions and/or in other countries. In short, there is no 'one size fits all' solution in this area. Transferring good practices requires careful tailoring.

Notwithstanding the differentiated forms of radicalisation, experts identified two broad kinds of factors contributing to radicalisation: those that encouraged the perception of an internal threat; and those that encouraged perception of an external threat.

Factors cited that contributed to the perception of an internal threat include:

- a range of negative consequences of the lack of cultural, social and economic integration of citizens into their societies, as well as a failure of Member States to provide adequate venues and support for positive integration for all;
- the growing polarisation between rich/poor, people/elites, different cultures and religions;
- socio-spatial inequalities, from urban ghettoization to inequalities between rich/poor areas and towns through to divisions between the global North and South;
- the increasing extension of various forms of radicalisation to middle class youth from all backgrounds;
- the resurgence of extreme-right violent groups/militias/vigilantes.

Factors contributing to the perception of an external threat were said to be:

- influence/actions of the so-called ISIS foreign fighters and other European citizens (and their children) returning mainly from Syria;
- the spill-over effect of tensions into European countries, through diaspora from conflict-torn regions and other diverse non-diasporic support groups.

A third conclusion is that in counteracting radicalisation **a focus on the local community level is crucial**. Many European countries are launching programmes to combat radicalisation, which are visibly more locally oriented (using a bottom-up logic). Countries are increasingly investing in training programmes for schools, teachers, police officers and security professionals to work at the community level. According to interviewed experts, this locally structured counter-radicalisation perspective facilitates conversations and (re)establishes relations between authorities and individuals/groups. This contributes to confronting radicalisation at the level closest to the personal, social and emotional experience of individuals and, in this way, encourages the nurturing of social cohesion as a long-term counter-radicalisation strategy. It is therefore important that such programmes targeting groups at risk of radicalisation are community-owned or led rather than enacted upon communities by law enforcement agencies which may themselves be viewed with suspicion.

Fourthly, experts recognised **that social media has a strong impact in particular on young people's vision of the world and thus contributes to the generation of their radical – both Islamist and far-right – beliefs**. However, they suggest it is important also not to overestimate the influence of such new media. Experts noted a growing lack of trust in content and tools encountered on the internet among youth. This suggests that other milieus where radicalisation processes take place require equal attention. These include: localities, neighbourhoods, communities, family, schools, religious or civic networks, youth organisations, sports centres, gangs, paramilitary organisations or prisons. The potential positive effects of the Internet should however also not be underestimated (e.g. providing a forum for public debate). With a view to reducing the risk of radicalisation (both Islamist and far-right), experts highlight the need to invest more in strengthening communication/relationships with younger cohorts of Europeans including through the use of social media.

A fifth area of concern among experts is that European institutions and Member States should not ostracise radicalised individuals (or those on the way to becoming radicalised) but recognise them as part of wider society as well as part of their value-based or religious environments. This strategy of inclusion could support their more open communication with state structures (central and local) and NGOs and facilitate the defusing of tensions and the collective search for non-violent resolutions to such conflicts.

Finally, there is an agreed need for reliable evaluation of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies and programmes. It is crucial to include in all counter/de-radicalisation policies and programmes impact assessment measures that ensure rigorous and fair evaluation by the practitioners themselves, by funders, states and civil society representatives. Sound monitoring will improve the capacities of practitioners to adjust to a quickly changing security environment in Europe. The design of such evaluation systems is extremely timely because prevention of counter-radicalisation is generally a new area of state policy in EU countries – in which significant public funds are being invested encouraging the emergence of a booming entrepreneurial market (in particular concerning jihadist home-grown radicalisation processes). In particular, in light of encountering poorly structured programmes producing questionable results over the past three to five years, expert interviewees note that it is vital that these counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies and programmes are monitored and evaluated in order to ensure that they are achieving the desired goals.

4. European counter-radicalisation, counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation policies: A comparative analysis

In this section of the report, we summarise the findings of the comparative analysis of approaches taken and solutions suggested to counter-radicalisation, counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation as outlined in the policy documents included in this study (see Section 2.1). The findings of the comparative analysis are divided into nine subsections referring to each of the nine categories established following preliminary analysis of gathered documents as well as interviews with experts. In this section, the headline findings are outlined with illustrative reference to specific policy documents. A fuller outline of the relevant policy documents relating to each of the categories can be found in the technical appendix.⁵

⁵ A number of interesting or innovative ideas that fall beyond the scope of these categories, but nonetheless informed the recommendations generated for this report, are collated and included in the technical appendix which can be found here: <http://www.dare-h2020.org/publications.html>

4.1 Societal and educational approach (category 1)

Radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism are processes that are inherently social in nature. This is reflected in the high importance attached to factors connected with the social and educational aspects of (counter) radicalisation in policies and programmes analysed; 93 per cent of the documents studied included provisions in this category. The prominence of this societal and educational approach, shows an understanding of the need to address the root causes of radicalisation and acts as a cue to further actions in this area. However, such long-term causes of radicalisation include a wide range of socio-economic, cultural, moral, ideological, religious, educational and cultural factors - from thrill-seeking to legitimate grievances – and thus more specific isolation of the roots of individual radicalisation is necessary in order to develop policy responses. In addition to these social roots of radicalisation, in this category, we also include policies and programmes that tackle social and territorial inequalities, integration frames, social and cultural cohesion and the (positive and negative) role of the internet.

The EU policies and programmes analysed⁶ reflect a serious concern with social and educational factors related to radicalisation. EU policy recognises the importance of preventing violent extremism through cooperation with young people in the initial phase of radicalisation as they become involved in, or show susceptibility to, right-wing extremism, ethno-nationalism, religious fundamentalism as well as to xenophobic, racist and other forms of hatred and exclusionary behaviour (*European Fair Skills – De-radicalisation. Training for Peer Role Models and Youth Workers*).

At the national level, all of the Spanish documents take into account long-term social, cultural and religious aspects of potential radicalisation, although individual policies stress different elements of those dimensions. Social integration and cohesion seem to be important aspects of counter-radicalisation activity. The *Comprehensive Strategy against International Terrorism and Radicalisation (EICTIR)* (2010 - implemented 2012) underlines the need to generate trust and social legitimacy and to prevent the spread of violent radical ideologies through the promotion of social inclusion and diversity. In Finnish documents, social aspects of the minimisation of the potential threat of radicalisation are stressed on the basis that ideological commitment to a radical group may develop only after membership of it (*Towards a Cohesive Society. Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism*, 2012). The Danish approach, as stated in *the Introduction to The Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation*, 2015, stresses the need for guaranteeing equality, including through systematised multi-agency collaboration between various social-service providers, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, and the intelligence and security services. Promoting common democratic values, integration and social cohesion to facilitate a sense of belonging is an important aspect of the Dutch approach to counter-radicalisation. It is based on knowledge-sharing, promoting common democratic values, integration and social cohesion (*NUANSA and Personal Intervention against Young People in Right-Wing Extremist Circles* (2007). Dutch documents also ascribe significant importance to the question of integration of minorities (Turkish, Moroccan) and building their sense of belonging (*Personal Intervention against Young People in Right-Wing Extremist Circles*, 2007 and *Slotevaart Action Plan to Prevent Radicalisation*, 2009).

Sweden, as many other Scandinavian countries, ascribes a lot of importance to social cohesion (*Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism* 2011). The Belgian authorities have adopted an approach emphasising that successful de-radicalisation depends heavily on the establishment of better living conditions and systematic involvement of representatives of the various religions in de-radicalisation processes (*Action Plan against radicalisation in prisons*, 2015). The societal approach to prevention, inclusion of religious communities and creation of a society based on diversity

⁶ A list of these documents can be found in Appendix 8.2

and respect, integrating multiple identities while defending a set of common values is deemed to be crucial.

The French approach is based on improving protection of the population by a consolidated system of vigilance planning through the VIGIPRATE programme. Threat prevention is also pursued through policies designed to improve the socio-economic protection of Europeans against international economic and political superpowers (USA, China, Russia) as well as protection against migration, financial crisis and terrorism (*Action Plan Against Terrorism (PACT)*, 13 July 2018). In the long term, an increase in social aid – such as making available social funds for flats - should help to lower radicalisation among marginalised parts of the population, while development of ‘critical thinking’ as a ‘civic power’ can counteract the long term radicalisation process (*Action Plan against Radicalization and Terrorism (PART)*, 9 May 2016).

British solutions are based on the principle that vulnerable communities should be seen not only through a counter-terrorist lens (*Channel Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists 2010*). Addressing economic opportunity for all is a key pillar to better integration and businesses are encouraged to work with other agencies to address inequalities in the workplace and thus provide a valuable contribution to enhancing social cohesion (*A Shared Future - A report of the Greater Manchester Tackling Hateful Extremism and Promoting Social Cohesion Commission*, 2018).

The German approach is based on a principle that racism and discrimination are a violation of basic human rights, a threat to social cohesion and the cause of internal and international armed conflicts (*National Action Plan against Racism - positions and measures to deal with ideologies of inequality and related discrimination*, 2017). The *Federal Government Strategy on Extremism Prevention and Democracy Promotion* (2016) demonstrates a particular concern in Germany with the issue of social media and the internet in relation to radicalisation. The majority of Finnish and Norwegian documents also stress the role of the internet as an actual and potential terrorist propaganda platform requiring appropriate counter-action (see, for example *Radicalisation and extremism. A learning resource for education within social science for secondary schools*, Oslo Municipality, December 2014) while, in Belgium, a policy priority is reducing the use of the internet for radicalisation (*Programme on the prevention of violent radicalisation 2013*).

In Greece the government focuses on the prevention of incitement of hatred or violence and punishes those who (publicly and intentionally, in media or via internet) incite or provoke people to act with prejudice, discrimination, hatred or violence against individuals or groups of people based on colour, race, religion, national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender identity (*Bill of law no. 4285 ‘on confronting specific forms of racism and xenophobia’ to toughen previous anti-racism legislation (1979) and criminalise the denial of the Holocaust, crimes against humanity and Nazi crimes recognised by international courts or the Hellenic Parliament*, September 2014). In the UK, the threat is determined to be one of ‘extremism’ more broadly, defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (*Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism England and Wales 2015*). However, free speech is seen as a weapon against radicalisation and not a hindrance, as tensions in a healthy community are not intrinsically bad (*Understanding and monitoring tension and conflict in local communities A practical guide for local authorities, police service and partner agencies*). Some of German documents include a goal of achieving the prevention of extremism and supporting those who work for democracy in the field, while increasing governmental presence on the internet (*Federal government strategy on extremism prevention and democracy promotion*, 2016).

Non-EU countries also emphasise the long-term societal causes of radicalisation. Apart from the penal code, all Russian documents addressed the social, cultural and ideological roots of radicalisation. Prevention of the spread of xenophobia, nationalist ideology, religious and racial intolerance and the

falsification of history aimed at inciting ethnic hatred are important elements of Russian policy towards preventing radicalisation (*The Federal Law 'On countering extremism', 2002*). Provisions designed to solve wider social problems among the population are also included (*The threat of international terrorism and religious extremism to the Member States of the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] in the Central Asian and Afghan Governments*).

Alongside the role of leadership figures and networks, including new communication channels, Switzerland identifies a wide range of long term factors driving violent extremism including: lack of social and economic prospects; marginalisation and discrimination; poor governance; violations of human rights and the rule of law; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; radicalisation in prisons; personal lives and motives; collective victimisation and dissatisfaction; falsification and misuse of religious teachings and political ideologies; and the exaggeration of ethnic and cultural differences (*Switzerland's Foreign Policy Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism 2016*). The Turkish approach to de-radicalisation focuses on shifting the radical ideologies of radicalised individuals and reintegrating them into society through counselling, help to obtain a job, and provision of access to healthcare, housing, and education (*Individual disengagement and de-radicalisation counterterrorism measures conducted by the Adana Police Department in Turkey between 2009 and 2015*). The educational and cultural training of religious officials is also deemed to play an important role in human relations including the prevention of radicalisation (*Diyanet's program to 'undermine violent extremist messaging' 2013*). The Norwegian approach takes into account new social and psychological conditions that can drive a person to extreme actions but also promotes integration and inclusion as a means to preventing violent extremism (*Prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism – what is the role of the municipality?, 2016*).

