STAND-ALONE DE-RADICALISATION PROGRAMME EVALUATION TOOL FOR STAKEHOLDERS

DARE
Dialogue About Radicalisation & Equality

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Contents

Concept and Approach

With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the emergence of terrorist semi-states (Honig & Yahel, 2017) like the so called 'caliphate' of the terror organization 'Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)' and the global increase in 'foreign fighter' travel movements to unprecedented levels (Hegghammer, 2013), governments around the world have been under pressure to develop and implement various responses to the perceived threat of returned and radicalised combatants (e.g. Vidino, 2014). In 2014, the United Nations Security Council released Resolution 2178 urging all member states to establish effective rehabilitation measures for returning fighters from Syria and Iraq (UNSC, 2014). Similarly, the revised European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy places a strong emphasis on the importance of ''disengagement and exit strategies'' (EU, 2014, p. 11). That development, however, was just the current peak of countering violent extremism (CVE) and de-radicalisation programmes and strategies within the counter-terrorism landscape, which had started decades earlier. Already in 2008, the international community had recognised the importance of effective prevention and intervention programmes to counter terrorist recruitment, when *Time Magazine* named ''reverse radicalism'' as one of the most important and promising ideas for the future (Ripley, 2008). Indeed, some European states had started experimenting with comprehensive CVE programmes in the late 1980s and 90s (e.g. Germany, Norway and Sweden). The spread of governmental and civil society based CVE initiatives in Europe led to the creation of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in September 2011 by the European Commission as a Europe-wide network of practitioners, politicians and academics, as part of its counter-terrorism strategy. And in January 2014 EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström presented a 10-point-plan[1] on combating extremism and terrorism in the EU, including a recommendation to all member states to establish exit strategies. In the same year, the revised ''European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy'' placed a strong emphasis on ''disengagement and exit strategies'' (EU, 2014, p. 11) and in 2016 the European Commission called the implementation of ''de-radicalisation'' programmes under the overall goal to prevent and fight radicalization an ''absolute priority'' (EC, 2016, p. 6). All in all, in the past few years de-radicalisation and counter-extremism programmes have become a firm feature of a number of national and European as well as international counter-terrorism strategies.

[1] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-18_en.htm (accessed on 1 December 2014).

Despite this development, the question of how to evaluate the success and quality of de-radicalisation programmes has remained largely unanswered. Whilst the underlying value of de-radicalisation is not contested, for years academics have criticized the lack of conceptual clarity and transparency in the overwhelming majority of such programmes (Horgan, 2015; Horgan & Altier, 2012; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Koehler, 2016; Williams & Lindsey, 2014).

Recognising that a lack of evaluation of CVE as a counter-terrorism tool not only means a waste of valuable resources, but might also include a risk of counterproductive blowbacks, the revised EU counter-terrorism strategy from 2014 not only included de-radicalisation as a counter-terrorism tool *per se*, but also called upon all member states to ensure that they evaluated their CVE initiatives (EU, 2014, p. 11). One important step forward in this direction, was the start of the FP7 IMPACT European research project running between 2014 and 2017 aiming to develop ‘‘an evaluation methodology guidance toolkit for practitioners designing and conducting counter violent radicalisation interventions’’[2]. This much needed support for practitioners to evaluate the impact of their own work, comes at a time when the spread of CVE initiatives appears to be outpacing their theoretical and scientific foundational development. Recognising this, a number of toolkits and guidelines have been published recently in order to improve quality in the field. Most notably, these include RAND corporation’s 2017 ‘Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism’ (Helmus et al., 2017) focusing on improving evaluation techniques for existing U.S. community based programmes countering violent extremism at an early stage (i.e. primary prevention), and the very recent ‘Toolkit for Design Monitoring and Evaluation’ for preventing violent extremism programmes by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2018), which is mainly concerned with early prevention programmes against violent extremism in ‘fragile and conflict affected environments’ (UNDP, 2018, p. 12).

In order to reconnect the practical development of CVE initiatives with the evidence base of good practices, the following theoretical framework has been developed for a stand-alone de-radicalisation programme evaluation tool for stakeholders. This tool is called the “**De-radicalisation Programme Integrity Evaluation Checklist – DPIEC**” is part of the EU Horizon 2020 project ‘Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality’ (DARE) and will augment evaluative capabilities and the available knowledge in this field provided by the IMPACT project. The focus of the structural assessment tool designed for DARE is not to

[2] http://impacteurope.eu/about-us/ (accessed January 1, 2018)

evaluate the impact or effect of a given CVE programme, but rather to assess the structural quality and chance of impact from the project design phase onwards. This is also the primary distinguishing factor from other existing toolkits and guidelines, e.g. the RAND, IMPACT or UNDP collections, which either focus on early stage CVE programmes (i.e. primary prevention) or measuring certain outputs and outcomes thought to be indicative of some form of effect.

This theoretical framework is structured as follows:

- Part I will outline the target group, methodology and terminology for the assessment tool and will provide the current state of research regarding evaluation in CVE, in which the key aspects of different ways to assess a de-radicalisation programme's performance and quality will be discussed and the basis for structural integrity assessment will be established. Following, the six main fields of structural integrity in CVE (running and developing a programme; organization; participant classification; case management and advisory services; quality assurance; transparency) will be described in detail and connected to the theoretical foundation for the assessment tool.
- Part II will then provide the three-step evaluation tool based on the theoretical groundwork of Part I. Each step (1: questionnaire of stakeholders; 2: in-depth problem centered interviews; 3: process analysis) will be discussed in detail, leading to the description of the evaluation procedure up to the formulation of the final assessment report. In addition, the necessary components containing designation of benchmarks, definitions and selection criteria will be provided.

The De-radicalisation Programme Integrity Evaluation Checklist (DPIEC) is given in Part III, together with guidance on how to apply the tool.

PART I

Target Group and Objectives

The assessment tool developed in this theoretical framework is aimed in particular at civil society practitioners and policy makers working on counter-extremism within a European legal and cultural context.

Because of the rapid growth of CVE programmes and policies, not just within the European Union but also globally in recent years, the necessity for developing criteria and standards for selecting and evaluating civil-society partners and establishing a solid foundation for high quality programmes and projects in the CVE field has become ever more pressing. Policy makers face the problem of having to assess the structural composition of potential grant applicants and project proposals when deciding a tender. At the same time the exponential rise in demand for qualified experts and programmes covering counter-extremism and interventions has not only led to a sharp increase in funding opportunities in recent years, but also necessitated the involvement of civil-society organisations with little practical experience of designing and carrying out interventions to counter radicalisation. To facilitate coordination and cooperation between state and non-state partners working on counter-extremism, the following assessment tool is designed to make a significant contribution to quality assurance in this field, both in Europe and globally.

Specifically this assessment tool helps:

- Governmental staff and policymakers to identify and verify the structural requirements of civil-society partners in counter-extremism; this enables effective cooperation on the basis of academic and practice-tested standards;
- Civil-society organisations with little practical experience of counter-extremism work to design programmes on the basis of solid structural standards in order subsequently to develop their expertise and their specialization;
- Civil-society organisations with broad practical experience of counter-extremism work to enhance existing programmes and identify structural weaknesses;
- Academic bodies to draw up and implement evaluation methods for counter-extremism measures in order to eliminate the often-criticized lack of transparency and lack of evaluation of the grounds on which interventions are based.

Methodology and Sources

This theoretical framework is primarily based on a critical review of published (theoretical, empirical and evaluative) studies of de-radicalisation and programmes and interventions.

In addition, it was possible to draw on interviews with over 50 leading international counter-extremism experts and 47 interviews with former members of the Far-Right in Germany. The literature review also included academic fields beyond de-radicalisation and countering violent extremism, such as studies on programmes concerned with the reintegration of criminals, former members of sects, youth gangs and civil war groups (as part of the reintegration of former fighters). Even though this framework draws on previously published work, for example regarding the literature review or the theoretical basis for structural integrity evaluations (Koehler, 2016, 2017b), in its composition and step-by-step guidelines including the integration into an overall evaluation and interpretation framework for policy makers and practitioners, this toolkit presented here is a milestone for ensuring quality in de-radicalisation work.

Terminology and Typology

Having clarity about the terms used and typologies employed is an indispensable prerequisite when discussing quality standards and means of evaluation in counter-extremism and de-radicalisation work. However, leading experts have found the 'lack of conceptual clarity in the emerging discourse on de-radicalisation striking' (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009, p. 3). It seemed, that the term was being applied to a wide array of policies and tools with 'virtually no conceptual development in the area' (Horgan, 2009b, p. 17). CVE programmes and strategies that could roughly be described as 'de-radicalisation' measures have gained global significance in the fight against terrorism, recruitment into violent extremism and violent radicalisation as noted in the introduction. However, terminology remains unclear and potentially inhibits development in the field, as Altier et al. found: 'that existing research remains devoid of conceptual clarity' (Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014, p. 647) with synonymous and inconsistent use of different terms.

Of course, de-radicalisation as a concept is by etymology tied to its opposite: 'radicalisation', an equally contested and controversial term, which entered the wider public discourse after the London 7/7 bombings in 2005 (Sedgwick, 2010). However, research into radicalisation processes and pathways leading to violent extremism, terrorism and violence have received

much more academic and public attention than de-radicalisation with an extensive and almost unmanageably large body of publications and studies from various different disciplines. Nevertheless, conceptual clarity and a more or less shared understanding of basic terms are absolutely indispensable for any academic or practical development and advancement in a field with so much expectations placed upon it, especially since 'much of our understanding of the causal processes of disengagement from terrorism remains theoretical or speculative under-researched' (Gill, Bouhana, & Morrison, 2015, p. 245).

As noted above, the term 'de-radicalisation' has been widely used with conceptual unclarity and also synonymously and inconsistently with other terms (Altier et al., 2014). Horgan and Taylor (2011, p. 175) for example listed 'rehabilitation', 'reform', 'counseling', 'reconciliation', 'amnesty', 'demobilization', 'disbandment', 'dialogue' and 'deprogrammeing' as concepts competing and sometimes used exchangeable with de-radicalisation. In addition, Koehler (2016) named 'reintegration', 're-education', 'desistance' (primary, secondary and tertiary), 'disaffiliation', and 'debiasing'. All these terms roughly describe a similar process of turning from a position of perceived deviance or conflict with the surrounding environment, towards moderation and equilibrium. This process can take numerous different forms, for example voluntary or involuntary; permanent or temporary; individual or collective; and psychological or physical (Koehler, 2016, p. 14).

It is obvious, that all these concepts and terms describe a psychological as well as physical process essentially measured by individuals' or groups' degree of accordance, as opposed to conflict, with the legal, cultural or moral views of the surrounding majority (or mainstream) environment. Hence, de-radicalisation and its competing concepts have to be understood as terms marking a specific kind of societal negotiation between a community and perceived deviants aiming at conflict reduction. Most of these concepts and terms (including de-radicalisation) imply, that the source of the conflict lies with the 'deviant' other, who must be aligned somehow with the position of the mainstream majority, assuming that an increased alignment automatically reduces conflict. De-radicalisation, like most of these competing concepts, therefore have to navigate a precarious borderline between reducing plurality of opinions and convictions on the one hand - sometimes even crossing the threshold to infringing upon central core freedoms guaranteed in all Western democratic countries - and on the other hand, reducing sources of violent conflict based on extremist thought patterns, ideologies or group dynamics. This inherent struggle with moral legitimacy of the de-radicalisation concept (i.e. the attempted change of a person's or group's political or religious opinion, which is oftentimes not illegal), at least in Western countries, was described in detail

by Koehler (2016, pp. 201-210) and has to be the background for the following conceptual and definitional remarks.

The inherent moral legitimacy conflict is one of the reasons that de-radicalisation's most important competing concept is 'disengagement' and both are usually used in combination with each other. Looking at some definitions by leading academic experts, the main difference between de-radicalisation and disengagement is the focus on ideology, or more precisely the psychological side of exiting a violent extremist milieu. Horgan and Braddock for example define disengagement as:

> 'the process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation. It may not necessarily involve leaving the movement, but is most frequently associated with significant temporary or permanent role change. Additionally, while disengagement may stem from role change, that role change may be influenced by psychological factors such as disillusionment, burnout or the failure to reach the expectations that influenced initial involvement. This can lead to a member seeking out a different role within the movement' (Horgan and Braddock, (2010, p. 152)

and de-radicalisation as:

> 'the social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. De-radicalization may also refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-offending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues' (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 153).

More specifically, Braddock (2014, p. 60) points out, that de-radicalisation is a 'psychological process through which an individual abandons his extremist ideology and is theoretically rendered a decreased threat for re-engaging in terrorism.'

Hence, at a first glance, the main difference between disengagement and de-radicalisation according to this view is: whether the main focus of the process is reduction of the ideological commitment (de-radicalisation), or physical role change and desistance from illegal behaviour (disengagement). However, it is more complex than that. Horgan (2009a, p. 19) for example notes that, even if psychologically reducing commitment to a violent extremist group is the goal, de-radicalisation (i.e. reduction in ideological commitment) does not have to be part of

the process, and he therefore introduced the intermediary concept of 'psychological disengagement' between 'physical disengagement' and 'de-radicalisation (ibid., pp. 21-27). This became necessary after Horgan found, in his large sample of interviews (that he collected between 2006 and 2008) with former terrorists, that while 'almost all could be described as disengaged, the vast majority of them could not be said to be 'de-radicalised'' (ibid., p. 27). In this differentiation between the disengagement and de-radicalisation, another term, 'ideology', plays a significant role. To complicate this even further, ideology, and its role in entering as well as leaving extremist milieus, has essentially divided the discourse specifically on de-radicalisation into a 'narrow' and 'broad' school (Clubb, 2015), with the first aiming to achieve rejection of ideological based violence and the latter including various other ideological aspects as well. While, furthermore, it has been argued that disengagement, i.e. the mere physical role change and desistance from crime, would be more feasible and realistic (e.g. Noricks, 2009), other scholars have pointed out that, in order to reduce recidivism of extremist offenders, it is necessary to address 'beliefs and attitudes that drive violent behavior' (Braddock, 2014, p. 60). Not addressing these underlying beliefs and attitudes, as well as the individual psychological factors of attraction, might increase the chance of a failed exit process and the risk of re-radicalisation (Koehler, 2016; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). However, beliefs, attitudes and factors of attraction might overlap with the milieu's ideology, but they don't have to be entirely equal. Other parts of the collective identity or oppositional culture within the extremist environment can also provide a pull factor. In that sense, 'ideology' is better understood as a dynamic set of political values and ideals, which is constantly renegotiated between the individual and the collective, albeit to a differing degree of involvement from both sides.

It is important to note here that the term de-radicalisation has been used to describe both the process of exiting an extremist environment on the one side, and the wider practical activity by programmes or mentors on the other. Practitioners in the field tend not to distinguish between the role of ideology in the exit process when describing their activities, but rather see every from of assisted departure from an extremist milieu and reintegration into a non-extremist life as 'de-radicalisation'. Bringing together the terminology of the wider de-radicalisation field at this point, the different forms of exiting can be defined according to the degree of ideological removal (from the weakest to the strongest): physical disengagement, psychological disengagement, de-radicalisation (narrow) and de-radicalisation (broad). These processes can overlap and an individual might go through all or only one of them in different order. For example, physical disengagement might lead to a narrow de-radicalisation, which

might lead to a broad one in the long run (Clubb, 2017). It must also be recognized, that these developments are not a one-way process but also include setback and reversals. Some aspects of the ideology or group might regain attractiveness, for example in the form of another extremist ideology or group. This essentially means that 'deradicalisation should not be considered a psychological return to some pre-radicalised state' (Braddock, 2014, p. 62) but as a new development in itself.

Shifting the focus to de-radicalisation as a practical activity, another set of terms and concepts have entered the discourse. One common classification used in connection to de-radicalisation is the trifold prevention matrix from Caplan (1964) being rooted in clinical psychiatry and dubbed 'Public Health Model'. 'Primary' prevention in this matrix aims to prevent a deviant behaviour from occurring in a non-infected system. 'Secondary' prevention aims to avert its solidification, when it is already present and 'tertiary' prevention in consequence aims to prevent this element from reoccurring in the future. As intended by Caplan, every intervention in tertiary prevention essentially aims to prevent recidivism. This mechanism was echoed when de-radicalisation, as a practical activity, was seen as programmes reducing risk of terrorist recidivism (Horgan & Altier, 2012). In this context, academics and practitioners have seen de-radicalisation activities as tertiary prevention (e.g. Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Zammit, 2015). Another classification concept from using a prevention based terminology applied to de-radicalisation was introduced by Gordon Jr. (1983), who, in contrast to Caplan, only looked at a state of non-infection. 'Universal' prevention in this concept aims to introduce wide, easy and cheap measures of preventative care, e.g. a healthier nutrition. 'Selective' prevention aims to introduce more differential methods targeting a group with a higher risk of infection, while 'indexed' prevention aims at those with a high risk. Objection to that framework was for example raised by Koehler (2016), who argued that preventing recidivism is just one necessary (and later) part of de-radicalisation, which must reduce individual physical and psychological commitment to the extremist group and ideology in the first place. In addition, using a classification scheme from clinical psychiatry might imply a pathological nature of radicalisation and de-radicalisation, which can have significant negative impact on the practitioners' self-understanding and the cognitive opening of the programme participants.

Next to these classifications from mental health and disease control, attempts to counter violent radicalisation processes have been commonly referred to as 'Countering Violent Extremism' (CVE) programmes (e.g. Cherney et al., 2017; Harris-Hogan et al., 2015). These are usually understood to be preventative in nature and to be 'an approach intended to preclude individuals from engaging in, or materially supporting, ideologically motivated

violence' (Williams, 2017, p. 153). It would be more accurate, however, to see CVE as the umbrella category under which prevention oriented initiatives (i.e. before a person radicalises to a point of using violence) and intervention oriented initiatives (i.e. de-radicalisation and disengagement of persons who are already radicalised to the point of using violence) are subsumed. The first is commonly referred to as 'counter-radicalisation' or 'Preventing Violent Extremism' (PVE) programmes and the latter as de-radicalisation, rehabilitation or reintegration programmes.

Naturally, there is no clear distinction between prevention or intervention oriented methods and programmes in practice, as radicalisation processes are not linear and are also dynamic. Hence, whether or not a person is not yet 'radical enough' for de-radicalisation is mostly impossible and even futile to answer, which is why most practitioners do not differentiate the different terms and concepts as clearly as the academic discourse might suggest. Case managers or mentors, who are in touch with the client, participant or beneficiary, have to decide which tools and methods to choose, on an individual case-by-case basis. In reality, prevention and intervention oriented tools form a methods-blend aiming to achieve effects on all levels: preventing further radicalisation; decreasing physical and psychological commitment to the radical milieu and thought pattern or ideology; preventing return to violence and extremism; increasing resilience to extremist ideologies or groups; and assisting to build a new self-sustained life and identity. Usually, the reference points for mentors and case managers are: the time spent in the extremist environment; the position or rank in the group; and the quantity and severity of crimes committed in the name of the extremist ideology. The question of individual conviction or the degree of internalization of that extremist ideology is, in many cases, never fully answered but rather addressed through a methods mix including a variety of different approaches (for an overview see: Koehler, 2016). Even though it is seen as a major necessity of high quality de-radicalisation work to base the methods mix for individual counselling on a detailed account of the client's risk factors and needs (Koehler, 2017a), tools for adequate risk assessment are contested (Sarma, 2017) and so are attempts to identify root causes or driving factors of violent radicalisation. Practitioners mostly assume some connection between identified biographical friction points or traumatic experiences, as well as somehow expressed factors of attraction (e.g. action and adventure seeking; quest for significance; search for loyalty, comradery, and honour), which is embodied in the extremist group or ideology. As outlined by Koehler (2015a), violent radical milieus are no monolithic, static or clearly separated groups but rather in constant exchange with their positive and negative target societies through infrastructure and ideology. As there

are multiple ways in and out of these 'contrast societies' (i.e. the mechanism of interaction between the radical group and mainstream environment), it is also possible to move within these milieus. Motivations for joining can, but do not have to be, connected to reasons for leaving. In consequence, as radicalisation is a context bound phenomenon 'par excellence' (Reinares et al., 2008, p. 7), so is de-radicalisation. Practitioners constantly have to adapt their methods and tools to the individual context of the client, combined with the goal to achieve the maximum disengagement or de-radicalisation possible.

