Report on the relationship between inequality and youth radicalisation from existing European survey datasets

DARE
Dialogue About Radicalisation & Equality

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report on the relationship between inequality and youth radicalisation is written on the basis of statistical analysis of five cross-national population surveys, and two youth surveys. The primary purpose of this research was to examine associations between different forms of national and individual level inequality and social attitudes associated with far right and Islamist radicalisation among young people.

While none of the questions available in multiple large-scale surveys can identify extremism or radicalisation directly, there are some that capture attitudes and opinions that we would expect far right and/or Islamist extremists to typically hold. These are Attitudes towards political violence; Anti-democratic attitudes, and Anti-Muslim attitudes.

This report attempts to systematically analyse the relationship of these attitudes with demographic information, experiences and attitudes relevant for inequalities on the individual level and country-level variables relevant for inequalities on the macro-level. This is done in order to see whether these attitudes, proxies for cognitive radicalisation, are more common among people who have personal experience or perceptions of economic or social adversity, discrimination or feelings of injustice, or people from economically unequal countries. Most of the analysis is restricted to under 30-year olds, although we also do some comparative analyses.

The secondary data analysis shows that there is no straightforward relationship between inequality and cognitive radicalisation, measured as support for political violence, opposition to democracy, and negative attitudes to Muslims. Most notably, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient was not significant in any of the analyses. However, this does not mean that there is no relationship at all between inequality and attitudes associated with radicalisation. We find that indicators of individual level financial difficulty, as well as lower GDP, welfare expenditure and governance quality at the country level are predictors of some, but not all of the outcome variables. Moreover, as well as the previously documented perceived injustice, and experiences of discrimination, a sense of powerlessness is one of the most consistent factors across datasets.

Perceived inequality and lack of control could increase group identity, which in turn can increase experienced horizontal inequality and radicalised narratives to frame and make sense of such experiences. However, it is important to note that this is only one of many possibilities. Mainstream groups, institutions and narrative could fulfil the same search for compensatory control, order and purpose as extremist movements. None of the variables in our models, can reliably distinguish between those who hold extremist attitudes and not, much less who acts on them. This difference, although it can be influenced by social and economic disadvantage, seems largely dependent on situational and idiosyncratic factors, and other unobserved and variables like personality and prior experience.

It should also be noted that most of the relationships reported here are very weak, and this combined with the other limitations mentioned above, makes it difficult to extract any practical or policy implications, without considering the wider literature and research in more specific milieus of radicalisation.

1. Introduction

This report on the relationship between inequality and youth radicalisation is written on the basis of statistical analysis of five cross-national population surveys, and two youth surveys. The primary purpose of this research was to examine associations between different forms of national and individual level inequality and social attitudes associated with far right and Islamist radicalisation among young people.

1.1 Inequality and its measurement

Inequality represents the objectively unequal, or subjectively perceived, unjust distribution of valued outcomes (such as resources and power) or the gaps in access to opportunities (Franc and Pavlović, 2019). The above definition captures at least three important aspect of inequality. Firstly, inequality as a concept is multidimensional. In other words, when investigating inequality, we should always be aware of the question '*inequality of what?*' (McKay, 2002). Since valued outcomes and opportunities are numerous and different, there are numerous and different specific manifestations of inequalities (e.g. inequalities in income, health, education, employment, political representation, legal and civil rights). However, there is no consensus in the literature on whether these specific manifestations of inequalities can be conceptualised as a single construct or as different dimensions or types of inequality. The same terms are used differently, while different terms are used interchangeably. For example, social inequality or socioeconomic inequality for some authors means primarily economic inequality - the unequal distribution of economic outcomes e.g. income, assets, wealth, capital and living standard (DeVerteuil, 2009). Moreover, economic inequality means primarily income inequality (see more in Goldthorpe, 2009). At the same time, social inequality or socioeconomic inequality are frequently used as general labels for multidimensional inequality (capturing disparities along several dimensions that matter for the lives of individuals and the societies, Binelli, Loveless and Whitefield, 2015). On the other side, some authors are more specific and differentiate between several types of inequalities. For example Deere, Kanbur and Stewart (2018: 87) differentiate between *socioeconomic* (inequalities in access to basic services and inequalities in economic resources, including income, assets, employment), *cultural inequalities* (inequalities such as in recognition, use and respect for language, religion and cultural practices), and *political inequalities* (like those in representation in government, the upper levels of the bureaucracy, the military and the police, and in local administrations).

A second important aspect of inequality is related to the question of *inequality between whom?* (McKay, 2002; Stewart and Samman, 2014), since inequality can exist (and be measured) between different actors or entities such as individuals, households, groups, localities, countries, continents. In this regard, Stewart (2005; 2011) differentiates between vertical inequality (VI) (when inequality is measured among individuals or households) as the most commonly used measure of inequality, and horizontal inequality (HI) (when inequality is measured among groups with a shared identity). According to Stewart (2016: 51), HI are the most important types of inequality because of their implications for justice and social stability, where relevant group categories include, among others, race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender and age. In terms of justice, according to Deere et al. (2018: 87) significant horizontal inequalities or inequalities among groups are unjust 'since there is no reason why people should receive unequal rewards or have unequal political power merely because they are black rather than white, women rather than men, or of one ethnicity rather than another' .

A third important aspect of inequality is that inequality can be *objective*, but also *subjectively perceived* (regardless of objective inequality). Such subjective or perceived inequality is frequently equated with perceived injustice. Although objective inequality may exist, it subjectively does not represent a problem even if it is perceived, as long as it is not considered unjust or unfair (e.g. Jetten et al., 2017). Perceptions of unfairness or injustice can stem from different sources, such as unfair distribution of valued goods and services or experiences of unfair treatment (see van den Bos, 2020). Thus, injustice is generally aroused by perceptions of unfair outcomes or treatment, similar to the case with relative

deprivation (the subjective experience of unjust disadvantage). In this sense *perceived inequality* or *perceived injustice* is also like the term 'grievance', accounting for feelings of personal or group frustration, or dissatisfaction with economic, social or political conditions (Ajil, 2020: 2). Since subjective inequality is based on an evaluation against a specific criterion (i.e., we compare our income or social status with income or social status of another person or group), it can be perceived on an inter-individual or inter-group level (Jasso and Kotz, 2008), corresponding to individual and group relative deprivation (Smith et al., 2012; van den Bos, 2020).

As the discussion above demonstrated, inequalities can also be measured on different levels: individual or micro level, group or meso, and country or macro level. These possible different levels of measurement are obvious in the case of objective inequality indicators. However, indicators of subjective or perceived inequality (more frequently operationalised in terms of perceived injustice or grievances) could also refer to different levels. Although indicators of perceived inequality as subjective perceptions are always measured by individual responses (thus on individual level), they could refer to different actors and entities too, such as individual (e.g. perceived personal social status, discrimination or relative deprivation), group (e.g. perceived group discrimination, deprivation or injustice) or macro level (e.g. perceived inequalities between countries or perceived imperialism or injustices in the country's foreign policy, see O'Duffy, 2008) factors (Ajil, 2020).

In this report, in accordance with the DARE conceptual definition of inequality and approach elaborated above and applied in DARE's synthesis reports (Franc and Pavlović, 2018; Poli and Arun, 2019), we will mainly differentiate between economic inequality and socio-political inequality. Economic inequality could be represented by data about unequal distribution of economic outcomes such as income, assets, wealth, capital and living standard, or subjectively perceived economic inequality. By socio-political inequality we refer to inequalities, primarily connected with social stratification which denotes structural disadvantages or perceived injustice and grievances, based on membership of a social group (McLeod and Nonnemaker, 1999; van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, 2008; Warwick-Booth, 2013). Such understanding of socio-political inequality is similarly to the dimension of cultural inequalities by Deere et al. (2018), but also, in case of perceived inequalities, to grievances or perceived injustices (Ajil, 2020; van den Bos, 2020).

Thus, when investigating the inequality-radicalisation relationship based on secondary analyses of existing survey data sets, besides taking into account whether the available inequality indicators or proxies refer to economic or socio-political inequality, we consider if they represent individual or group inequalities, objective or subjective inequality, and on which level (individual or macro) they are measured.

1.2 Radicalisation and its measurement

Despite conceptual disagreement over the term radicalisation, there is consensus that radicalisation is a process (Pisoiu, 2012; Neumann, 2013; Khalil, Horgan and Zeuthen, 2019). Within the DARE project radicalisation is understood as 'the process by which individuals or groups come to embrace attitudes, or engage in actions, that support violence in the pursuit of extremist causes' (Pilkington, 2019). This reflects DARE's position that ideological radicalisation (the process of coming to hold radical or extremist views) must be analytically distinguished from behavioural radicalisation (engagement in violent extremist actions or terrorism), although both might be considered 'radicalisation'.

The idea of a distinction between behavioural and attitudinal radicalisation is not new as nowadays it is generally accepted that not everyone who holds radical beliefs will engage in violent behaviour and numerous authors acknowledge some difference between radicalised attitudes and radicalised action (Hafez and Mullins, 2015; Moghaddam, 2005) or between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation (Dzhekova, Mancheva, Stoynova and Anagnostou, 2017; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018; Neumann, 2013; Wolfowicz, Litmanovitz, Weisburd and Hasisi, 2019). However, the possible relationships between these two types of radicalisation or more general radicalised attitudes and behaviour are (still) unclear

(Pisoiu, 2012). In fact, there are only two theories or models which explicitly differentiate between radicalisation of opinions (cognitive radicalisation) and radicalisation of action (behavioural radicalisation): The Two pyramid model by (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2010, 2017), and the more recent Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) Model by Khalil et al. (2019). Although a more detailed description of these models and their differences is out of the scope of this report, it should be stressed that both models firstly stress the importance of separate and parallel investigation of both radicalisation process and propose that each of them could have different determinants and mechanisms. For example, McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) argue for the necessity to separately theorise radicalisation of opinion and radicalisation of action, stressing that separating radicalisation of ideas from radicalisation of action can open new research directions for both pyramids. Similarly, authors of the ABC model advocate parallel investigation of determinants of sympathy for violent extremism and actual involvement, and even advocate a more nuanced approach in conceptualising and operationalising attitudes towards violence in terms of sympathy for objectives and sympathy for violence as distinct (albeit obviously interrelated) 'variables' (Khalil et al., 2019).

In practice, the differentiation between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation and investigation of their determinants require valid and reliable measures for both cognitive and behavioural radicalisation. Although to date there is no systematic investigation of how radicalisation and its determinants have been operationalised in past studies (see Batzdorfer and Bosnjak, 2018), Scarcella, Page and Furtado's (2016) systematic evaluation revealed that the majority of existing rating scales for assessing radicalisation and extremism are not adequately validated. Similarly, the DARE systematic review of previous quantitative findings (2001-2017) about the inequality-radicalisation relationship revealed the limitations of previous studies in terms of operationalisations of both concepts (inequality and radicalisation), and stressed such suboptimal operationalisations as one of the possible reasons for inconsistent findings about the inequality-radicalisation relationship (Franc and Pavlović, 2018).

Since the aim of this report is to investigate the relationship between inequality and radicalisation based on secondary analyses of existing survey data sets (primarily large international surveys such as *Word Value Survey*, *European Value Survey* and *European Social Survey*) we could use only measures and operationalisations which were available in these data sets. As such, we selected three attitude measures which are at the same time present in more than one data set and could be regarded as relevant for cognitive radicalisation. Specifically, as three proxies for cognitive radicalisation we used:

- Attitudes towards (political) violence;
- Anti-democratic attitudes;
- Anti-Muslim attitudes.

In line with the DARE project's focus on Islamist and anti-Islam(ist) radicalisations we used attitudes towards (political) violence and anti-democratic attitudes as relevant for both Islamist and anti-Islamist cognitive radicalisation (and conducted separate analysis on Christian and Muslim samples where it was possible), while we used anti-Muslim attitudes as a proxy for anti-Islamist cognitive radicalisation.

1.2.1 Attitudes towards political violence as proxy for cognitive Islamist and anti-Islamist radicalisation

Almost all definitions of radicalisation stress violence, either in terms of direct involvement in political violence (Della Porta and LaFree, 2012) or in terms of attitudes supportive of political violence (Schmid, 2013) as the ultimate point of a radicalisation process. Similarly, many radicalisation models speak about support for political violence. For example, within the '3N' approach to radicalisation (Webber and Kruglanski, 2018), justification of violence and legitimisations of violence are important parts of the radicalisation process (narratives). In fact, radicalisation research most frequently operationalises radicalisation through different types of attitudes toward political violence, or, more rarely, violent behavioural intention and previous violent or terrorist behaviour (see Franc and

Pavlović, 2018; Wolfowicz et al., 2019). In line with the above discussion about differentiation between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation, survey self-report measures of attitudes supportive of political violence are not only the most frequently used but also obvious and face valid indicators of cognitive radicalisation, although associated with risk of socially desirable responding.

1.2.2 Anti-democratic attitudes as a proxy for cognitive Islamist and anti-Islamist radicalisation

Contrary to attitudes towards political violence, anti-democratic attitudes generally have not been investigated as a radicalisation outcome of cognitive radicalisation, or as an important element of radicalisation process in empirical (quantitative) radicalisation studies. However, the relevance of democracy attitudes for radicalisation stem from many contemporary definitions of radicalisation or extremisms. For example, Bötticher (2017: 74) in a conceptual analysis of radicalism and extremism stresses *inter alia* '*Extremists* glorify violence as a conflict resolution mechanism and *are opposed to* the constitutional state, *majority-based democracy*, the rule of law, and human rights for all' (italics added Bötticher (2017: 74), or '*Extremism* is, by its very nature, *anti-democratic*; it seeks to abolish constitutional democracy and the rule of law' (Bötticher, 2017: 74). Similarly, Schmid (2013: 9) stressed 'In the context of democratic societies, *(violent) extremist groups*, movements and parties tend to have a political programme that contains many of the following elements: Anti-constitutional, *anti-democratic*, anti-pluralist, authoritarian ….' and that 'while radicals might be violent or not, might be democrats or not, *extremists are never democrats'* (Schmid, 2013: 10). Anti-democratic attitudes have been regarded as a part of both Islamist and anti-Islamist extremist or radicalised ideologies. Regarding right-wing extremism, for example, Carter (2018), starting from Mudde's influential study (1995), considers anti-democracy as one of three main elements in her minimal definition of the right-wing extremism concept as an ideology (together with authoritarianism and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism). Likewise, regarding Islamist radicalisation, Ashour (2009: 4) in explaining the difference between a moderate and radical Islamist group, stresses that ideological rejection of democracy (and the legitimacy of political and ideological pluralism) is the main characteristic of a radical Islamist.

The importance of anti-democratic attitudes as a part of cognitive radicalisation process was recently demonstrated by Feddes, Huijzer, van Ooijen and Doosje (2019). Authors experimentally evaluated effects of educational intervention (the interactive exhibition) on democracy in the context of prevention of radicalisation. Although, the exhibition was found to have an effect only on young people by increasing their knowledge about democracy, not on attitudes toward democracy and support for ideology-based violence, additional analyses showed that more knowledge about democracy was associated with less support for ideology-based violence via more positive attitudes toward democracy.

At the same time, it should be stressed that using anti-democracy attitudes as a proxy for cognitive radicalisation does not mean equating anti-democratic attitudes with radicalisation. Namely, as Schmid (2016: 27) warned, 'If we indeed would take - following this official European[1] definition - democracy, equality and diversity as benchmarks for measuring degrees of radicalisation, we would have a great deal more radicalisation in the world….'.

1.2.3 Anti-Muslim attitudes as a proxy for anti-Islamist cognitive radicalisation

As an additional proxy for cognitive anti-Islamist cognitive radicalisation only, we used measures of *anti-Muslim attitudes*. Namely, anti-Muslim attitudes play a part in the broader radicalisation of far-right extremists (Abbas, 2020). Besides, many extreme right movements are characterised by anti-

1 Referring to the European Union definition 'Radicalisation: Individuals or groups becoming intolerant with regard to basic democratic values like equality and diversity, as well as a rising propensity towards using means of force to reach political goals that negate and/or undermine democracy'. Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA cited in Schmid, 2016: 27).

Islam or anti-Muslim attitudes, in addition to opposition to Islamist ideology (Pilkington, 2016). In line with this, Goodwin, Cutts and Janta-Lipinski (2016) established xenophobic hostility toward Muslims (and ethnic minorities more generally) as the strongest predictor of public support for the English Defence League (EDL). Generally, for radical right parties, Islamophobia presents a common ideological basis and programmatic platform (Hafez, 2014), while the new European 'Counter-Jihad' Movement (ECJM) also identified Islam and Muslim immigration as major threats to Europe (Koehler, 2016). Islamophobic attitudes and discourse is also reported to encourage Islamophobic hate crimes (e.g. Bayrakli and Hafez, 2019). Beyond the potential for anti-Islamism to develop into violent extremism, DARE identifies the social threat posed by the routinisation of anti-Islam sentiments in European societies. Thus, the relevance of investigating anti-Muslim attitudes in the context of radicalisation stems also from the established relationship between intensity of anti-Muslim hostility at the local level and pro-ISIS radicalisation on Twitter (Mitts, 2019) in line with a cumulative extremism argument. On a more general level, there are established links between negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities reported in surveys, and regional data about the extent of ethnic discrimination, confirming that majorities' reported attitudes in surveys are useful predictors of ethnic discrimination against minorities (Carlsson and Eriksson, 2017).

1.3 Structure of the report

The research focused on the three outcome variables detailed above, which were available in multiple surveys. Thus, following an outline of the data sources and methods used in our analysis (Section 2), the report is organised as three main sections – on support for political violence (Section 3), anti-democratic attitudes (Section 4) and anti-Muslim attitudes (Section 5). In each section both previous literature and the results of our analysis are discussed. The final section of the report (Section 6) sets out a discussion of the findings and implications for future research.

2. Data and Methods

Having reviewed the questionnaires of a number of large scale survey datasets, which include measures of socio-political attitudes as well as socio-economic inequality, three common topics were identified, around which this report is structured. While none of the questions can identify extremism or radicalisation directly, there are some that capture attitudes and opinions that we would expect far right and/or Islamist extremists to typically hold. These are:

- Attitudes towards political violence;
- Anti-democratic attitudes;
- Anti-Muslim attitudes.

In the data analysis we attempt to systematically identify the relationship of these attitudes with demographic information, experiences and attitudes relevant for inequalities on the individual level and country-level variables relevant for inequalities on the macro-level. In particular, we investigated whether these attitudes, proxies for cognitive radicalisation, are more common among people who have personal experience or perceptions of economic or social adversity, discrimination or feelings of injustice, or people from economically unequal countries. Because we are primarily interested in youth radicalisation, most of the analysis is restricted to under 30-year olds, although we also do some comparative analyses.

We use multilevel regression models in all the international datasets where individuals are clustered in localities / countries. This allows the effects of variables to vary between different contexts. We have conducted separate models for each outcome variable, including individual level variables of interest (economic and socio-political 'inequality'), individual control variables (sociodemographic variables) and macro-level variables (country / location-level inequality). We have tried, as closely as

possible, to match the variables for all the datasets, as a similar model better enables us to compare the results. By using a number of data sets, and systematically comparing the results we are able to analyse the robustness and reliability of the relationship between inequality and the various outcomes, as well as the size and direction. This is an unusual approach in social science, which tends to either focus or one or two datasets per study, or conduct a meta-analysis of already completed studies with different model designs.

It is important to note that we would not expect complete similarity of results, for a number of reasons. First, the three outcome variables - Attitudes towards political violence, Anti-democracy and Anti-Muslim attitudes - are not all identified by the same questions in each data set. Different question wordings and different answer options can contribute to differences in the results. Furthermore, the samples are different; most of the surveys are international, and include different countries, and sampling strategies within those countries. Finally, they are from different years ranging from 2008 to 2017 – a period in which a number of international, domestic and local events could have coloured public opinion in ways which are difficult to account for.

In the following we briefly discuss how we can measure inequality using survey data, then we introduce each of the datasets, and the variables we use, before describing the models in more detail. Some of the specifics of the analysis of each outcome variable will be described within the results sections.

2.1 Measuring inequality

We identify three different types of inequality indicators. Firstly, individual level indicators of economic inequality, or disadvantage; these are measures of the survey respondent's personal economic situation and status, and includes low household income (relative to the country average), and unemployment as measures of objective economic inequality, and experienced financial difficulty as a measure of perceived economic inequality. Secondly, measures of individual level socio-political inequality include perceived lack of political influence and experienced discrimination. Finally, we include country level indicators of economic inequality (redistribution, economic wealth) and of socio-political inequality (governance quality and inclusiveness).

In addition, all our models control for individual level variables which may affect the relationship between inequality and the outcome variables, including age, gender, nationality or immigration history, and whether the respondent lives in a rural or urban community. In the following section we describe the variables used in each of the datasets.

2.2 Datasets

The study includes data from six population surveys, which have a random sample of the population in each of the countries, in addition to two youth surveys (MYPLACE and Young in Oslo), where young respondents are sampled from specific locations. In the population surveys, analysis was restricted to under 30 year olds with the exception of the EVS and WVS, where the 30+ age group was additionally analysed separately.

Since we were interested in the effects of economic and social inequality and disadvantage, all the relevant variables were reversed so that higher values represented 'worse' outcomes. All the independent variables were also standardised (centred) in order to be more comparable, by rescaling it to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The standard deviation that was used was taken separately for the under 30 year olds, (and the 30+ group in the EVS and WVS data). Binary variables were coded as -0.5 and 0.5.

2.2.1 European Values Study 2008 and 2017

The European Values Study (EVS) is a large scale repeated cross national survey programme, which aims to provide insight into social attitudes and opinions in Europe. It started in 1981, and is repeated every 9 years with some changes to the questionnaire and countries included. In this research we use

data from the 2008 survey, which has a sample of 66281 respondents from 46 countries, and the 2017 survey which has 56368 respondents from 30 countries. The data are archived at the GESIS Data Archive in Cologne, and are available to researchers free of charge. The study design was representative multi-stage or stratified random samples of the adult population of 18 years old and older. The data collection is done by face-to-face interviews with a standardised questionnaire between 2008 and 2010. Exceptions are Finland (internet panel) and Sweden (postal survey). In 2017, six countries (Switzerland, Netherlands, Iceland, Germany, Denmark, and Finland) carried out mixed mode data collection with half of the sample in each country assigned to self-assessed web-based surveys, and the other half face to face. The questionnaires were translated into each language spoken by at least 5% of the population (EVS, 2017).

The EVS includes questions for all three of the outcome variables we focus on. For *attitudes to political violence*, the question **'**Do you justify: political violence' is included in EVS 2017 (2018), and the answers were on a scale from 1) Never to 10) Always. In 2008 (EVS 2010) there was a question about terrorism, **'**terrorism may in certain circumstances be justified vs. always condemned'. However, there was not enough variation on this item to include it in the analysis, as less than 6% agreed terrorism could be justified under any circumstance.

The European Values Study asks several questions about *attitudes to democracy*. Here we combine two of them, based on Magalhães (2014), index of explicit support for democracy, namely 'Democracy is a bad political system', and 'Democracy is not important' ($r(50546)$=.41, P<.001) (EVS 2018). For EVS 2008, the two items are 'Disagree that democracy is best political system', and 'Democracy is a bad political system' ($r(56726)$= .49, P<.001). In each dataset, the two four-category items[2] were combined by taking the mean of both, resulting in a 7-point scale ranging from 1 to 4.

Finally, the EVS from 2017 and 2008 ask the same question about *anti-Muslim attitudes*. In a question about neighbours, respondents are given a list of categories of people, including Muslims, and are asked to indicate any that they would *not* like to have as neighbours[3] (EVS 2018; EVS 2010). The outcome variable is a binary variable (dislike vs. not mentioned. We also created an additional variable where we calculated the mean of all the mentions of other groups of neighbours (drug addicts, heavy drinkers, homosexuals, immigrants, Christians, Jews, and Gypsies (Roma)) a respondent did not like, and subtract it from their attitude to Muslim neighbours. The result a binary variable where 1 is someone who specifically would not like a Muslim neighbour, but who would not mind other groups on the list, and 0 is someone who is equally or more negative to other groups. The question was optional in countries with Muslim majority populations.