4.2 Youth factor (category 2)

Young people are identified as one of the most vulnerable groups for potential radicalisation because they are most exposed to radical messaging and because they are viewed as impressionable, prone to reason in categories of absolutes and quick to judge. Addressing the needs and characteristics of this group is thus an important aspect of preventing and countering radicalisation. Social inclusion, empowerment, and education (including peer-based education) appear as leading motifs of programmes and policies aimed at countering and preventing radicalisation among the younger population.

Most of the analysed documents emphasise the education of young people on radicalisation and respect for human rights. The Spanish *Protocol of prevention, detection and intervention of Islamist radicalisation processes*, for example, notes that youth is a life stage when people are particularly vulnerable. It sets out the objective to provide educational centres with guidance on the analysis of risk factors linked to personal development, school and social contexts and family environment as well as teaching resources to prevent radicalisation. Success in education and the labour market is also seen as important for building self-worth among young people and thus helping them build immunity to anti-democratic ideologies.

Alongside education, dialogue is seen as an important mechanism for combating radicalisation. The Finnish *Towards a Cohesive Society. Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism 2012* is an illustrative example. This document recognises the importance of building young people's trust in the state system through dialogue on radicalisation issues conducted via the youth council. The document also discusses a range of ways in which the Social Services can work with children under the age of 18 who are at risk of radicalisation. Families are also identified as having a unique opportunity to detect radicalisation, but often need information and support. Education aimed at young people on broad topics, such as tolerance, respect for others and respect for human rights are also important. Schools have a role to play

in building resilience and preventing radicalisation regardless of ideology. As young people are wrestling with resolving dilemmas that shape their identity, they may be particularly sensitive to apparently simple answers, and messages of hatred and violence, offered by recruiters to the problems they face. On the other hand, despite their sensitivity, young people may also be strong allies in the fight against manifesting hatred.

A broad understanding of education as preparation for life is central to the Greater Manchester Combined Authority's (GMCA) report on how to promote social cohesion and prevent hateful extremism (*A Shared Future - A report of the Greater Manchester Preventing Hateful Extremism and Promoting Social Cohesion Commission*, 2018). The regional authority for Greater Manchester sets itself the objective of ensuring all children are given the best start in life and young people are ready for life once they finish their education by working with schools/colleges and employers to develop a Curriculum for Life, designed to equip young people with the broad range of knowledge and skills they need. Alongside financial education, management of tenancy agreements and relationship education, this curriculum for life includes how to hold 'difficult conversations'. The Danish government's *Prevention of radicalisation and extremism* action plan (September 2014) also promotes a form of dialogue through the establishment of regular contact with an individual or even the whole family. This dialogue often takes the form of mentoring and provides specialist professional assistance to young people as a form of early intervention.

In the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation, there have also been successful examples of collaboration between the authorities, civil society and official clergy to de-radicalise members of violent extremist groups (see: *The threat of international terrorism and religious extremism to the Member States of the CSTO in the Central Asian and Afghan Governments*). A number of heads of the Caucasian republics set up reconciliation commissions that worked with members of terrorist groups or acted as negotiators during counter-terrorist operations. While this work has not been systematised or consistently undertaken, it has provided examples of successful cooperation between representatives of the Republic authorities and the official Islamic clergy to work with radicalised individuals. This has included collaboration outside the North Caucasus such as in St. Petersburg where it was used to help prevent the departure of young people to participate in the military conflict in Syria in 2012-2016.

Many policies analysed recognise that young people may be drawn into radicalisation or joining a terrorist group in a quest for belonging. This importance to young people of feeling a sense of belonging to society, not least because it gives a feeling of security, is recognised, for example, in Dutch policy initiatives (*Personal Intervention against Young People in Right-Wing Extremist Circles*, 2007).

Alongside a raft of programmes employing dialogue, contact, education and respect for human dignity in order to prevent young people's recruitment into anti-democratic movements, some countries also highlight the importance of support for those who have been radicalised but are seeking to leave such movements. For example, in 2000, Norway, implemented an EXIT program, which works with young right-wing extremists looking to leave extremist movements (*Exit. Youth leaving violent youth groups. Final report*, 2000). Despite criticisms of lack of clear data on how many young people have been helped out of right-wing groups as a result of EXIT, the model has been implemented in a number of countries.

Preventive support is also evident in the Oslo municipality's programme *Radicalisation and extremism. A learning resource for education within social science for secondary schools*, (December 2014). This programme focuses on a specific age group considered to be particularly vulnerable to radicalisation and provides appropriate knowledge and care as early as possible in order to prevent future violence. The French government has also advocated increasing psychological care for people vulnerable to radicalisation with a particular emphasis on supervision in high schools to detect early signs of radicalisation of belief in conspiracy theories.

Summarising this second category it is important to note that the majority of analysed documents refer to issues like education, building new institutions promoting de-radicalisation and close contact with people exposed to acts of violence. The internet is shown to be an important means for the dissemination of terrorist ideas and the main channel of communication between people spreading these ideas and new recruits. Dialogue is referred to in most of the documents analysed. It can be used, among other things, to get through to a young person who, feels excluded from society. Developing skills of critical thinking and independent evaluation among young people is one of the issues that require more action. These skills allow young people to correctly identify facts and separate them from opinions; they also protect against all forms of indoctrination and hate speech.

4.3. Communication (category 3)

Extremist and counter-extremist narratives compete in modern societies. This makes it crucial to create effective tools of communication to disseminate pro-integration, inclusive discourse that can be used as a tool in fighting radicalisation. Even the best-organised policies and programmes will not gain enough societal attention and focus to effect real change if they are not properly - and widely - communicated and promoted. Creating space for dialogue is crucial to this, as evident in the Spanish *Transversal Plan for the Coexistence and Prevention of Violent radicalisation in the City of Malaga 2017-2020*. This plan focusses on preventing the emergence and development of processes of radicalisation, through early detection and neutralisation of emergent pockets of radicalisation and by acting on those groups or individuals at risk. A somewhat similar approach can be found in the UK document *A Shared Future - A report of the Greater Manchester Preventing Hateful Extremism and Promoting Social Cohesion Commission, 2018*, in which the importance of creating safe spaces for difficult conversations is recognised. The report also calls for the development of opportunities for both peer and intergenerational mentoring in order to provide opportunities for a wide range of ages and backgrounds to interact, exchange ideas, skills and knowledge and, in this way, reduce social isolation and forge meaningful, mutually beneficial relationships.

One proposal considered by the Greater Manchester Commission was the establishment of an anonymous phone line or website as a space where the public could seek help regarding radicalisation. The experience of introducing precisely such a Helpline Service was discussed in the Finnish *National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism* (2016). The Helpline Service was designed to support families and friends of radicalised people and help tackle the problem of social exclusion for people at risk of radicalisation and extremism. *The Finnish National Action plan* also emphasised the importance of improving and clarifying communications regarding the goals and means for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism as well as engaging in dialogue and interaction with different groups to ensure these goals and means were shared. A key element of the plan was the preparation of up-to-date material to support communications which increase awareness among those working to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism about the messages of violent extremist groups, their means of dissemination and target groups.

The Danish perspective – specifically the Aarhus model – also uses dialogue with Muslim communities with the aim of promoting the integration of those vulnerable to radicalisation, provided they have not committed criminal acts (*Danish Perspective Measures and de-radicalisation Strategies: The Aarhus Model 2015*). The focus of civic communication in the Dutch strategy is on raising public awareness about privacy and information security and the acquisition of intelligence and security services for better coping with cybercrime (*The National Cyber Security Strategy, 2011*). This reflects the ease with which information and propaganda can be disseminated via the internet and social media, requiring increased government control over the flow of information on the internet as well as cyber security. Within the

framework of the *Strategy of the State Nationality Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period Until 2025* (2012) at the Federal and regional levels, the involvement of civil society institutions, ethno-cultural organisations and associations, expert and scientific community in the fight against extremism is promoted and events are held to involve such groups.

Contact and cooperation between various religious societies and their participation in various sectors of society is commended. This is mentioned in the *Swedish Action Plan to Safeguard Democracy against Violence-promoting Extremism* (2011) as a good example of civic cooperation. These measures are meant to reach individuals who are at risk and those who have already joined violent extremist movements. The Greek approach includes building trust between state authorities and citizens (*Bill of law* (4356/2015) *for the establishment of a National Council against Racism and Bigotry at the Ministry of Justice*). The Greek government sees training and education as crucial in order to prevent the promotion of extremist ideologies, as well as forms of supporting terrorism. It also sees education, training and increased awareness of frontline-personnel as key to preventing the promotion of extremist ideologies and support for terrorism.

As mentioned in Section 3.4, the EXIT programme in Norway, not only guaranteed the care of young people, providing them with help when exiting extreme right-wing movements, but involved a continuous dialogue and the establishment of voluntary organisations to support those in need of help. An interesting solution is presented by the Turkish policy document on *Community Supported Policing* (TDP, 2008), where, in addition to meetings and education, other resources are used, such as booklets with guidelines on how to protect oneself in case of a criminal incident.

The Turkish *Diyanet* (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) – the Directorate of Religious Affairs - is tasked with promoting a more moderate version of Islam and weakening radical Islamist messaging. The *Diyanet* has been significantly strengthened as an institution with its budget increased fourfold and its staff doubled to nearly 150,000. It has great capacity for spreading its message having its own TV station, broadcasting 24 hours a day and three radio stations. The *Diyanet* employs all the imams in Turkey's 85.000 mosques and seeks to 'undercut violent extremist messaging', transmitting instead official, moderate messages to the public via official imams.

The *National Action Plan against Racism - Positions and Measures to Deal with Ideologies of Inequality and related Discrimination* promotes seminars that raise awareness for professionals in the media and help people respond appropriately to hatred as part of their peer group. The Turkish Penal Code does not refer to 'civic communication' as such but at the local level counter-terrorism measures reference the importance of close cooperation between law enforcement agencies and families⁷. In addition, the document calls for qualifications and training to be introduced to enable media and information literacy to be strengthened and specialists in social community management to be able to effectively counteract hatred in the society.

The *Polish National Anti-Terrorist Programme for 2015-2019* suggests that through a properly conducted media policy, resulting from cooperation between public entities and the media, society can become a partner in identifying terrorist threats. With similar aims, the French *Stop-Jihadism* programme seeks to counter Al-Qaida's terrorist attacks (in the wake of the attacks of 7-9 January 2015) by raising public awareness on what constitutes a terrorist threat, propaganda analysis and what is involved in the recruitment to Jihad. Even the best-organised policies and programmes will not gather enough public attention and focus to effect a real change if they are not properly - and widely - communicated and promoted. European programmes pay attention to the issue of communication directly or indirectly. As

⁷ See *Adana Police Department document*, which can be found in the technical appendix, at: <http://www.dare-h2020.org/publications.html>

it is mentioned through analysed documents, it is important that proper communication tools are planned and implemented in future counter-radicalisation policies.

Civic involvement is a significant contribution to solving socio-political problems. It is undertaken on a voluntary basis and does not generally require state control, but requires good framework conditions. Commitment brings people into contact with each other and thus can reduce prejudices and strengthen the foundation of a solidary, balanced and democratic society. Civil society has an important role to play in working against radicalisation and extremism in all their manifestations, including hate speech, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, by promoting cohesion and a sense of belonging to society. This can be manifested in many different ways, for example by the work of non-governmental organisations, religious communities and at the individual level by former extremists.

4.4 Community approach (category 4)

The fourth category is concerned with how policy documents understand the role of local communities, families, schools, religious or civic networks, youth organisations, sports centres, gangs, neighbourhoods, paramilitary organisations, demonstrations, and prisons in countering radicalisation. The analysed sources show clearly that vulnerability to potential radicalisation processes (push- and pull-factors) is closely connected with community and social cohesion, which play an important role in shaping the environment in which radicalisation processes take place. The community (including not only neighbourhoods but also, for example, schools or the penitentiary system) and family background can either forge or undermine an individual's or group's resilience to potential radicalisation. Working with communities, building on already existing ties of trust and reliability, and also acquiring partners within those communities to disseminate counter-radicalisation narratives is a very important element of counter-radicalisation efforts. The role of communities in this is addressed by 88 per cent of the analysed policy documents.

This community-focused approach recognises that the roots of radicalisation are best identified, diagnosed and addressed in the environment from which the victim of radicalisation comes.

The Spanish approach includes creation of solutions on the sub-national level, for example at the city level (*Transversal Plan for the Coexistence and Prevention of Violent Radicalisation in the City of Malaga 2017-2020*, 2017) and considers institutions such as prisons (*Framework Program of intervention in violent radicalisation with Islamist inmates*, 2016) and the educational system (*Adi-adian Educational Module*, 2013) as forms of communities.