In addition to terminology and concepts, evaluation of counter extremism projects must be based on a detailed understanding about the typology of programmes in this field. In recent decades around 40-50 projects which may be categorized as 'de-radicalisation' programmes have been launched, drawing their inspiration from a broad spectrum of schools of thought and political motivations. However, these programmes differ fundamentally from one another, for instance with regard to methodology, target group and structure. As a consequence, the respective expectations concerning participant numbers, recidivism rates, case duration etc. necessarily vary from programme to programme, and so such quantitative performance benchmarks, discussed below, must be adjusted accordingly.

Comparing the central characteristics of these initiatives around the world, it is possible to identify three core features which lend themselves to developing a typology and enables to better understand certain structural characteristics (potential and limits, strengths and weaknesses) and means of impact. Furthermore, the types introduced here also allow to derive criteria for evaluation and case-to-case interlinkages. The three core features are: stakeholdership (state/non-state); form of contact (active/passive[3]); and the role of ideology (central/negligible). Strictly speaking, only programmes containing an ideological component can be called 'de-radicalisation programmes'. That said, countless programmes address ideology as a secondary component or concentrate on moderately ideologized target groups.

[3] Active: the programme approaches the target group and seeks to encourage participation in the programme. Passive: the programme is contacted by interested participants in search of assistance and advice.

Figure 1: Typology of de-radicalisation programmes (yellow means ideological change has a key importance in the programme)



Whilst Type A and Type B are non-state organisations operating passively, it is rare to find non-state implementers who are in a position to approach a target group actively (Type C). Data protection legislation means it is usually extremely difficult for NGOs, at least in western countries, to obtain by legal means the names and addresses of active extremists and other persons of interest to the authorities. Internationally, the most common programmes are of Type B, alongside state programmes in the criminal justice system. Traditionally Type D and Type E are comprehensive state de-radicalisation programmes within prisons, in which access to potential participants is automatic. Such programmes, for instance in Saudi Arabia, revolve around intensive theological discourse, while, by contrast, western programmes (for instance in Denmark or the UK) either explicitly exclude this component or delegate it to non-state partners.

In addition to understanding different types of CVE and de-radicalisation programmes, it is necessary to recognize their role within the overall counter-terrorism frameworks of countries applying them. In essence, every country can utilize preventative, repressive or interventive measures to reduce the risk of terrorism. Further, all these measures can be deployed on a national macro-social scale, or on meso- (e.g. state, city, district, family) and micro-social (individual) levels. As was discussed above, this counter-terrorism network differentiates between intervention (e.g. de-radicalisation and family counseling) and prevention oriented tools:

Table 1: The counter-terrorism network

	Macrosocial	**Mesosocial**	**Microsocial**
Prevention (general, specific)	e.g. education, research, youth work, social work	e.g. local crime prevention, federal & state action plans etc.	e.g. workshops in schools with former extremists
Repression	Legislative, executive, nationwide security architecture	e.g. banning orders, neighbourhood officers	e.g. arrests, house searches
Intervention	Counter-narratives	e.g. family support	e.g. individual exit programmes

In the area of prevention we must distinguish between general prevention and specific prevention (e.g. counter-extremism), whereby the latter begins with the identified risk of a known individual entering a particular extremist group or radical milieu. Repression on the other hand pursues the aim of containing an existing radical milieu using police or criminal procedural measures. Equally, intervention assumes an existing radical milieu, entailing measures which complement repressive action in specifically targeting this milieu to break down the group structures and enable – in a variety of ways – individual or collective departure from the radical or extremist position. Essentially the corresponding methods and approaches should be conceived as a complementary partnership. For instance, individual de-radicalisation programmes only make sense if state authorities do not prosecute relevant politically motivated crimes and if a statutory basis is in place. By the same token, in the sphere of preventative action, for instance concerning school education and teacher training, a sound expert knowledge of radicalisation is necessary in order to foster early recognition, which is why a broad range of implementers, from the state and counter-extremism authorities to civil-society initiatives, offer relevant training and workshops.

Finally, it is also worth highlighting the difference between family support and individual exit programmes, which are often mentioned in parallel but without making the necessary distinction. The most important difference is that in the case of family support the person in question is still going through the radicalisation process. Hence the objective is to slow down and eventually stop this process with the help of the family and peers (Koehler, 2015d). As soon as the person in question displays any desire to disengage, an offer of individual de-radicalisation counselling should be made, since their desires and needs and those of their family may well not coincide.

Current State of Research and the Debate about Evaluation and Standards of Counter-Extremism Work

The Challenges and Necessity of Evaluating De-radicalisation Programmes

It has become clear that one of the most severe problems faced by all de-radicalisation programmes is the question of how to show and ensure a positive impact according to the programmes' goals. Many additional aspects connected to this issue – such as, for example, if there should be common working standards, how to evaluate de-radicalisation programmes' performance, and how to effectively structure or design these programmes – have been briefly touched upon in the existing literature so far. However, attempts to suggest comprehensive evaluation tools for de-radicalisation programmes coming from academia (e.g., Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Romaniuk & Fink, 2012; Williams & Kleinman, 2013) have almost completely failed to take root in practice. While the field of rehabilitation programmes for ordinary criminals has experienced a high level of standardization and the development of extensive evaluation tools, de-radicalisation programmes have struggled to demonstrate their impact or sometimes even actively blocked access for external researchers or requests for more information and transparency. This is partially due to the fact that many programmes are operated by security agencies, involve a target group deemed to be highly dangerous to their surrounding countries, and sometimes utilize questionable methods, as well as political and tactical motives.

Nevertheless, without the development of methods to evaluate de-radicalisation and terrorist rehabilitation programmes, comprehensive ethical and professional standards, or widely accepted norms regarding operational aspects of these initiatives, the field is inevitably bound to remain fragmented and confronted with suspected inefficiencies, failure, or misconduct. As well, the theoretical and partially demonstrated potential of de-radicalisation programmes in counter-terrorism will not be fully realized. Akin to any other complex social problem, terrorism and counter-radicalisation must be subjected to scrutiny to avoid backlash or waste of resources. Governments, practitioners, and researchers need to be able to compare and differentiate programmes according to their type, goals, and methods, but also on their impact, proficiency, and skills, in order to develop true 'best practices', to develop and build new programmes based on well-established principles, and to improve existing programmes regarding identified mistakes or insufficiencies. As pointed out by some of the leading experts in the field, 'best practice' can only apply to a method or technique with proven success in implementation, in addition to being transferrable and having a demonstrated superiority over

other approaches (quoted in: Susan, 2012, p. 82). As a consequence of these high demands regarding the label 'best practice', one can show that – similar to the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes and research – popular use of this term, applied to many different programmes without any significant evaluation or concept behind them, has resulted in a strong devaluation and inflated application of such quality statements. While there is no shortage of 'best practice' collections in de-radicalisation, almost none of the programmes have actually displayed any proven success, much less superiority over other approaches, or the possibility of transfer to other countries.

Of course, it would be naïve to propose that a 'one size fits all' solution could be developed for every country, target group, and context. Differences in political cultures, ideologies, structure of terrorist groups, legal frameworks, religion, and available resources need to be incorporated into every programme design. Sometimes the transfer of one specific programme from one community to another in the same country can prove to be highly problematic, as, for example, with the Danish Aarhus approach (Agerschou, 2014). Depending on how context specific the programme design was built, it might even be entirely impossible to try to copy the approach elsewhere. Other programme designs have been used as models across the world, such as the British Channel programme (Robertson, 2015). In general, one needs to differentiate between the types of de-radicalisation programmes, the political context, and the goals of each initiative. Although governmental programmes have been deemed to be relatively easier to transfer, this only applies to the political-social context sharing similar traditions or main elements, such as the British Channel project, and the sharing of the British legal and political infrastructure with Canadian, US, or Dutch partners. Another example would be the Saudi Arabian or Singaporean de-radicalisation programmes, which have acted as models for rehabilitation programmes in Malaysia or Indonesia. Civil society based de-radicalisation programmes have experienced more difficulties regarding the possibility of transfer to other countries, as they have been traditionally seen as more context specific, although 'front line' practitioners from non-governmental programmes have acted as expert advisors to governments. While non-governmental programmes have inspired other civil society based initiatives and vice versa, with governmental approaches inspiring other governments, a similar rough rift exists between Western and Middle Eastern/South-East Asian approaches. Only marginal cross-cultural exchange exists between these two socio-political areas.

Several key questions related to evaluation, standards, and impact assessment of de-radicalisation programmes need to be discussed in order to recognize the strengths and

weaknesses of the different approaches. Many of these aspects have already been extensively discussed in other fields, such as DDR or criminology, for rehabilitation programmes focusing on 'ordinary' criminals. Hence, the possibility of translating that knowledge to the field of de-radicalisation will be scrutinized. This translation has partially been suggested by other studies in the past (e.g., Mullins, 2010), without a detailed theoretical test of application based on in-depth field studies and practical perspectives of de-radicalisation work. Indeed, how the 'impact' of de-radicalisation programmes is defined and measured to ensure quality for these initiatives needs to be discussed. Paradoxically, the majority of programmes have not included clearly defined goals and impact measures, which directly refers to the questions of which quantitative or qualitative metrics or factors should be used to assess a programme's effect. Organizational aspects are equally important. The possible impact of criminological research on effective rehabilitation programmes of non-political or religious offenders might prove especially useful. Nevertheless, there must be discussion of the specific requirements that must be placed on the staff of de-radicalisation programmes, if there are any genuine to that field. Finally, several methods for evaluation of de-radicalisation and disengagement programmes will be introduced and analysed regarding their practical applicability.

Basics from Evaluation Research

Theories and models for evaluating social programmes are abundant, and the academic study of evaluation methods has resulted in its own research discipline with roots in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As outlined by Alkin and Christie (2004, p. 13) evaluation can be roughly separated into three categories: utility, methods and valuing oriented. While the utility-oriented evaluation focuses on the decision makers needs regarding information about a certain programme, method-oriented evaluation approaches are mainly concerned with internal validity of an evaluation study, e.g. experimental settings and control variables. Valuing-oriented evaluation places its main goal into making judgements about the quality of a programme, as it is seen in this approach that an evaluation must essentially place a value on the findings to inform decision making and recourse allocation. All three approaches are of course relevant for de-radicalisation programmes and stakeholders as well. Without a judgment about the quality and effectiveness of a de-radicalisation programme, policy makers and the general public will not be able to determine whether or not continuing the programme is an adequate use of resources, especially when facing competing or alternative policy options (such as, for example, tougher laws and longer prison sentences instead of rehabilitation). Furthermore, evaluation of de-radicalisation programmes must adhere to the

highest academic standards, and validity must be at least one of the main goals. This is in order to minimise the risk that an evaluation outcome, while ideologically or politically desired, is not an accurate reflection of the de-radicalisation programme's efficacy, and therefore is of no real benefit (e.g. a programme is deemed successful simply because funders or politicians do not want to admit failure). Evaluations that do not adhere to basic standards of validity insurance not only contribute to corruption and waste of critical resources, but also negatively impact the threat posed by violent extremism and terrorism. If ineffective or corrupt de-radicalisation programmes are not identified and dismantled the overall quality of the field will suffer, and programmes not fit to work with high risk cases might still try to counsel such individuals with potentially devastating effects. Finally, de-radicalisation programmes are always part of wider counter-terrorism efforts by governments and societies and hence cannot be disconnected from the decision makers' needs to be informed about their inner workings.

Consequently, in all three main approaches to evaluation described by Alkin and Christie (2004, p. 13) scholars have advocated for specific elements essential for evaluating de-radicalisation programmes, even though their demands are not unproblematic, which will be explained in detail below. Within methods-oriented evaluation for example, Tyler (1942) has pointed out the importance of measuring important outcomes, Suchman (1968) applied David Campbell's (1957; 1966) works on experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation designs to social programmes, and Chen's (1990) model of theory-driven evaluation emphasizes the importance of a coherent programme theory as the starting point for every evaluation. These are only three important representatives with high relevance for the de-radicalisation field. In addition, the utility-oriented approach to evaluation has set the main standards for evaluations as part of Daniel Stufflebeam's (2000) CIPP (Context, Input, Process, Product) model: utility, feasibility, accuracy, and propriety. Also belonging to this strand, the 'Empowerment Evaluation Model' from David Fetterman et al. (1996) has shown the importance and feasibility of teaching communities and social programme practitioners to monitor and improve their own performance. Finally, valuing-oriented evaluation approaches have added the stakeholder perspective to the field, for example with the work from Michael Scriven (1972) pointing out that social programmes essentially should meet the specific needs of their stakeholders, who must be included in the evaluation (Robert E Stake, 1983; Robert E. Stake, 2004). Some scholars from this strand went so far as to claim that evaluations are essentially nothing else than the guided attempt to create a judgemental consensus among stakeholders (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Lastly, the widely known 'Connoisseurship Model' from Eisner

(1977; 1991) established the need for the evaluator to be an experienced expert in the very field the evaluated programme works.

In summary, the major works in evaluation approaches across the different strands have pointed out the need for outcome measurement, high validity and quasi-experimental designs, consistent programme theories, utility, feasibility, accuracy, propriety, self-enhancement components and the inclusion of stakeholder perspectives, as well as the expert level experience of the evaluator in the field which is to be evaluated. All of these aspects are without a doubt essential in understanding and evaluating the impact of a de-radicalisation programme as well. As will be shown below, the discourse on de-radicalisation evaluation has, however, mainly focused on outcome measurement (especially recidivism rates), as well as the discussion of if and how quasi-experimental designs could be applied to the CVE field. Before moving on to shedding some light on the problems with these two approaches to evaluating de-radicalisation programmes and suggesting an alternative route, two evaluation concepts need to be presented in more detail, as they include very valuable components for finding a new way to assess a de-radicalisation programme's effects and effectiveness.

One of the most important goals for evaluating CVE programmes - in addition to finding out if they are effective (i.e. reaching the programme's goals) - is usually to identify 'best practices' and provide the possibility to transfer a programme's experiences and methods to other contexts. In other words: CVE evaluations usually have the mission to identify, multiply and spread 'what works', simply because the threat and growth of violent extremism and terrorism outpaces the availability of CVE programmes and initiatives in most countries (arguably with the noteworthy exception of Saudi Arabia in terms of financial resources and counselling places available in the country's programme). Two evaluation approaches seem to fit into that need quite well: the Empowerment Evaluation (EE) (D. M. Fetterman et al., 1996; D. M. Fetterman & Wandersman, 2005) and the theory-driven evaluation (Chen, 1990; Coryn, Noakes, Westine, & Schröter, 2011; Donaldson, 2003). Empowerment Evaluation was originally designed by David Fetterman (1994) with the goal to provide communities and small group settings (i.e. stakeholders) with the tools and guidance to monitor and evaluate their own programmes and initiatives in order to foster a self-improvement and mutual learning process. In Empowerment Evaluation the professional evaluator takes over the role of an advisor to the stakeholders and only marginally provides assistance for self-evaluation. EE was consequentially applied to various social programmes and intervention settings from higher education to women shelters (see for example: A. B. Andrews, 1996; D. Fetterman, 2011). Interestingly, without labelling it Empowerment Evaluation, many current evaluative

efforts directed at de-radicalisation programmes take over the form of that approach by combining self-descriptive accounts of these initiatives with workshops aiming to improve the ability of stakeholders (in this case mostly programme staff) to self-evaluate. Naturally, the shift of responsibility regarding the evaluation from professional evaluators to the stakeholders themselves, who might be biased to give outcome in line with their own interests, has received substantial criticism (e.g. Stufflebeam, 1994). Without the necessity to describe EE in detail here, it seems a logical choice to apply to de-radicalisation programmes, which are very often lacking any transparency or access to data for researchers (Horgan & Altier, 2012; Horgan & Braddock, 2010), and in consequence circumvent the practical problems faced by external researchers. However, this evaluation approach applied to de-radicalisation programmes essentially means that these programmes evaluate themselves without any external quality assurance or even vetting mechanism. Hence, at least one essential function of effective evaluations, which is to build trust between stakeholders and programme staff, will also be excluded from the potential results. As examples of moral and legal misconduct by de-radicalisation programmes below show, the lack of transparency and the high level of insecurity when it comes to accepting a former terrorist back into the society are very important reasons to retain that trust building goal of evaluations.

A second potential approach to evaluating de-radicalisation programmes is theory-driven evaluation designed by Huey Chen (1990), who points out the importance of the theoretical basis of any programme to be evaluated. In essence, theory-driven evaluation aims to understand how a programme works with a higher priority than measuring a certain effect. ‘Conceptually, theory-driven evaluations should explicate a programme theory or model. Empirically, theory-driven evaluations seek to investigate how programmes cause intended or observed outcomes’ (Coryn et al., 2011, p. 203), which is a direct reaction to the fact that ‘social programmes are more complex in composition and are more likely to have delayed, diffuse, and subtle effects’ (Donaldson, 2003, p. 126). Again, there is no need to describe the approach in too much detail at this point, but it suffices to say here that without having been applied to de-radicalisation programmes so far, theory-driven evaluations open the main route to an alternative method to assess the quality of a de-radicalisation programme: structural integrity evaluation. Including the validity and coherence of a programme’s theory of change and methodological foundation, structural integrity evaluation moves beyond that aspect to assess the structural programme features within a comprehensive framework, which will be explained below in the discussion of traditional problems with evaluating de-radicalisation initiatives.

Problem I: Defining Impact and Showing Effect

Defining impact for de-radicalisation programmes can be one of the most difficult and complex tasks involved in designing and conducting these activities. In one of the most comprehensive and comparative studies of de-radicalisation programmes targeting Islamic extremists, Rabasa et al. (2010) have suggested several aspects regarding the impact and success of de-radicalisation programmes. While, first of all, the majority of programme graduates should stay disengaged and not be actively involved in violent activities, 'a more robust definition of success would be that most of the former radicals de-radicalise as well as disengage' (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010, p. 41), connecting the question of dismantling the radical ideology to the goal for de-radicalisation programmes of weakening the extremist milieu in general. In addition, the authors suggest the incorporation of other measurable factors, such as if programme graduates supply intelligence to the authorities, if they actively encourage other radicals to leave, and whether the programme targets high-ranking or peripheral members. Rabasa et al. belong to the school of de-radicalisation thought dubbed 'broad' by Clubb (2015), which he contrasts with the 'narrow' school. Both are differentiated by the importance of ideology and its presumed effects on behavioural change. It is argued by supporters of the 'narrow' school of thought (e.g. Clubb, 2015; Noricks, 2009) that the goal of de-radicalisation programmes should be to reach individual or collective renunciation of the use of violence in the present. Attempting to encourage programme graduates to reject the use of violence in the past or future might already be too high an expectation and close the window of opportunities for initial disengagement, out of which later de-radicalisation – i.e. dismissal of the radical ideology – might follow. In consequence, some 'de-radicalisation' programmes have deemed it impossible to achieve an ideological reversal and concentrate on the context-specific rejection of violence as the major goal (e.g. in Indonesia: Hwang, 2015; Osman, 2014). This definitional question has a significant effect on impact assessment and the criteria used for programme evaluation, as well as theoretically possible effects in counter-terrorism. In addition, these psychological outcome measures ('de-radicalised' personality, 'true' rejection of violence etc.) are of course very hard if not impossible to be scientifically assessed, since it is hardly possible to fully prove a human being's changed personality without the possibility of deceit through that person. However, some indications for an individual change on that level do exist, although the development of practical validations is in its early infancy. Coming from criminology, thematic content analysis was suggested to evaluate whether or not an individual had progressed from primary (behavioural only) to secondary (psychological change) desistance (Maruna, 2001, pp. 169-

179). Employing adapted forms of generativity content analysis (Stewart, Franz, & Layton, 1988), agency content analysis, and redemption sequences (McAdams, Diamond, de St Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997), Maruna (2001) established a set of measurable themes to be effectively coded, in order to show an interviewee's perception of positive or negative self-agency, as well as sympathy for others and individual values. So far, it has neither been discussed nor tested whether such content analysis methods could be effectively adapted to former extremists or those radicals currently undergoing rehabilitation. It needs to be stressed, however, that the close proximity of desistance, as well as the themes coded by Maruna, very closely resemble elements that most de-radicalisation programmes would claim as success if achieved.