Demographic variables included were *age* and *gender*, their immigrant background: separate dichotomous variables for whether the *respondent themselves or their parents were born abroad*. Whether they lived in a place or *town with fewer than 5000 people* was also included as a dichotomous variable, although this was not asked in all the countries in 2017, and was thus excluded from much of the reported analysis. As an indication of the economic activity we included a dichotomous variable for whether they were *in work or education* or not. Education and training is strongly related to age, and how this relationship works may vary between countries. Because we were primarily interested in the population under 30, we decided to combine work and education and distinguish it from

[2] The importance of democracy variable in EVS 2017 originally had 10 values from 1) not at all important, to 10) absolutely important, but was recoded and reversed into a 4 category variable to enable combination with the other 4 category variable.

[3] The other categories are: *People of a different race; Heavy drinkers; Immigrants/foreign workers; Drug addicts; Homosexuals; Christians; Jews* and *Gypsies*. In 2008, the list further included *People with a criminal record; Left wing extremists; Right wing extremists; People with large families; Emotionally unstable people* and *People who have AIDS*.

unemployment and inactivity. Another economic variable is *income*, which was measured differently in 2008 and 2017. In 2008 it was measured as monthly household income (x1000), corrected for PPP in Euros. We then adjusted this for household size, by dividing it by the square root of the number of people in the household (OECD, 2019:74). In 2017, household income was measured in deciles relative to the national average. As an indicator of *childhood financial difficulty*, we included a dichotomous question of whether the father (or mother if father absent) was employed when the respondent was 14. However, because this variable had many missing values (3931) in the 2017 survey, and respondents who did not live with parents at age 14 only account for a small proportion of them (1800), we instead included a variable which asks if the respondent's parents had problems making ends meet when the respondent was 14 years old in 2017. The answers were on a 4-point scale.

For most of the datasets we include only sociodemographic, economic and socio-political inequality variables. However, in the EVS datasets we also include some attitudinal variables in order to see whether the relationship between variables indicating inequality, and the outcome variables, could be mediated in part by attitudes and values that the respondent holds. As this was not our main research question, and because attitudinal variables vary greatly between datasets, even more so than the sociodemographic and 'inequality' variables, we only did this analysis in the EVS and WVS data. Because we have three datasets from different years and different countries with almost the same attitudinal questions, this nevertheless allows us to test the robustness of our findings across contexts.

The first attitudinal variable was whether *religion is important in the respondent's life*. The variable had four values ranging from 1) not at all important to 4) very important. This was the simplest and most comparable religiosity question across contexts. Each country has different religious denominations. Religious service attendance, similarly has different meanings and norms attached to it in different national and local contexts. Religiosity has previously been found to be related to both economic variables (Storm, 2018) and anti-Muslim attitudes (Schlueter, Masso and Davidov, 2019), although the evidence is mixed (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008). It is also associated with authoritarianism which could reduce support for democracy (Canetti-Nisim, 2004), and moral certainty which could increase support for political violence (Shaw, Quezada & Zárate, 2011; Canetti et al., 2010)

Political orientation was the second attitude we included. This is a 10-point scale ranging from 1) left to 10) right, which has been found to be appropriate for comparative analysis (Huber, 1989). Political views are often a response to personal economic circumstances as well as reactions to perceived injustice (whether that is despair over lack of public services, or worry about benefit frauds and high taxes). Moreover, ideology can shape how people respond to economic and social inequality (Hoyt et al., 2018). For example, Anderson and Singer (2008) found that the negative effect of inequality on support for democratic political systems is particularly powerful among individuals on the political left. Further, because anti-Muslim attitudes are associated with the extreme right, and is more common among people who align with right wing politics in general (Zick, Küpper and Höverman, 2011: 95), this may be an important variable to control for.

Third, we included a measure of *national pride*, that is, whether the respondent is proud to be citizen of their country, with response categories ranging from 1) Not at all proud to 4) Very proud. National pride can, like religious identity, be an ideological justification or motivating factor for supporting political violence. In democratic countries, national identity is often tied up with ideas about democracy and democratic values (Moore, 2003). Some previous studies (Hainmuller and Hopkins, 2014; Obaidi et al., 2018; Sides and Citrin, 2007) have also found that public opinion on immigration and Muslims, is associated with concerns about national identity, more than economic concerns.

The survey also asked respondents to indicate to what extent they felt *in control of their own life*, on a scale from 1) a great deal of control to 10) not at all in control. The theory of compensatory control (Kay et al., 2008; Kay and Eibach, 2013) argues that 'when people experience random, threatening events they defensively embrace ideologies that restore their faith in internal or external sources of

control in their lives' (Kay and Eibach, 2013: 581). Low personal control could thus in some circumstances increase adherence to and support for extreme ideologies, but in others increase support for the political system and democratically elected government (Kay et al., 2008; Kay and Eibach, 2013), as these are both external sources of control. Insecurity and low personal control could also increase the need to belong to a group (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Fritsche et al., 2013), which is another mechanism through which lack of control could increase outgroup hostility, and justification for political violence.

Postmaterialism is a value orientation that emphasises self-expression and quality of life over economic and physical security, and is arguably more prominent in contexts where the fulfilment of material needs can be taken for granted (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson, 1999; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The postmaterialist values index is based on two variables, where respondents were asked to indicate the most and second most important priorities from a list of four: 1) maintaining order in the nation, 2) giving people more say in important government decisions, 3) fighting rising prices, 4) protecting freedom of speech. According to the choice of materialistic (1 and 3) or postmaterialistic (2 and 4) aims, respondents were coded as materialistic or postmaterialistic. Those who chose one of each were coded as mixed. There was a slight difference in the wording of the question in the different surveys. In the EVS 2008 it was specified that this was aims for the country for the next 10 years, whereas in EVS 2017 respondents were given no context and simply asked which aim they would say was most (and second most) important if they had to choose). According to Inglehart (1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), an increase in postmaterialist values gives rise to growing support for democracy. Those who hold postmaterialist values are also more likely to be tolerant to Muslims (Kaya, 2015).

Bivariate correlations between each of the dependent and all the independent variables in the model for under 30 year olds can be found in Tables 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1 respectively. There are no individual level variable correlations between predictors larger than .3 in EVS 2017 for under 30 year olds. The largest correlations are between Religion important and Reverse GDP (.36), and between Religion important and Reverse WGI (.30). For the 30 year olds and over, similarly there were no individual level variable correlations larger than .3, and the largest correlation was between Religion important and Reverse GDP (.31). The results are similar for the sample when the Muslim respondents are excluded.

In EVS 2008 reverse GDP and WGI are both correlated with household income above .4, WGI and Religion important above .3 for the under 30 year olds. For the 30 years and older group, reverse GDP and WGI are both correlated with household income above .5 (.54 and .51 respectively), and reverse social welfare spending and MIPEX and correlated with reverse household income above .3 This is similar for the non-Muslim sample.

2.2.2 The World Values Survey 2010-2014

The World Values Survey (WVS) gathers a network of social scientists collecting data and studying changes in socio-political, economic, but also psychological values over time in multiple countries (WVS 2020). The study has been conducted in multiple waves, with wave six data (2010-2014) containing data relevant for our analyses (Inglehart et al., 2014). Unlike the EVS, WVS also includes many non-European countries, with larger variability in socio-political and economic country-level variables, which makes it more likely to detect culturally specific mechanisms underlying radicalisation. In line with this, the analyses conducted on the WVS were done on Muslim and Christian samples separately to distinguish possible differences in the relationship between inequality, attitudes and radicalisation with respect to religious affiliation. This means people of other religions and no religion in the WVS were not analysed here.

Attitudes to political violence were measured using a question which asked if participants considered violence against other people justifiable. The variable was measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 'never justified' (1) to 'always justified' (10). After excluding participants who provided incomplete

answers, the distribution of the variable looked extremely skewed towards condemning the use of violence, which could represent problems for quantitative analyses that rely on the assumption of a normally distributed dependent variable. In order to minimise the negative effects on the validity of statistical analyses, the variable was recoded into three categories: the first category was composed of the participants who thought violence was never an option, the second category, named 'rarely', was composed of individuals who provided answers 2 and 3, while the third category, called 'sometimes', was composed of individuals who provided other, larger estimates.

The WVS (2010-14) has four questions regarding *Anti-democratic attitudes*, asking respondents their opinion of how good or bad certain government types are for a country (i.e. having a strong leader, expert decision-makers, army rule and democratic multiparty system). Participants provided answers on a four-point scale ranging from very good (1) to very bad (4). However, as the factor analysis revealed that the four items do not measure the same construct, only the item related to democracy was used in further analyses[4].

Gender and *age* were used as control factors in the analyses conducted. Since WVS is not focused on youth, it was divided into two parts to allow comparison of findings: youth (15-29) and adult (30+) subsamples. Moreover, two subsamples were drawn from each of these subsamples: one with participants belonging to Christian denominations (44.15% of the total sample that provided answers on the relevant variables) and another with Muslim participants (15.75% of the total sample that provided answers on the relevant variables). This resulted in four subsets of data that were used in further analyses: Muslim youth, Muslim adults, Christian youth and Christian adults.

Multiple variables related to economic status and opportunities of participants were included in this study. *Satisfaction with income* was measured using a question which asked participants to estimate how satisfied with the situation in their household they were. The participants could respond on a scale from (1) completely dissatisfied to (10) completely satisfied. *Income level* was measured also using a 10-level scale, with higher values indicating higher level of household income. *Employment/in education* status was measured with an item which asked participants about their current occupation. Although it initially had 8 levels it was recoded into two: one denoting that the participant is employed or in education, and others indicating the remaining options (retired, housewife, unemployed and other).

Of socio-political inequality, *experience of discrimination* was measured using two items: one related to police interfering in private life of citizens and one related to racist behaviour in the neighbourhood, both measured on a 1-4 scale with higher values indicating lower frequency. The two variables were recoded into a single index where higher values indicated more frequent discrimination.

Town size was measured using interviewers' codes, which ranged from small towns or villages (under 2000 citizens, 1)) to large cities (more than 500000 citizens, 8)).

Several variables were also used to measure additional, possibly relevant attitudes. *Importance of religion* was measured using a question which asked how important religion was to participants, ranging from (1) Very important) to (4) Not at all important. This variable was used to distinguish between active religious participants and those who declare themselves as members of a denomination, but do not consider this aspect of social identity as salient. *Political orientation* was

[4] The conducted confirmatory factor analysis with robust maximum likelihood estimator on the entire sample (with the first loading fixed to 1) pointed out that the fit of democracy-autocracy dimension is marginal ($\chi 2/df$ = 338.58, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .03). However, insight into factor loadings revealed that support for democracy does not actually play an important role in forming the results of this factor (λ = -.12). In such a situation, in order to retain maximum construct validity of the dependent variable, only the question regarding democracy as a political system was retained.

measured using a scale that lets participants place themselves on the political left (1) or right (10). *Citizenship pride* was also included and measured on a 1-5 scale with higher values indicating lower pride in being a citizen of a country. The *Postmaterialist* index was also included in the study, and its pre-computed version available from the dataset was used to distinguish between participants who were materialist (1), mixed (2) and postmaterialist (3) oriented. Finally, *control over life* was also included in the study. It was measured on a 1-10 scale with higher values indicating more freedom in life.

2.2.3 The European Social Survey 2014

The European Social Survey (ESS) is a high-quality cross-sectional survey. The 7th round, collected in 2014, included 21 countries. The survey is administered by a team of academics and social research professionals, in collaboration with partners in all the participating countries. The samples are representative of each country's adult population (aged 15 and over) resident within private households and the typical response rates are between 50 and 70 per cent in each country and wave. The questionnaire is designed in English and translated by each national team.

The ESS 2014 includes a variable on anti-Muslim attitudes. *Opposition to Muslim immigration* is measured by asking whether Muslims should be allowed to come and live in the country. Respondents are asked to answer on a scale of 1 to 4 where 1 is 'allow many' and 4 is 'allow none'.

This variable does not clearly distinguish between general anti-immigration sentiment and anti-Muslim sentiment. However, there is another question about immigration of 'people of a different race or ethnic group from the majority' in the dataset that we can use to examine whether there are people who are otherwise positive to immigration but who are specifically negative to Muslim immigration. We created an additional variable where we subtract the opposition to immigration of people of a different race or ethnic group from their opposition to Muslim immigration. The result is a binary variable where 1 is someone who *specifically opposes Muslim immigration*, but who would not mind other minority groups immigrating, and 0 is someone who is equally or more negative to other groups.

The sociodemographic variables in the model include *age, gender*, and whether the *parents and / or respondent was born abroad*. The variables relevant for economic inequality include whether the respondent is in paid *work or education*, and *feelings about household income*[5] on a four point scale ranging from (1) Living comfortably on present income to (4) Finding it very difficult on present income. Respondents are also asked how often they experienced severe *financial difficulties in the family growing up* on a 5 point scale from (1) Never to (5) Always.

To measure socio-political disadvantage or 'inequality', we include a binary measure of whether the respondent perceives themselves as a *member of a group that is discriminated against* in the country. The final variable from ESS is a measure of *low political influence*. This is derived by taking the mean of 6 observed variables, which all ask slightly different questions about the respondent's perceived influence in politics. This includes questions of whether politicians would listen or care about what they had to say as well as the respondent's confidence in their own skills and abilities to participate in politics. For details of question wordings see the variable list in Appendix 1, Table A1.6 A Cronbach's alpha of 0.86 indicates internal reliability between the observed variables that went into the measure, they all load on one factor in a principal factor analysis, and have similar bivariate correlations with attitudes to Muslim immigration (between -.23 and -.29).

All analysis is conducted on the sample of non-Muslims under 30 years old. The largest bivariate correlations between individual level variables are between feelings about household income and

[5] There is also a variable of household income measured in deciles relative to the national average. However, this had more than 10 000 missing values (almost 3000 under 30 year olds), and was excluded in favour of a more subjective measure.

financial difficulty (.38). The largest correlations are between Gini and reverse GDP (.45) and reverse WGI (.39) respectively.

2.2.4 Eurobarometer 2015

The Eurobarometer is a survey programme conducted on behalf of the European Commission which monitors public opinion in the European Union (EU) member countries. The surveys consist of standard modules and special topic modules. The standard modules address attitudes towards European unification, institutions and policies, general socio-political orientations, as well as respondent and household demographics. The Eurobarometer 83.4 (2015), includes the standard modules and covers the following special topics: (1) Climate Change, (2) Biodiversity, (3) and Discrimination of Minority Groups.

The data was collected between 30 May and 8 June 2015, the sample was drawn using a multi-stage, random probability design, and is representative of the whole territory of the countries surveyed and, according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective nationalities, in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. All interviews were conducted face-to-face in respondents' homes and in the appropriate national language.

The survey asks two questions about attitudes to Muslims. Respondents are asked to what extent they are *comfortable with having a colleague who is Muslim*, and their *child being in a love relationship with a Muslim person* (as well as other ethnic, religious and minority groups). The questions ask them to imagine their response regardless of their employment situation or whether or not they have children. The response categories for both questions range from (1) totally comfortable to (10) not at all comfortable[6].

The sociodemographic variables in the model include *age, gender*, and whether the respondent is an *ethnic or religious minority*, and whether they live in an *urban or rural area*. The individual level economic variables include whether the respondent is in paid *work or education* and how often they find it *difficult to pay their bills*, as well as how they would describe their *social class* on a five point scale from (1) higher class to (5) working class.

To measure (perceived) socio-political inequality we include a question on whether the respondent has *experienced discrimination* on any grounds, and to what extent they agree that their *voice counts* in their country from (1) Totally agree to (4) Totally disagree.

The bivariate correlation between individual level variables and social distance to Muslims are generally small (see Table 5.1). The largest correlation between the predictors included in the same model is between the Gini coefficient and reverse WGI (.44). There are no other bivariate correlations among the predictors larger than 0.3.

2.2.5 International Social Survey Programme 2008

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 2008) is a cross-national collaboration, which has been conducting annual surveys since 1985. Each annual survey is made up of a Basic Questionnaire, and a module questionnaire, with a specific topic. The module for the 2008 survey was Religion. Each national sample of about 2000 respondents is representative of the population. The data collection is managed by research institutions in each country, and the exact sampling method and mode of data collection varies between countries. There is a question about attitude to Muslims where respondents are asked 'What is your personal attitude towards members of the following religious groups?' and lists a series of religious groups, including Muslims. The response categories range from (1) Very positive to (5) Very negative. The question was only asked in 20 out of the 40 countries in the survey.

[6] Two more spontaneous response categories 'Indifferent' and 'It depends' were included in the scale, as category 5 and 6 respectively.

This survey, because it mostly concerns religion, and the basic questionnaire is relatively short, has fewer of the variables than are available in the other surveys. The socio-demographics available are age, gender and the type of community the respondent lives in ranging from a urban, a big city (1) to (5) rural, farm or home in the country. To measure economic disadvantage, we also include a binary variable of employment status, whether or not they are in work or study. Finally there is a measure of social class which asks respondents to place themselves on a 1-10 point scale from the top (1) to the bottom (10) groups in society. There were no measures of socio-political disadvantage available in the dataset[7]. There is a measure of ethnicity, but it was only available in 11 countries, and was coded differently in all of them. It is worth noting that the question wording in this survey varies not only according to language but also in the meaning conveyed. For example, some countries ask about current employment status, while others ask about 'main activity last week'. For details see ISSP (2008).

The bivariate correlation between predictor variables and attitudes to Muslims are generally very small (see Table 5.1). The Gini coefficient is not included in models with other country level variables for the ISSP analysis, as the correlations are above 0.5 with welfare spending, reverse GDP and reverse WGI. There are no other bivariate correlations larger than 0.3 among predictors.

2.2.6 MYPLACE 2012-2013

MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement) was an FP7 EU-funded project which ran from 2011 to 2015, and focused on investigating youth socio-political participation in the context of (former) totalitarianism and populism in Europe by combining quantitative and qualitative research methods (MYPLACE, 2015). Within the project, a survey was conducted in 2012 on two locations within each of the 14 participating countries (with an exception of Germany where four locations were included). The sample consisted of 16935 young citizens of European countries that were born between 1986 and 1997 representative for 30 locations. Its wide coverage of European countries and multi-item measures of relevant dependent variables were the main arguments in favour of their its inclusion into this study. However, due to missing values, results of only 8583 participants, of which 664 were Muslims, were used in the analyses. All the locations remained present in the sample, with lowest number of cases remaining in Lieksa and Nurmes (n = 84) and highest number in Jena (n = 500).

General support for *political violence* was calculated using the confirmatory factor analysis, as this approach allows testing for cross-country stability and comparability of the results, based on eight items related to specific forms of political violence (to protect workplaces from closing, to protect human rights, to stop global warming, to stop poverty, to protect one's own ethnic group, to keep a stable government, to overthrow government and to respect and protect animal rights). Each of the items was measured on a 1-5 scale with larger values indicating less support for political violence. Results of the common factor were multiplied by -1, resulting in higher values indicating more support for political violence. The reliability of the scale was high (α = .92).

Although four items in the MYPLACE questionnaire measured attitudes towards autocratic and democratic government systems (how good they were for a country), confirmatory factor analysis failed to confirm their single-factor structure. Therefore, only items related to democratic system ('having a democratic, multi-party system' and 'having the opposition that can freely express their opinions') were used as operationalisation of *anti-democratic attitudes*. Both were measured on a 1-4 scale with higher value indicating more negative opinion on the presented option. Two variables were moderately correlated (r = .40) and were averaged to get the final score, and this average was

[7] There is a measure of ethnicity, but it was only available in 11 countries, and was coded differently in all of them.

subtracted by 1 in order to get more interpretable results, so the final score can range from 0 to 3, where higher values indicate more antidemocratic attitudes.

Anti-Muslim attitudes were measured using two items: 'Muslims positively contribute to the society' and 'It is OK to be suspicious towards Muslims'. Answers were provided on a 1-5 scale, with higher values indicating less agreement with the statement. Due to the moderate negative correlation between the two items (r = -.45), the second item was recoded and the two items were averaged. In order to make the result easier to interpret, 1 was subtracted from the average, creating a scale ranging from (0) positive attitude to (4) negative attitude towards Mulsim. Muslims were excluded from the sample while conducting this analysis.

Of socio-demographic variables, *gender* and *age* (in form of year of birth) were measured for all participants. Several variables related to economic status of the participants were included into the research design. Participants provided answers regarding their current occupation, which was recoded into a dichotomous variable indicating whether a participant was *employed or in education* or not, allowing an estimate of the individual's position on the job market. Furthermore, *coping with income* was measured using an item that asked participants to select a statement that describes their life with current income best, ranging from living comfortably (1) to having lots of difficulties (4). *Earlier socio-economic status* was also measured as a combination of employment status of parents and their level of education. Parents' level of education was measured using the ISCED classification, while employment status offered several options that were recoded into two: employed (originally employed or self-employed) and unemployed (unemployed or not present in the household). The combined variable was multiplied by -1 in order for higher values to indicate lower SES at participant's age of 14.

Experience of (different forms of) *threat* was also measured. Participants were asked if they had ever felt threatened because of their support for a specific political movement, belonging to an ethnic or religious minority, sexual orientation, belonging to a specific subculture or gender, and, if they had experienced such threats, they were offered responses of never (1), sometimes (2) or often (3). These variables were recoded into a single dichotomous index, where 0 indicated that the participant never felt threatened, while 1 indicated that the participant felt threatened at least sometimes in some domain. We used this variable as a measure of perceived socio-political inequality.

2.2.7 Young in Oslo 2015

Another youth survey we include is the Young in Oslo survey from 2015, which surveyed more than 20000 16-22 year old school pupils in 30 high schools ('videregående skole') in Oslo, Norway[8] (Andersen & Bakken, 2015). Pupils from every year (the normal duration of schooling at this level is three years full time), in all state schools (excluding a few specialist schools), and most private schools were included in the survey, and the response rate was 72% at high school level. This makes it a comprehensive survey of all school pupils in Oslo aged 16-18/22 years old. While this survey is only representative of a particular time and place, it was included in our study because it includes some focused questions on young people and political violence which are particularly relevant to radicalisation. The survey was financed by Oslo Municipality and is archived at NOVA Norwegian Social Research, at Oslo Metropolitan University.

The survey has three general questions about *justifying political violence*: 1) 'to attract attention to an important political cause', 2) 'to achieve political change in Norway', and 3) 'to achieve political change elsewhere in Europe'. They all had a 5-point response scale from 1) Not at all to 5) To a very great

[8] The full survey included an additional 12,449 pupils from secondary schools ('ungdomsskole') aged 13-16, but these were not asked questions about political violence, and were thus excluded from this analysis.

extent[9]. These three variables are strongly correlated with one another[10], and have a Cronbach's alpha of .91. They were combined into a single variable by taking the mean value of all three.

Furthermore, there are two questions about *young people's involvement in the war in Syria*. One question asks whether the respondents 'sympathise with young people who have gone to fight the war in Syria using violent means', and the other asks the same question, about 'nonviolent means'. The 5-point answer scales are the same as for the more general questions. We use justifying political violence in general and support for violence in Syria in particular as two separate outcome variables for regression analysis. Support for non-violent involvement in Syria is included as a control variable in the latter model, to attempt to distinguish between support for violence per se, and support for active involvement in the war in general.

The socio-demographic variables, are *age* (between 16 and 22) and *gender*, and a binary variable of whether the *parents are born abroad*. Because the question about Syria in particular is presumably more relevant for the Muslim youth, and because the dataset contains a large Muslim sample (3472 respondents), we also control for *religious affiliation* in the model, with dummy variables Christian, Muslim, and other religion, with no religion as the reference category.

Economic variables include whether the *family has been struggling financially* over the past two years on a five point scale from (1) Our finances have been good the whole time to (5) Our finances have been bad the whole time. In addition, there is a question about expectations for the future, and specifically whether the respondent *expects to be unemployed* at any time. The three answer categories are yes, no and don't know, and because more than 40% answered don't know we included this as a middle category (2) between no (1) and yes (3), rather than missing. They are also asked about their *mother and father's work*, and this was coded into a variable of three categories indicating whether (1) both parents, (2) one parent, or (3) neither parent works.