In Finland, there are provisions for training that specifically address the key sectors of action in counter radicalisation: education, youth work, social and health services and the police as well as basic and high-level local cooperation groups (*National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. Annual Report 2017*, 2017). The National Cooperation Network promotes cooperation with civil society in order to prevent violent extremism (*Towards a Cohesive Society. Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism*, 2012). Denmark also stresses the importance of work in schools and prisons (*A Common and Safe Future: A Danish Action Plan to Prevent Extremism*, 2009). The concept of info-centres – a framework for local cooperation between the police and municipal social service administrations and providers and as centres of excellence concerning extremism and radicalisation - points to the importance of work on the local level (*Introduction to The Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism And Radicalisation*, 2016), as well as underlining the importance of work with teachers, consultants, job centre staff, workers in after-school centres, residential social workers and employees of the Prison Service who all play an important role in prevention (*Prevention of radicalisation and extremism. The action plan of the government*, September 2014). Continuous open dialogue with

different Muslim communities, organisations and mosques is stressed (*Danish Perspective Measures and de-radicalisation Strategies: The Aarhus Model*, 2015).

In the Netherlands, the emphasis on bringing local actors together is evident in the partnership between local authorities and government (*Personal Intervention against Young People in Right-Wing Extremist Circles*, 2007). The creation of NUANSA as an entity providing advice to municipalities on the best practices to counter radicalisation and helping citizens recognise the signs of extremism is also important. The programme offers customised trainings with the help of local government in 25 regions in the Netherlands (*Nuansa*, 2014), as well as constantly building a network of key figures and self-organisation involved in discussing and solving problems (*Implementation framework for case-based approach to radicalisation*).

Improving the cooperation between agencies, local government and organisations at national, regional and local level and the creation of a national telephone hotline, which relatives, local government and organisations can use to obtain information, advice and support on issues concerning violent extremism, is a testament to the fact, that Sweden recognises the need for a multi-level approach with a strong role for communities (*Prevent, preempt and protect – the Swedish Counter-terrorism Strategy*).

In Greece cooperation with civil society on de-radicalisation issues is an important aspect of action (*Bill of law (4356/2015) for the establishment of a National Council against Racism and Bigotry at the Ministry of Justice December 2015*), as well as the establishment of an expert network on a national level including non-governmental organisations and institutions (research centres, NGOs, immigrant organisations). Greece recognises also the role of family and school, the internet and social media, and the need for counter radicalisation in prisons (*Counter-Radicalisation pocket guides for the public and front line practitioners*, 2016).

In Belgium the role of cooperation between the penitentiary institutions, in particular the psychosocial service, and the prevention officials of the cities and communes is recognised (*Action Plan against radicalisation in prisons 2015*) in preventing radicalisation in prisons. Priority is given to local actors from civil society, NGOs or the religious sector to bring trust and avoid suspicion (*Programme on the prevention of violent radicalisation 2013*).

In the United Kingdom Prevent activities are conducted mainly at the local level (*Channel Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists 2010; Channel Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists 2010; Understanding and monitoring tension and conflict in local communities A practical guide for local authorities, police service and partner agencies*). The actors responsible for projects realised under ‘Prevent’ include: community safety services, police – borough liaison, safer neighbourhoods, borough intelligence; education – schools section dealing with racial incidents; community development/area or neighbourhood teams; youth service; environment services; housing – estate management, registered social landlord representatives. Additional members, involved in different parts of the country, include: executive member with cohesion or community safety portfolio; community representatives – for example from independent advisory group, tenants and residents associations, faith groups; voluntary organisations – race equality council, voluntary action council; and health services. *A Shared Future - A report of the Greater Manchester Preventing Hateful Extremism and Promoting Social Cohesion Commission* (2018) stresses the need to critically review the approach to community engagement and identify opportunities for ongoing engagement where meaningful relationships can be developed, as well as ensuring that specific engagement exercises and consultations reach deep into communities and beyond those who regularly speak on behalf of communities.

In Germany, a lot of de-radicalisation and preventive measures are based at the local level. The federal states and municipalities also play an enormous role in activities against racism and other ideologies of inequality as well as in preventing extremism and promoting democracy (*National Action Plan against Racism - Positions and Measures to deal with Ideologies of Inequality and the related Discrimination* (2017). The federal government's strategy is to act in various places that are key to preventing extremism and promoting democracy - in social areas, municipalities and counties, institutions, clubs, associations, schools, prisons and many other places where people are committed to strengthening democracy and defending people and freedom (*Federal government strategy on extremism prevention and democracy promotion*, 2016).

France – where a particular national security challenge is presented by the anticipation that around 450 radicalised individuals (50 of whom were sentenced for terrorism and 400 were radicalised in prison) will leave French prisons by the end of 2019 – has created a dedicated agency to detect signs of radicalisation in prisons. By the end of March 2019, the surveillance of prisons and radicalisation in detention will be placed under the auspices of a 'service with national competence'.

The French experience with de-radicalisation programmes is an example of learning from past failure. France's first de-radicalisation centre in the Château de Pontourny was closed after just under a year. This Centre of Prevention, Integration and Citizenship was a pilot site that was supposed to act as a prototype for 13 centres of its kind across the country. Its failure is attributed to a number of reasons: high maintenance costs; a complicated and ineffective system for selecting programme participants - based on cooperation with prefectures; the principle of voluntary participation contributed to early resignation of residents; co-production of the stigmatisation of programme participants who also experienced huge pressure from the media (the centre was often called the 'jihadist academy'); and incompetent work with those on the path to radicalisation who, in contact with already radicalised individuals, have often become more radicalised themselves.

Non-EU countries in our sample also see an important role for local communities. In Russia the law makes it a duty for state and municipal bodies, media, internet sites, officials, NGOs and other entities to prevent extremist activity (*The Federal Law 'On countering extremism'*), with involvement of civil society institutions, ethno-cultural organisations and associations, expert and scientific community in the fight against extremism (*The Strategy of the State nationality Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period Until 2025*) and improving the interaction of public authorities and local self-government with civil society institutions (*The action plan for implementation in 2016-2018 of the Strategy of the state nationality policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025*). Switzerland also stresses the importance of the role of Territorial States in actions directed at minimising the threat of radicalisation (*Montreux Initiative 2008*).

Norway has a record of implementing strong solutions at the local level, especially by connecting knowledge of local events, actors and contextualised relationships with general knowledge of what causes and triggers criminal acts in general, and what contributes to youth entry and exit from gangs or racist environments in particular (*Exit. Youth leaving violent youth groups. Final report*, 2000). This local focus continues through the inclusion into planned actions of schools, child welfare, health centres, youth clubs, cultural activities, labour and welfare services, correctional services and the police (*SALTO. Together we create a safe Oslo. Guide for concern: how to prevent and handle hate crime and violent extremism among young people?*).

In Turkey, the role of the educational system is stressed (*Individual disengagement and deradicalisation: Counterterrorism measures conducted by the Adana Police Department in Turkey 2009-2015*), as well as close cooperation of state institutions and cooperation between law enforcement authorities and families (*Diyanet's programme to 'undermine violent extremist messaging' 2013*).

4.5 External factors (category 5)

In an era of heightened mobility and migration in planning of counter-radicalisation policies, it is essential to take into consideration external factors that influence radicalisation processes in Europe. These include the return of individuals and families from conflict areas, the threat of foreign fighters, terrorist attacks perpetrated by external terrorist organisations, radical Islamist propaganda, developments in conflict zones and threats from the Middle East. Without some knowledge and awareness of the influence of these factors, counter-radicalisation efforts in Europe will be flawed.

The Spanish strategy - *Comprehensive Strategy Against International Terrorism and radicalisation*, declares support for non-EU countries suffering from terrorism in order to address the roots of the threat and commits to improving border control to counter terrorist infiltration of Spain and the EU.

The French *Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism* (9 May 2016) advocates more restricted control of the EU's external borders as one of the main priorities in the fight against terrorism. The document sets out that France will intensify its efforts to resolve international conflicts – in particular in Africa and Middle East - that feed the phenomenon of radicalisation in Europe. One of the key challenges in this context is to limit migratory flows which are being exploited by terrorist groups. It is the intention of France to lobby at the European level for the recruitment of 900 additional FRONTEX employees to manage migration flows more efficiently. The plan makes clear that returning people from conflict zones are considered a potential threat, and those 'who are found to have committed a crime while being there will be held responsible. The Finnish government also addresses the issue, stating that all returning persons will be systematically targeted with individually tailored measures which reduce the risk of violence and help improve their ability to cope' (*National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism*, 2016). This approach aims to reduce the risk of crime and help increase capacity to deal with this problem. The priority is to detain those who have committed crimes, although this can prove difficult due to the lack of evidence. When it comes to these individuals, the most important thing is to reduce the risk of violence and the increasing risk of radicalisation associated with them, and to promote their reintegration into society, as noted in the *National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism, Annual Report 2017. Published by Ministry of the Interior Publication, Helsinki 2017*.

States also have an obligation to investigate and, as required by international law or otherwise as appropriate, prosecute, extradite or surrender persons suspected of having committed other crimes under international law, such as torture or hostage taking. A similar identification of returning foreign fighters as the main external threat is evident in the Danish *Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalisation. National Action Plan* (2016). This document specifically states that appropriate measures must be taken to protect young people against radicalisation and terrorism including via international exchange of information. Developments in conflict zones can affect a person's propensity to join violent groups, according to Swedish *Action Plan to Safeguard Democracy against Violence-promoting Extremism 2011*.

According to UK Government guidance, the most significant of these threats is currently from terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq, and Al-Qaida associated groups. However, terrorists associated with the extreme right also pose a continued threat to safety and security (*Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism 2015*). The internet is the tool used most frequently by terrorists to disseminate radical views and extremism internationally and to acquire new recruits for their organisations. In terms of prevention, it is a cause for concern that propaganda is encouraging people to act alone and without the support of a group. In this way, an apparently 'external' threat may

be external in the sense that it is comprised of extremist propaganda and training materials emanating from outside the country but they are ‘consumed’ internally, by the residents of the country, resulting in so-called ‘home grown terrorism’ (see: *Towards a Cohesive Society. Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism*, 2012). Radical Islamist propaganda instigating violence is actively distributed on the internet. Propaganda on the internet and discussion forums can have a strong contributory impact on the radicalisation of a vulnerable individual. Such material is abundant and easily available in several European languages. Violent messages are specifically targeted at radicalising and recruiting young Western people. Invitations to sympathisers in the West to carry out attacks are recognised as mobilising extreme Islamists in Norway (*Prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism – what is the role of the municipality?*, 2016). Germany sees the greatest challenge as the growing number of Islamist threats and extensive influence of Salafi groups. The *European Fair Skills – De-radicalisation Training for Peer Role Models and Youth Workers* (2015), document, for example, states that ‘[...] protecting young people from external threats has become crucial today’. Among all European countries France is the most vulnerable to radicalisation due to French citizens returning from Iraq and Syria, where they were suspected of cooperation with terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaida or ISIS and the incursion of terrorist organisations via social media, which turns an outside threat into an internal one. New government strategies and legislation in France (*Action Plan Against Terrorism (PACT)*, 13 July 2018, *Law Strengthening Domestic Security and the fight against terrorism*, 30 October 2017) suggest one effective way to fight against radicalisation in the Middle East and Africa while another is to institute more restricted control of the European Union’s external borders (*Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism*, 9 May 2016). The Russian Federation’s *Strategy of the State Nationality Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period Until 2025* (2012) also notes that the expansion of international terrorism and religious extremism is a key problem.

In two countries – Turkey and Greece – none of the analysed documents mention external threat factors.

4.6 EU and international cooperation (category 6)

This category reflects collaboration with other states, mostly within the EU, on counter-terrorism but also, more rarely, on the prevention of radicalisation. The EU plays an important role as a creator of cooperation standards, facilitator and - often - source of financing of mutually important efforts on the national and international levels. From the security point of view, the EU is primarily a tool for coordination of policies and shaping common approaches, threat awareness and situational awareness. The cooperation is a crucial element in strengthening national capacities. The EU plays an important role as a creator of cooperation standards, facilitator and - often - the source of financing of mutually important efforts on a national and international level.