Nevertheless, in consequence to the difficulty in assessing an individual's change of mind, evaluators of de-radicalisation programmes have tried to identify other effects that are more measurable and verifiable.

Problem II: Measurable Impacts? Manpower Reduction, Reduced Recruitment Efforts, Diminishing Public Activity, Decreasing Crimes.

In theory, de-radicalisation programmes have various specific effects in counter-terrorism (Koehler, 2015b), ranging from manpower reduction, employment of former extremists in counter-radicalisation and prevention work, intelligence and knowledge gathering about radical and terrorist milieus, destruction of internal group hierarchies and narratives, and more, which could be gathered in line with objectives-oriented evaluations focusing on measurable outcomes (Tyler, 1942). Depending, of course, on the programmes' organizational capacities, proficiency, resources, and scope, de-radicalisation, as well as disengagement programmes, should theoretically have a measurable positive impact on terrorist and extremist activities, such as violent attacks, recruitment, and number of followers. Albeit this impact should be expected to be less significant with those programmes ignoring ideological reversal, as programme graduates might still be supportive of the cause, advertise, or recruit for the extremist groups; however, an overall impact in the given sense could be visible and measurable. Even though the causality between a de-radicalisation programme and the development of these variables connected to the extremist target milieu might be only theoretical and the named factors could be influenced by various other external causes, at least it should be possible to show some degree of interaction statistically.

However, the main problem is that only very few countries provide sufficient data to gain some indication of these effects. First of all, the country should have well-established and

coherent standards for measuring involvement in extremist milieus, de-radicalisation programmes running for a sufficient amount of time and with country-wide reach, as well as available information on the programmes' basic numbers of clients and graduation.

Problem III: Recidivism and Quasi-Experimental Designs

Moving on with the discussion of 'success' measures for de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes, by far the most widely used metric to show positive impact is the rate of recidivism of programme graduates back into terrorism, violence, or criminal activity in general. Although many programmes do not offer transparent statistics, have no effective monitoring system for programme graduates, as well as no clear definition of when an individual might be regarded as having returned to a deviant state, the majority of programmes nevertheless claim high success rates based on the low percentages of recidivism (e.g. El-Said, 2015; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Most notably, the programmes in Saudi Arabia and Singapore have claimed 90 to 100 per cent rate of 'success' (e.g. al-Hadlaq, 2015; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Ramakrishna, 2014), although numerous high-level cases of programme graduates are known to have become active terrorists again, and additional questions, such as the monitoring, criteria, or pool of graduates (high-ranking versus peripheral), remain unanswered. More problematically, however, is the value of recidivism as a 'success measurement'. As the base rates of terrorist recidivism are unknown, it is hence questionable to use an apparent decrease as proof of success (Mullins, 2010, p. 174). Existing studies for example suggest much lower recidivism rates amongst imprisoned terrorists than of 'ordinary' criminals: 'overall less than five percent of all released terrorist prisoners will be re-convicted for involvement in terrorist related activity' (Silke, 2014). If so – and the existing studies do suffer from too small research populations, lack of comparison groups, account of political context, etc. – de-radicalisation programmes might claim false positives based on naturally low recidivism rate of terrorists. In addition, it needs to be taken into account if the programme belongs to a passive or active type category. Lower rates of recidivism are to be expected with any programme that works mainly with those individuals reaching out to the programme of their own will and motivation to leave the radical environment. Programmes actively reaching out, or even coercively making clients participate, are expected to have naturally higher rates of recidivism. As there is not enough information and transparency from the majority of de-radicalisation programmes, it is very difficult to establish expected recidivism rates for each programme type. In addition, it needs to be stressed that programme-specific definitions of 'recidivism' vary greatly and sometimes include any form of illegal activity by the graduate or only involvement in organised terrorist groups. Some programmes

count technical violations, conviction, arrest, return to prison, incarceration, or other factors as recidivism and rehabilitation failure. As well as the definition of recidivism, the time frame for monitoring after release differs and it is not clear how long a convicted terrorist has to be under surveillance before 'recidivism' might become highly unlikely. In desistance-focused rehabilitation of 'ordinary' offenders, two- or three-year follow-up monitoring is typically seen as adequate and the graduate will be counted as reformed usually after a period of 6 to 24 months without offending (Laub & Sampson, 2001, p. 9). That time frame might be considerably longer for former terrorists and violent extremists.

Further, recidivism numbers rely on what is reported about or by the programmes themselves. Oftentimes, due to a lack of aftercare monitoring, a high unknown number of graduates may return to terrorism. As well, the initial success definition of the programme plays an important role. Those not including an ideological element are expected to have a lower recidivism rate, as on the one hand these programmes tend to have a narrow definition of success and recidivism, meaning that only active involvement in terrorist violence after graduation will be counted as a failure. On the other hand, disengagement programmes do not actively tackle the ideological or theological element of radicalism, which is arguably a highly complex and even burdensome process for the participants. With less complex and stressful programme content, reduced recidivism amongst graduates is expected. By contrast, those programmes setting ideological reversal as their major goal, a higher recidivism rate must be expected. Due to a lack of in-depth research and access to information, it is unknown how much, or even if, programme characteristics such as an active or passive approach and the aim for ideological reversal, influence each other, reinforce, or even negate their influence on recidivism.

Also, it needs to be recognized that 'recidivism' only covers those individuals who finish the programme and not those who stop participating before completion. This 'drop out rate' might in the end be a much more effective performance indicator than 'recidivism' and should be collected as part of programme evaluation, which in turn requires the programme to file adequate process statistics. Passive programmes are to be expected to have a slightly higher drop-out rate of participants simply due to their own motivation and voluntary involvement, whereas active governmental – especially prison-based – programmes are expected to have lower drop-out rates. In these cases, participants usually only have to gain from participation and sometimes are forced to stay. Participation might not be seen as treason of fellow comrades when the programme is mandatory or actively addresses all group members. Again, the programme characteristics regarding ideology play a significant role. A higher drop-out rate must be seen as natural with those initiatives including and demanding ideological

reversal of their participants, as this raises the individual costs and potential feelings of uncomfortableness.

Next to recidivism and drop-out rates, the question of experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation designs to be directed at de-radicalisation was discussed in the literature (see for example: Mastroe & Szmania, 2016; Williams, 2016), as this approach is widely seen as the 'gold standard' of evaluations (Campbell, 1957; Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Suchman, 1968). However, there are a number of reasons against applying experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation designs to de-radicalisation programmes. First, and arguably most importantly, it would be ethically immoral to put a control group of clients at risk of re-radicalising into terrorism and violent extremism, due to consciously preventing them from active participation in a programme. Even beyond the moral costs of such an approach, the potential economic costs (e.g. loss of life, damage of property). caused by someone who could have been de-radicalised but was put in the control group and then conducted a terrorist attack, cannot and should not be factored in as 'collateral damage'. Second, as de-radicalisation processes are so individual and subject to various external and subjective influences, it might be argued that it is simply impossible to find a control group sharing all relevant characteristics of the treatment group in order to make a meaningful comparison. Third, control of the experiment for all relevant variables over a long period might be impossible to achieve, while still maintaining validity of the outcomes.

As an alternative to the simple 'test vs 'control' comparisons, it was suggested to use randomized treatment as quasi-experimental evaluation design (e.g. Mastroe & Szmania, 2016) and indeed this approach was tested out in the field with encouraging results with the rehabilitation and reintegration programme for Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélanger, Gunaratna, & Hettiarachchi, 2014). It seems that this evaluation approach is only limited by the available resources, data access and – most importantly – the availability of equally structured treatment groups. In practice, however, it might prove difficult or even impossible to find such near perfect conditions for this kind of evaluation again outside of Sri Lanka.

Other Metrics: Lack of Attacks, Demand and Contact Numbers, Reintegration

Next to recidivism and drop-out rates, as well as experimental designs, other metrics have traditionally been used by de-radicalisation programmes to provide 'proof' of their success, such as the lack of terrorist attacks in the given country after the introduction of the programme, lack of extremist activities, reduction of terrorist recruitment, and rate of

employment of programme graduates. These metrics are very country specific and relate to the external political, economic, or even global factors hardly under the control of any de-radicalisation programme. Outbreak of civil war in a country with such a programme or in the close neighbourhood – such as, for example, in Yemen or in the Middle East in general (especially with the Syrian and Iraqi civil war) – has a strong distorting effect on these impact measures. Graduates might, for example, leave the country and participate in another conflict or terror organization elsewhere, which is unlikely to show in any statistic. On the other hand, graduates might be forced to join one or another faction if civil war in their home country breaks out. Is this type of violent behaviour classified as recidivism or not, since it might be entirely based on different motives than the previous activity?

Other impact measures are programme-type specific and aim to showcase the 'demand' for the programme, such as number of calls, referral of cases to the authorities, duration of case counselling, etc. While all of these measures are important to understand how a programme might work and achieve some of its goals – if defined – much more detailed information is necessary to put this data into context. A high number of calls for a government de-radicalisation hotline in itself is not of significance, if, for example, the majority of cases are of a general and informative nature involving individuals not considered to be radicalising or radicalised. In addition, a programme might receive a high number of referrals or calls – even from the main target group involving radicalised individuals – but each 'case contact' might only involve one or a few phone conversations, before the case is referred to another organization or they do not contact the programme anymore. Any programme must have detailed and qualitative definitions of when a case is closed by the programme staff, namely whether the individual 'dropped-out' 'finished', or is 'inactive'. In civil society based and passive programmes it is a common phenomenon that cases shift from active to inactive phases with high and low to no activity on the part of the counsellor. Typically, these phases relate to whether or not certain measures have taken effect or need time to be implemented, e.g. finding a new job, finishing vocational training, finishing psychological treatment, or drug rehabilitation. Usually, if the clients in a certain case focus on one specific 'task' set out for them by their counsellors, the communication and practical activity between client and programme staff might revert to a basic level of coordination or mandatory meetings and reports. On the other hand, individual problems during the de-radicalisation or disengagement might result in a very high frequency of communication. Each passive programme therefore needs to include a clear definition of the time frames allocated for each case before being considered 'inactive', and also of how it is classified (e.g. as a 'failure', 'drop-out', etc.).

Problems of Measuring Impact and Potential Solutions.

Nevertheless, public perception of the 'success' or 'failure' of any de-radicalisation programme will continue to be measured mostly against the recidivism rates of their graduates. In addition, these programmes do face a much higher expectation regarding exceptionally low rates of recidivism than those placed on rehabilitation programmes for 'ordinary' offenders. This is because even small numbers of graduates, out of thousands of those who are fully de-radicalised, can inflict potentially devastating damage if they return to terrorism and conduct attacks. In this sense, these high expectations and the risk of quick dismissal of a programme as a failure is a result of the exponentially higher risks and threats associated with the target groups of de-radicalisation programmes. In consequence, some programmes have categorically excluded those persons who have committed 'serious' crimes or murder from participating (e.g. in Saudi Arabia, see El-Said & Barrett, 2012, p. 217). It becomes clear that any programme needs to balance its goal of reaching the target group of highly radicalised and violent extremists against the potential blowback from the population, which might not be willing to take even the smallest risk of recidivism.

In general, every programme should have a clear guideline on its goals, especially regarding the inclusion of ideological reversal or not. As already mentioned in this report, as well as in the standard literature, ideological reversal is exceptionally difficult to measure or prove.

Another set of measurable impacts of programme treatment on the reintegration or rehabilitation of offenders could be taken from DDR research. As suggested by Humphreys and Weinstein (2007, p. 534), the success of DDR programmes for combatants can be measured by four main criteria: (i) the individual degree of economic reintegration, (ii) trust in democratic forms of government, (iii) reconciliation with friends, family and community, as well as (iv) the separation from the former group. In addition, it was suggested that distrust and dissatisfaction were added as spoiling variables (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007, p. 544). The fact that Humphreys and Weinstein did not find a significant statistical relationship between these factors and the participation in DDR programmes does not mean that the goals for individual reintegration are invalid, but merely that the programmes trying to facilitate them are facing much more complex problems and difficulties than anticipated. If additional variables for the support of violence or specific religious or political opinions are added to these four main criteria, it might be possible to measure the individual impact of de-radicalisation programmes quite effectively.

A third example of how positive individual impact of de-radicalisation programmes could be shown was suggested by Alonso & Díaz Bada (2016) and Clubb (2016). These authors studied the involvement of former ETA and IRA combatants in active counter-radicalisation work, based on the premise that successful de-radicalisation would mean (i) an individually disowned past, (ii) rejection of violence (at least in the present and future), as well as (iii) the acknowledgement of the victims' suffering. In consequence, an individual activity to assess these three attitudes would be the level of engagement in preventing others to become radicalised as well.

As a last aspect related to defining and showing impact, the question of monitoring and time frames must be discussed by every programme. Depending on the legal framework and programme type, there might be a very limited time frame for the monitoring of graduates, as well as very limited access to data. While police agencies naturally have more information on when and how a person returns to crime and violence, non-governmental actors – and this is one of the most severe shortcomings – do not possess effective monitoring tools for their graduates. Relying solely on open source intelligence, personal networks, and a general monitoring of the extremist milieu, these non-governmental programmes can only hope somehow to retrieve information when a graduate returns to the former extremist movement, another radical milieu, or ordinary crime. In most cases, however, NGOs lose track quite quickly once the participants have finished the programme. It must therefore be stressed that non-governmental programmes' success claims have to be treated with much more caution and scrutiny than with comparable governmental initiatives.

Formal Evaluations

Although a small number of studies have designed and suggested specific evaluation tools for terrorist rehabilitation programmes, criminology and penology have a much longer track record and – more importantly – extensive empirical validation research about the effectiveness of their evaluation approaches. Hence, it makes sense to discuss them here, before advancing to the field of de-radicalisation. Probably the two most widely used or at least well-known assessment tools for correctional and rehabilitation programmes focusing on 'ordinary' criminals are the 'Correctional Programme Assessment Inventory' (CPAI) 2000, and the 'Correctional Programme Checklist' (CPC). Developed in Canada in the early 1990s, the CPAI has undergone several revisions and is now in its third edition: CPAI-2010 (Gendreau, Andrews, & Theriault, 2010). It is being used in many countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. While the 2000 edition included 131

items (Gendreau, Goggin, & Smith, 2001), the latest version was streamlined to 70 factors in eight different domains: (1) organizational culture; (2) programme implementation; (3) management and staff characteristics; (4) client risk-need practices; (5) programme characteristics; (6) core correctional practices; (7) interagency communication; and (8) evaluation. As was pointed out by Mullins (2010), the CPAI is highly relevant for the assessment of de-radicalisation programmes also, because basically similar quality criteria can be applied, at least for governmental initiatives.

Building on the CPAI, the CPC was designed by the University of Cincinnati and is divided into two basic areas: capacity and content.

> 'The capacity area is designed to measure whether a correctional programme has the capability to deliver evidence-based interventions and services for offenders. There are three domains in the capacity area including: Leadership and Development, Staff, and Quality Assurance. The content area focuses on the substantive domains of Offender Assessment and Treatment, and the extent to which the programme meets the principles of risk, need and responsivity. There are a total of seventy-seven indicators, worth up to 83 total points that are scored during the assessment' (Latessa, 2013, p. 69).

Both CPC and CPAI have been extensively validated empirically and there is a strong proven relationship between high programme integrity, measured through these tools, and low rates of recidivism (e.g., Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Smith, 2006; Smith, Gendreau, & Swartz, 2009). Almost all of the CPC's indicators can be translated to de-radicalisation programmes and even more for those which are prison based, as the theoretical and practical elements employed are virtually identical. For non-prison and civil society based programmes, some of the CPC's indicators do not apply, however the rest remain valid. One very important step forward in the evaluation of de-radicalisation programmes is therefore the statutory assessment of the programme's integrity through an adapted CPC-like checklist to ensure that the programme works with a minimum of organizational capacity and treatment-specific content. So far, the only structural integrity assessment tool for de-radicalisation programmes based on the CPC was suggested by Koehler (2017a). As many programmes have been implemented without coherent planning and design regarding programme integrity, it must be expected that the majority of de-radicalisation programmes score relatively low in these ratings.

In the field of de-radicalisation research, some experts have suggested specific methods and approaches to evaluating these initiatives. One of the first was published by Horgan and

Braddock (2010) and applies the 'Multi Attribute Utility Technology' (MAUT) to the field of terrorism risk reduction programmes. Recognizing formal comparisons and systematic efforts to evaluate, claimed successes despite different cultural and political characteristics, Horgan and Braddock chose MAUT as the most effective tool to facilitate identifying and weighing of the goals and objectives held by the programme's stakeholders, as well as the assessment of how much these goals are being met. One strength of MAUT, which was originally designed by Edwards et al. (1982), is that it actively incorporates multiple constituencies and objectives of any given programme. Thus, MAUT can theoretically be used to fine-tune a programme, compare existing initiatives, and design new programmes. MAUT operates basically by identifying the stakeholders of a de-radicalisation programme and the construction of a 'value tree' after the object and functions of the evaluation have been set. Stakeholders will be included in the grading of the standardized 'value tree', which is a list of those objectives the programme should fulfil for the respective stakeholders, whereby the assessment and grading of the values is conducted relative to the importance assigned (ration weighting: Horgan & Braddock, 2010, pp. 282–284). Based on sources such as interviews, observation, surveys, questionnaires, and document analysis, MAUT also contains elements of process and outcome evaluations, and it becomes theoretically possible to 'draw general conclusions regarding (a) which goals are important, (b) the relative difficulty in achieving certain goals, (c) where efforts should be focused to develop a successful de-radicalisation initiative, and (d) the differences in the priorities of the initiatives we have mentioned here' (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 285).

A second approach was designed by Williams and Kleinman (2013), which focuses on already existing and fully functioning programmes. Pointing out severe problems involved in evaluating de-radicalisation programmes – the potential unwillingness of programme staff and managers to provide data to evaluators and a lack of general 'evaluability' (lack of funding for personnel, time, and participants) – the authors also discussed another complication with the measurement of recidivism as a success factor: '[S]hould success be measured by an absolute value (e.g. ten incidents of post-detainment terrorism engagement per year), the percentage of such engagement for a given year, or change over time (e.g. a 10% reduction of post-detainment terrorism engagement compared to the previous year)' (Williams & Kleinman, 2013, p. 104). In addition, it was correctly stressed that de-radicalisation programmes do not simply work or not, but have different effects for different participants with differing margins for success and failure. Hence, the eligibility criteria are another highly important aspect in the evaluation, as 'there may be a tendency for initiatives to permit only those prospective

participants deemed at relatively low risk of committing post-detainment terrorism to participate. Therefore, a given programme could demonstrate low post-detainment terrorism engagement rates, (perhaps) not because the programme's interventions are especially effective, but that the participants already were at a low risk of reoffending' (Williams & Kleinman, 2013, p. 112). Another question is whether the programme should be assessed by its effects on the whole target group or only the participants. In conclusion, Williams and Kleinman also advocate for the stakeholders' responsibility to decide which measures and characteristics of success are important to them. Hence, identifying and consulting the stakeholders, selection of the evaluation personnel, and defining the problem and evaluation goals are the first steps in their approach. When describing the programme's next step, Williams and Kleinman stress that an important aspect of the programme is that evaluators should speak not only to active staff and 'successful' participants, but also to former employees and 'failed' participants to identify shortcomings and failures. However, this might substantially reduce the motivation of many stakeholders to cooperate in the evaluation – a problem that affects all attempts to assess de-radicalisation programmes. Another point stressed by Williams and Kleinman as being one of the chief pieces of information regarding quality assessment and evaluation, is the risk assessment protocols used by the programme. Unfortunately, the vast majority of de-radicalisation programmes do not employ structured intake and risk assessment protocols so far. Nevertheless, the authors suggest using the ends (outcomes), ways (outputs), and means (input) of the programme in the form of a logic model (Williams & Kleinman, 2013, p. 109). Furthermore, especially relevant for the overall evaluation is the programme's theory of change or, in other words, the theoretical foundations, in order to understand its mechanisms and characteristics. After choosing the appropriate method, the authors suggest using benchmarks, comparison groups, and conduct quasi-experimental designs, such as randomized treatment. It is noteworthy that Williams and Kleinman discuss that a programme's records and archives might not contain sufficient information for the evaluation. Conducting interviews with programme staff and participants might be obscured by overstated successes, due to the awareness of being evaluated (Hawthorne effect). Finally, process evaluation, dissemination, and publicity are deemed essential in their approach.