To measure socio-political inequality we include a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent has been a *victim of harassment or violence* in the past 12 months. This is a variable derived from six more specific questions about online and offline harassment, and different degrees of violence. For details see the variable list in Appendix 1, Table A1.5. We also included a similar variable derived from six questions specifically concerning *dislike, discrimination, harassment and hate crimes* on the basis of the respondent's immigrant or religious background. The four answer categories in the derived variable range from (0) No to (4) Threatened or attacked. These questions were originally asked only of those who had two parents born abroad. However, in order to include this measure on the analysis of the whole sample, those without immigrant background (i.e. at least one Norwegian parent) were coded as having no experience of discrimination on the basis of their immigrant background.

Finally, we also include two attitudinal variables in a second model with a smaller number of respondents, as these were only asked of 1/3 of the sample. The first is a self-assessed political orientation on a scale from (1) extreme left to (10) extreme right. The second is a statement about there being a war between Islam and the West, which the respondent is invited to agree or disagree with on a four-point scale. Finally, in the analysis of support for Norwegian foreign fighters in Syria, we also include a question about people travelling to Syria to help using nonviolent means.

The highest bivariate correlation are .51 between Muslim and parents born abroad, .41 between Muslim and parents no job. There is also a correlation of .39 between sympathy for young people who have gone to fight in Syria using violent and nonviolent means. For correlations with the outcome variables, see Table 3.1.

[9] 'Don't know' responses were treated as missing

[10] Pearson's R (1-2) .82 P<.001, (1-3) .75 P<.001, (2-3) .80 P<.001

2.2.8 Country level variables

While we can to some extent measure perceived social and economic disadvantage at an individual level, in order to assess the effect of *inequality* per se, we need to look at the macro-level. The only direct measure we have of country-level inequality that is available in enough countries and years to be included in the analysis here is the Gini coefficient.

The Gini coefficient, also known as the Gini index and Gini ratio, is the most commonly used measure of income inequality (Gastwirth, 2017). It was designed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912, to be a single summary measure of unequal distribution of incomes. It compares the distribution of income in a society (a Lorenz curve showing the cumulative share of income for the poorest x percentage of the population) with a similar society in which everyone earned exactly the same amount (45 degree line). Inequality on the Gini scale varies between 0, where everybody has equal income, and 1, where all the country's income is allocated to a single person (Osberg, 2017). There are several limitations to this measure. It has attracted criticism for focusing on relative income distributions rather than real levels of poverty and prosperity (Osberg, 2017). It is also important to note that Gini coefficients are not unique. It is possible for two different income distributions to give rise to the same Gini coefficient (Gini index, 2020; Osberg, 2017). When used to measure change in inequality over time, it has also been criticised for being overly sensitive to changes in some parts of the distribution than others (Gastwirth, 2017). There are alternative measures of inequality, such as the Palma ratio of the income share of the top 10% to that of the bottom 40%, which attempt to rectify these issues, and which have become more widely used (Cobham, Schlögl & Sumner, 2016). However, this measure is not available in enough countries and years to include in the analysis of the datasets we are interested in. It should, however, be noted that it is possible that some forms of inequality not captured by the Gini coefficient would significantly impact on the outcome variables we are analysing here.

An additional issue is that the Gini coefficient can be calculated in slightly different ways, and different organisations use slightly different measures. For this reason, for the datasets prior to 2012 (i.e. EVS, 2008 and ISSP, 2008), we use a combined measure from a dataset called 'All the Ginis' which combines and standardises measures from eight different sources from 1950 to 2012 (All the Ginis Dataset, 2013). These are the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Socio-Economic Database for Latin America (SEDLAC), Survey of Living Conditions (SILC) by Eurostat, World Income Distribution, World Bank Europe and Central Asia dataset, World Institute for Development Research (WIDER), World Bank Povcal, and Ginis from individual long-term inequality studies (Milanovic, 2014).

For the more recent datasets, EVS 2017, Eurobarometer 2015 and WVS 2010, we use the World Bank measure (Gini index, 2020), as it had the most data points from the most number of relevant countries and years. Data are based on primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. For the Eurobarometer all of the Gini coefficients are from 2015, except Bulgaria from 2014. For the EVS 2017, not all the countries are up to date, but with the exception of Albania (2012) and Bulgaria (2014), the measures are all from the period 2015-2017. For the ESS 2014, we use Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income 2014 (from Eurostat) which was already included in the downloadable dataset (ESS, 2014).

Welfare and redistribution of resources can be seen as an alternative indicator of socio-economic inequality. While it may not measure inequality per se (as the Gini does) it does indicate the efforts and willingness of the state to reduce inequality and the impact of inequality, through social welfare to those in need (Ebert, 2007; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Gärtner and Prado, 2016; Obst, 2013). To capture this, we included a measure of expenditure on social protection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This measure, from Eurostat (2019) includes pensions, disability, housing unemployment and child benefits as well as other forms of social protection financed by taxes. The measure is reversed, such that higher values indicate that a lower percentage of the GDP is spent on welfare.

A third country level measure is GDP per capita. This is a country's total economic output divided by its population. This measure is the most widely used measure of national economic growth and performance. However, it is also controversial, as it has been misleadingly used to indicate national living standards and even wellbeing. It is important to note that GDP is a measure of the market value of goods and services produced and traded in a country during a given year. It does not say anything about how wealth is spread across the population or whether the expenditures that are added up are for activities that reduce or increase welfare (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2010). It moreover does not take unpaid labour or the cost of living into account. Hence it is here used in combination with the other measures as an indication of the size of a country's economy. The measure used here comes from the World Bank, and has been converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States (GDP per capita, PPP 2020). We use a reverse measure of GDP per capita such that higher values indicate lower GDP.

In addition to economic factors, socio-political insecurity and instability is another possible driver of radicalisation. While this tends to be associated with economic growth, it is plausible that it may play a more important role than economic variables in shaping attitudes about political systems, including democracy, intergroup relations and use of political violence. We include the mean of *The World Governance indicators* (WGI) as a measure of the quality of governance at the country level in the models. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, 2020; 2019) are composite governance indicators which have been collected annually since 1996, based on over 30 underlying data sources. These include surveys of households and firms, commercial business information providers, non-governmental organisations, and public sector organisations. These data sources are rescaled and combined to create the six aggregate indicators using a statistical methodology known as an unobserved components model. The six dimensions covered by the World Governance Indicators are (I) Voice and Accountability; (II) Political Stability and Absence of Violence; (III) Government Effectiveness; (IV) Regulatory Quality; (V) Rule of Law; and (VI) Control of Corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011; WGI, 2020; 2019). The original values range from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating higher quality of governance. Because these are strongly correlated with one another[11], we use a mean of all six as a summary measure of governance quality. We also reversed the score by multiplying it by -1, such that higher values indicate lower quality of governance.

Finally we include a measure of between group social inequality, through an index of immigrant integration policies. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, 2015) measures integration outcomes, integration policies, and contextual factors that can impact policy effectiveness and evaluations of policy effects, against international equality standards. It is designed to measure to what extent immigrants have equal opportunities to lead dignified, independent and active lives as the rest of the population, across eight policy areas: 1) labour market mobility, 2) family reunion, 3) education, 4) political participation, 5) long-term residence, 6) access to nationality, 7) anti-discrimination and 8) health. This may be a particularly important variable for accounting for country differences in Anti-Muslim attitudes (Green et al., 2019). However, it is important to note that the measure is only available for some of the countries. It should further be noted that the latest MIPEX is available for 2014, hence it may be slightly outdated for the analysis of the Eurobarometer 2015 and EVS 2017 data. The original index has values from 0 to 100 where 100 is most favourable policies to integration. However, it has been reversed in our analysis (by multiplying it by -1) such that higher values represent fewer or less effective integration policies.

[11] All Pearson's correlations between the WGI indicators are above 0.6 in EVS 2008, above 0.7 in EVS2017, and above 0.8 in ISSP 2008.

It should be noted that most of the country level measures are strongly correlated with one another[12]. Simply put, wealthier countries also tend to be better governed, and these countries also spend on average more on welfare and migrant integration. Because the country level measures are so strongly correlated, they have to be analysed separately. The only exception is the Gini coefficient, which in most of the dataset has sufficiently low bivariate correlations with the other country measures to be included in all the models. The multicollinearity between these measures means that if we find relationships between the country level and outcome variables, we cannot necessarily determine which is the most influential factor, or if the relationship is the result of another unobserved variable that is associated with all of them, for example living standards, population health or cultural differences.

2.3 Model design

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, we use hierarchical linear regression models on all the international datasets where individuals are clustered in localities / countries. Young in Oslo is the only dataset where we conduct single level regression models.

We have conducted separate analyses for each outcome variable. In some cases we have conducted more than one piece of analysis per dataset per outcome, because there are two variables in the dataset which represents that outcome which cannot be combined. This is the case for general and specific attitudes to Muslims in the EVS and ESS, and general and specific attitudes to Political violence in Young in Oslo.

We have tried, as closely as possible, to match the variables for all the datasets, as a similar model better enables us to compare the results. However, we also wanted to balance this concern with making use of the variety of variables and strengths of each dataset within the time and resource constraints of the project. To this end we have two basic model designs, which we can call Model design A and Model design B, which are detailed below. The Young in Oslo analysis is an exception to both of these. For details about this analysis see the section about this dataset above.

Model design A is the most basic analysis conducted on the MYPLACE, ESS, Eurobarometer and ISSP data. This analysis is conducted only on respondents aged under 30 years old. Model design A includes one null model (in the case of the multilevel models), where we determine the proportion of the variance accounted for by individual level and contextual level differences. The first model is a random intercept, fixed slope model[13], where we include individual level variables of interest (economic and socio-political disadvantage) and individual control variables (sociodemographic variables). In the second model (with the exception of EVS and WVS – see below) we include random slopes[14] across all variables where this improved the model. To determine the model specification, variables were included as random slopes one by one, and those that were a significant improvement in fit from likelihood ratio test (P<.05) compared to the random intercept, fixed slopes model were included as random slopes. Finally, we included country level variables – first Gini, then adding reverse welfare expenditure, GDP, WGI and MIPEX one by one in separate models.

[12] A number of other country level measures were considered for inclusion, including unemployment rates, the Palma ratio, the Human Development Index, and the Freedom of the World Index. These were excluded from the final analysis on the basis that they were either unavailable in a large number of countries and years, or even more strongly correlated with the other country level measures.

[13] This is a model in which *intercepts* (i.e. the value of the outcome variable when the predictor variables are set to 0) are allowed to vary between groups (in this case countries or locations). The model assumes that *slopes* (i.e. the size of the effect of each predictor variable) are the same across different groups.

[14] This is a more complex model in which the *slopes* (i.e. the size of the effect of each predictor variable) as well as the *intercepts* (i.e. the value of the outcome variable when the predictor variables are set to 0) are allowed to vary between different groups (in this case countries or locations).

Model design B is conducted on the EVS 2008 and 2017 and WVS 2010 data. These datasets were chosen for this more complex analysis because they cover a wide range of countries and years and have similar survey question wordings. Here we conduct separate analysis on those aged under 30 and over 30 to allow for comparison between them. Moreover, we include five attitudinal variables (left-right political orientation, importance of religion in life, national pride, low control over life, and postmaterialist values) first in a random intercept, fixed slope model (Model 2) and, and then in the random intercept, random slope models (Model 3+), including country level variables in the same way as in Model design A. Note that we test all the results for the latter models excluding the attitudinal variables for comparison, and report on any major discrepancies.

Because of the interest in anti-Islamist and Islamist radicalisation specifically, we also conducted separate analysis in the WVS 2010 data on Muslims and Christian samples. We cannot include religious denomination as a control variable in most of the datasets because the numbers of each religious denomination vary too much across countries, and the numbers of Muslims are simply too small in most of the samples (especially once the sample is restricted to those under 30) to be meaningful for multilevel analysis. The WVS was the only dataset with enough countries with enough Muslims in the sample to conduct the analysis in this way.

3. Support for political violence

Although the tradition of studying political violence may be very long, the line of research that found its way into the modern study of political violence and terrorism stems from the beginning of the second half of the 20th century (Bosi and Malthaner, 2015). The emerging paradigm of political violence as 'protests by other means' (Apter, 1997; Tilly, 1986, as cited in Bosi and Malthaner, 2015) has allowed a deeper insight into political violence through the lens of social movement perspective. This deviation from early paradigms that observed political violence as social pathology or *sui generis* phenomenon has shed new light on the contextual dimensions of the construct. Another big change occurred in the 1990s, when it became apparent that large-scale conflicts had less to do with 'ancient hatreds', to which it had previously been attributed, and more to do with powerful actors who fostered the growth of minor differences and conflicts into brutal wars in order to achieve political goals (Valentino, 2014). These insights allowed a broader approach to political violence as the focus shifted from minor episodes of violence and groups of actors towards grasping major, state-level actors and conflicts as well. This shift can also be observed in the definitions of political violence; 1960s definitions were focused on violent groups, but not states, as perpetrators (Nieburg, 1969; Gurr, 1970; all as cited in Zimmerman, 2017). This change permitted the discovery of a close relationship between wars and political violence and description of political violence as 'war by other means' (Valentino, 2000, p. 47) and 'a hallmark of weakly institutionalized polities' (Besley and Persson, 2010: 1).

In this chapter, both due to data availability, and our interest in individual radicalisation, we focus on political violence conducted against the state or groups, with an exception of WVS where political violence is operationalised as 'violence against other people'. Although such operationalisation could convey a plethora of forms of violence, in line with the goal of testing the models in multiple databases to obtain robust results, it was included in the study. Firstly, the key concepts are defined, along with their established covariates and possible predictors in the form of inequality. Finally, the analyses of large-scale surveys are presented.

3.1 What is political violence?

Many theorists have attempted to discern the characteristics of political violence, resulting in multiple definitions, which have changed through time. Moreover, the complexity of phenomenon has often been adjusted during operationalisations to the needs of 'counterterrorism business' (Goodwin, 2004: 259), unjustly narrowing the focus on only the most devastating forms of political violence like terrorist attacks and ignoring the rest of the spectrum of political violence. In order to provide a more

comprehensive overview of the construct, a meta-definition was formed from several definitions that have guided studies during the last few decades.

The common element of all definitions is that *political violence is a form of collective violence focused on political enemies*, as explicitly highlighted by Della Porta (2006) and Valentino (2014), based on *morally doubtful and dehumanizing rationale* (see Apter, 1997). It represents only *one of many available political strategies* of those applying it (Apter, 1997; Della Porta, 2006; Bosi and Malthaner, 2015), can exist in forms of *physical, psychological or symbolic attacks* and be used by *groups of citizens against the political system or dominant group* (e.g. riots, Gurr, 1970; Nieburg, 1969; both as cited in Zimmerman, 2013) or *vice-versa* (e.g. laws that allow torture of political prisoners; Bosi and Malthaner, 2015). *Many contextual and individual factors, as well as their interactions, can foster the development* (Apter, 1997; Bosi and Malthaner, 2015; Nieburg, 1969, as cited in Zimmerman, 2013, Kalyvas, 2003) and *define a specific form* of applied political violence (Apter, 1997; Della Porta, 2006). It can be *planned or occur spontaneously* (e.g. non-violent protests that turn violent; Apter, 1997; Della Porta, 2006), targeting *individuals or property*, while its general goal is to *influence an audience to conduct or resist a structural (social, political or cultural) change* (Apter, 1997; Bosi and Malthaner, 2015).

Regardless of its specifications and role as conveyer of sometimes positive change that is out of bounds of mainstream politics (Apter, 1997), its two characteristics remain stable: firstly, its *acceptability even in best cases remains questionable*, and secondly, political violence *always stems from something* (Della Porta, 2006), which implies that adequate and timely reactions to its causes may be used in prevention of its incidence.

3.2 Measurement (and mismeasurement) of support for political violence

Although there are many studies that focus on political violence, consideration of its measurement reveals that there still might be some room for improvement, both regarding validity and reliability of obtained data. Due to the limitations of this review, only the most prominent examples will be provided (for more detailed discussions, see Bowling, 2005; Diamantopolous et al., 2012; Sarstedt and Wilczynski, 2009).

Political violence in the context of radicalisation studies based on surveys was often measured directly as support for (various kinds of) political violence, with previous violent behaviours or intentions being assessed in fewer cases (Franc and Pavlović, 2018). Single item operationalisation of constructs of interest might represent a problem in terms of validity, as obtained results may be relevant only for the specifically mentioned element of the construct. For instance, although single-item measures of positive attitudes towards a specific terrorist group may be informative, they do not discern if participants support the goals of the group or its methods, and even if they did, they would still fail to explain if the respondent is just a passive supporter or a potential participant in violence (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017; Ofosu and Tesfaye, 2018). Single-item measures also pose problems in terms of reliability, as respondents may not categorise their attitudes in a single item as precisely as they would if the scale had multiple items. This, in turn, leads to more non-systematic variability and lowers the odds of finding a significant difference if it exists (i.e. inflates the type II error), especially if the number of possible responses is low.

Returning to the question of validity, the quality of items should be considered just as much as their quantity. Although face validity is usually beneficial as participants may clearly see what they are answering, it introduces the problem of social desirability that is especially present in studies of violence (for detailed discussions, see Saunders, 1991; Sugarman and Hotaling, 1997; Vigil-Colet et al., 2012). This could be an issue for the study of political violence as well; several authors have noted that relationships between observed phenomena and political violence differ depending on whether the violence is measured directly or indirectly (Fair et al., 2018; Ofosu and Tesfaye, 2018). Therefore, results obtained in surveys from direct questions about the respondents' willingness to justify political

violence are inclined to be downward-biased, which also hinders the probability of finding significant differences or relationships. In the most extreme cases, more than 95% of participants simply state that they would never support any form of political violence, which, due to low variability, prevents us from conducting any of the more sophisticated statistical analyses. This might be one of the reasons we observe weak effects and inconsistencies among the results.

An additional question that should be raised regarding validity is related to what we are measuring and on which population. According to cognitive psychologists, although all of us can observe the same reality, not all of us interpret it in the same way nor relate it to similar cognitions (for more detailed discussion, see Sternberg, 2005). This means that although all respondents can read the same stimulus (e.g. term 'political violence'), not all of them will understand it in the same way. Political violence is a complex construct, as evident from attempts to define or classify it discussed above. This only magnifies the problem as some respondents may associate 'political violence' with minor violent protests while other think of revolutions, wars or assassinations. Moreover, some participants may support violence against property, but not against humans, while others may support 'revolutions of the oppressed' but find violent protests brutal and primitive. A third group may consider violence completely inappropriate except in one or two specific situations, while a fourth group may perceive suicide terrorist attacks as acts of martyrdom, not violence. Many distinctions could be made at this point, however, a simple variable measuring 'support for political violence' is clearly not sufficient to grasp the complete variability of opinions.

One study has shown that targets of political violence should also be taken into account as socio-political inequality is more likely to lead to attacks against the government, while economic inequality was related to higher risk of both civil and communal conflict (Hillesund, 2018). This distinction was interpreted in terms of agents of change and blame assignment; while governments have the power to increase the rights of minorities, they get targeted when these laws are perceived as unfair by those affected by them. On the other hand, redistribution of wealth can have more agents compared to redistribution of political power, which may influence those living in inadequate economic condition to choose different targets. In other words, the target or end goal of the violence may change the perception of whether it it is justified, indicating that questions involving specific situations should produce less biased estimates than general questions.

Although brief, this discussion has revealed several caveats in the study of political violence that should be considered when analysing data and interpreting observed results. The optimal way of measuring political violence in surveys would rely on indirect measurement and splitting the construct into relevant facets, or at least on use of multiple explicit items that target different elements of political violence.

3.3 Established predictors of political violence

Although different systematic reviews and attempts at meta-analyses exist regarding potential factors that contribute to radicalisation or extremism, the phenomenon of political violence *per se* is under-analysed. However, in order to provide at least a rough insight into its characteristics, Borum's (2014) mindset-worldview approach will be applied, according to which, and similar to McGregor et al.'s (2013) approach to religious political violence or the CLASH model (van Lange, Rinderu and Bushman, 2017), interactions between vulnerabilities/propensities and characteristics/threats of the social system may turn citizens violent.

Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018) offered an overview of different theories of radicalisation, along with an evaluation of the empirical evidence supporting those theories. Such an approach allowed both integration of common points of the theories, while their empirical evaluation allowed insight into which propensities and vulnerabilities often occur within the trajectories towards political violence. One such occurrence might be the loss of personal significance and meaning (Hogg and Adelman, 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2014, McGregor et al., 2013), which may spur existential questions that foster

the growth of extremist ideology. As examples of events that may occasion such a loss, Kruglanski et al. (2018: 109) mention failing at an important life pursuit, experiencing deep humiliation, or experiencing significant loss on behalf of a group they identify with. Robust findings reveal that need for closure created by significance loss motivates individuals to seek answers to those questions in stable and organised extremist groups that promote unity and common goals (Kruglanski et al. 2018; Webber et al., 2018).

3.3.1 Uncertainties and social identities

Group identity (Atran, 2016; Hogg and Adelman, 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2014), loss of meaning (Kruglanski et al., 2014) and personal values that are being violated by structural pressure (Atran, 2016) have also been observed as steps on the road to political violence. Becoming a member of the group imposes new structure in the life of ones who join them (Hogg and Adelman, 2013), which along common 'sacred' goals (Atran, 2016) shared by narratives of fellow members in the eyes of new members may represent steps towards a new meaning of life (Kruglanski et al., 2014). These explanations are in line with findings that variables related to personal and group relative deprivation were the most consistent (and strongest) predictors of radicalisation among inequality variables (Franc and Pavlović, 2018), as such individuals may feel their values (or new meaning) are threatened by structural pressure. Inter-group tensions and threat (Beller and Kroger, 2017; Obaidi, Thomsen and Bergh, 2018b; Obaidi et al., 2018a) can also provide a contribution to probability of violence escalation, indicating the relevance of inter-group relations. Doosje et al. (2016) conducted a review of contemporary theories of radicalisation and formed a general model consisting of three roughly defined steps: vulnerabilities, group memberships and actions, with the first step containing different uncertainties and factors that contribute to their development. In a broader sense, these uncertainties combined with ideologies presented through narratives and networks form a ground for development of cognitive and behavioural support of political violence. However, the role of ideology remains ambiguous, as some researchers remain uncertain if ideology fosters political violence or simply serves as an excuse to use it. For instance, one study found that arrested and convicted terrorists were more likely to justify harm in order to achieve their goals than matched non-criminal controls (Baez et al., 2017), while studies of Islamist radicalisation have shown that perpetrators create pseudo-ideologies that serve their needs (Kiefer et al., 2017) and are generally not very familiar with (religious) ideas used as a basis of their political violence (Borum, 2014; Fair, Goldstien and Hamza, 2017). Thus, although ideologies that promote political violence may gradually boost support for political violence among their followers, the explanation that they simply gather followers who are waiting for an opportunity to stir some chaos (see for example Roy, 2017), cannot be ruled out. This is also an indication that multiple groups of supporters of political violence exist, with some of them supporting political violence as an excuse to be violent, while others see it as a mean of achieving political goals. The latter group, according to this division, enters the process of radicalisation due to uncertainties that stem from unfavourable circumstances, which points to the need to study which (objective or subjective) circumstances make individuals perceive political violence as the most efficient way to achieve political goals.

3.3.2 Personality traits

Understanding individuals who perceive political violence as an opportunity to express various forms of violent behavior, may require a dispositional approach. Previous studies have emphasised personality traits like dispositional anxiety, aggressiveness or impulsivity (Kalmoe, 2014; McGregor et al., 2015). Moreover, in a recent study, Gøtzsche-Astrup (2019) found that a combination of low openness to new experience with high uncertainty appears to be a relatively robust predictor of support for political violence both when measured by McCauley and Moskalenko's Activism and Radicalism intentions scale (2009) as well as a single-item measure. A similar finding has been made for low agreeableness and conscientiousness (Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2019). Recent studies have also shown relationships between Dark personality traits (e.g. Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and militant extremist mindset traits (Međedović and Knežević, 2019). Another new

approach also emphasises the importance of interaction between personality characteristics like aggression and self-control and contextual factors (van Lange et al., 2017). However, the number of studies focusing on the relationship between personality traits and political violence is still very low, which prevents any firm conclusions regarding the effect sizes of the relationship. Moreover, personality traits may vary depending on the role an individual takes with respect to supporting or participating in political violence. For example, one study has shown that lower status members within a terrorist organisation tend to have lower ego-power and higher dependency than organisers of attacks (Merari et al., 2009).