As the Finnish document *Towards a Cohesive Society. Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism* (2012) states, in the last twenty years, globalisation and the development of communication technology have meant that, for better or worse, Finland has become more closely entwined in an international community characterised by violent extremism. Preventing and combating violent extremism is a European Union-wide challenge and, since responsibility for preventive action lies with each Member State, Preventive programmes have been prepared in many Member States of the European Union. However, international coordination and cooperation in intelligence and security is important to these efforts. This is reflected in Spanish documents, where such cooperation, supranational initiatives (especially within the EU) and exchange of information on the processes of radicalisation constitute an important part of the global and national response to terrorism and generate a sense of security (*Comprehensive Strategy Against International Terrorism*, 2010 and *Radicalisation and National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation*, January 2015).

The French document *France in face of Terrorism - Government White Paper on Homeland Security challenged by Terrorism* (2006), underlines that there is an urgent need to extend international cooperation between European countries. The reinforcement of European and international cooperation in the field of intelligence is also mentioned in the *Action Plan Against Terrorism* (13 July 2018). The Finnish *National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism* (2016) mentions the international cooperation taking place among the Nordic countries, in the European Union and with third countries. This cooperation, it is stated, helps develop strategies and policies for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. It also makes it possible to compare the lessons learned and best practices, to expand knowledge on different methods, to participate in research cooperation and to anticipate future developments. The National Action Plan also mentions the Reach Out project, which has been pursued with the EU's Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in order to increase know-how and its exchange as a part of international cooperation. Information is exchanged with international partners on experiences gained and best practices. Brainstorming is performed on preventive measures. The National Action Plan successfully promotes the international objectives established by the European Union and the United Nations. The view in this document is that Nordic cooperation, in turn, enables the further development of research activities and concrete measures to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism.

The *Prevention of radicalisation and extremism. The action plan of the government (2014)* of the Danish government notes the international nature of the challenges posed by extremism, which makes it essential that national prevention campaigns share information and experiences. It is suggested that partnerships should not be restricted to the country's immediate neighbours in the EU; prevention in third countries is also important to Denmark and to Danish interests at home and abroad. According to the Dutch *National Counterterrorism Strategy, 2011-2015. Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007- 2011*, international cooperation between the police and the judiciary is crucial because of increased international terrorist threats. This document states that the Netherlands is playing an active role in such cooperation including through knowledge exchange and sharing good experience in the EU context. Of the six documents from the UK, surprisingly only one mentions international cooperation. This is the *Contest Strategy, 2011*, where it is stated that success depends on the quality of engagement in the international arena with close allies. It is worth noting that the 2015 version of the UK government's *Counter-extremism strategy*, focuses on extremism at home but recognises that the flow of people, ideology and money is increasingly international. It states that a clear plan will be developed for international work to reinforce efforts to defeat extremism at home and that there will also be a campaign to build a more robust international response to counter extremist ideology and propaganda and a continued focus on strengthening international bodies and partnerships. The document continues that this will be a key priority for the UK's network of diplomatic missions, working through international institutions such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the European Union and through government and civil society partners and that the UK will expand its partnerships with governments and multilateral groups overseas to reduce the threat to the UK via concerted international action including tackling extremism online.

The Turkish document *Community Supported Policing (TDP)*, is related to the EU nomination of Turkey and the requirements of policing implementations of the EU in order to improve policing activities. Two of the documents are based on the Penal Code, where there is no mention of any international cooperation. Introducing Turkey's experience and heritage in the field of religion abroad, enabling people to understand Islam correctly, closely following discussions about religious understanding and practices in both EU Member States and Turkey and ensuring accurate information on this is released to inform public opinion in the West are included in *Diyanet's* programme to 'undermine violent extremist

messaging' (2013). Switzerland's *Montreux Initiative 2008*, states that cooperation, information sharing and assistance between states, commensurate with each state's capacities, are desirable in order to achieve full respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law.

4.7 Institutional and bottom-up Logic (category 7)

Under this category, policies and programmes are assessed in relation to how far they are transversal. This relates, firstly, to whether they cut across policy fields as well as government departments/offices and ministries. Secondly, it considers whether they work unidirectionally (from the top downwards) or are responsive to initiatives from the bottom up.

Terrorism takes different forms and impacts on societies and groups within society in different ways. Today's terrorist organisations are often amorphous entities, against which traditional hierarchies may be helpless. Asymmetric threats call for non-hierarchical organisational solutions in order to effectively combat them. The principles of subsidiarity worked out at the EU level as well as the facilitating abilities of the EU institutions (along with the experiences of creating cross-sectoral policies and programmes) call for the use of the European 'acquis' in this area.

Spanish counter-radicalisation policies (*National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation* (El PEN-LCRV), January 2015; *Comprehensive Strategy Against International Terrorism and Radicalisation*, 2010) are based on a cross-administrative and multi-agency principle and adopt a multidisciplinary approach to the prevention of radicalisation (*Protocol of prevention, detection and intervention of Islamist radicalisation processes* (PRODERAI), 2017), as well as to coordination, information and training (*Adrian Educational Module*, 2013).

In Finland cooperation is pursued through local networks and new forms of operation based on multi-professional cooperation (*National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. Annual Report*, 2017). The underlying approach is to create a permanent multi-professional team, expert in the prevention of violent extremism that can be called upon to provide 'a forum in which various professionals can discuss the situation and the most suitable methods for dealing with it' (*Towards a Cohesive Society. Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism*, 2012).

In Denmark a crucial part of the multi-agency approach is the already established networks of School, Social Services & Police (SSP), the networks of Prison and Probations Services, Social Services & Police (KSP), and the networks of Psychiatry, Social Services & Police (PSP); the networks also contribute substantially by having direct contact with the general public and individuals at risk (*Introduction to the Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism And Radicalisation*, 2016). At the core of the Danish approach is a close collaboration between different authorities and a joint understanding that the prevention effort can take place on many levels and involve different types of initiatives (*Danish Perspective Measures and de-radicalisation Strategies: The Aarhus Model – 2015*).

In the Netherlands, the emphasis is placed on partnership between local authorities and government that can bring together a coalition of state and local actors (*Personal Intervention Against Young People in Right-Wing Extremist Circles*, 2007). *The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism* (2014) is in its entirety a programme involving various entities from public and private sectors, including the military, police, NGOs etc. The Dutch approach also includes NGOs (*My City, My World – Second Wave*).

In Sweden, crucial importance is ascribed to national coordination to safeguard democracy against violent extremism and developing local crime prevention work by strengthening national coordination in the area (*Prevent, preempt and protect – the Swedish Counter-terrorism Strategy*). The Greek approach

advocates the involvement of all services concerned, as well as society at large, in countering radicalisation (*Counter-Radicalisation pocket guides for the public and front line practitioners*, 2016). Based on the analysed documents from Belgium, there is a multifaceted approach to de-radicalisation which recognises support for local, educational, civil society and the goal of involving, strengthening and supporting the various relevant actors (*Programme on the prevention of violent radicalisation*, 2013).

In the UK, a multi-agency approach to countering radicalisation is adopted (*Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism England and Wales*, 2015). The approach includes work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) (*Contest Strategy*, 2011).

In Germany the federal government's strategy focuses on the systematic involvement of multiple actors (*Federal government strategy on extremism prevention and democracy promotion*, 2016). A multi-stakeholder approach is viewed as important since, in order to prevent radicalisation and protect vulnerable people, cooperation between the various bodies is necessary because it is the only way to create a coherent and reliable network (*Instrumentalisation of the topic of "sexual abuse" by neo-Nazis. Strategies and action recommendations. Democracy is (not) a child's birthday. Help for day care centers in dealing with right-wing extremism*, 2013).

In France, the government has recently centralised decisions and actions regarding the fight against terrorism. It has also given the services more latitude in their response. A National Counter-Terrorism Centre was created, supervised by the national coordinator of special services, who is an official of the presidential administration. The government has also adopted a new strategy to fight terrorism (*Action Plan Against Terrorism (PACT)*, 13 July 2018) which increases the role of the General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI), will employ 3,000 new officers and should allow the intensification of intelligence and preventive activities. The strategy also assumes more effective punishment for terrorism in part through the creation of a national prosecutor's office for terrorism. To improve monitoring of people considered prone to radicalisation, now estimated at 24,000, a special team for profiling and monitoring suspected terrorists will be launched in 2019 as part of the existing Central Directorate of the Judicial Police. From 30 October 2017, a new anti-terrorist law came into force (*Law Strengthening Domestic Security and the fight against terrorism, 30 October 2017*); this replaced the state of emergency (which was ended as of 1 November 2017) whilst retaining several of its instruments. The new legislation strengthens the powers of the administrative authorities: the minister of internal affairs and prefectures, especially in arrests and searches. In addition, administrative authorities may order the immediate closure of a place of religious worship or the dissolution of a legal public gathering if they consider the activity there provokes discrimination, hatred, or violence, or is being used to prepare a terrorist attack. The implemented reforms have also visibly improved coordination between French institutions, in particular, with the DGSI, where staff have been appointed to improve cooperation with territorial intelligence units, judicial police and cybersecurity services.

The non-EU countries in our sample also value cross-sectoral activity, although primarily in the form of multi-level rather than horizontal coordination. In Russia, for example, counter-radicalisation is conducted at federal, regional and municipal levels but via a hierarchical approach. Nonetheless, the involvement of all levels of public authorities allows the strategy to reach across the whole population, as well as to take into account the regional and local context in its implementation (*The Federal Law 'On countering extremism'*).

Switzerland focuses on the creation of a comprehensive approach to preventing violent extremism at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, where it cooperates with governments, international

organisations and forums, non-governmental actors, including civil society, the private sector and armed groups (*Switzerland's Foreign Policy Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism*, 2016).

In Norway, an interministerial group under government leadership is described as an entity designed to facilitate the continuous coordination of efforts to combat radicalisation and violent extremism (including follow-up of the measures in the plan and discussion and implementation of new measures) and is composed of representatives from various professions, voluntary organisations and research institutions (*Action plan against radicalisation and violent extremism*, 2014, revised in 2017). The importance of the division of responsibilities between the central government, county, municipality and civil players is implied (*Threats to the nation*, 2018). Turkey recognises also the importance of multi-level cooperation.

4.8 Budgets (category 8)

Of 100 analysed documents, only 35 contained any reference to the budget allocated for implementation of the programme or strategy. From what data there is on budgets, it is evident that funding for counter-extremism is allocated differently between countries. Within any country, funding may be allocated through budgets for education, employment, social dialogue activities or to a range of specific programmes and projects. Funds are allocated to building capacity, which involves activities, resources and support that strengthen the skills, abilities and confidence of people and community groups to take effective action and leading roles in the development of their communities. Funds are also allocated to support the integration of foreign nationals and projects aimed at providing free legal services to foreigners and supporting further development of relations between foreigners and their communities with citizens.

4.9 Evaluation (category 9)

This category captures whether programmes and strategies detailed were evaluated and by whom. This is important in order to identify any programmes that have sprung up to exploit the 'counter-radicalisation industry' and promote superficial or even counterproductive programmes.

Evaluation is an important aspect of effective work in de-radicalisation and prevention of radicalisation. However, only 27 of the 100 analysed policies, plans of action, legal acts, strategies etc. include appropriate provisions for evaluation. In some countries (e.g. Switzerland, Sweden, Greece, Turkey, France) none of the analysed documents mentioned any evaluation or monitoring at all. Some of the analysed documents included provisions for the evaluation of individual actions in the plan, without the overall evaluation of the plan itself. This may be due to the difficulty of creating measures of effectiveness for programmes of de-radicalisation and prevention of radicalisation where success is indicated by the absence of behaviours or attitudes.

5. Conclusions

The following conclusions are based on the analysis of 100 policy documents as well as findings from interviews with 25 international experts.

5.1 Social / cultural / ideological / religious factors

Radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism are processes inherently social in nature. A security response is insufficient therefore to counteract such a complex and dynamically changing phenomenon as radicalisation. This is reflected in the high importance attached to factors connected with the social and educational aspects of radicalisation in policies and programmes analysed; 93 per cent of the documents studied included provisions in this category. However, security, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies continue to take insufficient account of long-term and socio-economic factors, either at the national or at the European level.

The prominence of this societal and educational approach in the analysed documents, shows an understanding of the need to address the root causes of radicalisation and acts as a cue to further actions in this area. However, such long-term causes of radicalisation include a wide range of socio-economic, cultural, moral, ideological, religious, educational and cultural factors - from thrill-seeking to legitimate grievances – and thus more specific isolation of the roots of individual radicalisation is necessary in order to develop policy responses.