A third approach was suggested by Romaniuk and Fink (2012) under the umbrella of multi-dimensional, vertical (specifically for de-radicalisation programmes, assessing them from inception to outcome), and horizontal evaluations. They also stress the importance of

stakeholder engagement and collection of baseline data to conduct a before-and-after comparison.

Although these three models represent comparatively detailed and sophisticated approaches to evaluating de-radicalisation programmes, virtually no attempts to implement them in practice have been conducted. As pointed out by Feddes and Gallucci (2015) in their only available meta-analysis, the clear majority of evaluative studies looking at CVE interventions were based on anecdotal evidence (i.e. programme description), without 'explicit reference to theory and no empirical quantitative or qualitative data was reported' (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015, p. 17). Therefore, it seems that either the suggested evaluation methods in the literature have inherent problems in being implemented, or the practice (i.e. the programmes and evaluators) rejects the approaches outlined. Based on the author's own involvement as expert advisor for governments regarding the construction of de-radicalisation programmes, and on numerous interviews with de-radicalisation programme staff and participants, one of the most problematic aspects of evaluation is the involvement of stakeholders. Albeit, as correctly pointed out by the studies discussed above, their inclusion raises the evaluation's credibility and also solves the issue of defining impact – another barrier to effective evaluation. As most, if not all, de-radicalisation programmes are highly political endeavours and a not insignificant competition between civil society based programmes exists, the motivation of some key stakeholders to evaluate effectively – meaning also to show failures and areas for improvement – can be low. Especially if the programme has been running for quite some time without a built-in evaluation mechanism and has been praised as successful, political embarrassment could prevent funders from supporting a full-fledged and independent evaluation. In addition, programme staff have no inherent interest in supporting any evaluation that, as suggested by Williams and Kleinman (2013), includes the perspective of former employees and failed participants. Many policy and 'best practice' 'evaluation' tools currently being discussed are completely based on the programmes' self-accounts and self-assessments, which naturally do not produce many critical evaluations. In the end, not many stakeholders are left who have a genuine interest in effective evaluations, which is why those evaluative studies often amount to not much more than descriptive accounts. Evaluators usually depend on the two least likely stakeholders (programme staff and governments) to support an effective evaluation, regarding the two most significant resources (funding and data access). It is simply because of that reason that most evaluations being done in practice are so limited. Other barriers are issues of privacy and data protection, as well as a widespread lack of even the basic requirements for evaluation, such as effective case documentation, risk

assessment protocols, training manuals, or theories of change. In consequence, evaluators should actively seek out those stakeholders with a greater interest in effective evaluations, such as the communities intending to reintegrate the former terrorists or international organisations.

Other reasons for current evaluations' limitations are that the suggested approaches are too time intensive, abstract, and require too much resources to conduct. Also, it is often argued that the success of de-radicalisation programmes cannot be measured and that programmes are too country- and culture-specific. Regarding the first aspect – the inherent 'inevaluability' of de-radicalisation programmes – the above discussed approaches and research from DDR programmes have correctly stressed that a best approach does exist: randomized intervention treatment as quasi-experimental settings, as well as the identification of programme divisions starting their treatment in chronological order, so as to include them as comparison groups (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélanger, Gunaratna, & Hettiarachchi, 2014; Romaniuk & Fink, 2012; Williams & Kleinman, 2013). Regarding the second aspect – the context specificity of de-radicalisation programmes – even a very superficial comparison of programmes being conducted around the world reveals that they operate with a very high degree of similarity in terms of basic theories, methods, and tools applied, as well as goals (Koehler, 2016). In fact, the typology of programmes introduced above shows that it is possible to group these programmes into clusters according to their ownership, contact approach, and relevance of ideological reversal, which have proven to be much stronger determinants of the programme's character than their country or cultural background.

However, as long as no independent and widely recognized standards and definitions or evaluation expert institutions exist, effective in-depth evaluations of terrorism risk reduction programmes will remain very limited. One way of increasing stakeholders' interest in supporting these evaluations would be to establish a gold standard seal or award for effective de-radicalisation programmes connected to specific benefits, such as free training or additional budget from international donors like the United Nations. Increasing the funding role of international organisations and donors will also automatically reduce the dependency of evaluators on governments and the programmes for financing the assessment. Evaluations should be conducted by experts and institutions independent of the programme or responsible government regarding funding. However, access to data will always have to include some form of consent from the programme managers and responsible governments.

A first step to achieving that gold standard would be to assess the programme integrity through an adapted CPC-like checklist as suggested by Koehler (2017a). Elements such as staff training, leadership, assessment protocols, risk-need-responsivity matching, or the quality of the programme manual are the basic elements on which any de-radicalisation programme should be assessed. If these initiatives do not uphold the fundamental standards of integrity – including transparency – they cannot be expected to be successful, however defined. A second step towards evaluation implementation is to raise awareness that ill-designed, flawed, and non-evaluated de-radicalisation programmes are not only a waste of resources, but, more importantly, a significant security risk for the communities and countries conducting them. Without proper evaluation, the identification of potential backfiring mechanisms might create even more violent radicalisation and harmful terrorists than without the programme. Failed de-radicalisation programmes will, in addition, not only create high security risks, but also damage populations' trust in non-kinetic soft approaches against radicalisation, fuelling a public demand for a return to repression only policies.

While all the evaluation models presented above are possible step-by-step guides, their major problem is the lack of stakeholder interest in effective evaluation. Only after this has been addressed internationally can one advance to the following phases of conducting the assessments to the extent described above. Important factors to be kept in mind are the time (evaluations must be conducted repeatedly over time to measure development), data type (quantitative and qualitative), and evaluators' expertise (strong record or own practical experience in de-radicalisation work).

Organizational Aspects: Structural Integrity as Key Assessment Tool.

As a main alternative to such evaluation approaches focusing on metrics and effect measurement (effect evaluation) and those looking at internal process efficiency (process evaluation), a third evaluation technique might be more helpful in assessing a de-radicalisation programme's 'value': structural integrity evaluation. Based on the premise that direct measurable effects of a de-radicalisation programmes are either: a) difficult to access (data collection problem, lack of control group, ethical issues); b) difficult to causally connect to the programme (causality problem); or c) difficult to interpret (e.g. recidivism without base rates), the best way to assess a de-radicalisation programme's chance of impact might be through evaluating and validating the programme's structural integrity, which includes clearly defined elements that can easily be measured, verified and compared (e.g. level of staff training, programme theory of change, methodological rigour, quality of programme procedures). Looking at certain key variables in this approach – the programme's theory of

change and theoretical basis for methods used – directly stems from theory-driven evaluation (Chen, 1990; Coryn et al., 2011; Donaldson, 2003) because a solid theory of change and efficacy seems to be one of the most important 'success factors' for de-radicalisation programmes in light of the individual nature of violent radicalisation processes. Without a well-grounded theory of change and the application of treatment methods based on solid research from other disciplines, a CVE programme aiming to address individual risk factors of radicalisation, or to identify and exploit defection motivations, seems much less likely to succeed. However, the theoretical basis of a de-radicalisation programme is but one organisational or structural component that can be assessed as part of this approach to evaluation.

Looking at other organizational aspects regarding the effectiveness of DDPs, the most valuable existing insights from related fields come from criminology and penology. Here, an extensive literature, as well as practical experience in evaluating prison rehabilitation and correction programmes for 'ordinary' criminals, exists. Over the last decade, numerous highly structured assessment protocols have been developed and field tested with extensive and comparative studies based on high numbers of subjects. So far, these experiences and models have only marginally been discussed in relation to their application in the field of de-radicalisation (e.g., Irwin, 2015; Mullins, 2010), although the potential seems to be promising, especially since most de-radicalisation programmes in the world are prison-based and have been subjected to widespread criticism based on the lack of structured and informed assessment, as well as structural guidelines. Of course, the main measurement of success for rehabilitation programmes focusing on ordinary criminals is the rate of recidivism and re-arrest, which has been shown to be problematic in the field of de-radicalisation. In consequence, it must be stressed that structural integrity evaluations are based on the premise that a well-designed and well-structured programme (with structural elements proven to have an impact on programme performance) should automatically increase the programme's chance of impact, however defined.

Before scrutinizing criminological evaluation tools and their applicability for de-radicalisation programmes in detail, it needs to be discussed what information existing research and practical experience from the field provide for the structural design of de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes. As mentioned throughout this theoretical framework, one of the most severe shortcomings of nearly all de-radicalisation programmes in the world is the almost complete lack of transparency regarding procedures, quantitative and qualitative content (such as participant numbers and characteristics), as well as methods and theories

behind the programme (Koehler, 2016). In consequence, many experts have focused their critique and recommendations for improvement of de-radicalisation programmes on this issue (e.g., Horgan & Altier, 2012; Marsden, 2016; Rabasa et al., 2010). Resulting in distrust and suspicion on the side of the population as well as the erection of protective borders against evaluation, the lack of transparency is, indeed, one of the first and foremost quality standards to be set and monitored for any de-radicalisation programme that claims to be successful. The first steps in that direction regard the organizational transparency, not including the operational aspects. One example would be the non-governmental organization 'Transparency International' (TI), which has released a ten point criteria list (as part of its initiative 'transparent civil society'), consisting of basic information, such as staffing levels, financial income of the organization, or institutional and financial relationships with other corporations (TI, 2016). Receiving government funding should be connected to some basic organizational requirements, such as those listed by TI. In some countries, quality seals – like, for example, the 'Charity Navigator' in the United States – assess a non-profit's financial and organizational efficiency with a strong focus on project and administration costs, as well as organizational capacities. It is essential to reach commonly accepted quality standards for de-radicalisation programmes, in order to differentiate those with a high degree of institutional integrity from those not fulfilling the basic requirements.

Moving beyond organizational transparency, knowledge about operational procedures and working standards are equally essential when designing a programme with high integrity. As noted by Mullins (2010, p. 180), who draws heavily from criminological research by Cooke and Philip (2001), treatment integrity through solid organization needs to be recognized as the foundation for achieving any impact or success, typically measured through low rates of recidivism. Next to such elements, like adequate funding and observation of internal conflicts, three key factors are cited as essential: (1) the existence of an empirically validated and thorough theoretical framework (including clearly defined target groups, goals, and methods); (2) the availability of a comprehensive programme manual based on extensive research and explaining design, set-up, procedures, and evaluation of the programme (including highly detailed operational aspects, such as number of sessions, case typology, assessment guidelines, means to achieve the defined goals, etc.); and (3) permanent evaluation and monitoring mechanisms built into the organizational design. Monitoring needs to focus on the short-term process, outcome, and cost effectiveness (Mullins, 2010).

These points were partially taken up in 2011 when experts of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the International Centre for Counter-

Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague developed the first, and so far only, international quality framework for prison-based de-radicalisation programmes. The 'Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders' consists of 25 core principles of organizational and political integrity designed to ensure effectiveness, defined as low rates of recidivism (Stone, 2015). Focusing on four core ideas, the Rome Memorandum points out the importance of: (i) clearly defined goals and objectives, (ii) high prison standards regarding treatment, setting, and observation of human rights, as well as the (iii) inclusion of multiple different actors (e.g. experts from different fields, communities, families, law enforcement, civil society, former extremists) and (iv) comprehensive reintegration and after-care components. Although the Rome Memorandum was adopted by all 30 member states of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, these basic standards still mostly exist on paper only.

Several key points of the Rome Memorandum need to be highlighted separately here. First, it is recommended to develop and implement effective intake, assessment, and classification systems, as well as continuous monitoring (Stone, 2015, p. 227). A severe and potentially dangerous lack of these intake and assessment schemes was noted numerous times by experts in that field (e.g. Horgan & Altier, 2012; Mullins, 2010; Williams & Kleinman, 2013; Williams & Lindsey, 2014). Due to the fact that most de-radicalisation programmes do not possess or conduct adequate intake classification and risk assessments, it is difficult later to evaluate the programmes' effectiveness in reaching specific sub-populations, such as highly radicalised extremists. In addition, security-related aspects of de-radicalisation become especially relevant, as many programmes are not able to allocate specific resources or methods to those participants with the highest need and risk of recidivism. Second, the Rome Memorandum recognizes the importance of intelligence for counter-terrorism won through interrogating detainees undergoing rehabilitation. However, the Memorandum stresses the importance of specialized training and caution for law enforcement officers to avoid interfering with the rehabilitation process. Third, the framework places great importance on the inclusion of multiple actors, as well as specific components, such as vocational training, cognitive skills, and protective measures against retaliation of the former group. Based on its content, the Rome Memorandum is a milestone for establishing good practices and a comprehensive code of conduct in the field of prison-based rehabilitation. However, its implementation has not been a high priority for many states.

Furthermore, regarding the operational aspects of an effective de-radicalisation programme, it is again necessary to borrow from criminology, where the so-called Risk-Need-Responsivity

(RNR) model is widely accepted as a core mechanism of organizational integrity (Don A Andrews, Bonta, & Wormith, 2006; Mullins, 2010). This model suggests that curative or rehabilitative organisations and programmes should be able to focus their resources on those participants with the highest risk (Risk), designed to address the individual's motivations for offending or radicalising (Need), and maximize social learning (Responsivity). A long history of penalogical and criminological research has established these three basic organizational mechanisms as highly relevant for ensuring positive outcomes (Dean, 2014). In addition, it was suggested by Mullins (2010, p. 178) that cognitive-behavioural interventions (focus on rewarding appropriate behaviour, behavioural practice and role play, addressing pro-criminal attitudes, enhancing relevant cognitive skills) and interpersonally sensitive approaches would be most likely to have a recidivism reducing effect in de-radicalisation as well.

Staff and Personnel

Another organizational aspect of high relevance pointed out by the Rome Memorandum is the adequate training and specialization of staff, as their roles and requirements are highly different in de-radicalisation programmes than in an ordinary prison environment (Stone, 2015, p. 231). So far, no agreement on the required skills for de-radicalisation professionals exists, and only very few certified or standardized training courses are available to date. Most programmes around the world, however, share a number of professions typically involved in the mentoring work. Next to security officials (police and intelligence officers specialized in counter-terrorism), psychologists are among the most widely used experts in de-radicalisation (al-Hadlaq, 2015; Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; El-Said, 2015; Rabasa et al., 2010; Ramakrishna, 2014; Speckhard, 2010). This is partially because many programmes presume that extremists and terrorists might be suffering from mental health disorders or have experienced severely traumatic events in their past, resulting in violent behaviour. Although this is generally rejected in the majority of studies that pose the possibility of psychological disorders as an explanation for terrorist involvement (e.g. Horgan, 2005; McCauley & Segal, 1987; Silke, 1998; Taylor & Quayle, 1994), some recent publications have nevertheless argued that there might still be a prevalence of some specific disorders. Not discussing this aspect here in-depth (for a critical assessment, see Corner, Gill, & Mason, 2015), it suffices to say that psychological counselling is widely considered a standard component of effective de-radicalisation programmes. Even if the participants' involvement in terrorism cannot be explained through childhood trauma or mental disorders, they still might have been traumatized during their active time in a terrorist group. Massive and widespread exposure to violence and brutality in their own group and from opponents is a common reason for many

defectors distancing themselves from the group (e.g., Alonso, 2011; Barrelle, 2015; Demant, Slootman, Buijs, & Tillie, 2008; Kassimeris, 2011; Reinares, 2011; Rosenau, Espach, Ortiz, & Herrera, 2014; Speckhard & Yayla, 2015). As a consequence, it should be expected by de-radicalisation programmes that their clients will need intensive psychological care. Sometimes the main focus in one programme might be placed on another aspect, such as religious debates, but in these cases it is often advised or even mandatory for these religious scholars to acquire specialized training in psychological counselling work—for example, in the Singaporean Religious Rehabilitation Group (Gunaratna and Bin Mohamed Hassan, 2015, p. 46).

Other widely used professions in de-radicalisation programmes are teachers, social workers, vocational trainers, artists, and, of course, religious authorities, such as Imams or Sheikhs. Following the line of what the programmes assume to be the reasons for radicalism in the first place, and their theories on which elements are most essential for a sustainable disengagement and de-radicalisation, experts in these various fields are included to work with the participants in sometimes extensive and detailed schedules.

The Saudi Arabian rehabilitation scheme, for example, includes, among other elements, a pre-release (sometimes referred to as ‘prevention’) and after-release (‘rehabilitation’) component. Extremist detainees can voluntarily participate in group discussions led by religious scholars, psychologists, and social workers. These group settings mostly focus on religious issues and only those participants who respond well in the ‘prevention’ element are deemed eligible for the ‘rehabilitation’ programme in the halfway house. There, the participants (called ‘beneficiaries’) are subjected to an intense schedule consisting of modules in the religious, social, educational, and psychological areas. The beneficiaries need to complete group classes and discussions and one-on-one sessions (Porges, 2014). Another highly structured rehabilitation programme for extremist offenders can be found in Malaysia. Here, the detention for the participants is separated into three phases: the orientation, personality enhancement, and structured rehabilitation phases. During orientation (three months), the detainees go through security assessment, basic religious classes, hygiene, civil and moral education, as well as the ‘building of discipline’ (Harrigan, 2012, p. 151). In the following personality enhancement phase, participants undergo intense religious counselling with the goal to develop an understanding of moderate Islam. Afterwards, the structured rehabilitation phase includes work assignments, recreation, social and religious or vocational training, special treatments, anger management, and parenting education (Harrigan, 2012). Religious

classes on a daily basis and punishments for failure to comply with the programme make the Malaysian rehabilitation scheme exceptionally restrictive.

However important these professions are for the individual programme, it has so far rarely been discussed in the literature whether specialized training or expertise might be required in addition. It is due to the involvement of the professions named above that no genuine skills and knowledge regarding that activity exist that could be trained or taught. Mostly, 'expert status' in de-radicalisation is typically conferred to either those individuals with a long-term involvement in the field, or to those who have been extremists themselves and are now engaged in de-radicalisation, which is why such a high degree of variety and 'what works' approaches can be found. However, neither automatically provides knowledge in these disciplines and fields that is most relevant for the practical execution of de-radicalisation mentoring. Constructing a basic curriculum for de-radicalisation practitioners not only provides another angle for evaluation (as this training and expertise of programme staff and mentors can easily be assessed), but it also would be a big step towards building common quality standards. Various organisations and networks worldwide have engaged in building international, national or local networks of different stakeholders in the P/CVE field. But only few have developed specialised staff training courses, with some notable examples:

Hedayah[4]

The first international center of excellence for CVE was opened December 2012 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, as an initiative of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Hedayah has developed various CVE training courses and workshops for partners in the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as for national governments and international organisations around the world. As one of the few networks looking into CVE staff training, Hedayah has also designed specific training courses for family counsellors for example.