3.3.3 Neurobiological determinants

Some more biologically focused researchers have provided neurological explanations of how traumatic events in childhoods change the qualitative characteristics of neural transmission, which may result in heightened tendency to use violence during adulthood (for more detailed discussions on the potential contribution of neurology in identification of high-risk individuals, see Hatemi and McDermott, 2011; McDermott and Hatemi, 2014). The inclusion of social neurology in the field of radicalisation may offer some new insights into the relevant phenomena and their relationships on the most precise level of analysis (see Decety, Pape and Workman (2017) for detailed discussion).

3.3.4 Gender

Gender is one of the variables that is more frequently used as a control factor than as the main predictor of support for political violence, and the results are overall inconsistent. Jo (2012) failed to find any relationship between gender and support for Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and Indonesia, while Berger (2014) found no multivariate relationship between gender and support for attacks on civilians in the US among citizens of Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia. On the other hand, women in Pakistan were slightly less supportive of attacks against US troops in Iraq than men, although no similar finding was evident in Egypt and Indonesia. In another study by the same author, Muslim men in Germany were slightly more likely to have confidence in Osama bin Laden than women, while in other countries (UK, France, Spain) no significant relationships were found between gender and support for suicide bombing (Berger, 2016). In the context of right-wing extremism, Decker et al. (2013) also found women in Germany to hold less extreme attitudes than men, while Fischer et al. (2008) failed to find any relationship between support for violent resistance against US army and gender among students in Baghdad. Haddad (2004), on the other hand, found that Lebanese, but not Palestinian women were more supportive of suicide attacks than men. Although all of these relationships were established within specific regression models and prevent any conclusions regarding the bivariate relationships between support for political violence and gender, even in such analyses gender occasionally emerged significant. Moreover, there may be differences in the mechanisms, for example, Pearson and Winterbotham (2017) examine the role of gender norms (which can be strong in both far right and Islamist groups), and find different effects of environmental push and pull factors like clothing discrimination and marriage, among women who supported or joined ISIS (Daesh) compared to the men. Schils and Pauwels (2014) find that males are more susceptiple to exposure to violent extremism than females in Belgium. Therefore, controlling the results for gender may provide somewhat clearer results, at least in specific contexts.

3.3.5 Age

Although young people may be more likely to take part in political violence (Urdal, 2006; Weber, 2019), there is little evidence that younger people are more *supportive* of political violence than older people. Participants younger than 30 were equally supportive of attacks on the civilians in the US and attacks on US troops in Iraq as older participants in Pakistan, Indonesia and Egypt (Berger, 2014), in line with Jo's (2012) findings in Pakistan and Indonesia regarding the support for Osama bin Laden and finding of Fisher et al. (2008) of no relationship between age and support for violent oppression towards US army among students in Baghdad. Haddad (2004) also failed to find any relationship between age and support for suicide attacks in Lebanon and Palestine. In a study of European Muslims,

Berger (2016) found that younger citizens of UK and older citizens of Germany were slightly more supportive of suicide bombing and confident in Osama bin Laden, respectively, but found no significant relationship in the other countries (France, Spain and the UK) (Berger, 2016). Another study conducted in Germany, but with a focus on right-wing extremism, found that older participants were more likely to hold extremist views (Decker et al., 2013).

3.4 Does inequality predict support for political violence?

In order to discern the potential role of inequality in political violence, and in line with the scope of DARE project, the following sections will focus on political violence as a final product of radicalisation.

The notion of a relationship between inequality and radicalisation as the process that leads to political violence, has frequently been discussed with a presumption that different forms of inequality may foster negative emotions that lead to political violence (DFID, 2005, as cited in Blair et al., 2013). However, two reviews that incorporated the relationship between inequality and terrorism (Campana and Lapointe, 2012; Desmarais et al., 2017) failed to establish any firm relationship due to insufficient evidence. Nevertheless, Campana and Lapointe (2012) indicated several potential factors that have higher odds of showing a consistent relationship with terrorism, some of them being socio-economic status, education, employment status, grievance and macro-level inequality.

A recent systematic review (Franc and Pavlović, 2018) has provided a detailed insight into the relationship between inequality and radicalisation, which contains political violence as well. The variety of dependent variables which were used in studies comprised in the review included: support for suicide bombing or other forms of violence to protect Islam (e.g. de Mesquita, 2007; Mousseau, 2011), support for violent jihad (Muluk et al., 2013) or terrorism (Cherney and Povey, 2013), general support for political violence (Fair et al., 2017a), tendency to participate in political violence (Khashnan, 2003), support for violence against armed forces (Tausch, 2011) or religious political violence (Muluk et al., 2013). Similarly, various operationalisations of political violence were applied in the newer studies: previous use of political violence or willingness to use it in future (Bartusevičius and van Leeuwen, 2018; Bartusevičius, van Leeuwen and Petersen, 2018), use of suicide bombings to protect Islam (Fair and Patel, 2019; Fair and Savla, 2018; Fair, Hwang and Majid, 2018a), support for Islamist militancy (Fair, Littman and Nugent, 2018b) and specific terrorist groups like SSP or Taliban (Fair and Hamza, 2018), ISIL (Kaltenthaler, Silverman and Dagher, 2018) or support for terrorism in general (Egger and Magni-Berton, 2019; Piazza, 2018), violent behavioural intentions and political violence (Obaidi et al., 2018a), justification of attacks on civilians (Desai et al., 2018), or propensity of youth to support political violence (Ofosu and Tesfaye, 2018). A significant number of the studies were themselves based on secondary data analyses of databases like PEW (Fair and Patel, 2018; Fair and Savla, 2018; Fair et al., 2018a), Afrobarometer (Bartusevičius and van Leeuwen, 2018; Bartusevičius et al., 2018), Arab democracy-barometer (Desai et al., 2018; Piazza, 2018), WWS (Desai et al., 2018), Gallup world poll (Desai et al., 2018), EVS (Egger and Magni-Berton, 2019) or local polling companies (Kaltenthaler et al., 2015).

Regarding objective inequality indicators, newer findings generally confirm previous conclusions regarding inconsistencies of outcomes. The review of quantitative studies (Franc and Pavlović, 2018) failed to establish any consistent linear relationship between income and support for political violence. Instead there may be a curvilinear relationship. In the Arab samples (multiple waves of the Gallup World Poll, Arab Democracy-Barometer, World Values Survey), participants with low and those with high income were found to be less supportive of political violence than participants in-between (Desai et al., 2018). The authors also revealed the similarities between pattern of protests and strikes and support for violence, indicating a need to control for activism when studying extremism. Other authors explored income, household assets or economic status as linear predictors of political violence and revealed inconsistent results (Bartusevičius and van Leeuwen, 2018; Egger and Magni-Berton, 2019; Fair and Hamza, 2018; Fair et al., 2018a, 2018b; Fair and Patel, 2018; Fair and Savla, 2018; Kaltenthaler et al., 2018, Pedersen et al. 2018; Piazza, 2018). Similar inconstencies were found for

education (Bartusevičius and van Leeuwen, 2018; Bartusevičius et al., 2018; Fair and Hamza, 2018; Fair et al., 2018a, 2018b; Fair and Patel, 2018; Fair and Savla, 2018; Kaltenthaler et al., 2018; Ofosu and Tesfaye, 2018), with two studies showing that effects of education vary with respect to direct/indirect method of data collection (Fair et al., 2018b; Ofosu and Tesfaye, 2018). Unemployment status was also relatively often included as one of the potential predictors of political violence, although it also revealed an inconsistent relationship with support for political violence across studies (Bartusevičius and van Leeuwen, 2018; Bartusevičius et al., 2018; Egger and Magni-Berton, 2019; Piazza, 2018). Objective socio-political inequality (like experienced displacement) was also not found to be a predictor of youth support for political violence (Ofosu and Tesfaye, 2018). This is in line with findings of the review, where objective inequality indicators (e.g. income, education, unemployment) were not established as consistent predictors of political violence.

However, studies included in the review (Franc and Pavlović, 2018) revealed some arguments in favour of the relationship between subjective inequality and radicalisation. While income dissatisfaction did not show any significant relationship with (support for) political violence (Cherney and Povey, 2013; De Mesquita, 2007; Mousseau, 2011), Fair et al (2017a) found a very weak relationship between support for suicide attacks and perceived personal economic status in Bangladesh, although no studies used the same approach on another sample to see if these conclusions are specific for the context or represent a stable and consistent relationship. Perceived economic dominance, on the other hand, was a weak-to-moderate predictor of support for political violence in Spain and weak predictor of support for political violence in the UK and France, but not in Germany (Zhirkov et al., 2014). In terms of group deprivation, Doosje et al (2013) and Van Bergen et al (2016) noticed that bivariate relationships between support for Muslim violence was significant only for collective and not for individual deprivation, although none of the two were related to own violent intentions. This indicates that prior group identity may play a role. In a study of Muslims and Jews, Canetti et al. (2010) found evidence that economic and psychological resource loss mediated the relationship between religion and support for political violence.

A slightly stronger relationship has been noticed between perceived injustice and support for political violence in general by Tausch et al. (2011), although the more detailed approach has shown that this support is generally focused on violence against armed forces and not civilians. In Indonesia, perceived social inequality (unfairness), was correlated with support for Sharia law, but was not a predictor of support for jihad or 'sacred' violence (Muluk et al., 2013), while in a study in Iraq in 2004 it explained approximately 15% of variance in bivariate and 8% of variance of support for violent resistance against the USA in a multivariable model (Fischer et al, 2008). However, these findings were not consistently replicated on samples from the USA (McCauley, 2012; Victoroff et al., 2012). Personal experiences of discrimination also failed to consistently predict support for political violence in the European context (Berger, 2016; Victoroff et al., 2012), although Schils and Pauwels (2016) confirmed a direct relationship between perceived injustice and violent beliefs.

Indicators of subjective estimates of inequality were seldom included in the newer studies, although they revealed somewhat stronger relationships with political violence. Bartusevičius et al. (2018) have found an inconsistent relationship between perceived social class and support for political violence, while Fair and Patel (2018) found perceived higher socio-economic status to be a consistent predictor of support for political violence in Muslim countries. Obaidi et al. (2018a) by use of more sophisticated statistical procedures on different samples managed to identify that perceived group deprivation plays an important role in Western Muslims' support for political violence. Bartusevičius and van Leeuwen (2018) found that prospective decremental deprivation (i.e. expectation of stronger deprivation in future) can predict violent tendencies even better than group relative deprivation, with those with more pessimistic expectations being more supportive of political violence.

Additionally, far-right radicalisation was found to be under-investigated compared to Islamist radicalisation. On a more general level, in Germany no relationship was found between individual income and experience of unemployment and right-wing extremism (Decker et al., 2013), while in the

Israeli context, lower indicators of economic status were weakly-to-moderately related to higher preference for right-wing extremism (Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim, 2004). In line with these studies, in a non-Muslim Dutch youth sample, perceived injustice, individual and group deprivation exhibited significant weak-to-moderate relationships with own violent intentions and support for the violent right-wing actions of others, with higher estimates of deprivations and injustice being related to more pro-violent attitudes (Doosje et al., 2012). Similar results were found in another study on Dutch youth (Pauwels and De Waele, 2014; Pauwels and Heylen, 2017).

All in all, these newer findings follow the patterns noticed in the review (Franc and Pavlović, 2018), with indicators of subjective inequality being somewhat more consistent predictors of political violence than objective ones, although a slight confounding factor here might be the use of multi-item measures and more sophisticated statistical analyses like structural equation modelling. Taken together, these studies indicate that subjective (or perceived) deprivation/injustice tend to be better predictors of support for political violence than objective measures, with the effect possibly being mediated by emotions and attitudes towards in-group and out-groups (Doosje et al., 2012, 2013; Tausch et al., 2011). This implies that inequality *per se* may not be enough for predicting violent political intentions unless other individual or contextual characteristic trigger the associated emotions and attitudes.

3.5 Results

This section presents the outcomes of the applied statistical procedures. After a brief discussion of frequencies and bivariate correlations among the key variables, graphs with regression coefficients and confidence intervals are presented, along with their brief explanations. A summary table is provided at the end giving a more general overview of findings.

Bivariate correlations represent the direct association between two variables without controlling for any possible confounding variables. Table 3.1 below shows the bivariate correlations between each of the dependent and all the independent variables in the model - including the country level variables, for under 30 year olds in each dataset. All the independent variables are standardised. For an overview of the variables including question wording, coding and sample size, see Appendix 1.

Table 3.1 Political violence attitudes among under 30 year olds (Pearson's correlations, P<0.05)

Survey	**European Values Study**	**World Values Survey**				**MYPLACE**	**Young in Oslo**	
Year / Sample	2017	2010/14 Muslims		2010/14 Christians		2012/13	2015	
Question	Do you justify: political violence	Justify violence against other people		Justify violence against other people		Justification of violence for 8 specific political reasons (8 items)	Justify violence for important causes / Political change (3 items)	Support travel to Syria to fight with weapons
Type of question	Justifica-tion of political violence	Never vs. Rarely	Never vs. Sometimes	Never vs. Rarely	Never vs. Sometimes	Justification of political violence	Justification of political violence	Justification of specific political violence
Sociodemographic								
Age	No	**0.02**	**-0.01**	No	**-0.05**	**0.09**	No	**-0.06**
Female	**-0.07**	**-0.02**	**-0.02**	No	No	**-0.10**	**-0.12**	**-0.04**
Rural area	No	**0.04**	**0.10**	**-0.07**	**0.07**			
Economic disadvantage								
Not in work not in education	**-0.04**	**0.06**	**0.05**	No	**0.06**	**0.06**		
Difficult on household income		**-0.06**	**0.01**	**-0.08**	**-0.04**	**0.02**	**0.09**	**0.06**
Reverse Household income	No	**-0.09**	**-0.08**	**0.04**	**-0.03**			
Financial difficulty in childhood	No					**0.08**	**0.08**	**0.05**
Expects future unemployment							**0.07**	**0.02**
Socio-political disadvantage								
Immigrant	**0.03**							
Immigrant parents	No						**0.10**	**0.06**
Experience of discrimination						**0.10**	**0.11**	**0.07**
Perceived group discrimination		**0.15**	**0.24**	**0.10**	**0.22**			
Victim of violence or							**0.11**	**0.06**
Christian							**-0.05**	**-0.02**
Muslim							**0.08**	**0.09**
Other religion							**0.07**	**0.05**
Attitudes								
Religion important	**-0.06**	**-0.13**	**-0.22**	**-0.20**	**-0.12**			
Rightwing	No	**0.04**	**-0.03**	**0.09**	**0.08**		**-0.04**	No
National pride	**-0.05**	**-0.04**	**-0.19**	**-0.12**	**-0.11**			
Low control	**0.05**	**0.01**	**0.09**	No	**0.11**			
Postmaterialist values	No	**0.06**	**0.08**	**0.08**	**0.04**			
War between Islam and West							No	**0.06**
Support nonviolent in Syria							**0.06**	**0.39**
Country level								
Gini	**0.06**			**0.07**	**0.16**			
Reverse Welfare spending	No							
Reverse GDP	**-0.08**			**-0.37**	**-0.15**			
Reverse WGI	**-0.03**			**-0.13**	No			
Reverse MIPEX	**0.03**							

Table 3.1: Results from under 30 year olds in EVS 2017, WVS 2010/14, MYPLACE 2012/13, and Young in Oslo 2015. Positive correlations are in blue, negative in red, with stronger colours indicating larger correlations. 'No'= no significant correlation. Note that that because of large samples some very low correlations (under 0.1) are statistically significant.

3.5.1 European Values Study 2017

The European Values Study 2017 asks people whether they would justify political violence on a scale from 1) Never to 10) Always. The main finding is that most people do not explicitly condone political violence under any circumstance, at least when asked in a survey. 70% of under 30 year olds answer they would never justify political violence, and the mean value on the 10 point scale is only 1.8 (1.6 for those aged 30 and over). No country averages higher than 2.75 on a 10-point scale, and only 6% of the variation on this variable was due to country differences (ICC=0.06). However, it is difficult to

interpret what the small differences mean, as the meaning of each point of the scale from 1 to 10 is not clearly defined and very much up to the individual respondent's interpretation. For example, what would it practically mean to think political violence is 'always' justifiable? It is likely in part because that option seems absurdly extreme, that the bulk of the responses fall very low on the scale. For these reasons, we converted the scale into a dichotomous variable, distinguishing between those who would 'never' justify political violence under any circumstance (0) and everyone else (1). It is also worth mentioning here that the EVS 2008 asked a similar question about terrorism, but as more than 94% said there are no circumstances in which they would justify terrorism, the variation in answers is too small to analyse further.

The country differences are shown in Figure 3.1, and range from only 4% in Albania[15] to more than 50% among under 30 year olds in Slovakia who are willing to justify political violence under certain circumstances[16]. There is no obvious geographic or cultural pattern to the country differences. However, among the countries least inclined to support political violence there are many countries who have experienced such violence (war or major ethnic violence) in recent history, such as Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The graph also shows that there is a notable age difference in some of the countries, with younger people being more willing to justify political violence (e.g. Norway and Estonia), whereas in other countries the two age groups answer in the same way on average (e.g. Russia and Croatia). Azerbaijan is the only country where older people seem more willing to justify political violence than under 30 year olds.

The bivariate correlations (shown in Table 3.1) are very small. All are under 0.1 or non-significant, meaning there is no clear association between support for political violence and any of the predictors.

[15] Albania was the only country with fewer than 30 cases in this category (14 cases). We tried to exclude Albania from the regression analysis below, but as this made no substantial difference to the results, we kept all the countries in the analysis reported here.

[16] If we instead rank the countries by the mean value on the 10 point scale, Russia (*M*=2.67 *SE*=.13) and Spain (*M*=2.66 *SE*=.21) are the countries where young people are most willing to justify political violence, while people in Albania (*M*=1.21 *S*E=.06) and Croatia (*M*=1.28 *S*E=.07) are still the least willing to justify violence.

Figure 3.1: Percentage willing to justify political violence under any circumstance, EVS 2017



Figure 3.1 (EVS 2017), 30+ N=40745, under 30 N=8532

The results multilevel logistic regression analysis of the EVS 2017 can be seen presented graphically in Figure 3.2. For full results, see Appendix 2, Table A2.1-2[17]. We find that gender and age are both significant predictors with younger and male respondents being more likely to justify political violence. There is no significant effect of any of the economic variables, nor did it matter whether the respondent had an immigrant background[18]. In the second and third model we included attitudinal variables, and here low control over life was significant predictor, particularly for the under 30 year

[17] There were no correlations above 0.4 between the individual level variables in EVS 2017. The largest Pearson's correlations were between Religion important and GDP (r=.39, P<0.001), Gini and WGI (r=.33, P<0.001) and Religion important and WGI (r=.33 ,P<0.001)

[18] The Urban / Rural variable was excluded in order to include the UK and the Netherlands where the variable was not available. Including this variable does not substantially affect the results of the models. Living in a town with a population of less than 5000 was not significantly associated with attitudes to political violence for under 30, and had a very small effect on those aged 30+ (Model 2 b=.092, SE=.037, P=.013)

olds, although the effect is very small. The average probability of justifying violence is 27% for someone who feels they have full control (1) over their life and increases by about 1.5% for each value on the scale, to 41% among those who say they have no control (10) over their life[19]. National pride had a slight negative effect such that people with lower national pride were more likely to justify political violence. Someone who is very proud to be a citizen of their country has an average probability of 29% to justify violence, whereas for those who are not at all proud it is 37%. The results for the over 30s was very similar except for smaller confidence intervals due to the larger sample, meaning that religion and right-wing ideology also had statistically significant results with less religious, and more right-wing people being more likely to justify political violence.

The country variance only accounts for 12.6% of the variance on this variable for under 30 year olds and 13.1% of the variance for over 29 year olds. The only significant country level predictor was reverse GDP, with young people in countries with higher GDP being more likely to justify political violence. None of the country level variables, GINI, GDP, WGI and MIPEX were significant for 30+ year olds when included in the model.

Not including attitudes in the model made a slight difference to the contextual variables; GDP and WGI both had larger standardised coefficients, and were significant at (P<.05). This suggests that part of the variation between more and less developed countries lies in more general attitudes and values which in turn impacts specific attitudes to political violence. There are no significant country level coefficients for the 30+ sample even when attitudes are excluded from the model.

For under 30 year olds, Religion important in life was included as a random slope in Model 3 as its relationship with justification of political violence varied significantly between the countries[20]. For the 30+ population, low life control and postmaterialist values were similarly included as random slopes.

[19] The predicted probabilities were calculated from unstandardised coefficients.

[20] To determine the model specification, variables were included as random slopes one by one, and those that were a significant improvement in fit from likelihood ratio test (P<.05) compared to the random intercept, fixed slopes model (Model 2) were included as random slopes in Model 3 in the under 30 sample. In the 30+ sample this method resulted in too many random slopes so the model would not converge. Hence for this sample, only random slopes which improved the model significant at the 0.1% level (P<.001) were included in Model 3.

Figure 3.2: Regression coefficients: Justify political violence (EVS 2017)



Figure 3.2 (EVS 2017). Regression coefficients, with 95% confidence interval, Models 3-7 include random slopes, and Models 4-7 control for all variables in Model 3. GDP=Gross Domestic Product, WGI=Mean of World Governance Indicators, MIPEX=Migrant Integration Policy index. All variables standardised. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.1-2

3.5.2 WVS 2010-2014

The World Values Survey (6th wave, 2010-2014) asked participants about the extent to which they justified the use of violence against other people. Although the original scale ranged 1-10 where lower scores indicated lower levels of justification of violence, the heavily skewed distribution (Figure 3.3) resulted in recoding the variable into three categories: never justifiable (1), rarely justifiable (2-3) and sometimes justifiable (4-10). In order to see if religion moderates the role of other predictors in explaining political violence, further analyses were conducted separately on Muslim and Christian samples.

Figure 3.3: Distribution of justification of violence against other people, WVS 2010/14



Figure 3.3 Distribution of support for violence against other people on the entire WVS 2010-14 database, N=88064

3.5.3 WVS Muslim sample

Before further analysis applying inferential procedures, frequencies of participants per newly-formed groups and countries were checked in order to eliminate the countries with insufficient number of participants per category (for stable estimates). After this step of data preparation, the Muslim youth sample consisted of participants from Algeria, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Nigeria and Tunisia, while the adult sample consisted of participants from Algeria, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Uzbekistan and Tunisia.

Figure 3.4: Distribution of justification of violence among Muslims, WVS 2010/14



ure 3.4. WVS 2010/2014. N (30+) = 3791, (under
= 2363

Before conducting ordinal regression, nominal effects were tested, and found in both the youth and adult samples[21]. The presence of nominal effects indicates that the assumptions of the ordinal (cumulative chain) regressions have been violated as one estimate cannot be used to represent the contribution of a predictor to the final outcome across all of its ordered categories[22]. To solve this issue, the dataset was divided into two: one containing participants who never justify use of violence against other people (0) and those who justify it on rare occasions (1) ('never versus rarely'); and one containing participants who would never justify political violence (0) and those who would justify it sometimes(1) ('never versus sometimes'). A binary logistic regression was calculated on each of the datasets with the mentioned categories as the dependent variables.

The correlation matrices calculated on the Muslim youth samples (see Table 3.1) revealed that importance of religion and experience of discrimination are the strongest correlates of support for violence in these models (in the 'never vs rarely' analysis: r = .15 for experienced discrimination and r = -.13 for importance of religion; in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis: r = .24 for experienced discrimination and r = -.22 for importance of religion). In the latter analysis, a more prominent role of national pride was also noticed (r = -.19). Taken together, these results would indicate that less religious people, and people who were discriminated against are slightly more likely to support the use of violence. Lack of national pride is also predictive of stronger support for violence against other people. This pattern was less clear among adults, as experienced discrimination is predictive of support for violence only in the more extreme comparison (r = .26 in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis and r = .03 in the 'never vs rarely' analysis), similar to national pride (r = -.14 in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis and r = -.09 in the 'never vs rarely' analysis), while importance of religion was important only in the less extreme comparison (r = -.08 in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis and r = -.18 in the 'never vs rarely' analysis).