Our study of interviews with international experts confirms this finding. One reason for the failure to adequately address root causes of radicalisation is that structural factors are more complex and data concerning them are gathered and analysed by government agencies other than those responsible for counter-radicalisation policies. This is even more complicated at the local level, because cities and local governments have limited leverage in terms of improving the economic environment.

Experts differentiated two forms of radicalisation, structured according to two main criteria – the internal or external nature of their root causes.

Factors cited that contributed to the perception of an internal threat include:

- a range of negative consequences of the lack of cultural, social and economic integration of citizens into their societies, as well as a failure of states to provide adequate venues and support to cater for the positive integration for all;
- the growing polarisation between rich/poor, people/elites, different cultures and religions;
- socio-spatial inequalities, from urban ghettoization through inequalities between rich/poor areas and towns to divisions between the global North and South;
- the increasing extension of various forms of radicalisation to middle class youth from all backgrounds;
- the resurgence of extreme-right violent groups/militias/vigilantes.

5.2 Youth

Young people are identified as one of the most vulnerable groups for potential radicalisation because they are most exposed to radical messaging and because they are viewed as impressionable, quick to judge and prone to reason in absolute categories. Addressing the needs and characteristics of young people is thus an important aspect of preventing and countering radicalisation and is found in 67 per cent of analysed documents. Social inclusion, empowerment, and education (including peer-based education) appear as leading motifs of programmes and policies aimed at countering and preventing radicalisation among the younger population.

Interviewed practitioners stress that families, schools, religious networks and facilities, political parties, youth organisations, sports centres, clubs, gangs, neighbourhoods, paramilitary organisations, demonstrations or prisons are important milieus where radicalisation processes take place. With a view to reducing the risk of radicalisation (both Islamist and extreme-right), experts highlight the need to invest more in strengthening communication/relationships with younger cohorts of Europeans, including through the use of social media.

5.3 Communication

Extremist and counter-extremist narratives compete in modern societies. This makes it crucial to create effective tools of communication to disseminate pro-integration, inclusive discourse that can be used as a tool in fighting radicalisation. This is reflected in the analysed policy documents of which three quarters (77 per cent) address the question of communication directly or indirectly. Even the best-organised policies and programmes will not gain enough societal attention and focus to effect real change if they are not properly - and widely - communicated and promoted. It is important that proper communication tools are planned and implemented in future counter-radicalisation policies.

Expert interviewees working in the field warned that European institutions and Member States should not ostracise radicalised individuals (or those on the way to becoming radicalised) but recognise them as part of wider society as well as part of their value-based or religious environments. This strategy of inclusion **could support their more open communication** with state structures (central and local) and NGOs and facilitate the defusing of tensions and the collective search for non-violent resolutions to such conflicts.

Experts recognised that social media has a strong impact in particular on young people's vision of the world and thus contributes to the generation of their radical – both Islamist and extreme-right – beliefs. However, they suggest it is important not to overestimate the influence of such new media. Experts noted a growing lack of trust in content and tools encountered on the internet among youth. This suggests that other milieus where radicalisation processes take place require equal attention. At the same time, **the potential positive effects of the internet should not be underestimated (e.g. in providing a forum for public debate).**

5.4 Communities

Our evidence illustrates that sources of vulnerability to potential radicalisation processes (push- and pull-factors) suggest that community and social cohesion play an important role in shaping the environment in which radicalisation processes take place. The community (including not only neighbourhoods but also, for example, schools or the penitentiary system) and family background can either forge or undermine an individual's or group's resilience to potential radicalisation. Working with communities, building on already existing ties of trust and reliability, and also acquiring partners within those communities to disseminate counter-radicalisation narratives is a very important element of counter-radicalisation efforts. The importance of bringing local communities into counter-radicalisation efforts is evident from the fact that although local documents constitute only 12 per cent of all analysed policies in this study, 88 per cent of the documents advocate what we have termed a 'community approach'.

Intermediary milieus, such as schools, sport centres and neighbourhood social facilities should be placed at the heart of counter-radicalisation policies. They constitute the social fabric of communities and are thus sites of interaction where individuals or groups embarking on paths to radicalisation may be visible

and timely interventions can be made.

In the majority of policies and published studies analysed for this report, as well as among expert interviewees, this community approach is understood to strengthen communities' resilience to polarisation and radicalisation. This is possible, however, only if there is a relationship of mutual trust and understanding; communities need to be able to count on the support from their authorities while the authorities need to trust communities sufficiently to invest in developing the civic and social infrastructure they need. It is also vital to bear in mind that there is significant consensus (across expert interviews and counter-radicalisation policies) that there is a feeling of saturation with security institutions and issues already in districts and neighbourhoods with a significant presence of either Islamist or extreme-right actors. Thus, a key conclusion is that the presence of counter-radicalisation actions in the field must be managed and coordinated more carefully. Where trust is already lacking, such a saturation with security-oriented policies and infrastructure could jeopardise efforts in building trust. This suggests that it would be more effective to prioritise the work of social and cultural (also religious) counter-radicalisation policy actors, who have more support in the local social environment.

Expert interviewees confirm that a focus on the local community level is crucial in counteracting radicalisation. According to interviewed experts, this locally structured counter-radicalisation perspective facilitates conversations and (re)establishes relations between authorities and individuals/groups. This contributes to confronting radicalisation at the level closest to the personal, social and emotional experience of individuals and, in this way, encourages the nurturing of social cohesion as a long-term counter-radicalisation strategy. It is therefore important that such programmes targeting groups at risk of radicalisation are community owned or led, rather than enacted upon communities by law enforcement agencies, which may themselves be viewed with suspicion.

5.5 External threats

No social or political entity exists fully autonomously. Thus, it is important to take into account the external realities surrounding the analysed subject; a fact that is all the more important in the current era of heightened mobility and migration in Europe. External factors that influence radicalisation processes in Europe include: the return of individuals and families from conflict areas; the threat of foreign fighters; terrorist attacks perpetrated by external terrorist organisations; radical Islamist propaganda; developments in conflict zones; and threats from conflicts in the Middle East. These issues are recognised as important in the majority (54 per cent) of the policy documents analysed for this report. Without some knowledge and awareness of the influence of these factors, counter-radicalisation efforts in Europe will be flawed.

Expert interviewees identified similar factors contributing to the perception of an external threat, specifically:

- influence/actions of the so-called ISIS foreign fighters and other European citizens (and their children) returning mainly from Syria;
- the spill-over effect of tensions into European countries, through diaspora from conflict torn regions and other diverse non-diaspora support groups.

5.6 International cooperation

It follows from this that the response to radicalisation needs to be global. Regional, national and international cooperation is stressed as an important step towards effective counter-radicalisation. The

need for a global approach to counter-terrorist strategy was expressed in the majority (56 per cent) of analysed policy documents. This cooperation is relatively well developed in the sphere of counter-terrorism (i.e. at the level of intelligence-sharing) but less so when it comes to the prevention of radicalisation. The analysis of both expert interviewees and 13 EU level policies revealed both benefits and challenges of sharing good practice with other states. On the one hand, whilst recognising the success of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in facilitating the exchange of good practice among Member States, experts felt that the transfer of good practice between European countries was often inhibited, notably because of crucial differences in legislative frameworks or political contexts. On the other hand, experts noted that radicalisation processes vary according to country and region and that this means it is important to proceed with caution in transferring solutions, even if they have been successful in other regions and/or in other countries. In short, there is no 'one size fits all' solution in this area. Transferring good practices requires careful tailoring.

From the security point of view, the EU is primarily a tool for coordination of policies and shaping common approaches, threat awareness and situational awareness. Cooperation is a crucial element in strengthening capacities at national level. The EU plays an important role as a creator of cooperation standards, facilitator and - often – as the source of financing of mutually important efforts on a national and international level. Benchmarking national initiatives against EU platforms of cooperation, their procedures and principles, may strengthen the feasibility of planned measures. This is all the more important considering the inherently international nature of terrorism, which renders unilateral effort to combat this threat inherently less effective.

5.7 Multi-level/multi-agency dimension

Terrorism takes different forms and impacts on societies and groups within society in different ways. Today's terrorist organisations are often amorphous entities, against which traditional hierarchies may be helpless. Asymmetric threats call for non-hierarchical organisational solutions in order to effectively combat them. The principles of subsidiarity worked out at the EU level as well as the facilitating abilities of the EU institutions (along with the experiences of creating cross-sectoral policies and programmes) call for the use of the European 'acquis' in this area.

The serious threat of future terrorist attacks requires state institutions and social systems to become more reflective and innovative in their counter-terrorist policies. France is an illustrative example. Recognising its hitherto inefficient counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policy – demonstrated for example by the dramatic closure of the Pontourny de-radicalisation centre (see above) - on 28 February 2018, the French government launched a new strategy for counteracting radicalisation containing a number of tools to combat extremism. Three new de-radicalisation centres will open in Lyon, Lille, and Marseille, in addition to one operating in Ile-de-France. These units will be located far from city centres and will be where people once radicalised, for instance, former ISIS fighters, will be isolated and rehabilitated.

As expert interviewees in this study noted, many European countries are launching programmes to combat radicalisation that are visibly more locally oriented (using a bottom-up logic) than centralised (employing a top-down logic). Countries are also increasingly investing in training programmes for schools, teachers, police officers and security professionals.

5.8 Budgets

Of 100 analysed documents, only 35 contained any reference to the budget allocated for implementation of the programme or strategy. From what data there is on budgets, it is evident that funding for counter-extremism is allocated differently between countries. Within any country, however, funding may be differently sourced e.g. from funds dedicated directly to the tasks included in the given document or, alternatively, from funds of responsible institutions named in the document. The key issue, however, is the need for including budget solutions in counter-radicalisation documents. Funding provision is crucial to the likelihood of the effective realisation of initiatives.

5.9 Evaluation

Evaluation is an important aspect of effective work in de-radicalisation and prevention of radicalisation. However, only 27 per cent of analysed policies, plans of action, legal acts, strategies etc. include appropriate provisions for evaluation. In some countries (e.g. Switzerland, Sweden, Greece, Turkey, France) none of the analysed documents mentioned any evaluation or monitoring at all.

Some of the analysed documents included provisions for the evaluation of individual actions in the plan, without the overall evaluation of the plan itself. This may be due to the difficulty of creating measures of effectiveness for programmes of de-radicalisation and prevention of radicalisation where success is indicated by the absence of behaviours or attitudes.

The design of such evaluation systems is extremely timely because prevention of counter-radicalisation is generally a new area of state policy in EU countries – in which significant public funds are being invested encouraging the emergence of a booming entrepreneurial market (especially concerning jihadist home-grown radicalisation processes). In particular, in light of encountering poorly structured programmes producing questionable results over the past three to five years, expert interviewees note that it is vital that these counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies and programmes are monitored and evaluated in order to ensure that they are achieving the desired goals.

Expert interviewees working in the field stressed the need for reliable evaluation of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies and programmes. It is crucial to include in all counter/de-radicalisation policies and programmes impact assessment measures that ensure rigorous and fair evaluation by the practitioners themselves, by funders, states and civil society representatives. Sound monitoring will improve the capacities of practitioners to adjust to a quickly changing security environment in Europe.

6. Recommendations

6.1 On society and education

- In order to create effective counter-radicalisation measures it is essential to take into account the social, cultural, religious economic and ideological roots of radicalisation.
- Both structural and relative deprivation must be addressed in designing long-term preventive counter-radicalisation policies.
- Promoting a cohesive society based on democratic values may steer people away from seeking to address their grievances through violence.
- Creative ways of turning people away from extremism need to be sought and tailored according to the relevant drivers of radicalisation in individual cases (e.g. provision of 'action' activities such as snowboarding, climbing and rafting may be helpful in cases where thrill-seeking was a driver for extremist activity).

6.2 On youth

- Levels of knowledge about radicalisation should be improved through teaching and training of both teachers and young people themselves.
- Schools (and NGOs) should be supported in promoting civic activism, use of democratic institutions and civic values to empower young people and boost confidence in democratic institutions.
- Dedicated help centres related to extremism/radicalisation should be established where young people can seek professional, including professional psychological, help. This 'face-to-face' tool should be additional to any publicly available anonymous help line.
- Programmes fostering the inclusion of young people in democratic structures through which they can achieve their goals and defend their rights should be actively promoted.
- Community cohesion programmes and exchanges (in youth centres, community meetings, etc.) should be used to establish offline interactions with and between young people.