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)[5]

RAN was founded 2011 by the European Commission as an EU-wide network for connecting first-line practitioners, such as teachers, social workers, community police officers, etc. The RAN Centre of Excellence (CoE) guides and coordinates different working groups organised within RAN and allows exchange of experiences, good practices and knowledge between experts in the wide field of P/CVE. The CoE is also tasked with delivering

[4] http://www.hedayah.ae/
[5] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en

> 'the ambitious objectives of tackling the most pressing challenges such as implementing deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmemes (including in prisons), developing approaches for handling returning foreign terrorist fighters, equipping teachers and youth workers in addressing the root causes of radicalisation and strengthening resilience of in particular young people.'[6]

RAN member states are supported by hand-tailored train-the-trainer courses, specific issue workshops or deployments of RAN advisory teams. Member states can request such assistance with their P/CVE policies, and RAN aims to use its collected expertise across the EU to deliver it.

The United Kingdom's National Prevent Strategy[7]

The Prevent programme is part of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), from 2005, which was created in reaction to the London bombings of July 7 in that year. One part of Prevent is the 'Channel' programme: a multi-agency approach to provide support and protection to individuals, who are at risk of radicalisation or extremism. One aspect of the British system is the 'Prevent Duty', which makes reporting of potentially radicalising individuals mandatory for various statutory service providers, for example in the public health and education sector. This in turn requires training to spot and interpret signs of radicalisation and Prevent aims to address such needs in the form of e-learning or face-to-face training.

START[8]

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is a university-based research and education center and was established in 2005 as a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence. START initiated an online training course for practitioners, law enforcement officers, school officers, and community leaders in March 2017 to foster understanding and preventing radicalisation to violence and violent extremism.

International Centre for Parliamentary Studies (ICPS)[9]

The centre, with its head office in the United Kingdom, is a research institute of the United Nations Public Administration Network (UNPAN). It provides an interactive learning course

[6] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-and-member-states_en (accessed December 3, 2017)
[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance
[8] http://www.start.umd.edu
[9] http://counteringterrorism.parlicentre.org

on understanding key topics in the field of CVE. The participants are taking part in a week-long course and will receive a certificate from the ICPS.

Surveying these existing training courses in the CVE field, it seems that a general consensus exists to teach the history of terrorism and political violence, as well as the different definitions, concepts, ideologies, and types of terrorist groups. In addition, usually exercises analyzing and assessing terrorist propaganda samples and statements of active and former terrorists are included. Aiming to make it possible for counsellors and mentors to develop an understanding and literacy for terrorist narratives and a way to identify core themes, issues, goals, and strategies of these groups; becoming familiar with these narratives and the way they are conveyed will also help the counsellors to spot violent radicalisation processes earlier and – more importantly – develop a working hypothesis of the motivations and interests of the persons consuming and sharing these narratives. Further, most schedules introduce and discuss the basic psychology of violent radicalisation and the role of the family and social networks for radicalisation and de-radicalisation processes, as well as how the counsellor has to work with the affective environment to build the most effective intervention strategy. It is also important to teach different case typologies and ranking mechanisms, in order for the counsellor to employ an effective intake procedure to allocate resources and tools according to the participants' needs, responsivity, and risk. One additional element discussed in-depth during many training courses is different risk assessment protocols used around the world and the practical experiences of the trainer in applying and using these protocols. Legal issues in de-radicalisation need to be addressed too, while the country-specific framework must be included, such as special data protection or privacy regulation. Depending whether this course focuses on jihadist or other extremist groups, it should introduce the basic and most characteristic elements of that ideology or theology. No matter if the mentor works on disengagement- or de-radicalisation-focused programmes after the training, an intimate knowledge of the ideological basics underlying the targeted group is indispensable for evaluating risks, success, radicalisation stages, and, of course, for designing specific intervention tools and approaches. Practically, the course attendees should also be taught the basics of case management procedures, such as case documentation and case conferences, as well as the personal risks involved for counsellors. Furthermore, it must explain what the cooperation with authorities and security agencies looks like in practice, if the attendees come from civil society. In addition, a set of standard methods in de-radicalisation counselling should be introduced and discussed, as well as how one could assess positive or negative

development in cases. Those training courses considered to be especially comprehensive and detailed include dummy case exercises to practice the methods and tools taught.

Based on the practical experience gained from these training courses, the most important and regularly requested modules – which have been used most often in the field by the later counsellors – are risk assessment, psychology of radicalisation, terrorist narrative analysis, case typology, basics of the ideology, and the dummy case exercise. Although it must be stressed that these courses are naturally a coherent and internally balanced curriculum, those elements deemed to be absolutely essential in practice can be identified as intimate knowledge of the targeted extremist ideology, ability to effectively rank and assess the cases in order to match them with the most adequate interventions, and a sense of flexibility or innovation in approaching every case gained through real life case exercises.

Furthermore, the level of staff training can be easily assessed as part of a structural evaluation. Interviews with programme staff or questionnaires asking about certain skills and knowledge (e.g. aspects of Jihadi ideology, right-wing extremist codes and symbols, elements of risk assessment protocols and so on) are an effective way to shed light on the question if case managers possess the minimum technical knowledge necessary to assure a basic efficacy.

Discussion

Summing up the above detailed approaches and factors typically cited in the evaluation literature and those studies focusing on impact assessment for de-radicalisation programmes, it must be concluded that both main types of evaluations, i.e. effect and process evaluation, are not likely to produce valuable and usable results. With the existing scarce level of knowledge regarding the individual psychological process behind de-radicalisation processes, the lack of access to programme data, ethical problems, resource restrictions and multiple methodological concerns, then structural evaluations present a much more efficient and feasible way to assess the organizational quality of de-radicalisation programmes and thereby creating the basis at least for long term in-depth process evaluations. Impact evaluations in the de-radicalisation field will very likely continue to suffer from lack of data access and validity problems in the foreseeable future. Since the recidivism rate has been essentially ruled out as a meaningful indicator, all other impact metrics are subject either to serious doubt about causality, or to limitations through sample size and lack of adequate comparison data. If the base rates for terrorist recidivism are not established, based on a sufficiently large data sample and time frame, this currently most often used quality indicator will remain questionable.

Since it was argued that social programmes very likely will always have 'delayed, diffuse, and subtle effects' (Donaldson, 2003, p. 126) – and de-radicalisation programmes are no exception – evaluation attempts to showcase measurable and meaningful effects and impacts are equally likely to fail and produce confusion regarding the value and quality of certain programmes. Looking at the research done for this theoretical framework, it becomes clear that many de-radicalisation programmes currently lack a fundamental professional basis, i.e. common definitions, practical standards and a commonly shared basic knowledge about methods, processes and theories to be deployed in the field and backed by solid research. Success of the programme might depend on its organizational capability to assess the barriers against leaving the terrorist or violent extremist milieu and design, as well as execute individual and hand-tailored counselling plans based for example on structured risk assessments, adequate accounting of the client's ideological and organizational background and sufficient skills to conduct long-term counselling. Hence, focusing on impact evaluations might be the wrong approach since such impacts could be undetectable even if they exist (through insufficient scale, unknown external variables and difficulty in proving causality). Trying to prove a non-event (i.e. a person not doing something connected to extremism or terrorism as the result of the intervention) is considerably problematic. In addition, individual de-radicalisation and disengagement processes are not only subject to the programme's intervention but also to various other external influences ranging from individual life circumstances to global political changes. Hence, even the best de-radicalisation programme might be deemed 'unsuccessful' based on impact metrics that were influenced by variables out of reach for that programme.

In consequence, focusing on structural and process evaluation seems to be the more adequate way to assess a de-radicalisation programme's quality and chance of impact. Process evaluations showing the operational efficiency of a programme is of course a long-term and very valuable tool, if enough access is granted to evaluators. However, this framework has also demonstrated that before any meaningful process evaluation can take place, de-radicalisation programmes should be assessed regarding their structural integrity. If a programme, for example, does not have any standardized case documentation mechanism or formulated goals and mandate, a process evaluation would be useless. In the same line of argument, the main goals of evaluating de-radicalisation programmes (i.e. how to multiply 'effective' approaches and to identify the quality/impact of a programme) is best served by focusing on structural integrity evaluation.

The following sections of this report present a detailed discussion of the structural requirements for programmes engaged in intervention work against violent extremist radicalisation which can form the basis of subsequent impact and process evaluations. Before the impact of an intervention programme or its internal working processes can ever be evaluated, it is essential first to define the central parameters of the programme's work with reference to quality standards, which should in turn function as minimum benchmarks for this field of work and which themselves should be easy to test. Particular consideration was thereby given to reflecting the diverse landscape of projects and implementers within the European Union and to ensuring that they can continue to develop themselves and maintain their unique identifiers and individual approaches.

Part II

General Remarks on Data Sources and Procedures

The second part of this evaluation toolkit framework will outline in detail the six fields of structural integrity for CVE and de-radicalisation programmes to be covered in an integrity evaluation. Each field (Running and Developing a CVE Programme; Personnel and Organisation; Participant Classification; Care and Advisory Services; Quality Assurance; Transparency) contains a number of key items to be qualitatively assessed and judged by the evaluator based on specially collected data and benchmarks. Hence, the structural evaluation presented here is best understood as structured professional judgement (SPJ) but can be used by various different groups of end users in order to plan, design and start a CVE and de-radicalisation programme, or to improve existing ones, as well as help policy makers to make funding decisions based on comparative and evidence-based quality standards.

As every evaluation relies on primary data, it is necessary to sketch the most important data sources for structural integrity evaluations in the CVE field. It is regularly noted and brought forward (especially by CVE practitioners) that programmes in this realm are highly context specific and therefore hardly comparable. In addition, it is remarked that CVE programmes by their nature have to deal with very sensitive personal or security relevant information and are thereby protected by privacy legislations on the one hand and by safety mechanisms on the other. Taking these legitimate concerns into account, structural integrity evaluations do not primarily rely on reviewing counselling case files or personal information to assess the impact of a certain treatment method as such. Neither does this form of evaluation make any judgement about the actual impacts, effects and successes of the evaluated programme, which is naturally very dependent upon external and contextual circumstances.

First Steps in the Evaluation Process

Conducting a structural integrity evaluation, as with any other high quality structured SPJ, requires careful preparation. The process steps described below aim to give a clear guideline for evaluating an existing CVE or de-radicalisation programme, either as stakeholder, policy maker or practitioner. Nevertheless, the structural integrity checklist presented here can of course also be used to plan and design a new CVE programme step-by-step, by integrating each factor described below into the project outline.

Step 1: To evaluate the structural integrity of an existing CVE or de-radicalisation programme, the evaluator must first collect as much as possible of the open-access information about the programme which is to be assessed. Most notably, this includes:

- press reports about the programme collected through a systematic search in certain press databases (e.g. LexisNexis, Factiva, Google News). It is important to make a list of relevant search indicators first (e.g. name of the programme, key personnel, organisations connected to the programme, funding schemes, government departments) and systematically collect any available press coverage, which must then be assessed regarding content quality (e.g. if based on primary data such as interviews with programme staff or clients or on secondary data, if positive or negative, if describing key events in the history of the programme);
- the programme's own public information (e.g. homepage, social media accounts, books, flyers, information material for public release);
- existing research or other systematic reports about the programme (e.g. evaluation reports, government accountability reports, research articles based on programme information). Again, any sources in this field must be assessed regarding their content quality, especially if the reports disclosed any potential conflict of interest (e.g. authors have been paid be the programme or tasked by a funding stakeholder).

Step 2: Once the publicly available information has been collected by the evaluator, a short outline of the programme's history, concept and structure (as visible through the open access information), including the most relevant stake- and shareholders (all parties who have a positive and negative interest in the programme, most importantly those financing or opposing it), should be compiled to prepare for the interview phase. It is important to compare external portrayals of the programme, with the information provided from within (e.g. interviews with staff). If any stark contrasts arise from that comparison, they should be included in the interview guidelines. At this stage, it is of key importance to take the programme type and character into account. This means to compare the available information about the programme with the CVE programme typology from Part I of this framework (see pages 7 to 16) and to assign the most adequate type class to the programme being evaluated. The key factors determining the programme type are: contact approach (active persuasion to participate in the programme vs. passive, e.g. hotline), actor (governmental, non-governmental, public-private-partnership) and role of ideology (central vs. peripheral). Understanding the programme type and associated main characteristics is essential to provide context to the key structural integrity factors in each assessment field and to correctly interpret the final outcomes at the

end. Within the European Union, the most likely CVE or de-radicalisation programme types [see Figure 1 on page 14] will be A/B (non-governmental passive hotline style programmes with and without ideological change as goal of the programme); E (governmental active programmes without striving for ideological change necessarily, for example in prison); F (governmental hotline style programmes with and without ideological change) and G (public-private-partnerships). Nevertheless, the checklist is applicable to all types of CVE and de-radicalisation programmes.

Step 3: After compiling all (or most of the) publicly available information about the programme, the next step is to familiarize oneself with the structural integrity fields and checklist, in order to adequately plan and conduct interviews with the most relevant stake- and shareholders. These can include programme staff and leadership, governmental personnel in regular contact with the programme or responsible for financing it, community representatives who have, or had, contact with the programme on a case by case basis, other organisations relevant for the programme's operations (e.g. prison or school staff), researchers or journalists who had, or have, contact with the programme or reported about it, former staff or former clients if identifiable and willing to be anonymously interviewed. It is important to note that CVE and de-radicalisation programmes often present successful cases to evaluators as proof of their impact. This pre-selection of case studies should be met with caution of course and noted as a potential source of bias in the evaluation. During the interviews each structural integrity field (detailed below) should be addressed. The interview design should be semi-structured in general but can also include multiple choice or other forms of structured questionnaires, especially to test basic knowledge of programme staff. As mentioned, specific events, potential historic developments, publicly known cases of failure etc. should be included in the interviews to collect different perspectives. Interviews should be conducted to the highest academic ethical standards, including full informed consent of the interviewees, and using fully anonymised content of any case-studies discussed. National privacy and data protection legislation – including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Regulation EU 2016/679) if applicable – must be observed, and the goals as well as scope of the evaluation should be discussed with the stakeholders before the interview phase begins.

Step 4: The third step after open source research and stakeholder interviews is the collection and analysis of internal programme documents, such as emergency protocols, staff handbooks, anonymized case files, training manuals and so on. It must be assured by contractual or otherwise binding forms of agreement between the evaluator and the stakeholders that strict confidentiality and data protection for such documents will be

observed. Such internal documents need to be categorized and coded according to the insights gained from the first two steps, specifically looking for any information relevant to the structural integrity fields and the listed factors.

Step 5: Once the analysis of internal documents is completed, the evaluator can proceed to filling out the structural integrity checklist and grading each factor based on professional and informed judgement. Each factor grading should be based on a short note about why that specific grade was chosen; this also helps to draft a final evaluation report, if necessary.

Specific Recommendations for Different End Users

This structural evaluation toolkit can be used by various different end users for different purposes. First, this toolkit helps policy makers determine the quality of de-radicalisation and CVE project proposals for funding based on their technical sophistication. The structural integrity checklist allows for a much more specific quality evaluation than any potential outcome, or effect promises, based on unclear and unverifiable metrics, or on 'soft' criteria (such as for example number of years of practical experience) alone. Governmental bodies are therefore equipped with an easy, cost-effective and evidence-based tool to screen proposals using a comparable and standardized approach. Once proposals have been accepted and programmes or projects are funded, this toolkit allows monitoring of the technical quality without pressuring the grantee to deliver partially meaningless impacts in a short time. In addition, policy makers have a means to demonstrate that they observed the highest quality standard in their project and programme selection and funding decisions, in case the desired impacts are not reached. Policy makers should involve external (e.g. academic) institutions to conduct the evaluation in order to observe neutrality of the process. At a minimum, a double blind peer review of the theoretical aspects of the proposal should be conducted with external subject matter experts. Other governmental bodies could be used for fact checking or subject expertise, such as for example experts on jihadist ideology within the intelligence services or criminal police.

Secondly, practitioners may use this toolkit to check the structural integrity of their own existing programme or project, in order to identify strengths and weaknesses as well as potential fields for development and improvement. During the project design phase, structural integrity provides a step-by-step guide on how to craft a technically sound CVE or de-radicalisation programme by filling each field and factor with specific content adapted to the goals and context. Essentially, this allows even inexperienced practitioners from other fields to design high quality programmes. External monitoring of the adherence to the structural

quality standards must nevertheless be organised in order to maintain integrity. Naturally, self-application by practitioners can only yield high quality results if used seriously and honestly, as this use of the toolkit does not include a neutral evaluator.

Thirdly, researchers tasked with assessing a CVE or de-radicalisation programme, or who are conducting field work related to this area, can use the toolkit to identify quickly key aspects and characteristics of such a programme. Furthermore, it helps to understand the dynamics and mechanisms involved in CVE and de-radicalisation, and allows practitioners or researchers to compare and translate lessons learned between different contexts.

Structural Field I: Running and Developing a CVE Programme

Senior management and team leaders are of central importance to programmes dealing with counter-extremism and interventions. The quality of the structured interventions on offer, depends to a large extent on the senior staff (from managers to team and project leaders). The relevant qualifications and practical experience of senior personnel must therefore be duly considered when deciding on an intervention programme and evaluating its structural integrity, not least because the managers and project leaders usually form the public 'face' of the programme and are hence crucial for gaining the trust of the target group. The findings of research in the fields of criminology and terrorism (de-radicalisation) indicate that the following questions should be answered in the affirmative:

- Are the management and project leaders sufficiently qualified in the subject to fulfil the requirements of the project? For example, can they demonstrate knowledge of jihadism, extremism, de-radicalisation, risk analysis etc. in line with the latest research?
- Do the management and project leaders have adequate practical experience, and is it also appropriate for the requirements of the intervention programme?
- Are the management and project leaders involved in recruiting and training staff?
- Are managers in a position to supervise staff sufficiently and to engage in quality assurance?
- Do the management and project leaders have practical experience of the activities expected of their staff?
- Is the risk of management overload (manifested e.g. by unreachability, failure to keep important appointments, lack of availability for stakeholders) largely mitigated?

One further aspect of great importance is the programme development process. Counter-extremism interventions must be placed on a robust theoretical foundation, in order to apply a heuristic method to the programme approach and the central impact mechanisms. In a high-quality intervention programme, contexts, impacts, methods and problem outlines cannot be identified without providing underlying evidence or referencing the latest research. The programme development phase should therefore entail a thorough consultation of academic literature in the relevant disciplines to ensure that the fundamental approach of the project is in line with the latest research. As is common in academia – although hitherto rarely the case in the field of counter-extremism – external academic experts with a proven track record, and experienced practitioners should review the theoretical basis of a project. A mutually confidential process (in which the external reviewers and project implementers are not known to each other) is advisable, and in the context of project evaluation the question of the academic quality and practical relevance of the project strategy is crucial.

Concrete issues to verify are whether:

- The theoretical basis of the project strategy is in line with the latest international academic research;
- Academic literature was sufficiently consulted during the programme development phase and the material reflected the latest findings on the relevant theories and models applied in the project;
- Pilots were conducted and adequately assessed and evaluated.

Moreover, when conducting a structural integrity evaluation, a high degree of acceptance and standing within the counter-extremism landscape as well as stable funding over a period of at least two years, at a level commensurate with the aims of the project, are further relevant indicators with regard to intervention projects which have been in operation for a long period of time.

Regardless of the specific nature of the funding schemes and competition among different project implementers, it is nevertheless sensible to consult relevant external experts routinely and anonymously about issues such as the acceptance of a particular project among peers. This is because the confidence of multipliers and academic experts or practitioners in an implementer's ability and the quality of their project can be central to success or failure in establishing the project. Stable funding is important insofar as intervention programmes which attract media attention by complaining of their impending financial collapse, or which otherwise gain a reputation for instability, may struggle to win the trust of the target group

(families and participants) to engage in long-term and lasting treatment. With regard to interventions in the field of counter-extremism it must be borne in mind that years of activity do not automatically equate to a high degree of competence or quality. As discussed above, the vast majority of programmes in this field are yet to be comprehensively evaluated. In such cases competence and success are not derived from programme evaluation, but from the long duration of the activity. Years of experience may indeed engender expertise, but this is not automatically the case.