In the first step of the multi-level analyses, ICCs were calculated to observe the portion of variance shared by the countries. This portion was smaller in the 'never vs rarely' group (ICC = .069 in youth sample and ICC = .077 in adult sample) compared to the 'never vs sometimes' group (ICC = .144 in youth sample and ICC = .118 in the adult sample). After confirming the existence of variability, further analyses were conducted.

Muslim youth subsample

In the Muslim youth sample, 42% of participants would never justify the use of violence. In the subsequent subsamples, 70% ('never vs sometimes') and 51% ('never vs rarely') of participants were not supportive of violence against other people. The analyses were set to predict belonging to the group that shows (some) support for the use of violence. As can be seen in Figure 3.5, only two predictors were consistent across analyses: experienced discrimination and level of income. Holding other predictors constant, participants who were discriminated against were on average more than 50% more likely to consider violence as justifiable than those who were not discriminated against[23] Similarly, with each additional standard deviation of rise in the perceived level of income the

[21] The test revealed the presence of nominal effects both in youth sample ($\chi^2(1) = 4.45$, p = .035 for satisfaction with income, $\chi^2(1) = 8.52$, p = .003 for experienced discrimination, $\chi^2(1) = 8.87$, p = .002 for importance of religion, $\chi^2(1) = 12.21$, p < .001 for citizenship pride and $\chi^2(1) = 5.25$, p = .022 for control over life) and in adult sample ($\chi^2(1) = 9.71$, p = .002 for gender, $\chi^2(1) = 7.83$, p = .005 for age, $\chi^2(1) = 3.99$, p = .045 for being in education or employed, $\chi^2(1) = 41.25$, p < .001 for experienced discrimination, $\chi^2(1) = 49.87$, p < .001 for importance of religion and $\chi^2(1) = 16.91$, p < .001 for postmaterialist values).

[22] If a dependent variables has levels A, B and C, the presence of nominal effects indicates that explanatory power of predictors when predicting A-B differences is not similar to that of predicting B-C differences, indicating that the use of a single estimate may not appropriately describe the studied relationship.

[23] Exp(B) = 1.48, 95% CI [1.28, 1.72] in the 'never vs rarely' analysis without attitudes, exp(B) = 1.47, 95% CI [1.26, 1.71] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis with attitudes, exp(B) = 1.79, 95% CI [1.47, 2.18] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.62, 95% CI [1.32, 1.99] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis with attitudes.

probability of belonging to a group that justifies use of violence was approximately 20% higher[24]. National pride predicted belonging to the group supportive of use of violence only in the more extreme comparisons ('never vs sometimes'). In this context, each raise of one standard deviation in national pride was related to 26% lower likelihood of being supportive of the use of violence[25]. Also, individuals with lower income tended to be slightly less supportive of use of violence against other people[26]. In the Muslim youth samples, none of the slopes consistently and significantly differed across countries, indicating that random slopes models do not provide a meaningful contribution to prediction of support for violence against other people.

Muslim adult subsample

In the Muslim adult sample, as in the youth sample, 42% of participants considered the use of violence never justifiable (49% in the 'never vs rarely' analysis and 75% in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis). As in the case with youth, the analyses were set in a way to predict belonging to the groups of participants who supported the use of violence. The results are shown in Figure 3.5. Holding other predictors constant, each standard deviation of raise in importance of religion was related to approximately 18% lower[27] odds of supporting political violence. Similarly, each standard deviation of raise in national pride was associated with approximately 17% lower[28] odds of being supportive of violence. People who perceived they had less choices in life were about 14% more likely[29] to be supportive of use of violence. Experience of discrimination also increased the support for the use of violence[30]. In the analysis that compared more extreme groups, holding other predictors consistent, with each standard deviation decrease in town size the odds of supporting violence were approximately 21% higher[31] . Higher scores on the postmaterialism scale, indicating more postmaterialistic attitudes, was associated with 17% higher odds of supporting the use of violence[32], while each standard deviation of support for the political right was associated with 14% increase in support of the use of violence[33]. None of the predictors showed a consistent pattern of differences across countries with respect to their predictive contribution.

[24] Exp(B) = 1.17, 95% CI [1.02, 1.35] in the 'never vs rarely' analysis without attitudes, exp(B) = 1.18, 95% CI [1.03, 1.36] in 'never versus rarely' analysis with attitudes, exp(B) = 1.22, 95% CI [1.02, 1.46] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.26, 95% CI [1.05, 1.53] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis with attitudes.

[25] Exp(B) = 0.74, 95% CI [0.63, 0.88]

[26] Exp(B) = 0.85, 95% CI [0.74, 0.98] in the 'never vs rarely' analysis without attitudes, exp(B) = 0.84, 95% CI [0.74, 0.97] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis with attitudes, exp(B) = 0.82, 95% CI [0.68, 0.98] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 0.79, 95% CI [0.65, 0.95] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis with attitudes.

[27] Exp(B) = 0.78, 95% CI [0.71, 0.86] in the 'never vs rarely' and exp(B) = 0.86, 95% CI [0.75, 0.99] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis

[28] Exp(B) = 0.86, 95% CI [0.79, 0.93] in the 'never vs rarely' and exp(B) = 0.82, 95% CI [0.73, 0.92] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis

[29] Exp(B) = 1.14, 95% CI [1.04, 1.24] in the 'never vs rarely' and exp(B) = 1.15, 95% CI [1.02, 1.29] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis

[30] Exp(B) = 1.29, 95% CI [1.15, 1.43] in the 'never vs rarely' analysis without attitudes, exp(B) = 1.26, 95% CI [1.12, 1.40] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis with attitudes, exp(B) = 1.82, 95% CI [1.58, 2.10] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.74, 95% CI [1.51, 2.01] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis with attitudes.

[31] Exp(B) = 1.26, 95% CI [1.11, 1.43] in the analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.27, 95% CI [1.12, 1.44] in the analysis with attitudes

[32] Exp(B) = 1.16, 95% CI [1.04, 1.31]

[33] Exp(B) = 1.15, 95% CI [1.02, 1.28]

Figure 3.5: Odds ratios: Support for violence against other people in the Muslim sample (WVS 2010/14)



Figure 3.5 (WVS 2010/14). Odds ratios, with 95% confidence interval calculated on youth (left) and adult (right) samples. All variables standardised except dichotomous ones. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.3-4.

3.5.4 WVS Christian sample

Frequencies of participants per newly formed groups and countries were checked before conducting any further analyses in order to eliminate the countries with insufficient number of participants per category (for stable estimates). After this step of data preparation, the Christian youth sample consisted of participants from Belarus, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Ghana, Haiti, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, while the adult sample consisted of participants from Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, Ukraine and Zimbabwe.

Figure 3.6: Distribution of justification of violence among Christians under 30, WVS 2010/14





gure 3.6. WVS 2010/2014. N = 5654,

Figure 3.7: Distribution of justification of violence among Christians 30 and older, WVS 2010/14



ıre 3.7. WVS 2010/2014. N = 12059,

Nominal effects were tested, and found to be present,[34] violating the assumptions of ordinal regression analysis. To solve this issue, as in the Muslim sample, the dataset was divided into two: one containing participants who never justify use of violence (0) against other people and those who justify it on rare occasions (1) ('never vs rarely'); and one containing participants who would never justify political violence (0) and those who would justify it sometimes (1) ('never vs sometimes'). A binary logistic regression was calculated on each of the datasets with the mentioned categories as the dependent variables.

In terms of correlations, Christian youth revealed a similar pattern to Muslim adults; experienced discrimination predictive of support for violence had higher correlations only in the more extreme comparison (r = .22 in 'never vs sometimes' analysis and r = .10 in 'never vs rarely' analysis), while importance of religion was correlated with interpersonal violence only in the less extreme comparison (r = -.12 in 'never vs sometimes' analysis and r = -.20 in 'never vs rarely' analysis). The correlation matrix (see Table 3.1) calculated on the adult sample was quite empty – the only correlation that stood out was that between experienced discrimination and support for the use of violence in the 'never vs sometimes' sample, with individuals who were discriminated against being more likely to support violence (r = .24).

In the following step, ICCs were calculated to find out what portion of the variance in support for political violence is due to differences between countries. This portion was relatively similar in the 'never vs rarely' group (ICC = .169 in youth sample and ICC = .183 in adult sample) and the 'never vs sometimes' group (ICC = .190 in the youth sample and ICC = .243 in the adult sample). After confirming the existence of variability, further analyses were conducted.

Christian youth subsample

In general, 40% of the youth sample was against any violence against other people (which makes 52% of the total subsample in the 'never vs rarely' comparison and 65% in the 'never vs sometimes' comparison). Regression analyses on the youth sample, shown in Figure 3.8 have highlighted several predictors of categorisation into those who never support use of violence and those who occasionally find it acceptable. In both Christian youth samples, holding other predictors consistent, experienced discrimination and political orientation were significant predictors of support for violence. More precisely, those who experienced discrimination were on average more than 20% more likely to support the use of violence[35] . Similarly, each standard deviation shift towards political right was associated with more than 20% higher odds of supporting interpersonal violence[36]. Additionally, in the 'never vs sometimes' sample, each standard deviation of decrease in control over life was associated with 28% higher odds of supporting the use of violence[37]. Similarly, with each raise of one standard

[34] The test revealed the presence of nominal effects both in the Christian youth sample ($\chi^2(1) = 5.12$, $p = .024$ for gender, $\chi^2(1) = 14.16$, $p < .001$ for satisfaction with income, $\chi^2(1) = 12.94$, $p < .001$ for income level, $\chi^2(1) = 30.39$, $p < .001$ for town size, $\chi^2(1) = 80.86$, $p < .001$ for importance of religion, $\chi^2(1) = 5.60$, $p = 0.018$ for political orientation, $\chi^2(1) = 15.30$, $p < .001$ for citizenship pride, $\chi^2(1) = 11.70$, $p < .001$ for postmaterialist values and $\chi^2(1) = 35.51$, $p < .001$ for control over life) and in adult sample ($\chi^2(1) = 43.07$, $p < .001$ for gender, $\chi^2(1) = 21.77$, $p < .001$ for age, $\chi^2(1) = 38.98$, $p < .001$ for income level, $\chi^2(1) = 31.78$, $p < .001$ for being employed or in education, $\chi^2(1) = 45.20$, $p < .001$ for being discriminated against, $\chi^2(1) = 80.86$, $\chi^2(1) = 21.91$, $p < .001$ for town size, $\chi^2(1) = 5.79$, $p = .016$ for importance of religion, $\chi^2(1) = 19.70$, $p < .001$ for citizenship pride, $\chi^2(1) = 11.41$, $p < .001$ for postmaterialist values and $\chi^2(1) = 11.22$, $p < .001$ for control over life.

[35] Exp(B) = 1.22, 95% CI [1.11, 1.34] in the 'never vs rarely' analysis without attitudes, exp(B) = 1.22, 95% CI [1.10, 1.34] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis with attitudes, exp(B) = 1.40, 95% CI [1.25, 1.56] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.38, 95% CI [1.24, 1.54] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis with attitudes.

[36] Exp(B) = 1.20, 95% CI [1.11, 1.30] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis and exp(B) = 1.27, 95% CI [1.16, 1.41] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis.

[37] Exp(B) = 1.28, 95% CI [1.16, 1.41]

deviation in national pride, the odds of supporting political violence were 12% lower[38]. Those with higher income were also approximately 20% more likely to support the use of violence[39].

The slopes of two predictors, income level and importance of religion, consistently varied across countries in the Christian youth sample, while the slopes of other predictors revealed less consistent patterns of variation[40]. As Figure 3.8 reveals, none of the macro indicators consistently predicted support for violence in the Christian youth sample, as only reverse GDP emerged significant in a less extreme comparison[41].

Christian adult subsample

In the adult sample, 40% of participants stated that violence was never justified (46% in the 'never vs rarely' group and 74% in the 'never vs sometimes' group), which is fairly similar to the rates obtained in the Muslim samples. The regression analyses shown in Figure 3.8 have highlighted several predictors of support for the use of violence. Individuals who were discriminated against, holding other predictors constant, were more than 20% more likely to belong to the group that supported the use of violence[42], as in the youth sample. With each standard deviation raise in importance of religion, there were slightly higher odds of supporting political violence[43], while each raise of one standard deviation in national pride was associated with approximately 10% lower odds of belonging to a group that supports the use of violence[44]. Each shift of one standard deviation towards the political right in this model was related to approximately 11% higher odds of supporting the use of violence[45]. On the other hand, each standard deviation decline of perceived control over life was associated with more than 10% higher odds of supporting the use of violence[46]. Additionally, only in the 'never vs sometimes' analyses, each standard deviation of increase in town size was associated with approximately 12% higher odds of supporting the use of violence[47]. Also, only in the 'never vs sometimes' sample, the individuals with lower income were less likely to support the use of violence[48].

In the adult subsample, only the slopes of political orientation and postmaterialist values differed consistently across countries, while other predictors exhibited less consistent patterns of variation.

Regarding the country level variables, although no relationship between support for the use of violence and macro-level predictors was found in the 'never vs rarely' analysis, in the 'never vs

[38] Exp(B) = 0.88, 95% CI [0.80, 0.97])
[39] Exp(B) = 0.80, 95% CI [0.72, 0.88] in the analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 0.80, 95% CI [0.71, 0.88] in the analysis with attitudes included.
[40] Due to computational complexity, random slopes models with multiple varying slopes were not calculated.
[41] Exp(B) = 0.60, 95% CI [0.44, 0.81] in the 'never vs rarely' analysis.
[42] Exp(B) = 1.24, 95% CI [1.17, 1.32] in the 'never vs rarely' analysis without attitudes, exp(B) = 1.24, 95% CI [1.16, 1.31] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis with attitudes, exp(B) = 1.55, 95% CI [1.43, 1.69] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.51, 95% CI [1.39, 1.65] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis with attitudes.
[43] Exp(B) = 0.94, 95% CI [0.89, 0.99] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis and exp(B) = 0.82, 95% CI [0.76, 0.89] in 'never vs sometimes' analysis.
[44] Exp(B) = 0.92, 95% CI [0.87, 0.97] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis and exp(B) = 0.90, 95% CI [0.83, 0.97] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis.
[45] Exp(B) = 1.09, 95% CI [1.04, 1.15] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis and exp(B) = 1.13, 95% CI [1.05, 1.21] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis.
[46] Exp(B) = 1.10, 95% CI [1.05, 1.16] in the 'never versus rarely' analysis and exp(B) = 1.30, 95% CI [1.21, 1.40] in the 'never vs sometimes' analysis.
[47] Exp(B) = 1.12, 95% CI [1.03, 1.22] in the analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.13, 95% CI [1.04, 1.23] in the analysis with attitudes included.
[48] Exp(B) = 0.86, 95% CI [0.80, 0.93] in the analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 0.84, 95% CI [0.78, 0.91] in the analysis with attitudes included.

sometimes' analysis participants from countries with lower GDP per capita[49], and lower world governance indicators[50] were more likely to be supportive of the use of violence.

Even the simplest visual comparison of results based on Muslim and Christian samples reveals many more similarities than differences, indicating that religion in general does not greatly impact the relationship between selected predictors and support for interpersonal violence. Furthermore, the (weak) impact that was found was negative, as for national pride, indicating that religious and proud citizens, both Christians and Muslims, have lower odds of supporting violence, consequently undermining the idea of mainstream religions as promotors of violence.

Figure 3.8: Odds ratios: Support for violence against other people in the Christian sample (WVS 2010/14)



Figure 3.8 (WVS 2010/14). Odds ratios, with 95% confidence interval calculated on youth (left) and adult (right) samples. All variables standardised except dichotomous ones. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.5-8.

3.5.5 MYPLACE (2012-13)

In the MYPLACE (2012-13) study of 16-25 year olds, support for political violence was measured by eight items that asked participants for which purposes they considered the use of violence as appropriate, with higher scores indicating lower support for political violence. Since the scale consists of multiple items, Confirmatory Factor Analysis was conducted using the robust version of maximum likelihood estimator (MLR), which did not clearly confirm its general single-factor structure (χ^2/df = 34.14, CFI (robust) = .97, RMSEA (robust) = .083, SRMR = .026). Therefore, in consultation with the modification indices, two minor changes were added into the model, in terms of correlated residuals between items describing the use of violence in order to maintain and to take down the government and between the use of violence to maintain the government and to protect own ethnic group. This change resulted in acceptable fit (χ^2/df = 26.65, CFI (robust) = .98, RMSEA (robust) = .073, SRMR =

[49] Exp(B) = 1.77, 95% CI [1.11, 2.81].
[50] Exp(B) = 1.74, 95% CI [1.17, 2.61].

.021), confirming the overall single-factor structure of political violence[51]. The minimum requirements of the partial strong invariance were met and that this means that comparisons of regression slopes and latent means across countries make sense.

These results were then extracted from the model and multiplied by -1 in order for higher scores to be indicative for more support for political violence. Such scores were used in further analyses. Figure 3.9 reveals the average score on the latent variable of political violence across different locations.

[51] However, before conducting any multi-group analyses, measurement invariance of the scale was tested using the model that revealed adequate fit. While doing so, we took into account the fact that model invariance is usually tested across several (up to five) groups, while this sample consisted of 30 groups. Therefore, in line with the conclusions of Rutkowski and Svetina (2014) who discussed the fit criteria with 10-20 groups, we employed slightly loosened invariance criteria, with RMSEA around .10 being considered adequate in the context of configural invariance. In determining higher levels of invariance (i.e., weak and strong), criteria proposed by Chen (2007) were used, with a change of CFI larger than .01 accompanied by the change of RMSEA larger than .015 indicating a mismatch between the model and the data. After forming the models, they were tested in pairs (i.e., weak versus configural invariance, strong versus weak invariance), with addition of modifications in order to achieve partial invariance where necessary. The configural invariance, according to Rutkowski and Svetina (2014), was met (χ^2/df = 2.98, CFI (robust) = .96, RMSEA (robust) = .111), indicating that the same items belong to the same latent factor across all groups. However, the weak invariance was not met by this model ($\chi^2(203)$ = 896.56, ΔCFI = .02, ΔRMSEA (robust) = .003), indicating that several factor loadings differ across groups. After releasing equality constraints on the loadings of items related to support for violence in order to prevent people from getting fired and use of violence to protect the rights of animals, the change in the fit indices was insufficient to reject the model ($\chi^2(145)$ = 501.51, ΔCFI = -.009, ΔRMSEA (robust) = -.003), indicating that partial weak (metric) invariance has been met. This model was tested for partial strong invariance and was rejected ($\chi^2(203)$ = 2378.5, ΔCFI (robust) = -.047, ΔRMSEA (robust) = -.022). The partial strong invariance was met when only two item intercepts remained constrained ($\chi^2(29)$ = 377.31, ΔCFI (robust) = .007, ΔRMSEA (robust) = .004), which is sufficient to calculate the mean scores comparable across groups (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998).

Figure 3.9: Support for political violence across locations, MYPLACE 2012/13



Figure 3.9 (MYPLACE, 2012/13), N=8583

The pattern shown in Figure 3.9 reveals that a relatively large difference in support for political violence between different locations exists, with some locations being clearly more supportive of political violence than others. Because of this between-location variation, the inclusion of varying intercepts across locations should yield more precise estimates of the inequality-radicalisation relationship.

The correlations diagram presented in (Table 3.1) indicates that none of the variables meaningfully contributes to prediction of political violence, with control variables of gender and age showing the strongest, but barely meaningful bivariate correlations with support for political violence. However, since this analysis did not take location-level differences into account, we also conducted multi-level regression analyses with individuals nested in the study's 30 locations.

Before adding the predictors into regression equations, the intercepts were allowed to vary across locations, which yielded an ICC of .17, confirming the results exhibited on the graph. The regression slopes were additionally tested for invariance in the context of other predictors; holding other predictors fixed, one regression slope by one was allowed to vary across countries, followed by testing the significance of this variation using analysis of variance (ANOVA). The results implied that next to intercepts, slopes of coping on income, SES at the age of 14 and age varied with respect to locations (*p*s < .01), indicating that a general trend might actually hide the location-specific differences.

As Figure 3.10 shows, the strongest positive relationship with support for political violence is revealed for gender of participants and their experience of threat (or discrimination) due to their identity or group belonging. Although in the case of continuous variables these effects would not be meaningless, in context of this study they indicate that women are approximately 0.24 standard deviations less supportive of political violence than men, unemployed youth was .08 standard deviations more supportive of political violence than employed youth or youth in education, while those who have been discriminated against are on average 0.17 standard deviations more supportive of political violence. Considering the fact that the range of this scale is approximately 4.8 points, with a standard deviation of 0.92, the difference of 0.24, 0.08 or 0.17 standard deviations indicates a consistent, but quite weak effect. With each year of age, participants were on average 0.07 standard deviations less supportive of political violence. Other effects were of marginal significance and negligible practical value.

Figure 3.10: Regression coefficients: Support for political violence (MYPLACE 2012/13)



Figure 3.10. (MYPLACE 2012/13). Regression coefficients, with 95% confidence interval. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.9.

3.5.6 Young in Oslo 2015

In the Young in Oslo survey from 2015, general attitudes to political violence are measured by the mean value of three questions about justifying political violence: (1) 'to attract attention to an

important political cause', (2) 'to achieve political change in Norway', and (3) 'to achieve political change elsewhere in Europe'. Of the sample, 69% do not agree at all that violence can be justified for political purposes (1) while only 2% say they agree to a great (4) or very great extent (5). Tthe remaining 29% answer somewhere in between.

In addition, specific attitudes to young people's involvement in the war in Syria was measured by the question of whether the respondents 'sympathise with young people who have gone to fight the war in Syria using violent means'. This is an interesting question to examine because it is about a type of political violence specifically associated with radicalisation among young people, and this was a particularly topical issue in the year the question was asked (2015). In the question about violence in Syria, 66 % answer not at all, while more than 7% say to a great or very great extent – in other words there is on average more sympathy in this sample for political violence in the particular conflict in Syria (*M*=1.63, *sd*=1.04), than there is for the idea of political violence in general (*M*=1.40, *sd*=.77).

Figure 3.11 shows the results of the single level regression model[52] for both outcome variables. The complete table of results can be found in Appendix 2 (Table A2.10). Model 1 includes sociodemographic variables, economic variables and immigration and religious background. These variables were asked of most of the sample of high school students. Model 2 includes attitudinal variables which were only asked of a subsample of about 5,000 respondents, namely left-right ideological self-placement, and thinking that there is a war between Islam and the West. For violence in Syria, we also control for the question about sympathising with non-violent participants in the war to gauge to what extent the question taps into strong feelings about the political situation rather than use of violence per se.

Younger and male respondents were more likely to justify general political violence. In addition, some of the economic inequality indicators were statistically significant in the predicted direction, but had only very slight effects. For example, both young people from poor families (about 6% of the sample), and those expecting to be unemployed in the future (about 15% of the sample) justify political violence to a greater extent. However, there is on average only a 0.2 difference on the 5 point scale of justifying political violence between those who say they have always been well off and those who say they have always been poor, and a similar distance between those who expect to be unemployed in the future and those who expect they will not be[53]. A previous study (Pedersen et al., 2018) , which used the same data, came to very similar conclusions about the socio-economic predictors of support for violence among youth in Oslo, but also added that poor school performance, behavioural conduct problems and general outsider status are associated with support for political violence both generally and in Syria particularly.

Ethnic and religious minorities are also slightly more likely to justify political violence. Being from an immigrant background has a small significant positive coefficient (*b*=.062, *SE*=.016, *P*<.01). Muslims (*b*=.084, *SE*=.023, *P*<.01) and others who identify with a non-Christian religion (*b*=.151, *SE*=.027, *P*<.01) are also slightly more likely than Christians and the non-religious to justify political violence, but the predicted difference is less than 0.1 on the scale[54] in model 1. Similarly, for experienced violence and

[52] We considered a multilevel model where individuals were nested within the 15 boroughs of Oslo. However, there was not enough variance by borough on either justification of political violence (*ICC*=.047) or sympathy for young foreign fighters in Syria (*ICC*=.042).

[53] The predicted probabilities were calculated from unstandardized coefficients.