6.3 On communication

- Communication between individuals, in particular from groups at risk of (violent) radicalisation, and the local police and security services, including via training and official cooperation with civil society organisations and/or social workers, should be facilitated.
- The existence (and effectiveness) of counter/de-radicalisation programmes should be communicated to the broader public as part of awareness raising campaigns. Effective communication with citizens about threats of radicalisation may help include them in an early warning local monitoring system.
- Effective, positive, alternative pathways to those that lead towards radical ideology should be promoted in particular, but not only, through the use of social media by and for young people. 'Former' radicals and extremists that have become CVE professionals should be considered for engagement in this process.

- The conclusions and recommendations of European policies (EU and Member States) should be written in easily understandable language that is accessible for not only practitioners but also the general public.
- Effort should be made to ensure that the security and counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation system benefits from consulting former radicals now working in CVE and families affected by radicalisation.
- Training manuals and courses for relevant professional groups such as police, teachers, public servants, social workers and security staff should adopt a more long-term, social and educational approach to understanding and countering radicalisation (as is the case with training on hate speech, racial prejudice and discrimination).
- Secure use of the internet should be promoted and greater control over social media used by terrorist groups for radicalisation purposes should be implemented urgently to reduce the risk from external threats.
- An organisational structure should be created as a permanent source of knowledge, information and awareness about radicalisation for all actors and in relation to all levels of radicalisation.
- Communication on radicalisation must employ a subtle, respectful and nuanced approach as demonisation or ridicule can elicit counterproductive effects.

6.4 On communities

- Community institutions and leaders should be supported to better understand radicalisation within their communities and to create ownership of resilience mechanisms.
- Counter-radicalisation narratives should focus on goals of a 'shared future', as it is now broadly considered that multiculturalism places too much emphasis on our differences.
- States should provide local networks not only with structural support but also knowledge, experience and training, drawing on NGO and academic actors in the field.
- Local counter-radicalisation networks may become an important tool for recognising risk of radicalisation and act as an early warning system in the context of the state anti-terrorism system.
- Prisons and schools should be seen as playing a particularly important role in recognising individuals at risk of radicalisation and reducing that risk.
- Intercultural and intercommunity empathy and trust should be promoted in collaboration with schools, local communities, neighbourhoods, and with the support of local authorities.
- Promoting positive models of community policing to ensure everyday contact between the police and local communities.

6.5 On external factors

- Control at airports, ports or state borders where people from conflict zones may return should be strengthened.
- Returnees and their families and former extreme-right militants, offenders and terrorists should be monitored and supported with the view to effectively de-radicalising them rather than

focusing on repressive security policies.

- Enhanced dialogue and cooperation with countries from the Middle East and Africa should be established.

6.6 On international cooperation

- A greater emphasis should be placed on understanding the religions and traditions of countries of the Middle East and on the exchange of good practices with European countries.
- Increased international cooperation on countering radicalisation - exchange of best practices, experience and knowledge should be encouraged in particular.
- The EU should be mobilised in the promotion of national and local solutions to be used as a benchmark for other states facing the threat of radicalisation. This might include the creation of a 'bank of ideas' on counter-radicalisation and radicalisation prevention.

6.7 On multi-level/multi-agency cooperation

- A multiagency approach to prevention and counter-radicalisation policies should be developed, particularly at local level.
- Prevention/counter-radicalisation policies need to be transversal, across policy fields, while ensuring reference to micro structures, including individuals (need for tailor-made solutions).
- Coordination across fields (psychological, social, police etc.) and levels in hierarchical structures should be considered as an important tool in guaranteeing the effectiveness of efforts
- Every counter-radicalisation initiative should take into account local institutional frameworks and cultures to ensure they can be applied within the system into which they are introduced.

6.8 On budget

- Policies and programmes for countering violent extremism should include financial solutions (through existing institutional budgets or dedicated resources) in order to ensure a timely, effective and practical approach to de-radicalisation.

6.9 On evaluation

- An effective tool to measure the effectiveness of de-radicalisation and radicalisation prevention programmes is required.
- Member States should be encouraged to include measures of effectiveness of de-radicalisation and radicalisation prevention in their policies and financing by the EU of such projects should be conditional on the inclusion of evaluation and monitoring mechanisms.
- Evaluation and monitoring tools should be included in documents regarding action in this area.
- Member States should establish measures of effectiveness in order to more efficiently evaluate counter- and de-radicalisation policy.
- New legislative or non-legislative proposals should not be introduced before publication of an

impact assessment of current instruments, including the EU counter-terrorism directive for which the deadline for transposition is in 2019.

7. References

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8. Appendices

8.1 List of 25 interviewed international experts

	Name	Surname	Nationality	Institution	Specialisation	Date of interview	Anonymous / Official
1	David	Wells	UK	Greater Manchester Police	North West Regional Prevent Coordinator responsible for delivering national counter-terrorism prevent strategy across North West Region	08.12.17	Official
2	Jørgen	Haavardsholm	Norway	Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research; Department of Education and Training	Educator	10.01.18 r.	Official
3	Anonymous		Germany		Counter-radicalisation expert	15.01.18 r.	Anonymous
4	Alexander	Verkhovsky	Russia	SOVA Center	Director of SOVA Center of Information and Analysis	19.01.18	Official
5	Anton	Weenink	Netherlands	National Police	Counter-terrorism expert	24.01.18	Official
6	Magda	Rooze	Netherlands	ARQ Psychotrauma	Prevention of terrorism	1.02.18	Official
7	Krzysztof	Łaskiewicz	Poland	National Police HQ	Police Inspector - Head of the Human Rights Department at the National Police HQ at Warsaw, Poland	07.02.18	Official

8	Soraya	Amrani Mekki	France	National Consultative Commission on Human Rights	Vice President of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (2nd term in 2017)	09.02.18	Official
9	Andrzej	Zybertowicz	Poland	Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland	Social Adviser for the President of the Republic of Poland	09.02.18	Official
10	Dr Sebastien	Boussois	Belgium	UQAM	Scientific Collaborator at UQAM and PRACTICIES	09.02.18	Official
11	Maarten	van de Donk	Netherlands	RAN	Manager at the RAN Centre of Excellence	14.02.18	Official
12	Peter	Knoope	Netherlands	International Centre for Counterterrorism - Hague	Terrorism awareness	16.02.18	Official
13	Eitan	Azani	Israel	International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel	Director of Research	15.02.18	Official
14	Boaz	Ganor	Israel	International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel	Founder & Executive Director	15.02.18	Official
15	James	Muncie	UK	Home Office	Counter-terrorism	19.02.18	Official
16	Sabin	Khan	UK	Research Information and Communications Unit	British civil servant who is deputy director of the Research Information and Communications Unit, a strategic communication operation which is part of the intelligence team connected to the Office for Security and Counter-	19.02.18	Official

					Terrorism (OSCT), based in the Home Office.		
17	Hamit	Bozarsan	Turkey	EHESS, France	An International Scholar on Kurdish issues in Turkey and Islamist Movements, Conservatism and Radical Movements	19.02.18	Official
18	Naifer	Noureddine	Tunisia	-	Academic, Professor, expert in security, and another expert from an international and Arabic institution specialising in security	via email	Official
19	Linda	Noor	Norway	Minority Policy Think Tank	General Manager Minotent - Minority Policy Think Tank (CSO)	via email	Official
20	Costis	Papaioannou	Greece	Ministry of Justice	School teacher-human rights activist, former Chair of the National Commission for Human Rights and former General Secretary for Human Rights, Ministry of Justice.	via email	Official
21.	Hadelin	Feron	Belgium	Municipality/Brussels	Director of Bravvo, the Brussels office for the prevention of radicalisation (and de-radicalisation), an NGO developed by the Municipality of Brussels	04.04.18	Official
22.	Muriel	Domenach	France	SG-CIPDR	Secretary General of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization (SG-CIPDR)	25.02.18	Official
23.	Kelly	Simcock	UK	RAN	RAN Youth, Families and Communities Working Group lead, Manchester City Councillor and Director of Programme at the Tim	26.02.18	Official

					Parry Johnathan Ball Foundation for Peace		
24.	Anonymous	-	Germany	EUROPOL	Counter Jihadist terrorism	via email	Anonymous
25.	Anonymous	-	Spain	RAN	Expert in prevention and fight against violent radicalisation, involvement of civil society and active participation of families.	22.02.18	Anonymous

8.2 DARE Database of documents

No	Document title/date	Geographic level (Local, National, EU)	Type (Strategy, Policy, Legal, Programme, Action Plan, Study)	Country of origin (if applicable)	Main area/purpose/means/message	Category								
						1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning Terrorist Recruitment: Addressing the Factors Contributing to Violent Radicalisation (2005)	EU	Policy	---	The core areas of immediate focus are broadcast media, the internet, education, youth engagement, employment, social exclusion and integration issues, equal opportunities and non-discrimination and inter-cultural dialogue.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x
2	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response (2014)	EU	Policy	---	Member States are responsible for designing and implementing measures aimed at preventing and countering radicalisation, and the core actions are, and should remain, at national and local levels.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x

3	The EU strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment - Implementation Report (15443/07) (2007)	EU	Legal	---	Implementation information	✓	✓	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x
4	Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (2016)	EU	Legal	---	To enhance the EU's policies to prevent new recruits to terrorism, it was agreed to expand a strategy and action plan to address radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, at the European Council on 17 December 2004. This strategy builds on the considerable work since the 25 March 2004 European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism, including the Commission Communication on Terrorist Recruitment addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation.	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x
5	Preventing and countering youth radicalisation in the EU (2014)	EU	Study	---	Analysis of existing solutions to de-radicalisation	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x	x	x	✓
6	The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (2005)	EU	Legal	EU	To enhance the EU's policies to prevent new recruits to terrorism, it was agreed to expand a strategy and action plan to address radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, at the European Council on 17 December	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x

					2004. This strategy builds on the considerable work since the 25 March 2004 European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism, including the Commission Communication on Terrorist Recruitment addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation.												
7	Reducing Terrorist Use of the Internet (2013)	EU	Programme	EU	Individual approaches (mixed governmental – non-governmental) to the negative role of the internet in terrorism/Clean IT Project	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x	x			
8	Value the difference - preventing youth radicalisation. Theory & practice of the European youth work (2018)	EU	Study	EU	Erasmus +	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
9	Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on a European Union Work Plan for Youth for 2016-2018 (2015)	EU	Action Plan	EU		✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x	x			
10	Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European	EU	Study	EU		✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	x			

	Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. An EU Strategy for Youth – Investing and Empowering A renewed open method of coordination to address youth challenges and opportunities (2009)																
11	Channel: Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists (March 2010)	National	Programme	UK	This document advises the police and local authorities on the implementation of Channel. Indicators and causes of violent extremism are also described.	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	N / A			
12	Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism (2015)	National	Programme	UK		✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	N / A			
13	A Shared Future - A report of the Greater Manchester Tackling Hateful Extremism and Promoting Social Cohesion Commission (July 2018)	National	Study	UK	The document created in order to identify the broader determinants of social exclusion and how people across Greater Manchester could work collectively to address them; to consider how a distinctive community-led Greater Manchester approach to challenging hateful	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓			

					extremism could be developed, to understand if a Greater Manchester Charter could be an effective way to promote social cohesion and to evaluate how Prevent operates in Greater Manchester al acts.												
14	Contest Strategy (2011)	National	Strategy	UK	4P strategy: Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks // Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism // Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack // Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
15	Understanding and Monitoring Tension and Conflict in Local Communities: A practical guide for local authorities, police service and partner agencies (2008)	Local	Action Plan	UK	Practical guide for local authorities on how to support communities to develop their own solutions and responses, to prevent tension escalating into conflict and to reduce risks to life and property.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
16	Prevent duty guidance for England and Wales (2015)	National	Programme	UK		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
17	Strategy for Combating Extremism (2008)	National	Strategy	Czech Republic	Statistical data, analysis of various forms of extremism (non-Islamist)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	N / A	
18	National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent	National	Action Plan	Finland		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓

	Radicalisation and Extremism (2016)																
19	National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. Annual Report 2017. Published by Ministry of the Interior Publication, Helsinki (2017)	National	Action Plan	Finland		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓		
20	Violent Extremism in Finland – situation overview 1/2018. Threat assessment of violent extremism in Finland in 2017 and trends. Women and children in radical Islamist terrorist organisations under special review. Published by Ministry of the Interior, Helsinki (2018)	National	Study	Finland	Threat assessment of violent extremism in Finland in 2017 and trends. Women and children in radical Islamist terrorist organisations under special review	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	x	✓			
21	Towards a Cohesive Society. Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism (2012)	National	Action Plan	Finland	Measures to fight extremism in the context of all Nordic countries	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓		
22	Radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Finland – support needs in de-	National	Study	Finland	A thesis prepared in cooperation with Radinet organisation. There is a need to explore the social support needs of	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x			

	radicalisation process (2018)				individuals in the de-radicalisation process in Finland. The aim of the thesis was to study the phenomena of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Finland and to investigate the possible social support needs of the individuals in the de-radicalisation process.												
23	EXIT. Ungdom ut av voldelige ungdomsgrupper (EXIT. Youth leaving violent youth groups. Final report) (2000)	National	Programme	Norway	This was an early programme for de-radicalisation of radical and violent right wing groups. Experiences from here have been analysed and spread through numerous publications.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	✓			
24	A guide to police conversation intervention (also published in English) (2011)	National	Programme	Norway	De-radicalisation through dialogue between police and young people, also building on experiences from EXIT.	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓			
25	Handlingsplan mot radikaliserings og voldelig ekstremisme (Action plan against radicalisation and violent extremism) (2014, revised in 2017)	National	Action Plan	Norway	The document's aim is to support de-radicalisation and to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
26	Radicalisation and extremism. A learning resource for education within social science for secondary schools. Oslo	National	Study	Norway	This paper analyses the process of radicalisation of Muslims in Norway and the Government's response to this.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x	✓			

	Municipality (December 2014)																		
27	SALTO – Sammen Lager vi et Trygt Oslo. Veileder ved bekymring – Hvordan forebygge og håndtere hatkriminalitet og voldelig ekstremisme blant unge? (SALTO - Together we create a safe Oslo. Guide for concern: how to prevent and handle hate crime and violent extremism among young people?) Oslo (January 2014)	Local	Study	Norway	An outline of radicalisation in Norway with an explanation of the increase in this among Norway's population.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x					
28	Trusselvurdering 2018 (Threats to the nation 2018) (2018)	Local	Action Plan	Norway	The publication provides guidelines for people working with youth on how to meet, follow up and prevent young peoples' engagement with extremist views and organisations	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	x					
29	Forebygging av radikaliserings og voldelig ekstremisme – Hva er kommunens rolle? (Prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism – what is the role of the municipality?)	Local	Study	Norway	A case study of 5 municipalities, and three development seminars for 31 municipalities. The report explores the following questions: What do the municipalities find problematic when it comes to radicalisation and violent extremism on the local level? What	✓	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x					

	(2016)				responsibilities and room for manoeuvre should municipalities have? What can be done locally to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism?												
30	Islamic radicalisation in Norway: preventative actions (2015)	National	Study	Norway	A yearly evaluation report on what the Police Security Service (PST) sees as the most important threats to the Norwegian nation. It covers espionage, politically motivated violence, and threats against civil servants and authorities.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x		
31	Montreux Initiative (2008)	National	Programme	Switzerland	In cooperation with Islamic charities and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Aims to improve trust and understanding between the Swiss federal authorities and charities.	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x		
32	Switzerland's Foreign Policy Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism (2016)	National	Action Plan	Switzerland	Strategic priorities and areas currently under action.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	x		
33	Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalisation (STRESAVIORA) (2013/15)	National	Programme	Belgium/ Europe	www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu Educating young people, raising awareness of parents and frontline workers; training for first line practitioners	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x	x		

34	Terrorist Offences Act (2003)	National	Legal	Belgium	This law inserts in the penal code a series of descriptions of what constitutes a terror act as well as the penalties linked to the various forms described. These depend on the level of seriousness, with an increase almost all of the prison penalties in the previous version of the penal code.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
35	Action Plan against radicalisation in prisons (2015)	National	Action Plan	Belgium	The main purpose of the Action Plan is to put in place measures to prevent the further radicalisation of detainees during their imprisonment and develop a specialised follow-up for radicalised people during their detention.	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓	✓	x	N / A	
36	Programme on the prevention of violent radicalisation (2013)	National	Programme	Belgium	Political approach. The first of its kind in Belgium – the programme focuses on violent radicalisation and polarisation and the societal approach to prevention. The programme is based on a two-approach policy focusing on the development of existing policies in the areas of employment, education and integration on one side, and on targeting specific prevention initiatives on the other.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	x	

37	A Common and Safe Future: A Danish Action Plan to Prevent Extremism (2009)	National	Action Plan	Denmark	Document directed at the increasing trend towards extremism and radicalisation – in Denmark and elsewhere in the world. Activities to prevent extremism and radicalisation comprise important element in the efforts to promote the values of freedom, security and opportunities for the individual person, in as well as outside Denmark. Therefore, in order to counter and prevent extremism, it is necessary to develop activities that are partly separate from and partly overlapping with some of the different areas of intervention. This is the basis on which the Government is now introducing an overall action plan to prevent extremist views and radicalisation among young people.	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x
38	Introduction to The Danish Approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalisation (2015)	National	Action Plan	Denmark	Danish government implemented various action plans in the field of radicalisation, not available online in EN version. The study presents an overview of the documents.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x
39	Forebyggelse av radikalisering og ekstremisme. Regeringens	National	Action Plan	Denmark	This is a plan for how to combat and prevent radicalisation and extremism, with descriptions of various actor's roles and experiences in these	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x

	handlingsplan (Prevention of radicalisation and extremism. The action plan of the government) Published by the Danish Government (September 2014)				matters.												
40	Danish Perspective Measures and de-radicalisation Strategies: The Aarhus Model (2015)	National	Strategy	Denmark	The aim of the project was to prevent the radicalisation (political as well as religious) of young people and thereby promoting safety and well-being.	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x			
41	Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalisation. National Action Plan. Denmark (2016)	National	Action Plan	Denmark	It takes more than good police work to prevent extremism and radicalisation. It also requires a comprehensive prevention effort on the part of national and local authorities as well as civil society.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	N / A	N / A			
42	Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism (2011)	N	Action Plan	Sweden	The action plan sets out the measures which the Swedish Government has already taken and intends to take in order to strengthen awareness of democracy and to safeguard it against violence-promoting extremism. The action plan contains measures to increase knowledge about violence-promoting extremism, to discourage individuals from joining violence-promoting extremist groups and to	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x			

					facilitate for those who have already joined to leave such groups. The action plan also contains measures to strengthen the structures for cooperation and measures to counter the breeding grounds for ideologically motivated violence												
43	Ung och extrem. Om våldsbejakande vansterextremism. Myndigheten för ungdoms- och civilsamfunnsfrågor (Young and extreme. On violence enhancing left wing extremism. A knowledge overview. Published by the Swedish Authorities for youth and civil society questions) (2016)	National	Study	Sweden	An assessment of the ideology, threats and potentials of left wing extremism in Sweden	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	x			
44	Prevent, preempt and protect – the Swedish Counter-terrorism Strategy (2014)	National	Strategy	Sweden	National strategy for prevention of terrorism 2011	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x		
45	Responsibility and commitment – a national counter-terrorism strategy (2011)	National	Strategy	Sweden	National strategy for prevention of terrorism 2011	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	N / A	✓		

46	National Counterterrorism Strategy (2011)	National	Strategy	Netherlands	The objective of the strategy is to reduce the risk and the fear of terrorist attacks and limit the possible damage following any attack.	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x
47	The National Cyber Security Strategy (2011)	National	Strategy	Netherlands	Integrated approach to cybercrime	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x
48	Personal Intervention Against Young People in Right-Wing Extremist Circles (2007)	National	Programme	Netherlands	Countering right-wing radicalisation	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x
49	Nuansa (2014)	National	Programme	Netherlands	The overarching aim of the initiative is to provide an integrated, national-level multi-agency approach to the challenge of radicalisation, where 'politicians connect with communities; frontline workers go to mosques; police interact with minority groups; so that all the networks are in place'. At its core, the initiative is engaged in three activities; an early-warning and advisory service; a research and information database; and the organisation of meetings, workshops and training sessions for professionals.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x
50	The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat	National	Programme	Netherlands	This is a comprehensive action programme with three objectives: to protect democracy and the rule of law, to combat and weaken the	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓

	jihadism (2014)				jihadist movement in the Netherlands and to remove the breeding ground for radicalisation.												
51	Slotervaart Action Plan to Prevent Radicalisation (2009)	Local	Programme	Netherlands	Town level (micro)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	N / A	N / A			
52	My City My World Second Wave (2011)	Local	Programme	Netherlands	Document addressed to the Dutch minority of Moroccan origin. Police – youth cooperation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	N / A	N / A			
53	Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007– 2011 (2007)	National	Action Plan	Netherlands	Violent and cognitive radicalisation were considered phenomena the government should tackle	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
54	Implementation framework for case-based approach to radicalisation (2016)	Local	Policy	Netherlands	The letter to the City Council it states that the tightened approach to radicalisation consists of three components. Excerpt below: The approach includes, more expressly than before, activities that protect vulnerable individuals and groups. Where fundamental values are at risk, we may be expected to protect liberties and to strengthen mutual tolerance. Secondly, we will create connections where necessary to strengthen mutual tolerance. This sends a clear message: radicalisation has no place in our city, and radicalisation is not the only way out,	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			

					even if it may appear that way to some. Thirdly, we are further tightening the risk-based aspect of the approach so that it focuses more on the target groups that represent the greatest risks. In this regard, it is important to improve supervision and information sharing.												
55	Online approach Radicalisation and Polarisation (2016)	Local	Action Plan	Netherlands/ Amsterdam	Three elements: Protection of vulnerable individuals, creation of connections, online detection of risks	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			x
56	Action plan polarization, radicalisation, and Jihadism 2015-2019	Local	Action Plan	Netherlands	Four elements: Personalised approach, knowledge and skills, networks and communication, community resilience. Actions: continuation personalised approach, elaboration on dynamic frame of reference, intensification of family support, development of regional picture, close contact with potentially violent individuals.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	N / A			x
57	Programme 'Rotterdam anti-radicalisation approach' 2014-2018	Local	Programme	Netherlands/ Rotterdam	Rotterdam Anti-Radicalisation Approach has the following objectives: Preventing polarisation and social tensions, preventing radicalisation by strengthening the resistance of vulnerable groups against the ideology of violent Jihadism,	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			x

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	and radicalisation (2015)																
59	Integral Approach to counter terrorism (2017)	National	Strategy	Netherlands	Focusses on the strengthening of counter-terrorism efforts to deal with online extremism and investment in de-radicalisation	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	
60	Pupil assortment for radicalisation and social safety (2017)	National	Action Plan	Netherlands	Provides additional assortments of initiatives related to radicalisation and social safety next to the training offering 'radicalisation and social safety at school'	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	
61	Developing a social media response to radicalisation The role of counter-narratives in prevention of radicalisation and de-radicalisation (2017)	National	Study	Netherlands	In this report, the authors examine the extent to which counter-narrative initiatives via social media can be effective in preventing people from radicalisation or can de-radicalise people. Specifically, they formulate the following research questions: (1) How can we conceptualise narratives and counter-narratives? (2) How are narratives and counter-narratives used via social media? (3) To what extent is it possible to use counter-narrative programmes via social media to de-radicalise individuals or prevent violent extremism? (4) What are the pre-requisites for a counter-narrative programme for it to be effective? a. Which social media are most suitable and why? b. What can	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	

					we learn from examples of counter-narrative programmes that have been operational in other democratic countries? c. What can we learn from examples of social media campaigns in other domains, such as health care and environmental issues? d. What are the potential risks for unwanted side effects? (5) How can the potential effectiveness of such a counter-narrative programme be determined? (6) What can be the role of the government in such a counter-narrative programme?												
62	La France face au Terrorisme - Livre Blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme (France in face of Terrorism - Government White Paper on Homeland Security challenged by Terrorism) (2006)	National	Strategy	France	'vigipirate' - Strategy of development of counterterrorism means in front of dynamic changes in social communication and transport	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x			
63	LOI n° 2014-1353 du 13 novembre 2014 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme	National	Legal	France		x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x			

	(Law n ° 2014-1353 of 13 November 2014 reinforcing the regulations relating to the fight against terrorism) (2014)																	
64	Stop-Djihadisme (Stop-Jihadism) (2015)	National	Programme	France	Online project addressed to the youth	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x	x				
65	Loi Renforçant la securite interieure et la lute contre le terrorisme (Law Strengthening Domestic Security and the fight against terrorism) (30 October 2017)	National	Legal	France	Analysis in progress	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x				
66	Plan d'action contre le terrorisme (Action Plan Against Terrorism) (13 July 2018)	National	Action Plan	France	Analysis in progress	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x			
67	Plan d'action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme (Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism) (9 May 2016)	National	Action Plan	France	file:///Users/lukaszjurchyszyn/Downloads/Plan-d-action-contre-la-radicalisation-et-le-terrorisme.pdf.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x			
68	Plan national de prevention de la radicalisation (National Action Plan for the	National	Action Plan	France	Analysis in progress	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x			