Indicators Summary:

- Programme leadership is qualified (i.e. senior management and project leaders sufficiently trained)
- Programme leadership is experienced in services (i.e. senior management and project leaders have practical experience in the services offered by the programme)
- Programme leadership selects staff (i.e. involvement in staff selection)
- Programme leadership involved in staff training
- Programme leadership supervises staff
- Programme is structured on the basis of solid theory
- Thorough consultation of academic literature in the development phase (i.e. literature review was conducted)
- Project in line with the current state of research
- Pilot interventions were conducted
- Approach evaluated by external experts
- Programme and approach valued by CVE community
- Programme and approach valued by at-large stakeholder community
- Funding situation adequate (in regard to the programme's aims)
- Funding stable over the past two years

Structural Field II: Personnel and Organization

The structural integrity of an intervention programme depends not only on senior management but also on further criteria relating to the organization of the programme. The concrete aims of the programme must be clearly defined. The absence of a formulated aim is a major problem when categorizing the programme as a particular type of preventative measure or intervention, which in turn is connected to the respective criteria for success and failure as well as expectations and claims. Both the target group and the financial backers – but not least also the staff themselves – must be as clear as possible about the actual aims of the programme. Evaluation is only possible when formulated aims can be measured against ultimate outcomes.

A central structural component of high-quality intervention programmes is the availability and operation of an effective case management registration, reception and categorization system. As emphasized in the 'Rome Memorandum' (Stone, 2015), the assistance requests and cases reaching an intervention programme do not all belong to the same risk and radicalisation type. As a result, the cases coming in, need to be captured in a uniform and effective reception process and categorized so as to enable the designation of individual caseworkers and a specific treatment methodology. Furthermore, as a matter of principle, effective interventions need to be designed in accordance with individual needs, which in turn requires a structured reception process which incorporates a biographical history (or something similar) as part of the treatment. This is the only way to ensure that the necessary information and categorization at the case reception phase are aligned with the methodology of the ensuing treatment, and thus to perform a targeted intervention or preventative measure. Programmes which log and consider all requests (including e.g. those merely enquiring about further information) as treatment cases, irrespective of relevance or degree of radicalisation, fail to distribute their time, material and personnel resources according to risk category, a point which criminology researchers have identified as a central problem in such programmes (Mullins, 2010). This has the effect of reducing the efficiency of intervention programmes and de-radicalisation work in general. It may safely be assumed that highly radicalised individuals and persons of interest to the security authorities require more effort and intensity of treatment than early-prevention cases. Caseworkers therefore need to be able to vary the duration of their advisory sessions by case type, and prioritize by urgency.

There are a number of further reasons why having an internal categorization system for different case types is an indispensable feature of an effective intervention programme. For instance, it is crucial that the programme and staff are capable of distinguishing between different work processes for different case types, which in turn also enables the various processes to be examined. If cases demonstrating no indication of current radicalisation are treated in the same way as cases of interest to the security authorities, instead of being delegated to partner organisations, this not only distorts the value of using the simple case numbers as a possible criterion of success, it also amounts to a use of programme resources which is at odds with the formulated aims and tasks. It is here that the interaction of the structural quality indicators is best illustrated. If an intervention programme does not have clearly defined aims and tasks, it becomes very difficult to establish a uniform reception process to allocate and prioritize resources. Consequently, inefficiency in intervention work can stem both from having consciously broad and undefined tasks, and also from not having

case typologies, reception procedures and registration criteria in place. In such circumstances it is also far less likely that a programme will concentrate on its originally defined target group and reject irrelevant cases, and the value of other forms of assessment (impact and process evaluation) becomes diminished. Ultimately, internal quality assurance is only possible to a limited degree without clear aims, tasks and registration of incoming cases. If the same amount of effort is always expended and the same substantive processes automatically applied, regardless of case type, then the crucial factors of success for individually tailored and needs- and risk-based treatment are not in place.

The threshold for initial contact or arranging a first approach should be as low as possible to ensure that individuals, particularly those in a situation of personal crisis or great uncertainty, have the opportunity to take up the offer of help and also want to do so. Individuals in search of advice should be confronted with as few hurdles as possible. As is common in other crisis treatments, it is essential to provide a direct contact person for the initial conversation in order to commence the case and, if necessary, to take immediate emergency steps. As a matter of routine, the initial conversation should include information about the CVE programme, the services it offers, and its approach in cases of interest to the security authorities. Such transparency with regard both to the work which may be expected from the programme, as well as the possible involvement of the security authorities, must be in place from the outset and the situation explained unequivocally to the individual. Whilst it will be very rare to secure written consent for the transmission of personal data, this can at least be obtained orally during the initial conversation. Such a step not only helps build trust between the individual and the programme provider, it also provides legal cover for both sides. It should be clear to individuals approaching the CVE programme which personal data may have to be transmitted to which bodies – for instance employers, schools or psychologists – as part of the consultation.

Further structural quality criteria which have become established in international good practice include having an interdisciplinary case management team and psychological expertise on hand. Since counter-extremism efforts and disengagement from radical milieu processes are highly complex affairs, it is essential that the advisory team can draw on various areas of academic and practical knowledge (e.g. Islamic studies, political science, law, psychology, sociology, theology, as well as practical experience in security, social work, family support and trauma therapy). Among those programmes around the world deemed to be effective, the overwhelming majority consider it essential that the necessary psychological expertise is available which goes beyond a mere basic knowledge of psychology for case

management purposes. Since both the contact with, and membership of, extremist groups can be linked to psychological traumas, many programmes offer the possibility of intensive trauma therapy in addition to their standard ideological or pragmatic disengagement and counter-extremism intervention. One example of the necessity for such therapy is the high risk of post-traumatic stress disorder among individuals returning from Syria or Iraq, which can also extend to relatives of the returnees and thus should also feature as part of family support.

A particular structural feature of counter-extremism and de-radicalisation work is the widespread international practice of using former extremists and terrorists as case workers. In line with this approach, the bulk of the real de-radicalisation work is done by former extremists, as for example in Indonesia (Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015) or Sweden (Christensen, 2015). In principle the involvement of reformed extremists in an intervention programme is to be welcomed, provided it takes place on the basis of clear quality standards and guidelines for their work, as they were for example formulated by the EU's Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2017 (RAN, 2017). The mere experience of having been a far-right extremist or a jihadist does not automatically mean suitability as an intervention caseworker. As a consequence, the expectations with regard to training, supervision and working standards for former extremists working on counter-extremism must significantly exceed the minimum standards. It must be checked: whether someone has the necessary expertise to do casework; that regular and intensive supervision and training are guaranteed; that the person has the mental stability (to avert the risk of re-traumatization through confrontation with one's own ideological past); as well as whether their activity conforms to the actual aims of the de-radicalisation project. A critical point is the observation that the status of 'professional ex-extremist' can at most be an interim stage in the disengagement process, since the aim of successful de-radicalisation is not to create a new dependency on the very same extremist milieu one has sought to quit. Programmes which former extremists exploit as a source of funding must be viewed as highly unprofessional. Ideally former extremists are therefore:

A) integrated in mixed teams (together with people without an extremist background);
B) involved in the intervention within the framework of clear and particular quality standards (including intensive training and supervision);
C) only involved for a pre-defined, limited time, in order to secure the transition to a lifestyle entirely free of extremism.

A further structural integrity standard for interventions concerns confronting disengaging extremists with the experiences of the victims of extremist violence or examining the victims' perspective. The risk to be averted here is an excessive focus on the former perpetrators which neglects the interests of the victims. Disengagement interventions for the perpetrators must be methodologically distinct from victim interventions, since an intersection of the two approaches would cause considerable structural and ethical problems. Researchers have repeatedly emphasized the positive impact of the victims' perspective (Barrett & Bokhari, 2008; Bazemore, 1998; Hettiarchchi, 2015; Mullins, 2015), particularly as an educational measure intended to raise awareness of the responsibility for one's own past and earlier violent crimes, as well as developing empathy for the victims and generating a reflection of the effects of violence on the basis of relationship work and critical examination in the context of 'forgiveness of guilt' and 'atonement'. Inclusion of the victims' perspective should be grounded in a sound methodological concept, in order to avoid reinforcing the conflicts between perpetrators and victims, or re-radicalisation due to a sense of perceived condemnation, shame, guilt, etc.

When designing an intervention project, it is always important to consider the perspective of the towns, cities and districts into which the former extremists will ultimately be reintegrated. Ideally, local authorities and towns will have either been directly involved in developing the programme, or their particular needs and expectations of the project will have been ascertained in advance. Since successful counter-extremism and intervention work is fundamentally dependent on support on the ground, both from the state administration structures (e.g. schools, council offices) and civil society (e.g. social partners and service providers, employers), practical necessities should be clarified in advance and a corresponding communication and education strategy for the local community network activities presented and implemented.

Within the organizational aspects of structural integrity evaluation, the CVE programme staff assume a central role. All over the world, the quality and effectiveness of counter-extremism and interventions (from family support to disengagement) depend chiefly and crucially on the caseworkers, who need to meet a broad range of requirements to fulfil these highly complex tasks. The importance of caseworker training should therefore not be underestimated. In the international context two distinct models for further training and specialization have established themselves in this area, whereby both assume greatly differing levels of prior knowledge (e.g. a degree in Islamic studies, political sciences, psychology or law, or prior practical experience as a police officer, journalist etc.). On the one hand is a special training

course developed specifically with the programme in mind and lasting for several weeks which commences and concludes a few months before the actual casework begins. The other approach often entails undergoing further training in parallel with ongoing casework. The latter model automatically requires a greater level of practical experience and subject-related expertise from caseworkers, who merely receive additional on-the-job training. In this context it should be borne in mind that highly complex cases, including those of interest to the security authorities, can come up at a relatively early stage, which in turn requires effective case management processes. Only by immediately categorizing new cases is it possible to designate them to appropriately qualified personnel or other organizational units (e.g. within senior management, among team leaders or training teams) or to supervise staff accordingly (e.g. when the caseworkers have not yet been fully inducted or trained). Furthermore, in the second model it is imperative for the trainers to ensure intensive and close support and supervision for the newly recruited caseworkers, as well as short and effective channels of communication between these caseworkers, senior management and the trainers themselves. For both models the following rules apply:

A) The curriculum for the caseworkers training units must be scientifically sound and in line with the latest research;

B) The specialization must be comprehensive and based on subject expertise (i.e. conceived, conducted and continuously updated by recognised and experienced experts);

C) Particularly relevant practical aspects (such as case studies, verification of the latest standard of knowledge and applicability of the learning material, risk analysis, recognition and interpretation of extremist ideology) must feature in the curriculum.

The materials used to implement the training strategy must be made available for the evaluation. By the same token, this strategy forms an integral part of the overall project, and hence it must be aligned in substantive and educational terms with its focus and aims (e.g. family support requires special modules on this topic, and work in prisons needs legal units on the relevant context). The broader the aims and tasks of an intervention project, the broader and substantively more complex the staff training must be. Here one must refer again to the aforementioned importance of drawing clear limits on the aims of an intervention project. In the course of staff training and specialization, consideration should also be given to including ethical guidelines for caseworkers as well as ensuring the possibility for staff to provide feedback on the course content. This should ensure that caseworkers know, share and support

the aims and tasks of the project. Ongoing further training is also a central component of quality assurance.

Caseworker recruitment should be undertaken according to relevant experience and subject expertise as well as verified competences and ethical values, which should be clearly defined for the project. Often it is the case that apolitical Salafists or others who, whilst not espousing violence, do hold deeply conservative or even radical opinions, consider engaging in counter-extremism casework. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the project as a whole and its implementer stand on a firm foundation of values and that this is also reflected in personnel recruited.

Regular team meetings and discussion of cases are just as essential for the caseworkers as an assessment of staff according to the quality of their work. A further central aspect of quality is effective caseworker supervision and the possibility for caseworkers to enlist psychological support themselves if needed. Counter-extremism casework is unavoidably associated with an intensive and challenging confrontation with a wide range of content and events which is sometimes traumatic (e.g. analyzing Daesh propaganda, informing families about the death of relatives in Syria or Iraq). The high number of cases and the stress and the pressure they entail (e.g. through the high hopes of family members that their son or daughter can be brought home from Syria alive) mean the risk of burnout or other stress-related effects are particularly high in this field of work. Just as with other jobs where wrong decisions or an unsuccessful intervention can have dire consequences (e.g., in an extreme situation, the death of the individual being treated), in the field of counter-extremism work, adequate staff support must be ensured.

With regard to effective intervention work, frequent mention has been made of the particular aspect of risk analysis or the assessment of the security relevance of a case. The identification of those cases that are of particular interest to the security authorities or that carry a high risk of violence for travel to Iraq, Syria or other regions of conflict, is central in determining the preventative impact of the project and the casework strategy pursued (including the possibility of referring a case to the security authorities). It is therefore fundamentally important for the entire spectrum of counter-extremism and intervention work to have recourse to a methodologically sound and comprehensively developed mechanism for risk analysis and assessment of a case's security relevance. This mechanism should also be made available to caseworkers through guidelines, analysis tools and handbooks. In addition, risk analysis must also be a fundamental component of staff training and be subject to broad examination. This

remains valid even though research has found the evidence base for existing risk assessment tools inadequate, both regarding the validation of factors included and the actual predictive value (Sarma, 2017). Nevertheless, risk assessment in terrorism related cases within the judiciary or police and intelligence services, as well as academia, has received substantially increased attention (e.g. Gudjonsson, West, & McKee, 2015; Hart, Cook, Pressman, Strang, & Lim, 2017; Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Monahan, 2015; Rousseau, Ellis, & Lantos, 2017; Schuurman & Eijkman, 2015; Shepherd & Sullivan, 2016). Caseworkers who are unable to recognize the potential security relevance of a case, and perhaps are even unclear about which bodies should be contacted when and how, pose a high risk themselves as well as representing a clear sign of unprofessional casework. In conjunction with this aspect, clear guidelines on cooperating with the security authorities should be available and known to all staff, and the application of these guidelines should be checked regularly. Generally speaking, there ought to be a distinct approach to high-risk cases, which should be familiar to all caseworkers. In the international context a series of approaches have become established in a number of countries and come to be seen as the basic standard, such as the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA) Protocol (Pressman & Flockton, 2014), which has undergone several revisions and now exists as a revised second version (VERA-2) and in short form (VERA-SV), as well as the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG 22+) (Dean, 2014; Silke, 2014). Further approaches are currently being tested for example in the United States, the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany (the latter is the 'risk-based analysis of potentially harmful perpetrators to assess acute risk – Islamist terrorism', or 'RADAR iTE'). All of these risk analysis methods require special training for staff, conducted by a qualified trainer and entailing corresponding practical exercises.

The question of incentives for participation in a CVE programme is the subject of controversy in international debate. Depending on the type of programme, possible incentives for participants who confront their own ideology, distance themselves from their extremist world views and actively participate in the corresponding groups commonly include the prospect of reduced custodial sentences, access to free education, removal of tattoos, drug therapy, psychotherapy, help finding a job, etc. With regard to the structural integrity of a counter-extremism and intervention programme, it is important to ensure that the incentives on offer clearly relate to the fundamental values and aims of the programme and the programme type. It is quite common for state programmes, and those which actively seek to engage participants, to offer a wide range of state-funded benefits including cash payments (e.g. for new clothes or to pay off debts), something which is rarely possible for those civil-society

implementers following a passive approach. Since in the latter case individuals in search of support usually contact the programme on their own volition, the need to 'tempt' them into participating would seem to be less. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that such incentives do not distort the motivation to participate in a programme and thus do not undermine its basic values and aims. Conversely, any effective counter-extremism programme ought to have the option of resorting to sufficient punitive mechanisms in the event of participants actively disregarding the intervention plan, refusing to cooperate with the necessary measures or showing no readiness to distance themselves from the extremist milieu and/or ideology. Such sanctions can range from a restriction on the abovementioned incentives, to the termination of the intervention by the programme implementer. At any rate these punitive mechanisms should form part of the clear procedures and mechanisms which are familiar to all parties in the programme.

In conclusion it may be said with regard to the structural integrity of an intervention project that, both in the programme's design and in the training of its staff as well as in all functional aspects, the central counter-extremism impact platform must be safeguarded:

1. Identification, documentation and clarification of the presumed reasons and motives for an individual's radicalisation, as well as the motives for leaving and potential barriers against that.
2. Development of an individually tailored treatment on the basis of this analysis, entailing:
   A) A selection of methods which are linked to the radicalising factors by a concrete impact theory.
   B) Effective internal verification of the impact of the selected treatment methods on the identified radicalising factors, and adjustment where necessary.
   C) Attainment of an objective identified at the outset, and a clearly defined end to the treatment.

Indicators Summary:

- Goals of the programme are clearly defined
- Programme contains and effective intake and classification system
- Lowest possible threshold for initial contact with clients is in place
- Personal point of contact for the initial contact
- Cross disciplinary staff
- Psychological expertise available
- Former extremists are available as advisers
- Quality criteria for former extremists as staff is included in the programme and followed

- Community perspective included in programme design
- Staff specially trained in intervention methods used by the programme
- Staff has relevant experience
- Staff selected for skills and values
- Regular staff meetings are held
- Staff assessed on service delivery
- External supervision for staff available
- Staff trained in risk assessment
- Guidelines for cooperation with external partners are included in the programme design
- Guidelines are followed
- Special procedure for high risk cases is available
- On-going training for staff is conducted
- Staff input for programme is possible
- Staff support counselling goals
- Ethical guidelines for staff are available
- Staff training includes counter-radicalisation techniques (identification of radicalising factors, corresponding selection of methods, impact assessment and documentation or recalibration)

Structural Field III: Participant Classification

Alongside the relevant aspects of programme management and development and the organization of the interventions or counter-extremism programme, the third area which plays a large role in structural integrity is the handling and categorization of programme participants, recipients of advisory services and 'clients' in a disengagement session.

As well as the programme aims, the target group for the intervention must be clearly defined and appropriate to the programme design. Different types of intervention programmes are suited to different kinds of target groups, and so the social and political context of the programme must be given serious thought at the programme development stage. Without precise knowledge of the given local extremist structures, their socio-biographical make-up and recruitment or radicalisation processes, any programme can only be developed in line with a general logic rather than adapting to circumstances on the ground. The defined target group with its specific characteristics (regarding language, family status, level of education etc.) has a direct influence on the core offers and services of the programme. These factors also determine the skills staff must possess (e.g. language ability). At any rate the quality of a programme's design can be assessed by whether field work or analysis of relevant sources of information has produced an accurate picture of the situation on the ground and whether the

programme has been adjusted accordingly. It would be lamentable for a programme to do the opposite, namely to simply assume a 'generally known' situation without gathering evidence, and to transfer an approach from one context to another without verifying possible differences.

Of comparable importance to the definition of the target group is the definition of clear exclusion criteria and their application in everyday casework. As a matter of principle, any counter-extremism programme or intervention should expect to be approached by some people seeking assistance who are in fact not at risk of radicalisation. In such circumstances caseworkers need clearly defined and easily understandable guidelines on when a case should be accepted or passed on to another organization. Here again, the undifferentiated classification of all requests as new cases must be seen as a major quality deficit, since such an approach undermines the genuine central counter-extremism aim by transitioning it into one of general preventative action. Without a clear definition of the target group, effectiveness is neither possible in theory nor in practice. Furthermore, exclusion criteria also serve to protect the ability of staff to work, since they ought to stipulate when a case must be stopped without bringing it to a successful conclusion or when it must be passed on to other organisations (such as the security authorities). Such exclusion criteria may be set out in security guidelines, for instance, which should also define risk factors (behaviours and biographical factors believed to present a potential risk of criminal activity). Carrying out structured risk analysis on the basis of these factors is an integral part of counter-extremism and interventions, and without them no programme should be funded or implemented – especially with regard to security-relevant cases. To ensure effective risk assessment in casework, the corresponding risk levels must also be defined and linked to certain procedures with which programme staff should be entirely familiar.