[54] There may be some multicollinearity issues with the religion variables. The largest Pearson's correlations were between Muslim religion and three other variables: parents born abroad (*r*=.507, *P*<.001), parents unemployed (*r*=.405, *P*<.001, and experience of discrimination (*r*=.374, *P*<.001). When these variables are excluded from model 1 the coefficient for Muslims is greater (*b*=.181, *SE*=.018, *P*<.001), but so is the coefficient for Other minority religion (*b*=.208, *SE*=.025, *P*<.001). There was also a question in the survey about religion's importance in life, but it was only asked of a subsample and too correlated with Muslim (*r*=.61, *P*<.001) and No religion (*r*=-.55, *P*<.001) to include. Because of the questions about Islam and Syria we consider religious denomination to

discrimination, there is a significant but small difference where those who have been threatened or attacked because of their immigrant or religious background score on average 1.6 on the scale compared to 1.5 for those who merely feel disliked because of it, and 1.4 for the vast majority (88%) who rarely or never experienced any discrimination on this basis. Being a victim of harassment, threats and violence in general was also predictive of justification of political violence with an average 0.2 difference between those who experienced any of these over the past 12 months compared to those who did not. In model 2, those who think there is a war between Islam and the West are more likely to justify political violence, but only by 0.12 points. There was no significant effect of left vs. right-wing political orientation.

The results are generally similar for specific sympathies with foreign fighters in Syria. The age effect is generally stronger, with 16 year olds on average responding 1.7 on the 5 point scale compared to 1.2 for 22 year olds. Belonging to a religion, and particularly to a religious minority also had an effect. Compared to non-religious people, Muslim and other non-Christian religious people were about 0.2 points more sympathetic towards young people who went to Syria to fight using violent means, while Christians were about 0.1 point more sympathetic. While it seems unsurprising that Muslims would be more sympathetic to people engaged in a conflict in a Muslim region and where religious ideology plays a great part, what is telling is that this seems to be a common feature of religious minorities. This indicates that it may be just as much a consequence of religious teachings of compassion and forgiveness or sympathy with others in a minority status, as it is a result of Islamist sympathies.

In the second model, thinking there is a war between Islam and the West is significantly associated with support for foreign fighters, with those who totally agree responding on average 0.2 points above those who totally disagree. The results are similar whether or not support for non-violent fighters in Syria is included in the model. This is unsurprisingly by far the largest coefficient (*b*=.362, *SE*=.019, *P*<.01)[55]. Nonetheless, there is much less support for those who use violence than non-violent means. Those who sympathise to a great extent with the non-violent foreign fighters answer on average 2.02, meaning they sympathise with the violent foreign fighters to a small extent. 45% of them say they have no sympathy at all for those who use violence. In comparison, those who have no sympathy for the non-violent foreign fighters, answer on average 1.02, and 98% of them have no sympathy at all for violent foreign fighters.

be more interesting. In an alternative model where this variable was included, it was significant (*b*=.047, *SE*=.009, *P*<.001), but Muslim was not significant.

[55] The direct Pearson's correlation between them is r=.394 (P<.001)

Figure 3.11: Regression coefficients: Justify political violence (YiO 2015)



Figure 3.11 (YiO 2015). Regression coefficients, with 95% confidence interval. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.10.

3.6 Discussion

The results of the analysis of support for political violence suggest that among investigated inequality indicators, control variables and additional attitudes there are no strong predictors of support for political violence among young people, and that these findings are generally consistent across datasets. A summary of the coefficients across analyses are shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Summary: Support for political violence among under 30 year olds (Regression coefficients, P<0.05)

Survey	**European Values Study**	**World Values Survey**				**MYPLACE**	**Young in Oslo**	
Year / Sample	2017	2010/14 Muslims		2010/14 Christians		2012/13	2015	
Question	Do you justify: political violence	Justify violence against other people		Justify violence against other people		Justification of violence for 8 specific political reasons (8 items)	Justify violence for Important causes / Political change (3 items)	Support travel to Syria to fight with weapons
Type of question	Justification of political violence	Never vs. Rarely	Never vs. Sometimes	Never vs. Rarely	Never vs. Sometimes	Justification of political violence	Justification of political violence	Justification of specific political violence
Sociodemographic								
Age	**-0.097**	No	No	No	**-0.156**	**0.070**	**-0.028**	**-0.156**
Female	**-0.271**	No	No	No	No	**-0.240**	**-0.107**	**-0.052**
Rural area	No	No	**0.188**	**0.191**	**0.115**			
Economic disadvantage								
Not in work not in education	No	**0.392**	**0.386**	No		**0.084**		
Difficult on household		No	**0.161**	No	No	No	**0.035**	**0.050**
Reverse Household income	No	**-0.161**	**-0.199**	**-0.080**	**-0.227**	No		
Financial difficulty in	No					**0.029**		
Parents unemployed							**0.016**	No
Expects future							**0.034**	No
Socio-political disadvantage								
Immigrant	No							
Immigrant parents	No						**0.062**	No
Experience of discrimination						**0.169**	**0.038**	**0.023**
Perceived group		**0.395**	**0.581**	No	**0.334**			
Victim of violence or							**0.150**	**0.125**
Christian							No	**0.076**
Muslim							**0.084**	**0.307**
Other religion							**0.151**	**0.276**
Attitudes								
Religion important	No	No	**-0.284**	**-0.139**	No			
Rightwing	No	No	No	**0.186**	**0.246**		No	**0.043**
National pride	**-0.099**	No	**-0.295**	No	**-0.128**			
Low control	**0.143**	No	No	No	**0.245**			
Postmaterialist values	**No**	No	No	No	No			
War between Islam and West							**0.039**	**0.066**
Support nonviolent in Syria								**0.362**
Country level								
Gini	**No**			No	No			
Reverse Welfare spending	**No**							
Reverse GDP	**-0.373**			**-0.518**	No			
Reverse WGI	No			No	No			
Reverse MIPEX	No							

Table 3.2: All coefficients are from analysis of samples restricted to respondents under 30 years old. With the exception of the Young in Oslo coefficients (which are from single level OLS regression models), the individual level coefficients are from random intercept, fixed slopes models. The country level variable coefficients are from random intercept, random slopes models. For the EVS, WVS and Young in Oslo analysis: attitude variable coefficients are from Model 2, while all other coefficients are from Model 1. Positive regression coefficients are in blue, negative in red, with stronger colours indicating larger coefficients. 'No'= no significant coefficient. For details see regression tables in Appendix 2.

3.6.1 Sociodemographic characteristics

Age is an inconsistent predictor of support for political violence (see for example Berger, 2016; Decker et al., 2013; Haddad 2004), even if young people have a reputation for more violent behaviour (Urdal,

2006; Weber, 2019). While there is a large age difference in some of the countries, with younger people being more willing to justify political violence, age does not seem to matter in other countries (see for example Figure 3.1 above.) Within the under 30 year old age group, older age is associated with lower support for political violence, to the extent that it has an effect at all, particularly among Christians in the WVS and school pupils in Oslo on the question about travel to Syria. The exception is the MYPLACE dataset where we see the opposite effect, but it is a weak one.

Despite the lack of consensus in the literature on the effect of gender, young men are consistently more supportive of political violence than women in the data analysed here, with the exception of the WVS where there was no significant gender difference in the question about interpersonal violence. Residents of smaller towns are rural areas were also consistently more likely to justify violence in the WVS. This may be related to other factors discussed below such as economic and social disadvantage in more rural areas.

3.6.2 Economic disadvantage and inequality

The DARE reviews of previous literature (Franc and Pavlović, 2018; Poli and Arun 2019) showed there to be inconsistent relationship between objective indicators of poverty and radicalisation, including endorsement of violence, and a similarly unclear relationship between subjectively perceived economic disadvantage and political violence. In the data analysed here, being unemployed and not in education is associated with more support of interpersonal violence in the WVS, and less so with political violence in MYPLACE. Similarly, experienced difficulties coping on household income has small and inconsistent associations with higher support for interpersonal and political violence. Lower levels of household income on the other hand, is associated with *less* support for violence among both young Muslims and Christians in the WVS, and was not significant in the EVS and MYPLACE. This confirms the findings from the previous review (Franc and Pavlović, 2018) that neither objective inequality nor subjective perceptions of inequality are clearly associated with support for *political* violence.

3.6.3. Socio-political disadvantage

Experienced or perceived discrimination was one of the strongest predictors of support for political violence. Across datasets, those who either experienced being discriminated against themselves, or think there is racism and police or military discrimination in their neighbourhood, are more likely to support political violence. This supports the findings of Pauwels and De Waele (2014) and Schils and Pauwels (2016) that perceived injustice and discrimination can motivate and predict youth involvement in political violence. The Youth in Oslo study also indicates, similarly, that being a victim of violence or harassment increases justification for political violence. In the Young in Oslo data, those with immigrant parents and those belonging to a minority religion were also more positive to political violence, although this could be accounted for by general 'outsider position' according to Pedersen et al. (2018), and the effect of immigrant status was not replicated in the EVS.

3.6.4 Attitudes and values

The effect of religion is ambiguous. While simply belonging to a religious denomination appeared to increase support for political violence in the Young in Oslo dataset, the importance of religion in one's life decreased it among both Muslim and Christian WVS respondents, and there was no significant effect in the EVS. While the difference may be due to the large difference in samples, and the question wording, it is also possible that religious identity and practice and belief have opposite effects, The mobilisation of religious and other forms of group identity for extremist causes and violence (Atran, 2016; Doojse et al., 2016; Hogg and Adelman, 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2014) is well documented, and does not necessarily require religious knowledge or practice as exemplified by Islamist violent extremism (Borum, 2014; Fair, Goldstien and Hamza, 2017). The results from the WVS also did not reveal any difference between religious denominations, however, and despite belonging to different countries as well as religions, the Christian and Muslim samples are remarkably similar both when it comes to the proportions who support interpersonal violence and what factors predict that support.

Right-wing political orientation was associated with justification of violence in the Christian sample of the WVS, and (somewhat surprisingly) also weakly associated with young Norwegians' support for their peers travelling to Syria to fight. However, it was not a significant predictor of attitudes to political violence in general in either Young in Oslo, EVS or the Muslim sample of the WVS.

Patriotism or pride in citizenship on the other hand, was weakly negatively associated with support for violence in both the EVS and WVS. While national identities and pride could be mobilised into support for political violence in nationalist, anti-immigration and extreme right movements, the vast majority of civic national pride is entirely benign and non-violent, and is more likely to reflect loyalty to the state. In other words, if the political violence they are asked about is interpreted as being against the state, this is not a surprising finding.

Low personal control was associated with support for political violence in the EVS as well as the Christian sample of the WVS. Like perceived financial difficulty, unemployment, minority status and experienced discrimination, low personal control is an indication of a difficult life situation. While low control may in itself be cause for a search for order, group membership and radical solutions (Kay and Eibach 2013), it may also be associated with other processes such as loss of personal significance and meaning (Hogg and Adelman, 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2014, Kruglanski et al., 2018; McGregor et al., 2013; Webber et al., 2018), which could instigate or reaffirm a belief in or justification of political violence.

3.6.5 Country level variables

The Gini coefficient for income inequality was not a significant predictor of attitudes to political violence in either of the datasets, and neither were measures of welfare spending, or socio-political group inequality (MIPEX) and governance quality. The only country level variable that was significant was GDP, in both the EVS and WVS (Christian sample), and it was in the opposite direction from that hypothesised. This indicates that populations of richer countries are more likely to support political violence than those in poorer countries. When attitudes were not included in the model, GDP had a larger effect, and the mean World governance index was also significant in the EVS, such that people in countries with higher governance quality were more likely to support political violence. This may suggest that the variation between countries on support for political violence can partly be accounted for by differences in social, political and religious attitudes and values. In other words, the results of this study do not support the proposition that social or economic inequality or deprivation at the country level, should increase justifications of political violence.

3.7 Summary

To summarise the findings, there is some support for a relationship between perceived economic and social disadvantage at the individual level and support for political violence. Particularly, perceived or experienced discrimination on the basis of group characteristics like race, nationality or religion. Moreover, struggling to cope on the household income and experiencing low control over one's own life in general, are consistent, if weak, predictors of support for violence. This supports previous work which has found that threats to a group one identifies with, as well as personal loss of meaning and direction, can trigger support for and participation in violent extremism. However, the effects are small and likely indirect, and could be influenced by personality and environmental differences, and mediated by other emotions and attitudes which we have not controlled for here (see for example Doosje et al., 2012, 2013; Tausch et al., 2011).

On the otherhand we find no effect of objective economic or social inequality either on the individual or country level. To the extent that there is an effect, young individuals with higher income are more likely to support interpersonal violence in the WVS, and populations of countries with higher GDP are more likely to support political violence. We do not have an explanation for these effects. However, it is important to note here that different individual experiences, contexts and question wordings may inspire different interpretations of the term '(political) violence' (Hillesund, 2018), and recall that it

can refer both to protest by the powerless or an assertion of power by the powerful. It should also be noted that the effect of GDP is tested only in three analyses. Hence caution should be taken in interpreting these results.

4. Anti-democratic attitudes

Although the majority of current political regimes are democratic (Roser, 2020), democracy is not everyone's ideal or preferred political system. Even in some highly-developed democracies, a non-negligible number of citizens in general, and youth specifically, show preference for non-democratic governments (Ellison, Goswami and Pollock, 2014; Foa and Mounk, 2016). Anti-democratic attitudes have been related to both Islamist and right-wing extremism by multiple theorists (Backes, 1989; Borum, 2012; Mudde, 1995; 2010), and could be seen as a component of contemporary extremism.

In the following subsections, we first define the key concepts and the main predictors. Subsequently, we present findings of earlier studies that examine the relationship between anti-democratic attitudes and measures of inequality. Finally, the results from the secondary analysis are presented and discussed.

4.1 What is democracy?

Before finding out how strongly participants support or oppose democracy and what predicts this support or opposition, it is important to outline what we mean by democracy, even if discussions regarding the definition are ongoing. In its most basic form, democracy might be conceptualised as a 'rule by the people' (Coppedge et al., 2011) that involves some sort of electoral process and some degree of proection of civil rights and civil liberties (Shafiq, 2010). Coppedge and colleagues (2011) offer a somewhat more precise categorisation of democracies, distinguishing between six sub-types. Electoral democracy refers to the idea of parties competing for leadership via elections. The liberal conception of democracy emphasises transparency, rule of law and civil liberties, as well as the need to protect minority rights. The majoritarian conception is somewhat opposed to the liberal conception, highlighting the sovereignty of the majority, centralisation and concentration of power. The participatory conception is related to the historical origins of democracy and highlights the relevance of various kinds of citizen engagement in political activities. The deliberative conception focuses on the decision-making process, with the goal of achieving the common good being the guiding principle. The egalitarian conception is tied to the principle of political equality of all citizens in terms of representation, participation, protection and resources. Each of these conceptions are reflected in political institutions and can be further broken down into 33 components (Coppedge et al., 2011). Epstein and colleagues (2006) are more interested in the process of transitioning to democracy and distinguish between four stages of democratic development. The first stage is comprised of non-democratic countries, followed by countries at early stages of democracy, countries that are partially democratic and, finally fully democratic countries (Epstein et al., 2006). This variety may undermine the validity of results and introduce measurement error as participants from different contexts may base their support for democracy on its different elements or development stages. For instance, while support for democracy in European countries may stem from the actual performance of the present democratic system, the support for democracy in autocratic Muslim countries may stem from an image of how an ideal democracy that combines freedoms and religion would function (Tessler and Gao, 2005).

4.2 What is support for democracy?

A broad definition of support for democracy (or any regime) was proposed by Easton (1975) to be the extent to which voters have positive opinions about governing authorities, the political regime in general and the community. The author further theorised about the multidimensionality of support for democracy, describing its two types as 'specific' and 'diffuse'. The former refers to support for

specific political acts or figures and the latter refers to support for democracy in general as a regime, referring to its abstract (ideal) characteristics (ibid.). A similar conceptualisation was developed by Bratton and Mattes (2001), who distinguished between intrinsic support, defined as relatively stable appreciation of the ideal of democracy, and instrumental support, defined as circumstance-dependent support for democracy based primarily on its effectiveness and consequences. Norris (1999) provided a more detailed distinction between different levels of support for democracy by dividing the support into a five-point continuum. The most diffuse support for a political system would represent the support for political community, which could be defined as the most basic feeling of attachment to one's nation. The second level includes support for regime principles, that is the values it conveys in its ideal form. The third level is focused on regime performance, referring to support for how the political system actually functions rather than how it should function. The fourth level describes support for regime institutions like the government, police or military, while the fifth and most specific level of support is concerned with specific political actors or authorities. All of the mentioned conceptualisations imply that support for democracy is multidimensional and highlight the advantages of using multiple operationalisations in order to receive valid results.

4.3 Measurement (and mismeasurement) of support for democracy

As with other contested concepts, various authors have used different methodological approaches to measure support for democracy. This section briefly discusses several approaches frequently used in cross-national studies, noting their strengths and weaknesses. Comparability of results across studies depends on comparability of applied measures. 'Comparability' in this context mainly refers to the questions 'Are we measuring what we intended to measure?' (construct validity) and 'Are we doing it well?' (reliability). Due to relatively limited space, the question of validity will not be discussed in detail, although a few key points in this field of study are noted. Firstly, findings may vary with respect to level of support for the different aspects of democracy we are measuring (e.g. support for democracy in general or support for specific laws), especially if we add similar, but not directly related, constructs as operationalisations of support for democracy. For instance, Linde and Ekman (2003) discussed satisfaction with democracy as a proxy for support for democracy and concluded that these concepts were not the same, with satisfaction with democracy being more contextually defined (i.e. specific) than support for democracy. Thus, combining qualitatively different measures into a single operationalisation of support for democracy without considering the relationships between the specific phenomena they measure may lead to conclusions that are different to ones based on the items used independently. Although according to previously discussed theories, both specific and diffuse support are relevant concepts of support for democracy, mixing them without taking their differences into account may lead to more noise than useful conclusions. A similar note of caution can also be applied to the 'democracy-autocracy continuum', which is used in the WVS (see below for details). Many authors use democracy and autocracy as two poles of the same dimension (e.g. Polity Project, 2018), although Gleditsch and Ward (1997) criticised such an approach by questioning if the two concepts actually represent opposite poles of the same continuum. Analyses of different data sets (e.g. *MYPLACE data:* Ellison et al., 2014; Franc, Perasović and Mustapić, 2018; *EVS data:* Tufis, 2014) suggested that, at least in terms of support, the correlation between these two constructs is not perfectly negative and varies by type of regime. Moreover, issues of regime typology have also been discussed (Gerschewski and Schmotz, 2011), particularly the placement of 'hybrid' regimes that are neither complete democracies nor autocracies on the continuum. For instance, 'delegative democracy' is used to describe the combination of autocracy and democracy present in the Russian political system (Hale, 2011). This work mentions a Russian Election Study (RES) conducted in 2008 that used an open-ended question to assess the perception of what makes a country democratic and revealed that only approximately 40% of Russians were able to provide a definition of democracy similar to standards set by Western countries, which might be a consequence of exposure to a hybrid regime (ibid.). In such situations, preference (and support) for democracy or autocracy may depend solely on specific characteristics of the current regime that are more prominent in participants' minds.

Therefore, using support for autocracy (as, for instance, in the democracy-autocracy preference scale described in the following sections) as an indirect way of measuring support for democracy might result in less valid findings.

Several large questionnaires relied on single-item measures of support for democracy. Although the European Social Survey does not directly measure support for democracy, it measures satisfaction with democracy and importance of living in democracy, both of which were used as a proxy of democratic support (e.g. Cordero and Simon, 2015). PEW questionnaires, on the other hand, included a single question regarding support for democracy that offered a dichotomous choice between democracy and autocracy (e.g. Shafiq, 2010). The Afrobarometer (2018) also included a measure of support for democracy, using a single item which asks if participants would prefer democratic, non-democratic or are indifferent regarding the form of government regime. Although this measure taps into the democracy-autocracy continuum, in its dichotomous form (as it is often dichotomised into democracy and everything else) it cannot capture the extent of support. An additional problem with single-item measures of support for democracy lies in the unclear specification of whether they are measuring support for democratic values or the regime in general (e.g. Canache, Mondak and Seligson, 2001; Linde and Ekman, 2004). If various possible conceptualisations of democracy are considered (e.g. Coppedge et al., 2011, Epstein et al., 2006), results of such items might be cross-culturally incomparable as citizens of different countries are probably exposed to (and perceive) different kinds of democracy. Inglehart (2003) also argues that overt measures of democracy (i.e. measures that ask specifically about the support for democracy) may not represent an optimal way to measure it, preferring instead more specific and indirect measures that operationalise democracy in terms of the values it promotes.

In other major cross-cultural studies, support for democracy is operationalised by multiple items in order to avoid the (mis)measurement issues related to the single-item operationalisation. However, the effectiveness of this approach (i.e. actual comparability of results) is rarely questioned. Ariely and Davidov (2011) tested the cross-national invariance of the World Values Survey (WVS) from 2000, which measured support for democracy in two ways: firstly, the democracy-autocracy preference (DAP; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005); followed by items focused on evaluation of democratic performance (DPE). Confirming the cross-national invariance would mean that their structure, which implies the structure of the democracy-autocracy relationship, is similar across different cultures. DAP measures support for democracy via four items: 1) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; 2) Having experts, not governments, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country; 3) Having the army rule; 4) Having a democratic political system. The DPE is similarly measured with four items: 1) In democracy, the economic system runs badly; 2) Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling; 3) Democracies are not good at maintaining order; 4) Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government. The results were much more in favour of cultural differences than invariance. Not even partial scalar invariance (invariance of item intercepts) was confirmed for the DAP scale, indicating that cross-national comparisons of DAP do not yield valid results. DPE, on the other hand, achieved partial scalar invariance, indicating that the short scale yields results generally comparable across nations. Although at least some of these differences might be attributed to minor deviations in translations and/or sampling (e.g. Curtice, 2007), the validity of such measures in terms of their operationalisation of the originally desired construct remains questionable. A way to overcome the problem with unsatisfactory item loadings of relevant items revealed by factor analysis was proposed by Magalhães (2014), who established an additional index of explicit support for democracy. Although multi-item measures should generally be preferred over single-item measures, the discussed findings indicate that currently present multi-item measures still have some room for improvement, both in terms of reliability (i.e., more precise measurement of the observed phenomena) and validity (i.e., more complete operationalisation of different levels of support according to dominant theoretical approaches).

A more encouraging example is Claassen's (2019) study, which tested the relationship between support for democracy and level of democracy within a country, with multiple studies and operationalisations of support for democracy included. The author focused on measures of diffuse support for democracy in more than 10 international surveys, along with some macro-level indicators of democracy within a country, like the V-Dem's liberal democracy index (V-Dem, 2020). Although inclusion of different operationalisations of the same construct may hinder comparability of findings, obtaining similar findings in this case can greatly increase their generalisability.

Measuring democracy in non-democratic countries, although their citizens generally consider democracy desirable (e.g. Hoffman, 2004; Tessler and Gao, 2005), represents a delicate task. As these citizens have not actually experienced democracy and its characteristics (Mattes and Bratton, 2007), their opinions are based on abstract concepts that often lead to biased results (Kiewet de Jonge, 2016). Moreover, exposure to an authoritarian regime or a loosened semi-democratic version of it may also represent a source of confusion in such studies (Schelder and Sarsfield, 2007). Another point that should be highlighted regarding (mis-)measurement of support for democracy are the political preferences of participants. People who feel they are underrepresented in political institutions, who feel like political institutions do not take their opinion into account or who simply are not satisfied with the present government tend to show lower support for democracy (e.g. Boräng, Nistotskaya and Xezonakis, 2017; Cordero and Simon, 2016). According to these premises, conducting a study that overrepresents minorities or voters of political opposition (Singh, Lago and Blais, 2011) may lead to underestimated support for democracy.

More detailed information on limitations of democracy measures can be found elsewhere (see, for example, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2017).