	Prevention of Radicalisation) (23 February 2018)																	
69	Criminal Code of Russian Federation (1996)	National	Legal	Russian Federation (RF)	Codified act in the field of criminal law, which defines the list of crimes and penalties for them, the composition of crimes, the purpose of criminal law, etc. One of the aspects of regulation is the fight against terrorism and extremism. The main objectives of the Criminal code: the protection of human rights and freedoms, property, public order and public safety, the environment, the prevention of crimes, the restoration of social justice.	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x				
70	The Federal Law 'On countering extremism' (2002)	National	Legal	Russian Federation	The law establishes the concept and types of extremist activity, the principles of countering it, and also establishes responsibility for carrying out extremist activity and disseminating extremist information. The law was adopted both to strengthen the fight against extremist activities, and to supplement criminal and administrative legislation, as it reveals the content of extremist activities and ways to counter it.	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	x				

71	Стратегия государственной национальной политики РФ на период до 2025 года (The Strategy of the State nationality Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period Until 2025) (2012)	National	Strategy	Russian Federation	The document contains basic information about the state, principles, achievements and current problems for the implementation of ethnic policy in the country and the regions. The main objectives of the Strategy are the strengthening of the state unity and integrity of Russia, the maintenance of the ethno-cultural identity of the people of Russia, combining of national and ethnic interests. As part of our study, it is important to note that the Strategy is aimed at preventing the radicalisation of interethnic relations.	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓
72	План мероприятий по реализации в 2016 - 2018 годах Стратегии государственной национальной политики Российской Федерации на период до 2025 года (The action plan for implementation in 2016-2018 of the Strategy of the state nationality policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025) (2015)	National	Action Plan	Russian Federation	The list of activities of various levels of government for the implementation of the Strategy.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓

73	Государственная программа Российской Федерации 'Реализация государственной национальной политики'/Подпрограмма 7 'Профилактика экстремизма на национальной и религиозной почве' (State program of the Russian Federation 'Realization of the state nationality policy'/Subprogramme 7, 'Prevention of extremism on national and religious grounds') (2016)	National	Programme	Russian Federation	The sub programme is aimed at reducing the number of conflicts and conflict situations in the field of interethnic and ethno-confessional relations. Few specific measures and activities are listed, mainly funding and target data. Objectives: reducing the total number of conflicts, detection of conflicts at the municipal, regional and federal levels, continuously monitoring the situation in this area.	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓
74	Угроза международного терроризма и религиозного экстремизма государствам – членам ОДКБ на центральноазиатском и афганском направлениях (The threat of international terrorism and religious extremism to the	National	Study	Russian Federation	The MGIMO study (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) for the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the situation of religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asia and Afghanistan and the role of the CSTO in solving these problems. The study contains an analysis of the situation in individual countries, the region as a whole, as well as conclusions and recommendations for reducing the	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x

	Member States of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) in the Central Asian and Afghani Governments) (2017)				level of terrorism and extremism.												
75	Nationaler Aktionsplan gegen Rassismus – Positionen und Maßnahmen zum Umgang mit Ideologien der Ungleichwertigkeit und den darauf bezogenen Diskriminierungen (National Action Plan Against Racism - positions and measures to deal with ideologies of inequality and the related discrimination) (2017)	National	Strategy	Germany	National plan to counteract racism. The strategy shows positions and means of dealing (fighting) with ideologies of inequality and related discrimination	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x
76	Strategie der Bundesregierung zur Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung (Federal government strategy on extremism prevention and democracy promotion)	National	Strategy	Germany	Federal CVE strategy from July 2016	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x

	(2016)																		
77	Nationales Präventionsprogramm gegen islamistischen Extremismus (National prevention program against Islamist extremism) (2018)	National	Programme	Germany	The national programme of prevention against Islamic extremism	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x					
78	'European Fair Skills – De-radicalisation Training for Peer Role Models and Youth Workers' (2015)	EU	Programme	Germany	ISEC project; training in the field of de-radicalisation for peer models and youth workers	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x					
79	Verantwortlich Handeln: Praxis der Sozialen Arbeit mit rechtsextrem orientierten und gefährdeten Jugendlichen ('Acting responsibly: Practice of the Social Work with right-wing extremist-oriented and endangered youth') (2014)	EU	Programme	Germany	Practice of social work with young people with right-wing and vulnerable orientation	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	x					
80	EU-funded project 'Containing Radicalisation In Modern Europe (CRIME)' (2013)	National	Study	Germany		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x					
81	Instrumentalisierung des	National	Programme	Germany	Instrumentalisation of the topic of	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	x					

	Themas 'sexueller Missbrauch' durch Neonazis. Strategien und Handlungsempfehlungen Demokratie ist (k)ein Kindergeburtstag. Handreichung für Kindertagesstätten im Umgang mit Rechtsextremismus (Instrumentalisation of the topic of 'sexual abuse' by neo-Nazis. Strategies and action recommendations. Democracy is (not) a child's birthday. Help for day care centers in dealing with right-wing extremism) (2013)				'sexual abuse' by neo-Nazis. Strategy and action recommendations. Democracy is not a birthday party for children. Democracy is not fun. Help with right-wing extremism for day care centres												
82	Was Sie über sexuellen Missbrauch wissen sollten. Gedankenanstöße für einen wirksamen Kinderschutz jenseits polemischer Scheinlösungen (What you should know about sexual abuse. Ideas for an effective child protection	National	Programme	Germany	What you should know about sexual harassment. Ideas for effective protection of children (other than polemic public dispute)	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	x			

	- instead of pseudo-solutions) (2015)																		
83	'TunnellichtBlicke' ('Lights in the tunnel') (2013)	National	Study	Germany		✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x				
84	Estrategia Integral Contra el Terrorismo Internacional y la Radicalización (EICTIR) (Comprehensive Strategy Against International Terrorism and Radicalisation) (2010) (implemented 2012)	National	Strategy	Spain	This strategy outlines how the threat of international terrorism has evolved and how it could be confronted in a coordinated way in Spain. To achieve this approach, general and specific objectives are defined, as well as strategic positions and concrete actions.	✓	x	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓				
85	Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha Contra La Radicalización Violenta (El PEN-LCRV) (National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation) (January 2015)	National	Policy	Spain	Sets up the basis for Spain's strategy to fight against radicalisation. Preventing the emergence and development of the processes of radicalisation, through early detection and neutralisation of possible outbreaks or focuses, and acting on those groups or individuals at risk or vulnerability.	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	✓				
86	Ley Orgánica 2/2015, de 30 de marzo, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal, en materia de delitos de terrorismo (LO	National	Legal	Spain	The crucial point here is the creation of new types of crimes/offenses (term 'radicals' is used now instead of 'terrorists; broader scope) which allows society (particularly security forces) to fight against this new terrorism and radicalisation dynamics.	✓	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	x					

	2/2015, modification of the Penal Law in terms of terrorist crimes) (2015)				Preventive character. Really important law, that created the basis for all terrorism and radicalisation fight.												
87	I Plan Transversal por la Convivencia y la Prevención de la Radicalización Violenta en la Ciudad de Málaga 2017-2020 (Transversal Plan for the Coexistence and Prevention of Violent Radicalisation in the City of Malaga 2017-2020) (2017)	National	Action Plan	Spain	Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation. Aims to detect and prevent this type of behaviour in all areas; as well as raise awareness, building an active and resilient citizenship that favours social cohesion, improves coexistence, respects religions and religious freedom and avoids marginalisation and violent radicalism.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	✓			
88	Protocol de prevenció, detecció i intervenció de processos de radicalització islamista (ProgrammeDERAI) (Protocol of prevention, detection and intervention of Islamist radicalisation processes) (2017)	National	Programme	Spain	Created by regional police and region educational department to provide teachers with resources and training to prevent, identify and work with potential radicals and the radicalisation process.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x			
89	Plan Municipal de Lucha Contra la Islamofobia. Barcelona (Municipal plan to combat Islamophobia.	National	Action Plan	Spain	Barcelona's city hall launched this plan to prevent hate and discrimination in the city. A preventive approach to radicalisation which	✓	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x			

	Barcelona) (2018)				hopes to create a more resilient city.												
90	Programa Marco de intervención en radicalización violenta con internos islamistas (Framework Program of intervention in violent radicalisation with Islamist inmates)(2016)	National	Programme	Spain	Programme of intervention and treatment of ideological radicalisation processes.	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	x			
91	Módulo educativo Adi-adian (Adi-adian Educational Module) (2013)	National	Programme	Spain	Educational. Use of victim's voices. Educational programme in Basque Country region that highlights the role of the victim's voice in education, promotes human dignity, empathy and harmonious coexistence. *Note: Spanish national education system makes regional authorities responsible for the development of their own educational solutions.	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x			
92	Bill of law (no 4285) 'for the confrontation of specific forms of racism and xenophobia' to toughen previous anti-racism legislation (1979) and criminalized the denial of the Holocaust, crimes against Humanity and Nazi crimes	National	Legal	Greece	The law lengthens the prison term for perpetrators of hate crimes from two to three years, and imposes heavy fines for inciting racism and participating in racially-motivated crimes, including crimes committed on the internet. The law targets mainly at the rise of right-wing extremism, racism and Islamophobia, but other forms of racism as well (e.g.	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓			

	recognized by international courts or the Hellenic Parliament (September 2014)				homophobia).												
93	Bill of law (4356/2015) for the establishment of a National Council against Racism and Bigotry at the Ministry of Justice (December 2015)	National	Legal	Greece	The council acts as a consultant to the Greek government, conducts reports, collects data on racism and bigotry, conducts the national action plan against racism, designs and suggests policies against racism and bigotry, etc. The council targets mainly the rise of right-wing extremism, racism and Islamophobia, but other forms of racism as well (e.g. homophobia).	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
94	Counter-Radicalisation pocket guides for the public and front line practitioners (2016)	National	Programme	Greece	This project's objectives are to provide continuous education and raise awareness among the first line practitioners. Successfully preventing terrorist activities and the spread of extremist ideologies requires the active participation of a wide-range of actors and institutions. More specifically, the participation of first line police offices, prison officers, coast guards, secret services employees, customs employees, asylum service employees and first reception service employees is an important component in preventing	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

					radicalisation. Education and awareness renders these actors capable of identifying signs of radicalisation at an early stage. Moreover, it also enables them to support individuals at risk or of referring these individuals to specialists for further assistance. The programme and the guides target both political and religious radicalisation.												
95	URBACT III- Rumourless Cities/ Transfer Networks (2018)	EU	Programme	---	This is a European programme initiated in the city of Amadora, Portugal with the city of Ioannina accepted as part of the network in April 2018. 'Don't Feed the Rumour' is part of a communication strategy developed by the municipality of Amadora (PT) since 2014, under the project 'Communication for Integration: social networking for diversity (C4I)', promoted by the Council of Europe. Its aim is to reach a better understanding of the effects of these rumours on people's lives. This strategy mainly targets right-wing extremism and racism.	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	x	✓	✓			
96	Toplum Destekli Polislik (TDP) (Community	National	Programme	Turkey	Adaptation and dissemination of preventive security measures	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	x			

	Supported Policing) (2008)																
97	Individual disengagement and de-radicalisation Counterterrorism measures that was conducted by the Adana Police Department in Turkey between 2009 and 2015 (2016)	Local	Programme	Turkey	Programme was designed to reach out to the members of extremist groups and their families for the purpose of persuading them to disengage from their groups, change their radical mind-sets, and help them reintegrate into society.	✓	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x			
98	Diyanet's program to 'undermine violent extremist messaging' (2013)	National	Programme	Turkey	Promoting a more moderate version of Islam and weakening radical Islamist messaging.	✓	x	✓	✓	x	x	x	✓	x			
99	Turkish Penal Code (2004)	National	Legal	Turkey	Criminalises public incitement to hatred or hostility and degrading sections of the public; Criminalises organisations established for crime; Criminalises armed organisations.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
100	National Anti-Terrorist Programme for the years 2015-2019	National	Programme	Poland	Terrorism prevention programme	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	