As is the case for rehabilitation programmes concerning other forms of criminality, the well-established RNR[10] principle (Donald A Andrews, Bonta, & Wormith, 2011; Mullins, 2010; Smith et al., 2009) should also apply to programmes in the field of counter-extremism and interventions. This principle, which numerous studies have strongly linked to low recidivism rates, programme effectiveness and long-term impact, states the following:

A) Individuals in the highest risk category must have the most programme resources devoted to them (risk);

[10] Risk, Need, Responsivity.

B) The treatment methods must be guided by the particular needs and motives for participation of the individuals in question (need);

C) Methods aimed at social learning must be prioritised (responsivity).

As a result, the casework with programme participants should have recourse to a mechanism and process for determining entry or radicalisation factors. These need to be anchored in staff training, and their implementation regularly checked. The selected methods of treatment must be aligned to these factors and be based on the notion of social learning.

Finally, the course of the intervention and the impact of the selected treatment methods on the risk factors must be recorded and documented in a standardized fashion. The case documentation system must facilitate both internal and external statistical programme evaluation as well as the effective handover of a case to other staff members.

Indicators Summary:

- Target group clearly defined and appropriate to the programme aims
- Definition and consistent application of exclusion criteria
- Performance of risk analysis
- Defined risk levels using in-house procedures
- Assured staff application of risk analysis
- Mechanism for identifying radicalising factors anchored in staff training
- Treatment methods adjusted to individual radicalising factors
- Adequate case documentation system capturing relevant case evolution
- Case documentation system enables internal and external evaluation

Structural Field IV: Care and Advisory Services

The nature of the specific mentoring or counselling services provided to individuals seeking assistance or desiring to disengage as part of a counter-extremism or intervention project is a further crucial aspect determining the success and lasting impact of such work. Furthermore, the quality of the advisory services and the methodological basis for the care must constitute part of the quality standards in all forms of evaluation.

As has been frequently noted, the basis of professional counter-extremism and intervention work is the capacity of the treatment to target, in combination, individual criminogenic factors *and* those factors (assumed to be) driving the ideological radicalisation. In the field of criminology, a series of criminogenic factors (the so-called ‘Central Eight’) have assumed a particular relevance with regard to managing extremist and terrorist criminals, and assessing the risk they pose. These factors consist of: (i) having experience of violence and committing

violent crimes in the past; (ii) anti-social personality disorders; (iii) drug abuse; (iv) views legitimizing criminality (including rationalizing crime); (v) social support for crime; (vi) family influence; (vii) influence of school and friend circles; and (viii) relevant problematic leisure activities (Donald A Andrews et al., 2011). Since the driving factors of extremist radicalisation are not identical to the criminogenic factors for apolitical criminal conduct, it is once again important to emphasize for the purposes of case management that uniform mechanisms identifying the grounds of radicalisation must be in place and be applied from the moment of taking-on and assessing a case, and the selection of advisory methods should be both conscious and strategic.

Comparative research about established CVE and de-radicalisation programmes around the world has shown, that five methodological fields are widely used to address individual needs of clients with specific counselling or mentoring: (i) theological/ideological; (ii) psychological; (iii) social; (iv) educational; and (v) creative arts/sports (Koehler, 2016). A key factor for structural integrity is whether there is a distinct role for coordinating these fields according to the individual client's needs and profile or whether the counselling and mentoring forms are rather dictated by the programme's organizational setup and culture.

Both the field of international research and everyday de-radicalisation practice have developed a standard for methods to strengthen the cognitive abilities of programme participants. The intention is thus, in combination with elements of general and vocational education, to expand their world view and open their cognitive capacity to a self-critical reflection of their own actions and the ideological attractiveness of the extremist milieu.

Of particular importance for the effective handling of individuals seeking assistance is the inclusion of their place of residency and an examination of whether the potential threat posed by the respective extremist milieu renders a move to another location necessary. The ability of a counter-extremism or intervention programme to arrange or secure individual protective measures also constitutes a quality standard in this area. As research has shown (Bates, 2010; Koehler, 2015c), in some cases extremist groups and radical milieus possess considerable capacity to sanction individuals and numerous reasons and mechanisms to punish those who leave the group or question its central ideological positions. Therefore, the aspect of planning and implementing protective measures (e.g. a move to a safe place of residency, personal protection to avert threats, removal of relevant online profiles, imposition of reporting requirements and curfews) must be integrated within the project or as part of the agreed procedures for high-risk cases as well as in caseworker training modules. The intensity of the

treatment (e.g. time length, density of sessions, measures) must increase in line with the risk level. This relationship between use of programme resources and respective risk level should be internally identifiable and comprehensible.

To abide by quality standards for participant care in counter-extremism and intervention projects it is also necessary for caseworkers to have recourse to a comprehensive handbook which is updated in line with the latest research and the programme's casework practice. Furthermore, caseworker training and application of the handbook's contents ought to be regularly assessed.

As is well known from the practice of counter-extremism and intervention casework, that the relationship between the caseworker and the participant can be of vital importance and the question of personal chemistry can certainly be a factor. It should therefore be possible within the treatment process to switch caseworkers or hand over cases or, alternatively, to incorporate a mechanism when commencing a new case to ensure the best possible compatibility of caseworkers and participants. Of similar importance is the compatibility of caseworkers and the programme, which should be reviewed regularly.

As part of the structural quality assurance it is essential – as far as possible – to gather feedback from participants about the programme offer. Whilst this is not feasible in all cases and circumstances, one option is to give participants the opportunity to provide anonymized feedback on a voluntary basis on conclusion of the treatment. This offer to participants provides a key resource for both internal and external impact and process evaluation. As mentioned earlier, in interviews the majority of relatives of radicalised individuals are overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the services offered in the programmes they have used. Some such programmes fall at the first hurdle by simply not being available or failing to provide information. Since the relatives interviewed generally had no opportunity to offer formal feedback which might have helped to improve the service provided, and since conducting questionnaires with participants is categorically refused on a multitude of grounds, it is rarely possible to evaluate the basic quality of the advisory services or their relevance to actual needs from a recipient's perspective.

As part of the internal impact assessment of the methods applied, all project caseworkers must be able to identify and document negative effects of their own advisory work. As described, one of the central mechanisms in counter-extremism and intervention work is linking a working hypothesis on the radicalising factors to a selection of programme elements and methods associated with these factors. If, for instance, it is suspected that racism and bullying

at school are contributing to the radicalisation of an individual, then one of the aspects of the treatment should comprise e.g. tailored information about legal options, psychological examination of possible traumas, victim support, measures to help boost self-confidence and targeted efforts to contact and link up with school staff members. The central impact level of such an intervention is achieved by finding a possible explanation for the respective grounds for radicalisation using the identified factors and the resultant connection to individually selected and composed advisory services. In such cases a positive effect may well not ensue, or indeed there may be a negative impact, if:

A) The radicalisation factors were wrong or imprecisely defined;
B) The treatment and applied methods were not aligned to the individual situation.

In a highly complex intervention situation, neither A) nor B) can be fundamentally or entirely excluded, and so the course a case takes needs to be continually monitored with regard to the methods being applied, in order to improve the impact of the intervention. As a first step, as part of their case documentation, caseworkers need to be able to confirm or adjust their working hypothesis by referring to the radicalisation motives and factors and to verify the positive or negative impact of the methods chosen. For this to happen, as a rule the *status quo* needs to be documented at the outset of the treatment, setting out the problematic behavioral or attitudinal patterns, and aims need to be set which have been drawn up jointly with those seeking assistance. At the very outset of the intervention the chosen methods should be tested for possible negative effects.

Closely linked to the set aims for an individual case are the defined criteria for concluding the treatment. The absence of criteria for closing a case runs the risk of continuing the treatment well beyond the period in which it is beneficial and efficient, which both presents an unnecessary danger of creating a dependency for the person seeking help and also unduly burdens the resources in the project. As soon as the defined aims and conclusion criteria have been met, the closure of a case should be planned and prepared – consistently and according to a fixed procedure – and/or the case handed over to a third party. Once the case has been closed, there should be a follow-up for the caseworkers to address positive and negative aspects of the case and produce possible feedback for the programme as whole. Moreover, every case provides the opportunity for structured learning and contains potential information about radicalisation processes, ideological aspects, access to new networks and contacts etc. which must be documented and evaluated for the benefit of future work. A case which is closed after meeting the criteria for conclusion is of far greater value to the process and

impact evaluation than those cases which the participants terminate prematurely. As a matter of routine, the ratio of closed cases to uncompleted ones should be recorded and documented as a structural programme quality standard.

Although determining recidivism rates as part of an impact evaluation is problematic for the reasons set out above, this will nevertheless remain a popular criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of an intervention or counter-extremism project. Closely connected with recidivism rates – and hence of importance in assessing structural quality – is the possibility of observing a case post-closure with regard to subsequent developments. Since western countries generally impose very strong constraints on protecting data, detailed evaluation of the subsequent development of a case is only possible during a narrow window and on a voluntary basis. State-run programmes have the obvious advantage that, within existing data protection frameworks, they can still learn of an individual relapsing into criminal activity after participating in an intervention. Civil-society projects on the other hand are usually reliant on conducting their own limited research or hearing of a relapse by chance. In terms of structural integrity, the important point is whether, or to what extent, the possibility of post-closure observation of a case and of obtaining feedback is discussed and applied in the methodology for the respective project type within the existing data protection framework.

The final quality standard concerns the area of family support. As numerous studies have illustrated, the so-called affective environment of peers is instrumental both in recognizing early signs of radicalisation and achieving an effective intervention. In one study of lone actor terrorism for instance, over 60% of families and friends were aware of the radicalisation or attack plans (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014). By the same token, families and the close social circle around radicalising individuals play a central role in paving the way to advisory services (Williams, Horgan, & Evans, 2015). The existence of a stable and positive social environment is one of the most frequently cited grounds for disengagement from extremist groups (Barrelle, 2015; Horgan, 2009b; Jacobson, 2010; Rosenau et al., 2014) and successful reintegration into a life free of crime (which applies not only to extremism/terrorism but also other phenomena such as youth gangs: Altier et al., 2014; Hastings, Dunbar, & Bania, 2011; Roman, Decker, & Pyrooz, 2017). Besides the positive influence of family and social networks on an intervention, in the area of jihadist radicalisation it is also known that the initial exposure to an extremist ideology or group – or indeed even the active recruitment – often happens through family members. Sageman's (2004) fundamental study of worldwide jihadist networks highlighted the central importance of social ties (friends and relatives) in the recruitment for Islamist extremism in 75% of the cases examined (p. 111-113). In the case of

European jihadists the figure is still 35% (Bakker, 2006). This share was confirmed for those Germans travelling to Syria or Iraq with jihadist motives: between 35% and 38% of them were centrally influenced by their close social circle when becoming radicalised (BKA, BfV, & HKE, 2016). As a result, the involvement of the affective environment (family, friends) both in counter-extremism measures and interventions is of great importance.

Indicators Summary:

- Emphasis of services on individual radicalisation
- Methods for boosting cognitive capabilities applied
- Methods of general and vocational education
- Inclusion of place of residence
- Possibility of protective measures
- Intensity of treatment according to risk level
- Availability of handbook for personnel
- Caseworker-participant compatibility
- Compatibility of caseworkers and programme
- Possibility of participant feedback
- Adequate incentives for participation
- Adequate sanction mechanisms
- Negative impacts of treatment are recognised and documented
- Clear criteria for case closure
- Case closure is planned and prepared
- Follow-up
- Ratio of closed to uncompleted cases is measured
- Case monitoring post-closure
- Inclusion of affective circle of family and friends

Structural Field V: Quality Assurance

Integrated programme quality assurance forms a further component of the structural integrity of counter-extremism programmes and interventions. This not only entails substantive safeguards for the project design, caseworker training content and constant updating of the underlying methods and processes, but also a quality assurance mechanism explicitly built into the programme structure. This mechanism should be divided into an internal and an external part.

The internal quality assurance must check actual compliance with the formulated aims and standards and envisaged processes. This includes verifying that:

- Caseworkers' knowledge is regularly tested and updated;

- Caseworkers' practice and awareness in matters pertaining to risk analysis and security relevance is tested;
- Case conferences are arranged regularly;
- Random checks of individual caseworkers' case documentation are performed;
- Reports are regularly submitted by caseworkers to project managers and senior management;
- Data on the economic parameters of the project (e.g. income/expenditure; duration of advisory services broken down by case type) are monitored;
- Demand for the advisory services is evaluated internally.

The latter point is only possible on the basis of effective case management procedures and corresponding documentation. With regard to the purpose of an advisory programme it is essential to ascertain, through comparison with the originally formulated tasks and aims, whether for instance the majority of cases reaching the programme belonged to the lowest radicalisation threshold or resulted from early-preventative work when the intended target group was in fact highly radicalised individuals and their families. If a programme is seeking to focus on specific preventative activities but is prevented from fulfilling this aim due to the high volume of cases coming in requiring an intervention, this too may be grounds for adjusting the programme's design. A host of further statistics are necessary for internal quality assurance, including: concentration of time periods for approaches to the programme (weekends, out of office hours), distribution of resources among the different case types, and time periods for measures being implemented. These internal quality assurance mechanisms ultimately help in making fine adjustments and optimizing processes with regard to the actual aims and tasks of the programme. As indicated above, in practice this is made more difficult by the fact that many implementers cast the net of services they offer too widely (ranging from preventative activities to family support and disengagement care) within one and the same project, which in light of the limited staff resources as a rule cannot work in a methodologically effective and sound manner without impacting negatively on the quality of the treatment. A further aspect of internal quality assurance is determining participant satisfaction to the extent that this is possible within the parameters of the programme. It should be emphasized here that, in particular, failed cases and those terminated by the participants themselves should be documented precisely and evaluated, in order to identify possible structural or methodological problems and avoid replicating them in future. The quality of a project dealing with counter-extremism activities or interventions depends fundamentally on how the unsuccessful cases and failures are handled. The fact that around

the world the overwhelming majority of projects in this field report almost nothing but successful cases and low recidivism rates is cause for scepticism. It also begs the question of how these few cases of relapses are handled, given that as matter of principle there is no such thing as a perfect methodology for all cases. Internal quality assurance should therefore entail a distinct error analysis and evaluate all unsuccessful cases separately. The feedback loop needs to be joined up, i.e. the mistakes and problems identified from a case must be documented and communicated back to the process cycle, through the modification of certain measures (for instance special training units on specific topics for individual caseworkers, optimization of the case reception process, improvement of the documentation system, capture and communication of lessons learned). As far as possible, statistics should be kept for known relapses following the successful completion of a case. In this context it is particularly important to evaluate the individual cases regularly, and, prior to concluding the case, fully (with regard to risk, security relevance, radicalisation etc.).

External quality assurance is not commonly conducted by persons or bodies outside the advisory programme or the implementing organization. It is based on comparisons using specific defined criteria and benchmarks. It is of fundamental importance to the structural integrity of counter-extremism and intervention activities that the programme undertakes regular external quality assurance using independent third parties. This entails conducting regular external evaluations of different areas of the programme. It must be borne in mind that whilst evaluations carried out in the past are to be welcomed with regard to structural integrity, conversely such evaluations are counter-productive if they merely transpose unrelated material or if studies with no evaluative substance are wrongly portrayed as evaluations. It is not uncommon for implementers to transpose evaluations from other projects which have no substantive connection to the counter-extremism or intervention activity in question. Furthermore, final project reports, student dissertations on projects and government responses to parliamentary questions are regularly cited as ‘evaluations’, despite the fact that as a rule these merely present information about the project rather than a genuine assessment. The professional examination and evaluation of various aspects of a particular programme should in all cases be carried out by people and bodies possessing relevant practical experience in the field or the necessary academic expertise.

In conclusion, we can state that internal and external quality assurance must entail a critical and transparent dialogue about mistakes made during the advisory activity and possible structural problems. Around the world numerous cases of corruption or even criminal acts involving staff members or senior managers in a host of de-radicalisation or counter-

extremism programmes have come to light. The knowledge of such incidents must be discussed critically as part of the structural integrity evaluation, which is why detailed media research and interviews with caseworkers to ascertain known cases of relapses or structural problems are an essential component of an evaluation. The question is also raised as to whether, or to what extent, the programme and the implementer have addressed such incidents and minimized the risk of repetition.

Indicators Summary:

- Internal and external quality assurance in place
- Statistics on known examples of relapses
- Complete case evaluation prior to closure
- Regular external evaluations
- Critical and transparent discussion of failures

Structural Field VI: Transparency

Transparency, the final aspect of structural integrity for programmes and implementers in the field of counter-extremism and interventions, is particularly important. Academia and media have regularly criticized the lack of transparency of state and non-state projects and implementers in this area, both in Germany and elsewhere (Horgan & Altier, 2012; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Mastroe & Szmania, 2016). The transparency of processes, financing, personnel structures and other aspects on a programme is crucial to winning the trust not only of prospective participants but also of financial sponsors and ultimately the wider public, leading specialists and the local authorities, all of which are indispensable partners for the successful implementation of the programme. Programme implementers often point to data protection rules, and the safeguarding of their own unique identifiers and methods, as a hurdle to full transparency. In response it should be observed that the field of counter-extremism and interventions has much catching up to do in comparison to other areas of activity with regard even to the most basic transparency. The NGO Transparency International has launched a Transparent Civil Society Initiative[11] based on a 10-Point self-commitment:

[11] https://www.transparency.de/Initiative-Transparente-Zivilg.1612.0.html (in German)

10 POINT PLAN

1. Name of the organization, headquarters, address and year of establishment
2. Complete statute or stakeholder contract and further central documents setting out the concrete aims being pursued and how they are to be achieved (e.g. vision, guiding principles, values, criteria for funding)
3. Date of the most recent confirmation from the tax office of the organization's preferential tax status as a (charitable) corporation (if this is indeed the case)
4. Name and function of the central decision-makers (e.g. senior management, board and supervisory bodies)
5. Timely, comprehensible and detailed report on the organization's activities
6. Personnel structure: number of employees, freelancers, part-time workers and people performing civilian or voluntary service, plus information about volunteers
7. Source of funding: information about all income, presented as part of the annually collated income/expenditure or profit/loss account and broken down into contributions (e.g. donations, membership fees and other contributions), public assistance, income from economic activity, taxable activity or wealth management.
8. Use of funding: information about the use of all income, presented as part of the annually collated income/expenditure or profit/loss account as well as the asset oversight or balance sheet
9. Company-law association with third parties, e.g. parent or subsidiary company, funding association, business, partner organization
10. Name of legal persons whose annual financial assistance (including contributions, payment for services rendered, fees, project funding, donations etc.) exceeds 10% of overall annual income; information about corresponding donations from natural persons are published with their consent, or at the very least listed as 'major donations from private individuals'

A lack of transparency is a considerable risk factor in counter-extremism and intervention work, influencing a project's effectiveness with regard to the target group as well as the long-term prospects of the organization. The higher the degree of transparency at the outset, the higher the structural integrity of the project should be judged to be. Within the checklist, programme transparency is included within the quality assurance field.