4.4 Established predictors of different types of support for democracy

As support for a regime in terms of its legitimacy is theorised to be the key to its survival (Diamond, 1999), many researchers have attempted to discern what factors contribute to this support. However, before discussion on predictors of support, its variability should be ascertained. The important role of variability of support for democracy is relatively recently recognised as earlier theorists speculated that democracy in 'established democracies' creates its own supporters, while newer studies have pointed to the opposite conclusion that could be defined as the negative feedback loop (Claassen, 2019). According to the Claassen (2019), support for democracy grows when democratic liberties are perceived as threatened, while autocratic alternatives receive more sympathies when democracy fails to meet expectations of its citizens. This also indicates that support for democracy is a dynamic phenomenon that does not reveal its dynamics until challenged by specific contexts. However, these trends are not rapid and substantial in most cases, as the average level of support for democracy has not changed during the last few decades (Voeten, 2016). Previous studies of support for democracy have predominantly focused on macro-level factors that reflect societal circumstances rather than individual characteristics. Moreover, no systematic reviews or meta-analyses of individuals' characteristics have been conducted to find the empirical basis for possible causal relationships. Therefore, no variables have been established by the earlier literature as stable correlates of diffuse support for democracy, although some of them, more relevant from the point of view of political science and economy, have been more often studied in relationship with support for democracy. These variables are grouped and described in the following sections, along with some evidence from previous studies on their relationship with support for democracy.

4.4.1 Gender

Although many studies have found that gender plays a role of in support for democracy, with women being less supportive than men, few have made the effort to interpret or investigate these findings further. Magalhães (2014) found that women were less supportive of democracy than men using all three of the previously described DAP, DPE and EDS scales. Several studies used data from Afrobarometer round four (2008-2009) and five (2010-2012) in an attempt to explain the sources of

this gender difference (Garcia-Penalosa and Konte, 2014; Konte and Klasen, 2016; Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, 2016). Putting aside the limitations of the single-item operationalisation of support for democracy available in Afrobarometer, the studies consistently found that men in Africa were more supportive of democracy than women. These findings were not only tied to Africa as earlier studies revealed similar trends in Poland (Oakes, 2002), and Latin America (Walker and Kehoe, 2013), while studies conducted in South Korea (Park and Shin, 2006) and Iran (Tezcur et al., 2012) found no gender differences in support for democracy. Boräng, Nistotskaya and Xezonakis (2017) studied WVS data and found that women exhibited less support for democracy on specific, but not on diffuse levels of support for democracy. Different explanations have been provided for this phenomenon, ranging from women's aversion to the competitiveness of the multiparty system or dynamics of democracy to different criteria of evaluating the quality of democracy. However, more probable explanations come from Garcia-Penalosa and Konte (2014) and Gottlieb and colleagues (2018) who noticed that the gap disappears in more developed countries (in terms of political rights and Human Development Index) and countries that include women in politics and protect their rights (Konte and Klasen, 2016). The gender differences thus seem to stem from a previously explained finding: a social group that is underrepresented (or discriminated against) in the political system (e.g. loses the elections) tends to be less supportive for that system as the system is less responsive to its needs (e.g. Anderson and Guillery, 1997). This highlights the role of specific cultural factors and relevance of including gender in statistical models to obtain clearer results.

4.4.2 Age

Age has also been studied as a predictor of support for democracy. Evans and Rose (2007) found that citizens of Malawi aged 18-25 were less supportive of democracy than older participants, although this relationship was not significant after including occupation and housing in the model. Similarly, Magalhães (2014) found that relationship between age and support for democracy is generally weak and depends on the applied measure and regression model. Park and Shin (2006) found no age-related differences in democratic support among South Koreans, although their operationalisation of age included multiple groups (age intervals) rather than two or three groups as described in the previous studies, while Tezcur et al. (2011) also failed to find a consistent relationship between age and support for democracy across different waves of WVS conducted in Iran. The multivariate study of Bratton and Mattes (2001) failed to find any relationship between age and support for democracy among citizens of South Africa, Ghana and Zambia, while Boräng et al. (2017) used WVS and found that older generations seem to exhibit more diffuse support for democracy than youth, while no age differences were found in specific support for democracy. This is in line with the study conducted by Lechler and Sunde (2018), also based on the WVS data, who found that age increases support for democracy, unlike proximity of death which decreases it, highlighting the role of life expectancy. Taken together, these findings seem to indicate that although some bivariate linear relationship between support for democracy and age may exist, it is not very strong and becomes insignificant when other socio-economic predictors are included into the equation. This indicates the presence of complex relationships, which could occur due to cohort-specific characteristics. One study conducted on Romanian and Spanish data found that early socialisation influences the acquirement of democratic values and support for democracy and shows that those who were raised in democratic regimes are more supportive of democratic political systems (Voicu and Peral, 2012). Similarly, studies conducted on citizens of China have shown that younger generations, born after the economic reform in late 1970s, were more supportive of democracy than older generations (Wang, 2007). Newer studies identified a diminished support for democracy (Foa and Mounk, 2016; 2017), indicating that younger generations care less about democracy than their predecessors, which Inglehart (2016) attributes to the shift in values that occurred in the last several decades due to overall improvements of living standards. However, Norris (2017) pointed out the methodological inconsistencies of the study and argues that one cannot conclude that there has been a drop in support for democracy among younger

cohorts. Nevertheless, the role of age (and cohort) in predicting support for democracy should not be neglected.

4.4.3 Quality of government

As mentioned in the previous sections, the quality of the current government, both measured at the individual and macro level, are important predictors of support for democracy. Boräng and colleagues (2017) used different waves of the WVS and operationalised their dependent variable by combining DAP items of strong leader, decision-making experts and army rule, which revealed that participants who perceived the quality of government as high were also more supportive of democracy than those who perceived it as low. This effect was more pronounced in newer democracies, although omission of more advanced statistical procedures like the confirmatory factor analysis and invariance testing implies questionable validity of relevant constructs. A similar finding was shown with macro-level indicators, by Magalhães (2014) who analysed more than 100 surveys: in democratic regimes, higher government effectiveness operationalised as quality of policy-making formulation and implementations was related to higher support for democracy, which was operationalised as DAP and DPE scales according to modifications proposed by Ariely and Davidov (2011). The strongest relationship was found between government effectiveness and DAP scale, and weakest between government effectiveness and EDS, with positive relationship being found in democracies and slightly negative in non-democracies. Confirmations of this relationship are relatively numerous (e.g. Cordero and Simon, 2015; Curini, Jou and Memoli, 2012; Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2012; Wagner, Schneider and Halla, 2009).

4.4.4 Religion/religiousness

The role of religion in support for democracy has also been studied by several researchers, although practical limitations should also be considered. For instance, older democracies tend to also be majority Christian. One could argue that support for democracy should not be studied across religions, because of two inevitable confounding factors present in these studies, namely that because democratic countries tend to be dominantly Christian, and non-Christians represent minorities in these countries. Using WVS data, Norris and Inglehart did not find any significant difference in the support for democracy between Christian and Muslim majority countries (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 134). Similarly, in a study of attitudes to democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, using WVS data, Valenta and Strabac (2012) did not find differences between Muslims and Christians in the same country. Religiousness can also be measured by religious activity, specific religious belief, and self-rated religiosity (e.g. intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness as discussed by Donahue, 1985; or the four-factor model proposed by Bodling et al., 2013). The previously discussed limitations put forward comparisons with respect to level of religiousness as more valid than comparisons with respect to denomination. Several studies attempted to delineate this relationship using complex models and found that, in general, support for an increased role of religion in political life is related to lower support for democracy (Golan and Kiousis, 2010; Meyer, Tope and Price, 2008), but there is no significant association with religiosity per se. Golan and Kiousis' (2010) study is based on large-scale public opinion studies focused on Arab youth in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while Meyer, Tope and Price (2008) used WVS data. Valenta and Strabac (2012) similarly found that religious beliefs and service attendance had a negative effect on support for democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this effect was no longer significant once the attitude to religion's influence on politics was controlled for in the model. However, Bloom and Arikan (2012) also using the WVS data show that higher religiousness is related to less support for democracy operationalized by DAP and DPE scales, which is mediated by rational and self-expression values (Bloom and Arikan, 2012). This is in contrast with findings by Meyer and colleagues (2008) who focused exclusively on democratic performance. However, a relatively large number of participants might have inflated statistical power of conducted tests and led to false positive outcomes. Taken together, the role of religion and religiosity in support for democracy remains ambiguous, which may be attributed to sub-optimal operationalisations of constructs.

4.4.5 Economic turbulence and violations of democracy

Economic crises are examples of historical events that may influence support for democracy (Acemoglu et al., 2008). This is partly because of the sudden change to the economy itself, and the associated unexpected drops in employment and living standards which could negatively affect the popularity of the system of government. However, it could also have consequences for the way in which democracy works. The relatively recent economic crisis of the entire Eurozone in 2007-2008, posed a crisis in a number of countries' national economies, and resolving it required the involvement of international monetary institutions. In certain countries (like Ireland, Portugal and Greece) governments were forced to make changes to their plans in order to get financial help. In other words, elected politicians were unable to lead the country according to their manifestos, which violates the concept of democracy. Several researchers attempted to discern if this violation led to change in support for democracy. Cordero and Simon (2015) used ESS round six (2012/2013) data to test if diffuse support for democracy (i.e. importance of living in democracy) would be higher in countries that received financial help (Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) from international monetary institutions compared to countries that did not receive it, which they confirmed. Moreover, although the general trend suggested that satisfaction with the economy was unrelated to support for democracy, the results have highlighted that in countries that received help, people who were least satisfied with the economy of their country (which was under control of the foreign monetary institutions), were the ones most supportive of democracy (Cordero and Simon, 2015). On the other hand, Teixeria, Tsatsanis and Belchior (2014) studied the same phenomenon in Greece and Portugal using national surveys with questions about democracy similar to those in EVS and WVS, which confirmed a drop in specific support for democracy in both countries but also revealed a drop in diffuse support for democracy in Greece. Although changes in societal conditions may affect support for democracy, with changes limiting democracy being predictors of higher diffused support for democracy (Claassen, 2019), further studies are required to shed some light on the mechanisms of this association.

4.5 Is inequality related to support for democracy?

The basic idea of a relationship between inequality and support for democracy stems from modernisation theory (Lipset, 1959), which deals with structural and societal conditions related to democracy. According to this theory, more developed nations, in terms of higher GDP, urbanisation, wealth and education, are more likely to have a democratic political regime (Lipset, 1959). According to Lipset, unlike autocracies in which a small number of citizens holds the majority of resources and power, democracies apply mechanisms of redistribution and citizenship in order to lower the gap between different societal groups. In such circumstances, the average citizen perceives that the regime is responsive their needs, gets more chances to develop and improve their life standard, achieves that improvement and in turn supports the system that provided them that chance. However, crucial terms here would be 'average' and 'redistribution', as both imply that some members of the society may not benefit from democracy. These citizens, then, would find the regime non-responsive to their needs, which would in turn lower their support (Anderson and Guillery, 1997). This introduces the role of inequality (i.e., imperfect redistribution of valuables) in support for democracy. Sprong et al. (2019) used multiple methodological approaches that yielded converging results, stating that economic inequality increases support for autocratic government types.

4.5.1 Economic inequality

According to modernisation theory (Lipset, 1959), democracy appears primarily in more developed countries. However, reviews of studies focused on this relationship provide contradictory results. While a review by Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009) generally provided support for the hypothesis, a study conducted by Acemoglu, Robinson, Johnson and Yared (2008) on the macro-level data concluded that this relationship exists solely due to many uncontrolled variables that affect both economic inequality and democracy, like constraint on the executive at independence (for ex-

colonies) or historical population density. However, this is not contradictory to the work of Lipset (1959) as he did not make any causal claims regarding the democracy-development relationship.

While these studies focused on macro-level variables as predictors of democracy, their inconsistencies in findings might at least in part be attributable to individual-level differences. If the theory holds, people who are less wealthy, less educated or live in worse conditions should be less supportive of democracy due to weak redistribution of resources. However, newer studies conducted on the individual level do not show a clear relationship between indicators of economic inequality and support for democracy. For instance, Shafiq (2010) used PEW 2005 data to test the relationship between income and education and support for democracy in Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Pakistan. The author found that more educated people were more supportive of democracy in Jordan, Lebanon and Pakistan, while the middle class in Turkey and Lebanon was more supportive of democracy than those with lowest and those with highest income. Although these results confirm that some relationship between income and support for democracy probably exists, they also indicate its context-dependency. Cordero and Simon (2015) also found that support for democracy was slightly higher among those who were more educated and had higher income, which was also found by Magalhães (2014), who additionally found that unemployed individuals tend to be less supportive of democracy. Similarly, Konte and Klasen (2016) found that more educated individuals in sub-Saharan Africa were robustly more supportive of democracy, while individuals who did not have enough money for food were less supportive of democracy. Insufficiency of medicine and water, as well as employment status were unrelated to democracy. Boräng et al. (2017) found that more educated individuals were consistently more supportive of democracy than less educated ones, while there were less consistent effects of income and employment status. This was found both for specific and diffuse support for democracy. Evans and Rose (2007) found that, in Malawi, the most supportive of democracy were the most educated individuals, while any formal education was predictive of positive attitudes towards democracy. Moreover, those working on manual tasks were less supportive of democracy than non-manual workers. Tezcür and colleagues (2011) investigated predictors of support for democracy in Iran using WVS 2005 and 2008 data along with data from a local survey of Tehran, and found that education has an indirect effect on support for democracy, mediated by satisfaction with regime performance. Political ideology may also play a role in this relationship. For example Anderson and Singer (2008) found that inequality had stronger negative effects on support for democracy among those with a left wing political orientation. Considered together, these studies indicate that the economic circumstances an individual is exposed to are related to the support for democracy they exhibit, and both the effects of individual-level economic disadvantage and country level economic development and equality on attitudes to democracy warrant further exploration.

4.5.2 Socio-political inequality

As mentioned in the section on gender, perceiving oneself as being discriminated against by the political system can lower the support for the system. This was found for gender (e.g. Klasen, O'Neill and Vargas, 2017; Konte and Klasen, 2015) and racial discrimination (Davies and Weber, 2018). Levitt (2015) proposed that individuals who are discriminated against tend to show less trust in protection from political institutions which, in democratic countries, would indicate lower support for democracy. Although potentially relevant, only rare studies included different forms of exclusion or discrimination as predictors of support for democracy, which points to the need for further investigation of this relationship.

4.6 Results

After gaining insight into outcomes of earlier studies and established predictors of support for democracy, the following section presents the results of the conducted analyses based on multi-level modelling. Bivariate correlations with the outcome variables in all datasets for those aged under 30, are presented in Table 4.1. The results calculated on each database are presented in the following

subsections, along with brief interpretations of practical implications of their effect sizes. Finally, a summary of findings is presented to provide insight into the general conclusions from the analyses.

Table 4.1 Anti-Democracy attitudes among under 30 year olds (Pearson's correlations, P<0.05)

Survey	**European Values Study**		**World Values Survey**				**MYPLACE**
Year / Sample	2008	2017	2010/14 Muslims		2010/14 Christians		2012/13
Question	a) Evaluate political systems: democratic b)Democracy better than other forms of govt.	a) Evaluate political systems: democratic b) How important for you to live in democracy?	Evaluate political systems: democratic		Evaluate political systems: democratic		Evaluate: a) Having a democratic, multi-party system. b) Having the opposition that can freely express their opinions.
Type of question	Lack of support for / negative view of democracy		Bad vs. Fairly good	Bad vs. Very	Bad vs. Fairly good	Bad vs. Very good	Negative view of
Sociodemographic							
Age	**-0.03**	No	No	No	No	No	**0.08**
Female	No	**-0.05**	No	No	No	No	No
Rural area	**0.06**	**0.07**	No	No	**0.05**	No	
Economic disadvantage							
Not in work not in education	**0.03**	**0.05**	No	No	No	**0.05**	**0.05**
Difficult on household income			No	No	**0.06**	No	**0.11**
Reverse Household income	**0.08**	No	No	No	No	No	
Financial difficulty/poverty in	No	**0.03**					**0.08**
Socio-political disadvantage							
Immigrant	**-0.05**	**-0.04**					
Immigrant parents	**0.02**	No					
Experience of discrimination							No
Perceived group discrimination			**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.06**	**0.12**	
Attitudes							
Religion important	**-0.05**	**0.07**	**-0.12**	**-0.23**	**-0.07**	**-0.20**	
Rightwing	No	**0.07**	No	No	No	**0.05**	
National pride	**-0.10**	**-0.09**	**-0.13**	**-0.10**	No	**-0.11**	
Low control	**0.07**	**0.09**	**0.09**	**0.08**	**0.10**	**0.06**	
Postmaterialist values	**-0.08**	**-0.14**	No	No	**-0.04**	No	
Country level							
Gini	No	**0.05**			No	**0.05**	
Reverse Welfare spending	**0.14**	**0.20**					
Reverse GDP	**0.09**	**0.16**			**0.11**	**-0.22**	
Reverse WGI	**0.09**	**0.18**			No	**-0.11**	
Reverse MIPEX	**0.08**	**0.17**					

Table 4.1: Results from under 30 year olds in EVS 2008, EVS 2017, WVS 2010/14 and MYPLACE 2012/13. Positive correlations are in blue, negative in red, with stronger colours indicating larger correlations. 'No'= no significant correlation. Note that that because of large samples some very low correlations (under 0.1) are statistical significant.

4.6.1 European Values Study 2008 and 2017

Age and country differences

The European Value Study asks several questions about attitudes to democracy. Here we combine two of them, based on Magalhães' (2014) index of explicit support for democracy, namely 'Democracy is a bad political system', and 'Democracy is not important' ($r(50546)$=.41, P<.001) (EVS 2017). For EVS 2008, the two items are 'Disagree that democracy is best political system', and 'Democracy is a bad

political system' (*r(56726)*= .49, *P*<.001) In each dataset, the two four-category items[56] were combined by taking the mean of both, resulting in a scale ranging from 1 to 4 where a higher number represent more anti-democratic attitudes. There are no glaring differences in anti-democracy support between younger and older respondents in either datasets. The mean value for under 30 year olds in 2017 was 1.61 (*St.d*=.63), whereas for the 30 year olds and over it was 1.51 (*St.d*=.62). In 2008, the mean value for under 30 year olds was 1.76 (*St.d*=.62), and 1.72 (*St.d*=.63) for the older age group. In other words, the vast majority (88% in EVS 2017 and 86% in EVS 2008) respond somewhere between 1 and 2, meaning they think democracy is good and important, even if they are not unanimously enthusiastic about it. The country differences are similarly small; although democratic regimes may not be equally successful in all these countries, the populations are in broad consensus that it is not a bad political system, and the national means range from around 2.0 in Russia and Serbia to 1.3 in Albania, Denmark and Norway in the EVS 2017. In the EVS 2008, Ukraine and Latvia have the most anti-democratic young populations with a mean of 2.1, while Greece and Denmark are the most positive towards democracy at 1.3. The country means are shown in Figure 4.1 (EVS2017) and Figure 4.2 (EVS2008).

[56] The importance of democracy variable in EVS2017 originally had 10 values from 1) not at all important, to 10) absolutely important, but was recoded and reversed into a 4 category variable to enable combination with the other 4 category variable.

Figure 4.1: Mean Anti-Democratic attitudes (1-4) by country, EVS 2017



Figure 4.1 (EVS 2017), 30+ N=44514, under 30 N=8667

Figure 4.2: Mean Anti-Democratic attitudes (1-4) by country, EVS 2008



Figure 4.2 (EVS 2008), 30+ N=48752, under 30 N=13108

Bivariate correlations

The most pronounced bivariate correlations (shown in Table 4.1) in both the EVS datasets are with the country level variables. The largest ones are welfare spending as a proportion of GDP (*r(6508)*=0.20, *P*<0.001) in EVS 2017, and *r(8739*)= .14, *P*<0.001) in EVS 2008. In contrast, there was only a very weak correlation with the Gini coefficient (*r(8667*)=.05, *P*<0.001) in EVS 2017 and it was not statistically significant at the 95% level in EVS 2008. The individual level economic variables have generally weaker correlations. There are no bivariate correlations between anti-democracy and sociodemographic or macro variables larger than .1 in either EVS 2017 or EVS 2008. In EVS 2008 the largest one was with reverse household income (*r(10108)*= .08, P<.001) and in EVS 2017 the largest was with living in rural area (*r(7936)*=.07, *P*<.001). The attitude variables have slightly larger correlations, particularly postmaterialist values (*r(8379)*=-.14, *P*<.001) in EVS 2017.

Sociodemographic and individual economic variables

From the multilevel regression analysis of the EVS 2017 (shown in Figure 4.3) we find that gender (*b*=-.072 *SE*=.016, *P*<.001) and age (*b*=-.026 *SE*=.008, *P*=.001) are both significant predictors of anti-democratic attitudes in Model 3. Male and younger people in the under 30 group are on average more anti-democratic, but the effects are not large. All else being equal the model (Model 3) predicts that a man would score 1.65 and a woman 1.57 on the anti-Democracy scale, an 18 year old would score 1.66 and a 29 year old 1.58. Unemployed under 30-year olds also hold slightly more anti-democratic attitudes, but there is only a .075 difference in anti-democratic attitudes between someone who is out of work compared to someone in work or education (*b*=.075 *SE*=.023, *P*=.001). Lower household income decile and childhood financial difficulty also increases anti-democracy support very slightly in Model 1, but these coefficients are not significant when including attitudes and allowing slopes to vary between countries in Model 3.). Living in a rural area or town with fewer than 5000 people was also associated with anti-democratic views in Model 1, but not when attitudes were controlled for. This variable was not available in the UK and Netherlands and was thus excluded from the analysis[57].

In the analysis of the EVS 2008 (shown in Figure 4.4), the significant effects are somewhat different. There is no significant effect of gender, but there is an effect of age (*b*=-.021 *SE*=.008 *P*=.006) similar to 2017, where younger under 30-year olds are slightly more anti-democratic. There is also a slightly heightened level of anti-democratic attitudes among those who live in less populated areas (*b*=-.072 *SE*=.023 *P*=.002). With the exception of unemployment (*b*=.049 *SE*=.020 *P*=.014), the economic variables had slightly larger effects in EVS 2008 than in 2017, and they remained significant when controlling for attitudinal variables and random slopes in models 2 and 3. Those who grew up with parents who were struggling financially scored .081 higher on the anti-democracy scale (*b*=-.081 *SE*=.028 *P*=.004), and anti-democracy declines by .026 for each 1000 Euros of household income per month adjusted for PPP[58], such that someone in a household with a monthly income of about 1000 Euros scores 1.76 while someone with an income of about 12000 scores 1.47 on anti-democracy.

As for the attitudinal variables, national pride (*b*=-.053 *SE*=.012 *P*=.000) and post-materialist values (*b*=-.072 *SE*=.009 *P*=.000) are both associated with less anti-democratic attitudes, whereas feeling lack of control over one's life (*b*=.052 *SE*=.015 *P*=.000) is associated with anti-democratic attitudes among

[57] The Urban / Rural variable was excluded in order to include the UK and the Netherlands where the variable was not available. Including this variable does not substantially affect the results of the models. Living in a town with a population of less than 5000 was significantly associated with anti-democratic attitudes in Model 1 (*b*=.056 *SE*=.018 *P*=.002) but not significant with attitudes controlled for in Model 2 (*b*=.032, *SE*=.020, *P*=.112).

[58] In EVS2008, household income is the Monthly household income in Euros (x1000) corrected for purchasing power parity (PPP). In the analysis shown in Table A.X and Figure 4.4, it is adjusted for household size by dividing it by the square root of the number of people in the household, reversed by multiplying it by -1 (as we are principally interested in the effect of lower income), and standardised. For clarity, the predicted scores in the text above are based on analysis of the original measure (i.e. Euros corrected for PPP) without the additional standardisation and adjustments for household size.

under 30 year olds in both EVS datasets (figures are from EVS 2017). The predicted anti-democracy score for someone who says they are not at all in control of their life is 1.78, compared to 1.58 for those who have a great deal of control of their life.

Country level variables

The multi-level model shows that 12.9% of the variance in anti-democratic attitudes in the EVS 2017 was at the country level rather than individual level. In the EVS 2007 data, only 9.7% of the variance was at the country level.