Indicators Summary:

- At the very least fulfilment of the Transparent Civil Society 10 Point Initiative

PART III

Applying the De-radicalisation Programme Integrity Evaluation Checklist - DPIEC

The DPIEC is an easy to use structured professional judgement tool based on a series of programme integrity factors to be graded by the evaluator. For the maximum of user friendliness, the grading is binary: either 0 (factor does not exist in the programme or is inadequate) or 1 (factor exists and is judged to be adequate). The key judgement aspect being done by the evaluator is therefore the decision as to whether or not a certain factor – if it exists within the programme – is sufficient programme. Verification is done through the data collection process described above. As an additional help for the evaluator, verification of an existing factor by two or more sources (e.g. a programme document and stakeholder interview) provides for a relatively strong evidence base to give a positive or negative judgement. If there is any doubt about the adequateness of a certain factor, the evaluator might consult the factor descriptions above for clarification or mark the factor as 'unclear'. This usually means to go back to data collection with the specific factor(s) in mind (e.g. consulting subject matter experts or search for additional information regarding the factor). If for any reason an additional data collection is not possible and the factor still remains unclear, it should be removed from the final overall score calculation. The decision to remove the factor must be well documented and explained in the report. If more than 25% of factors (i.e. 18) are removed in this way, the end score and final report must be clearly marked as deficient with severely reduced validity. If during the process of data collection false information that was willingly given is detected by the evaluator (e.g. multiple cases of false information in public statements even though correction was possible and necessary, interview statements by programme staff and leadership proven to be false), this must be clearly documented in the evaluation report and the factor in question must be marked as non-existent (i.e. '0'). Depending on the number and severity of wrong information, which is to be judged by the evaluator, the overall integrity judgement might be scored as 'defective'. This is usually the case when the evaluator comes to the conclusion that the false information was systematically given in order to 'cheat' or mislead the evaluator. As the point of the evaluation is to assess a programme's integrity, such behavior is especially incompatible with the aim and philosophy behind this approach.

In the following, the structural integrity checklist, score calculation matrix and short explanation for selected factors will be provided. By far, the majority of factors can be graded

by simply asking for them in the interviews and connecting a positive statement to proof (e.g. internal or external documents). It must be noted, however, that some factors go beyond the mere existence of a certain element (e.g. risk assessment protocol) and target the quality of application or sufficiency within the programme. Using the example of risk assessment protocols, the evaluator must see proof that the protocols are not only existent, but are actually being used as a standard procedure and that the programme staff is well aware of them. This could be done by asking for certain elements of the risk assessment protocols, by seeing case related risk assessments or by external confirmation through stakeholders, that risk assessment protocols are strictly followed to a satisfactory level for them.

De-radicalisation Programme Integrity Evaluation Checklist – DPIEC

BASIC INFORMATION

Name of Programme: .....

Location (town/city; area; country): .....

Programme serves: Males Yes/No Females Yes/No

Adults Yes/No Juveniles* Yes/No

**N.B. for juveniles, please state the country specific legal age)* ..... years

Programme type (e.g. governmental, non-governmental, active, passive etc.): .....

.....

Target Group/Ideology (e.g. Jihadi, Right-Wing Extremist, High Ranking etc.): .....

.....

ASSESSMENT DATE(S)

In case of evaluating a programme's development or establishment give dates (DD/MM/YYYY) of previous assessments:

1st Assessment: DD/MM/YYYY 2nd Assessment: DD/MM/YYYY

3rd Assessment: DD/MM/YYYY 4th Assessment: DD/MM/YYYY

5th Assessment: DD/MM/YYYY

Date of current Assessment (DD/MM/YYYY): .....

Name of Assessor (given name then family name): .....

Please write clearly and use upper-case letters

Reviewers:

- Please score each item either 0 (factor does not exist in the programme or is inadequate) or 1 (factor exists and is judged to be adequate).
- Please tick the box (on the right-hand-side) if verified by two or more sources.

1. Running and Developing a Programme			
		Reviewer score	**Tick (✓) if verified by 2nd source.**
1.1	Programme Leadership Qualified		
1.2	Programme Leadership Experienced in Services		
1.3	Programme Leadership Selects Staff		
1.4	Programme Leadership Involved in Staff Training		
1.5	Programme Leadership Supervises Staff		
1.6	Programme Structured on Solid Theory		
1.7	Literature Review Conducted Before Start		
1.8	Programme in Line with Current State of Research		
1.9	Pilot Interventions were Conducted		
1.10	Approach Evaluated by External Experts		
1.11	Valued by CVE Community		
1.12	Valued by Wider Stakeholder Community		
1.13	Funding Adequate		
1.14	Funding Stable Over the Past 2 Years		
	Total score:		

Guidance Notes

1.1. – 1.5.: Programme leadership has adequate training and experience in the key services of the programme. Programme leadership is personally involved in training, supervision and staff selection.

1.6.: Programme's theory of change or other theoretical foundation is up to date and adequate for aims and target group as for example judged through an external expert peer review of the project proposal.

1.7.: Programme concept is based on comprehensive literature review.

1.8.: Programme concepts/methods are up to date as judged for example by external expert review.

1.9.: Programme methods have been tested in a pilot or is based on relevant other pilots.

1.10.: There was an overall external (double blind) peer review process involved in the programme development or financing decision.

1.11.: Other CVE practitioners or researchers value the programme or methods as validated by stakeholder/expert interviews, press or other references.

1.12.: Majority of stakeholders interviewed expressed satisfaction with the programme design and performance.

1.13.: Programme funding is judged as adequate by stakeholders and programme staff, as well as typical for this field and service.

1.14.: Funding has been stable for at least 2 years.

Reviewers:

- Please score each item either 0 (factor does not exist in the programme or is inadequate) or 1 (factor exists and is judged to be adequate).
- Please tick the box (on the right-hand-side) if verified by two or more sources.

2. Personnel and Organisation			
		Reviewer score	**Tick (✓) if verified by 2nd source.**
2.1	Goals Clearly Defined		
2.2	Effective Intake and Classification System		
2.3	Lowest Possible Threshold for Contact		
2.4	Personal Point of Contact for Initial Contact		
2.5	Cross Disciplinary Staff		
2.6	Psychological Expertise Available		
2.7	Victims' Perspective Included		
2.8	Former Extremists Available as Advisers		
2.9	Quality Criteria Established for Former Extremists as Staff		
2.10	Community Perspective Included		
2.11	Staff Specially Trained in Intervention Methods		
2.12	Staff Has Relevant Experience		
2.13	Staff Selected for Skills & Values		
2.14	Regular Staff Meetings Held		
2.15	Staff Assessed on Service Delivery		
2.16	External Supervision Provided for Staff		
2.17	Staff Trained in Risk Assessment		
2.18	Guidelines Set Out for Cooperation with External Partners		
2.19	Guidelines Followed by Staff		
2.20	Procedures for High Risk Cases in Place		
2.21	On-going Training is Provided		
2.22	Staff Input for Programme Possible		
2.23	Staff Support Counselling Goals		
2.24	Ethical Guidelines for Staff Available		
2.25	Staff Training Includes Counter-Radicalisation		
	Total score:		

Guidance Notes

2.1.: Programme goals are clearly stated in main concept, project proposal or programme handbook.
2.2.: There is a standardized case intake procedure which establishes case types for resource allocation and main methods, as well as risk level.
2.3.: Contacting programme for clients has been made as easy and risk free as possible.
2.4.: Contacting programme immediately leads to a personal contact at least within normal operating hours. Emergency personal contact during night-time and weekends might be appropriate, depending on target group and goals.
2.5.: Programme staff comes from a variety of academic backgrounds and disciplines.
2.6.: Programme has access to psychological expertise.
2.7.: Programme utilizes victims' perspective (e.g. through victim-perpetrator-dialogue or other methods)
2.8.-2.9.: Former extremists are available as mentors and are included in the programme under specific quality criteria (e.g. limited employment as mentor).
2.10.: Community perspective is included (e.g. through polls, active partnerships, community leaders holding seats as programme advisors).
2.11.: Staff training includes service specific intervention methods.
2.12-2.13.: Staff selection includes relevant practical experience, as well as personal skills and values. Can be validated for example by job descriptions, selection process protocols etc.
2.14.: Regular case conferences are held. Validated for example through meeting protocols or staff schedules.
2.15.: Staff performance measurement includes direct feedback of clients or any other judgement of delivery quality.
2.16.: External supervision for staff is available and should be included in the stakeholder interviews.
2.17.: Risk assessment training is executed. Validated through certification or questioning of staff in key aspects of risk assessment.
2.18.: Programme handbook or other guidelines include clear mechanisms of interaction with external partners (e.g. police, social services).
2.19.: Guidelines are followed. This can be validated for example through case documentation, stakeholder interviews.
2.20.: High risk cases (as for example determined through risk assessment and/or intake procedure) are placed under special case management procedure.
2.21.: Staff training is continuously updated. Staff is required to attend, and made available for, additional on-the-job training.
2.22.: Staff is allowed and able to provide feedback about programme design.
2.23.: Staff interviews show support for the main counselling goals.
2.24.: Programme handbook includes ethical guidelines.
2.25.: Staff training is based on identification of radicalising factors, corresponding selection of methods, impact assessment and documentation or recalibration.

Reviewers:

- Please score each item either 0 (factor does not exist in the programme or is inadequate) or 1 (factor exists and is judged to be adequate).
- Please tick the box (on the right-hand-side) if verified by two or more sources.

3. Participant Classification			
		Reviewer score	**Tick (✓) if verified by 2nd source.**
3.1	Target Group Clearly Defined and Appropriate to Programme Aims		
3.2	Definition and Consistent Application of Exclusion Criteria		
3.3	Performance of Risk Assessment by Staff		
3.4	Defined Risk Levels Using In-House Procedures Available		
3.5	Rigorous Application of Risk Analysis by Staff		
3.6	Mechanism for Identifying Radicalising Factors Anchored in Staff Training		
3.7	Treatment Methods Adjusted to Individual Radicalising Factors		
3.8	Adequate Case Documentation System Capturing Relevant Case Evolution Used		
3.9	Case Documentation System Enables Internal and External Evaluation		
	Total score:		

Guidance Notes

3.1.: Programme concept or proposal clearly defines main target group (e.g. high risk, highly radicalised, families, early stages of radicalisation, low or high hierarchy) and programme aims are realistic (e.g. full de-radicalisation, disengagement, rejection of violence).

3.2.: Programme concept or proposal defines which groups of people will not be included in the programme and referred to other service providers. There is evidence that cases which do not fit the target group are consequently referred.

3.3.: Risk assessment protocols are followed and each case is assessed accordingly.

3.4.: Cases are assigned a risk level which is regularly checked.

3.5.: Staff is well acquainted with risk assessment protocols and how to apply them. This can be verified by for example by asking about key factors, risk levels and procedures.

3.6.: Staff training includes mechanisms to identify radicalisation drivers and staff is aware of their application.

3.7.: There is evidence of counselling methods being chosen and applied according to individual profiles.

3.8.-3.9.: There is evidence (e.g. anonymized case file) of adequate case documentation that allows for internal and external evaluation in terms of relevant information collected.

Reviewers:

- Please score each item either 0 (factor does not exist in the programme or is inadequate) or 1 (factor exists and is judged to be adequate).
- Please tick the box (on the right-hand-side) if verified by two or more sources.

4. Care and Advisory Services			
		Reviewer score	**Tick (✓) if verified by 2nd source.**
4.1	Emphasis of Services on Individual Radicalisation		
4.2	Methods for Boosting Cognitive Capabilities Applied		
4.3	Methods of General and Vocational Education Available and Used		
4.4	Inclusion of Place of Residence in Counseling		
4.5	Possibility of Protective Measures by Programme		
4.6	Intensity of Treatment Accords to Risk Level		
4.7	Availability of Handbook for Personnel		
4.8	Caseworker-Participant Compatibility Assessed and Applied		
4.9	Compatibility of Caseworkers and Programme Assessed and Applied		
4.10	Possibility of Participant Feedback		
4.11	Adequate Incentives for Participation Available		
4.12	Adequate Sanctions Mechanism Available		
4.13	Negative Impacts of Treatment are Recognized and Documented		
4.14	Clear Criteria for Case Closure Available and Followed		
4.15	Case Closure is Planned and Prepared		
4.16	Follow-Up Process in Place		
4.17	Ratio of Closed to Uncompleted Cases is Measured		
4.18	Case Monitoring Post-Closure Applied		
4.19	Inclusion of Affective Circle of Family and Friends		
	Total score:		

Guidance Notes

4.1.: Counselling focuses on individual radicalisation factors.
4.2.: Counselling services include methods to increase critical thinking or cognitive skills (e.g. educational, psychological, debiasing).
4.3.: Various forms of educational methods are available.
4.4.: Place of residence of client is included, for example in risk assessment or in terms of community perspective.
4.5.: Programme offers methods of personal protection (e.g. new identity, witness protection) or includes guidelines about how to approach authorities in such cases.
4.6.: Risk level determines level of applied resources.
4.7.: Programme includes a detailed handbook for staff which includes all relevant information and step-by-step guidelines, especially all structural integrity factors.

4.8.: Programme includes a mechanism orf matching client with caseworker (e.g. through intake procedure or case conference).
4.9.: Staff compatibility with programme is also assessed during staff selection or performance records.
4.10.: Clients are given the opportunity to provide feedback to programme (e.g. formal or informal).
4.11.: Programme offers incentives for participation that do not conflict with programme ethical and moral principles (a negative example would be a civil society based full de-radicalisation programme offering money to leave extremist movement).
4.12.: Programme includes a range of punitive mechanisms to discourage non-compliant behaviour of clients (e.g. from gradual decrease of counselling to unilateral termination of relationship).
4.13.: Case documentation includes potential negative effects of counselling and allows for correction.
4.14.: Programme concept or guidelines define case closure criteria.
4.15.: Case closure is predated by specific phasing out planning and preparation (e.g. gradual decrease in meetings and session time, client is informed about closure, contacts for follow-up are provided and introduced).
4.16.: Follow-up phase is part of the programme design.
4.17.: Programme collects information about uncompleted cases and measures ratio to completed cases.
4.18.: Cases are monitored after closure for a defined period of time.
4.19.: Services include clients' affective environment.

Reviewers:

- Please score each item either 0 (factor does not exist in the programme or is inadequate) or 1 (factor exists and is judged to be adequate).
- Please tick the box (on the right-hand-side) if verified by two or more sources.

5. Quality Assurance and Transparency			
		Reviewer score	**Tick (✓) if verified by 2nd source.**
5.1	Internal and External Quality Assurance in Place		
5.2	Statistics on Known Examples of Relapses Gathered		
5.3	Complete Case Evaluation Prior to Closure Conducted		
5.4	Regular External Evaluations Conducted		
5.5	Critical and Transparent Discussion of Failures Conducted		
5.6	Transparency Criteria Followed (see Box 1 below)		
	Total score:		

Guidance Notes

5.1.: Programme design includes mechanisms of external and internal quality assurance (e.g. expert advisory board with actual steering functions, performance reports, accountability checks).
5.2.: Programme collects data on examples of relapses or recidivism.
5.3.: Documents prove that there is full risk assessment and effect evaluation before closure.
5.4.: External and independent evaluations are conducted on a regular basis. Evaluation reports have been published in full and are publicly accessible.
5.5.: There is evidence of assessment of failed cases, for example through documentation, internal studies, press reports.
5.6.: At least ¾ (i.e. 8 of the 10) of transparency criteria list is followed.

Box 1:Transparency Criteria

1. Name, Address, Founding Date of Organization Available
2. All Documents of Relevance Regarding the Organization Available (Charter etc.)
3. Last Tax Statement Available
4. Name and Function of all Stakeholders and Executive Personnel Available
5. Annual Report on Activities Available
6. Personnel Structure Available
7. Complete List of all Financial Sources Available
8. Complete List of Expenditures Available
9. Contractual Relationships with other Organisations Stated
10. List of Persons or Organisations Contributing more than 10% of the Annual Income

SCORE SUMMARY TABLE		
	Reviewer's score	***Possible total***
1. Running and Developing a Program (14 items)		*14*
2. Organisation (25 items)		*25*
3. Participant Classification (9 items)		*9*
4. Care and Advisory Services (19 items)		*19*
5. Quality Assurance (6 items)		*6*
TOTAL SCORE		***73***

Ratings

CAPACITY AREAS:

1. Running & Developing a Programme _____% *(100% = maximum of 14 points)*

2. Organisation _____% *(100% = maximum of 25 points)*

5. Quality Assurance _____% *(100% = maximum of 6 points)*

CONTENT AREAS:

3. Participant Classification _____% *(100% = maximum of 9 points)*

4. Care and Advisory Services _____% *(100% = maximum of 19 points)*

OVERALL CAPACITY _____**%** *(100% = maximum of 45 points)*

OVERALL CONTENT _____**%** *(100% = maximum of 28 points)*

OVERALL RATING _____**%** *(100% = maximum of 73 points)*

OVERALL RATING: _____

Benchmarks
1= Very High Structural Integrity (80% or higher)
2= Good Structural Integrity (60%-79%)
3= Needs Improvement (46%-59%)
4=Defective (45% or lower)

Writing the Structural Integrity Evaluation Report

Finally, writing the structural evaluation report explaining the overall rating score and offering suggestions is another key output of the toolkit in addition to the score itself. While the specific form, scope and length of the report depends on the user of the toolkit (e.g. policy makers, practitioners, researchers) and the concrete aims (e.g. deciding about funding, programme improvement, programme design). Nevertheless, a structural integrity evaluation report should at least include an initial statement of the report background (i.e. major aims, author background, methods used, main theories and assumptions). Further, it must describe the data collection process, the quality of data gathered and the way it was used for the analysis. A project or programme description, including information produced by the programme and about the programme (e.g. press reports), should be delivered as well. Thirdly, the center piece of the report should be the detailed description of the grading process for the structural integrity checklist. Each factor decision should be supported by an explanation or reference if possible to make the decision transparent. The final score should be contextualized and used to make specific recommendations regarding weak structural integrity fields. Finally, the report should state, according to the contractual relationship being negotiated before the evaluation, who is able to access the findings and if any level of confidentiality must be observed.

Report annexes might include interview questionnaires, public programme documents, press articles, policy documents or legal frameworks.

Conclusion

Counter-extremism and intervention work, addressing emerging or well-advanced radicalisation processes as well as providing advisory services in the area of de-radicalisation to effect lasting disengagement and the rejection of extremist ideologies and radical milieus, is a highly complex and at times very risky activity.

In contrast to the extensive research available about radicalisation processes and individual motivations for joining such extremist groups, little reliable research is available in the field of disengagement and de-radicalisation processes. Only in recent years have a handful of academics begun conducting systematic research into the process of reversing radicalisation and developing initial basic theories (Barrelle, 2015; Clubb, 2017; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Hwang, 2015; Koehler, 2016). As a direct consequence, the field of prevention possesses an

(even) broader, more comprehensive and academically reliable stock of knowledge on the basis of high-quality research, which enables the development of sound methodologies for preventative work. Interventions on the other hand find themselves, to a large extent from an academic perspective, in a quasi-experimental phase, in spite of the fact that practitioners have been working for almost two decades now with radicalised persons associating themselves with a variety of different extremist ideologies and groups. Absent or deficient programme and methodology evaluation, a lack of transparency, non-existent standards and an extremely heterogeneous and competitive field of actors have so far greatly hindered the effective assessment and further development of intervention work.

Two central issues should be emphasized among current developments: evaluation and quality standards. As mentioned above, the state of evaluation of de-radicalisation projects is sub-standard (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015; Horgan & Altier, 2012; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Mastroe & Szmania, 2016). A variety of problems such as data protection, lack of transparency, the absence of theoretical foundations or the lack of clarity between different forms of assessment have so far hindered the necessary evaluations.

Without fundamental standards and an evaluation that builds on these benchmarks to assess programme structures and working processes, substantive progress in the field of counter-extremism is out of the question. In particular the trend in recent years towards using civil-society implementers for the counter-extremism networks' counselling programmes (Beutel & Weinberger, 2016) has exceeded the actual availability of trained personnel and implementers with structures of sufficiently high quality. For too long a variety of civil-society implementers, in their battle to secure programme funding, have sought to shield their own unique identifiers from transparent substantive scrutiny and thus thwarted substantive developments and the establishment of standardized methods.

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