The Gini coefficient for income inequality (World Bank 2019) was not significantly associated with anti-democracy in either the EVS 2017 or the EVS 2008. However, in 2017, young residents of countries with lower GDP, less spending on social welfare (as a percent of GDP) (Eurostat 2019), lower WGI (WGI 2019) and lower MIPEX (MIPEX 2015) were all more likely to express anti-democratic attitudes, compared to young people in countries with larger economies, more social welfare spending[59], more social and economic rights, and more rights specifically for migrants[60]. The predicted score of anti-democracy for an under 30 year old in a country which spends 15 percent of its GDP on social welfare benefits, is 1.80, while it is 1.32 in a country where 35 percent of the GDP goes to welfare. With the 2017 data, the coefficients are all larger by about .02 if the attitudinal variables (introduced in model 2) were excluded.

There were no significant effects of any of the country level variables in EVS2008 for those aged under 30, and not including attitudes in the model made no difference to the results.

[59] Eurostat's measure of social expenditure as a % of GDP and was not available for the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia and Ukraine (Eurostat 2019), and these countries were excluded from Model 5.

[60] Note that the most recent MIPEX used for the 2017 analysis was from 2014 and it was not available in five of the countries in the sample: Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Serbia which were consequently excluded from model 8. In 2008, the closest available MIPEX was from 2010 and was not available in the following 12 countries, which were thus excluded from model 8: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine (MIPEX 2015).

Figure 4.3: Regression coefficients: Anti-Democracy (EVS 2017)



Figure 4.3 (EVS 2017). Regression coefficients with 95% confidence interval. All variables standardised. Model 4-8 control for all variables from Model 3. GDP=Gross Domestic Product, WGI=Mean of World Governance Indicators, MIPEX=Migrant Integration Policy index. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.11-12.

Figure 4.4: Regression coefficients: Anti-Democracy (EVS 2008)



Figure 4.4 (EVS 2008). Regression coefficients with 95% confidence interval. All variables standardised. Model 4-8 control for all variables from Model 3. GDP=Gross Domestic Product, WGI=Mean of World Governance Indicators, MIPEX=Migrant Integration Policy index. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.13-14

Difference between younger and older respondents

Overall, there are very small differences between older and younger respondents in what affects their general anti-democracy attitudes.

Household income makes a bigger difference to anti-democracy for the older age group (*b*=.057 *SE*=.007 *P*=.000 in EVS 2017) than the younger. Someone in the bottom 10% of household incomes in their country scored 1.60, compared to 1.42 for someone in the top 10% in EVS 2017, whereas there was no significant effect for under 30 year olds. This may be because people over 29 are likely to have more expenses (mortgage, children etc.), and higher expectations from their household income than younger people. At that age, income is perhaps also more reflective of their personal status, and their future economic situation, than it is for someone just starting their career. On the other hand, the effect of not being in work, education or retirement is somewhat smaller for the older age group once attitudes are controlled for. There is no effect of gender in the older age group, as there is in the under 30s in EVS 2017. Younger respondents within the 30+ group are slightly more anti-democratic, but the effect is very small: a 30 year old scores on average 1.57 while a 60 year old scores 1.50.

The country level variables have slightly larger coefficients in the older age group than in the younger one. In EVS 2008, Welfare expenditure, GDP and governance quality are all predictive of slightly less anti-democratic populations aged 30 or over, even though these were not significant for under 30 year olds. As with the under 30 year olds, excluding attitudes from the model increases the country level coefficients slightly in EVS 2017, while it makes no difference to the results in 2008.

4.6.2 World Values Survey (2010-2014)

The World Values Survey (6th wave, 2010-2014) asked respondents to state their opinion of how good or bad a democratic multiparty system was as a way to govern a country. This is a measure of explicit, but diffuse support for democracy, according to Easton (1975)'s dichotomy. However, according to Norris' (1999) more detailed scale it is not the most diffuse measure, as it mentions a specific feature of a democratic system, the multiparty system. Participants provided answers on a four-point scale ranging from very good (1) to very bad (4)[61]. The database was divided into a Muslim and a Christian sample in order to test if religion moderates the predictive power of specific variables in explaining anti-democratic attitudes. Note that this means people of other religions and no religion in the WVS were not analysed here.

4.6.3 WVS Muslim sample

The distribution of anti-democratic attitudes was very asymmetrical: 87% of both those aged under 30 and those aged 30 and older say they consider democracy to be either a fairly good or very good political system. In the youth sample (aged 29 or less), 50.54% of participants stated that democracy was very good, 36.93% considered it to be fairly good, 9.18% thought democracy was fairly bad and 3.34% thought it was very bad. Similarly, in the adult sample (aged 30 or more), 43.24% of participants stated that democracy is very good, 33.27% considered it to be fairly good, 19.14% thought democracy was fairly bad and 4.35% thought it was very bad. Use of multilevel regression analyses requires a relatively large number of participants per second-level variable in order to obtain stable estimates, which makes it impossible to do such an analysis in a valid way with the answer 'very bad'. Therefore, answers 'fairly bad' and 'very bad' were combined into one answer-category 'bad', indicating negative

[61] There were similar questions about other systems of government. However, as the factor analysis revealed that the four items do not measure the same construct, only the item related to democracy was used in further analyses (see Chapter 2, page 15 for details).

opinion on democracy as a political system. The distribution of these results per country and age group can be found in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Distribution of attitudes to democracy in the Muslim sample of WVS 2010-2014



ure 4.5 (WVS 2010-2014), 30+ N=3054, under 30 N=2244

The graphs highlight the general trend across all countries; the majority of WVS Muslim participants have positive opinions on democratic, multi-party political systems. The magnitude of this finding is clearly visible from the low number of participants who had negative opinions on democracy in countries like Ghana or Malaysia. However, such low numbers would yield inconsistent parameter estimates in regression analyses. Therefore, in order to get as precise results as possible, countries with less than 20 participants in any of the three categories of opinions on democracy (bad, fairly good, very good) were excluded from further analyses. Remaining countries (Azerbaijan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria and Tunisia from the youth sample and Algeria, Azerbaijan, India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Tunisia and Yemen in the adult sample) were included in further analyses. Since the scale of attitudes towards democratic multi-party systems was developed as ordinal, analytical approaches adjusted for ordinal regression (such as cumulative link regression) would yield the most informative analyses. However, nominal effects were found for some of the predictors in the adult sample[62]. Since this indicated that almost half of the predictors had nominal effects, we decided to conduct two logistic regressions on 'bad' versus 'fairly good' participants and 'bad' versus 'very good' participants.

As the first step of the analyses, correlation tables were computed, separately for 'bad versus fairly good' and 'bad versus very good' categories (see Table 4.1). The 'bad versus fairly good' analyses revealed that the relationships between the selected predictors and anti-democratic attitudes in the Muslim youth sample are relatively weak, with experienced discrimination and citizenship pride having the strongest relationship with the criterion (both r = -.13), followed by the importance of religion (r = -.12). A similar result was found in the adult sample, with the two strongest correlates of anti-democratic attitudes being importance of religion (r = -.14) and experienced discrimination (r = .11). Taken together, the correlation matrices suggest that some kind of relationship between the predictors and the criterion exists, but these relationships are quite weak and of questionable practical value. However, in the 'bad versus very good' dataset, a somewhat stronger correlation was found between importance of religion and anti-democratic attitudes in the youth sample (r = -.23), while other relationships were relatively consistent with the 'bad versus fairly good' results. Similarly, importance of religion was highlighted as the strongest predictor of anti-democratic attitudes in the adult 'bad versus very good' sample (r = -.27). Muslims whose religion is only of minor or no importance in their lives generally hold a more negative opinion on democracy.

In the first step of the multi-level regression modelling, intercepts were allowed to vary across countries. Generally, less variation between countries was observed in the 'bad versus fairly good' sample (ICC = .053 for adult and ICC = .035 for youth sample) than 'bad versus very good' (ICC = .155 for adult and ICC = .127 for youth sample). The finding that variation is larger in the adult sample is not surprising since it contains more countries. Following steps included successive addition of predictors: firstly, the predictors related to inequality were added into the model, followed by the predictors related to attitudes. In the final step, all of the predictors were one-by-one allowed to vary across groups in order to determine which of them are consistent, and which are more context-dependent. The results of the first two steps are shown in Figure 4.6.

Youth subsample

Regarding the inequality variables, the only consistent relationship was found between experienced discrimination and anti-democratic attitudes, with those who were more discriminated against being more likely to hold negative opinion on democracy. Three attitudinal variables consistently predicted anti-democratic attitudes: control over life, citizenship pride and importance of religion. Participants

[62] ($\chi^2(1) = 9.46$, p = .002 for income level, $\chi^2(1) = 11.34$, p < .001 for experienced discrimination, $\chi^2(1) = 7.14$, p = .007 for town size, $\chi^2(1) = 7.59$, p = .006 for post-materialistic values and $\chi^2(1) = 5.47$, p = .019 for control over life) and in youth sample ($\chi^2(1) = 5.17$, p = .022 for income level, $\chi^2(1) = 8.89$, p = .003 for experienced discrimination, $\chi^2(1) = 3.99$, p = .045 for political orientation, $\chi^2(1) = 10.60$, p = .001 for citizenship pride and $\chi^2(1) = 5.18$, p = .023 for control over life), with several other predictors almost reaching the threshold for significance

with less control over life, those who were less proud of their citizenship and those who considered religion less important were more likely to hold negative opinions on democracy. Similar results were found in the adult sample, with the addition of the effect of income level: those with lower income were more likely to hold negative opinions on democracy.

In practice, the results indicate that 13.8% of this Muslim youth sample held negative opinions on democracy. When divided into two subgroups, in the 'bad versus fairly good' sample 26.7% of participants held negative views on democracy, while in the 'bad versus very good' sample 22.1% of participants held such views.

In the 'bad versus fairly good' sample, the odds of a participant belonging to that 26.7% of sample were affected by experienced discrimination, perceived control over life, citizenship pride and importance of religion. Holding other predictors constant, for every raise of one standard deviation in importance of religion, the odds of a participant belonging to a group that holds negative opinions on democracy were on average 24% lower[63]. Similarly, a raise of 1 standard deviation on the citizenship pride, was associated with approximately 18% lower[64] odds of belonging to a group that holds negative opinions on democracy. For each drop of one standard deviation in control over life, the odds of having negative opinions on democracy were approximately 20% higher[65], while those who were discriminated against were on average more than 30% more likely[66] to belong to the group that holds negative opinions on democracy than those who were not.

Although these percentages may sound important, the benchmark has to be considered. The odds ratio simply tells us how much more likely some participants are than others to belong to a group. Taking into account that the overall percentage of negative opinions on democracy was relatively low in this sample, with baseline levels for each variable necessarily being lower, 40% higher odds may actually represent 2-5% difference in practice, which speaks of the true magnitude of these findings.

Adult subsample

In the adult Muslim sample, 15.3% of participants held negative opinions on democracy. When divided into subgroups, the 'bad versus fairly good' sample was comprised of 29.3% of participants with negative opinions on democracy, while the 'bad versus very good' sample consisted of 24.2% individuals with negative views on democracy. Holding other predictors constant, for every raise of one standard deviation in the scale of importance of religion, the odds of a participant belonging to a group that holds negative opinions on democracy were approximately 33% lower[67]. A raise of 1 standard deviation in citizenship pride was associated with approximately 15% lower[68] odds of belonging to a group that holds negative opinions on democracy. A raise of 1 standard deviation in political orientation (i.e. to the political right) was associated with approximately 15% higher[69] odds of belonging to a group that holds negative opinions on democracy. For each drop of one standard deviation in control over life, the odds of having a negative opinion on democracy were approximately

[63] Exp(B) = 0.78, 95% CI [0.66, 0.92] for bad vs. fairly good + attitudes and exp(B) = 0.75, 95% CI [0.63, 0.89] for bad vs very good + attitudes.
[64] Exp(B) = 0.81, 95% CI [0.69, 0.95] for bad vs. fairly good + attitudes and exp(B) = 0.83, 95% CI [0.70, 0.97] for bad vs. very good + attitudes.
[65] Exp(B) = 1.19, 95% CI [1.00, 1.19] for bad vs. fairly good + attitudes and exp(B) = 1.21, 95% CI [1.02, 1.44] for bad vs. very good + attitudes.
[66] Exp(B) = 1.18, 95% CI [1.05, 1.32] in bad vs. fairly good and exp(B) = 1.29, 95% CI [1.05, 1.60] in bad vs. fairly good + attitudes for and exp(B) = 1.57, 95% CI [1.27, 1.93] in bad vs. very good and exp(B) = 1.46, 95% CI [1.18, 1.80] in model bad vs. very good + attitudes.
[67] Exp(B) = 0.67, 95% CI [0.60, 0.76] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 0.66, 95% CI [0.58, 0.74] for 'bad versus very good'.
[68] Exp(B) = 0.88, 95% CI [0.78, 0.98] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 0.83, 95% CI [0.74, 0.93] for 'bad versus very good'.
[69] Exp(B) = 1.14, 95% CI [1.01, 1.29] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 1.17, 95% CI [1.04, 1.32] for 'bad versus very good'.

20% higher[70] . Participants who were discriminated against were on average more than 37% more likely[71] to belong to the group that holds negative opinions on democracy than those who were not. Additionally, for each one standard deviation decrease in the level of income participants had about 20% higher[72] odds of holding negative opinions on democracy. Age, as one of the two control factors, was relevant only in the 'bad versus very good' analyses, with older participants being 14% more likely[73] to have negative opinions on democracy. Note again that because the overall percentage of negative opinions on democracy was relatively low in this sample (12.5% and 23.8% respectively), what looks like high odds may actually represent only a very small difference in practice.

Variation of slopes between countries

In the Muslim youth sample, two predictors had a different role in the prediction of anti-democratic attitudes in different countries: experienced discrimination and town size, although the variability in experienced discrimination was marginal in the 'bad versus fairly good' condition. In the Muslim adult sample, only the income level varied across countries in both 'bad versus fairly good' and 'bad versus very good' samples. Although this might point to the consistency of the relationships, a relatively low final number of countries in each sample should be taken into account. While some relationships seem to be relatively consistent, others could in fact be shown to vary across countries if more countries (or the same number of more representatively chosen countries) were included in the sample.

[70] Exp(B) = 1.17, 95% CI [1.04, 1.33] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 1.23, 95% CI [1.09, 1.38] for 'bad versus very good'.

[71] Exp(B) = 1.27, 95% CI [1.10, 1.48] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 1.55, 95% CI [1.33, 1.80] for 'bad versus very good' in models without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.23, 95% CI [1.05, 1.43] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 1.43, 95% CI [1.23, 1.67] for 'bad versus very good' in models with attitudes included.

[72] Exp(B) = 1.19, 95% CI [1.05, 1.34] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 1.24, 95% CI [1.09, 1.40] for 'bad versus very good' in models without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.17, 95% CI [1.03, 1.33] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 1.22, 95% CI [1.07, 1.40] for 'bad versus very good' in models with attitudes included.

[73] Exp(B) = 1.14, 95% CI [1.01, 1.28] in the analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.15, 95% CI [1.02, 1.30] in the analysis with attitudes included.

Figure 4.6: Odds ratios of anti-democratic attitudes in the Muslim sample (WVS 2010-14)



Figure 4.6 (WVS 2010-2014). Odds ratios, from regression, with 95% confidence interval calculated for youth (left) and adult (right) sample. All variables standardised. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.15-16.

4.6.4 WVS Christian sample

The distribution of anti-democratic attitudes among Christians, as in the Muslim sample, appeared to be very asymmetrical. 86 percent of those aged under 30 and 87 percent of those aged 30 and older say they consider democracy to be either a fairly good or very good political system. In the youth sample (aged 29 or less), 2797 participants stated that democracy was very good, 2076 considered it to be fairly good, 582 thought democracy was fairly bad and 189 thought it was very bad. Similarly, in the adult sample (aged 30 or more), 5632 participants stated that democracy is very good, 4890 considered it to be fairly good, 1163 thought democracy was fairly bad and 374 thought it was very bad. Use of multilevel regression analyses requires a relatively large number of participants per second-level variable in order to obtain stable estimates, which makes it impossible to do such an analysis in a valid way with the answer 'very bad'. Therefore, answers 'fairly bad' and 'very bad', were again united into one answer-category 'bad', indicating negative opinion on democracy as a political system. The distribution of these results per country and age group can be found in Figure 4.7 and 4.8.

Figure 4.7: Distribution of attitudes to democracy in the in the Christian sample aged under 30 (WVS 2010-2014)



ure 4.7 (WVS 2010-2014), Christians under 30 N=5644

Figure 4.8: Distribution of attitudes to democracy in the Christian sample aged 30+ (WVS 2010-2014)

Figure 4.8 (WVS 2010-2014), Christians 30+ N=12059

Again, the figures confirm that majority of population in the countries held positive opinions on democracy. Another similarity with the Muslim sample is the insufficient number of cases per category, which resulted in the subsequent exclusion of several countries. The final youth sample consisted of participants from Belarus, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Georgia, Ghana, Haiti, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, South Africa, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, while the final adult sample consisted of participants from Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa and Ukraine. Once again, cumulative regression was attempted, however, nominal effects were found for some of the predictors in the adult sample[74] Since a large number of the potential predictors had nominal effects, two logistic regressions were conducted: one on the participants who claimed democracy was bad versus those who claimed it was fairly good and another on the participants claiming democracy was bad and those claiming it was very good, independently.

The correlation patterns were very similar to those observed in the Muslim samples. In the context of Christian youth sample, all of the predictors showed weak correlations with anti-democratic attitudes when analysis was conducted on the 'bad versus fairly good' sample. However, the analysis conducted on the 'bad versus very good' sample revealed that those who considered religion less important held more negative attitudes towards democracy (r = -.20), just as in the Muslim sample. In the adult samples, however, the correlations were weaker, with only experience of discrimination in the 'bad versus very good' sample sharing more than 1% of variance with the criterion (r = .12), indicating that discriminated individuals held slightly more negative views on democracy.

In the first steps of the multilevel regression analyses, intercepts were allowed to vary across groups. This yielded conditional ICCs, which indicated that a substantial amount of variation could be attributed to countries (ICC = .115 for the 'bad versus fairly good' and ICC = .192 for the 'bad versus very good' youth sample and (ICC = .111 for the 'bad versus fairly good' and ICC = .164 for the 'bad versus very good' adult sample). In general, 14.2% of Christian youth and 14.8% of Christian adults were found to hold negative opinions on democracy, which is similar to the rates found among Muslims.

Youth subsample

As Figure 4.9 suggests, the only consistent predictor of anti-democratic attitudes was experienced discrimination. More precisely, compared to those who were not discriminated against, discriminated individuals were about 20% more likely to hold negative opinions[75] on democracy. In the 'bad versus very good' analyses only, several additional predictors relevant for classification of participants were noticed. Holding other predictors constant, an increase of one standard deviation on the importance of religion items was associated with 18% lower[76] odds of belonging to a group that holds negative opinions on democracy. Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation on the political orientation scale (i.e., shift to the political right) was also associated with 20% higher[77] odds of having negative attitudes towards democracy. A decline in control over life of one standard deviation was related to

[74] ($\chi^2(1) = 5.61$, p = .017 for income level, $\chi^2(1) = 6.31$, p = .011 for being in education or work, $\chi^2(1) = 4.78$, p = .029 for importance of religion, $\chi^2(1) = 10.81$, p = .001 for political orientation, and , $\chi^2(1) = 8.75$, p = .003 for control over life) and in youth sample ($\chi^2(1) = 15.01$, p < .001 for satisfaction with income, $\chi^2(1) = 4.60$, p = .003 for experienced discrimination, $\chi^2(1) = 3.99$, p = .045 for political orientation, $\chi^2(1) = 4.60$, p = .032 for town size, $\chi^2(1) = 9$, p = .002 for political orientation, $\chi^2(1) = 10.98$, p < .001 for post-materialist values and $\chi^2(1) = 21.64$, p < .001 for control over life), with several other predictors almost reaching the threshold for significance.

[75] Exp(B) = 1.17, 95% CI [1.04, 1.32] for 'bad versus fairly good' and Exp(B) = 1.26, 95% CI [1.12, 1.42] for 'bad versus very good' in models without attitudes and Exp(B) = 1.16, 95% CI [1.04, 1.31] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 1.27, 95% CI [1.13, 1.42] for 'bad versus very good' in models with attitudes included

[76] Exp(B) = 0.82, 95% CI [0.74, 0.91]

[77] Exp(B) = 1.20, 95% CI [1.08, 1.32]

13% higher[78] odds of having a negative opinion on democracy. Participants living in smaller towns were 12% more[79] likely to hold negative opinions on democracy with each standard deviation of town size. Individuals with higher income were also approximately 17% more[80] likely with each standard deviation to hold negative opinions on democracy.

Adult subsample

Similarly to the youth sample, only one variable – control over life in the adult Christian sample significantly and consistently predicted anti-democratic attitudes, with those having less control being more likely to have negative attitudes to democracy[81]. However, some trends are visible if only the extremes (i.e., participants who consider democracy 'bad' and 'very good') are taken into account. Next to the role of importance of religion, which reflected the findings obtained on the youth sample[82], those with higher scores on the scale of post-materialist values were about 8% less[83] likely to hold negative opinions on democracy, and with each standard deviation of increase in the citizenship pride participants were on average 9% less[84] likely to hold negative opinions on democracy. Also, participants discriminated against were approximately 30% more[85] likely to exhibit anti-democratic attitudes. similarly

Variation of slopes between countries

In order to see whether the magnitude or direction of the effect of each variable was the same in the different countries in the sample, each slope was individually tested for variability across countries within the scope of the specified model. The results revealed that no slopes differed in the youth 'bad versus fairly good' samples (all *p*s > .05), while in the 'bad versus very good' sample slopes of experienced discrimination, income level, town size, control over life, importance of religion and political orientation varied across countries. In the adult 'bad versus fairly good' sample, the slopes of income level, experienced discrimination, importance of religion, post-materialist values and control over life differed across countries, while in the 'bad versus very good' sample the slopes of age, income satisfaction, income level, experienced discrimination, being in education or work, importance of religion, post-materialist values and political orientation differed across countries. Generally, although less consistent predictors were found in Christian compared to Muslim samples, larger variability of slopes was found.

Macro-level predictors

Regarding the macro variables, GINI, GDP *per capita,* and WGI were selected as additional predictors to the previous models. Welfare spending data was available only for six countries (Australia, Chile, Germany, Mexico, Poland and Slovenia), just as MIPEX (Australia, Estonia, Germany, Poland, Romania and Slovenia), which was insufficient for planned analyses and resulted in exclusion of these variables. All of the remaining variables were standardised, and the latter two variables were additionally multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate worse socio-economic circumstances. Due to the computational complexity of multi-level models with multiple random slopes across more than 20 countries, which prevented the computation of random slopes model, these predictors were added one by one into the model with random intercept and fixed slopes. However, as the scores in Figure

[78] Exp(B) = 1.13, 95% CI [1.03, 1.25]
[79] Exp(B) = 1.14, 95% CI [1.01, 1.28] in the analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.14, 95% CI [1.01, 1.28] in the analysis with attitudes included.
[80] Exp(B) = 0.85, 95% CI [0.77, 0.95] both in analyses with and without attitudinal variables.
[81] Exp(B) = 1.09, 95% CI [1.02, 1.16] in the 'bad versus fairly good' sample and exp(B) = 1.17, 95% CI [1.09, 1.25] in the 'bad versus very good' sample.
[82] Exp(B) = 0.90, 95% CI [0.84, 0.97]
[83] Exp(B) = 0.92, 95% CI [0.86, 0.98]
[84] Exp(B) = 1.10, 95% CI [1.02, 1.18]
[85] Exp(B) = 1.31, 95% CI [1.20, 1.42] in the analysis without attitudes and exp(B) = 1.29, 95% CI [1.19, 1.40] in the analysis with attituded included.

4.9 suggest, none of the macro-level inequality indicators yielded consistent and significant results in the youth sample.

In the adult Christian sample (Figure 4.9), however, the macro-level predictors appeared to be more effective in prediction of anti-democratic attitudes. Generally, participants from countries with lower GDP per capita[86] and lower world governance indicators[87] were more likely to hold negative opinions on democracy. Since the sample of countries was limited and non-representative, the odds ratios should be interpreted with a dose of caution and treated as rough estimates rather than exact parameters.

Although this analysis delineated some differences in predictors of anti-democratic attitudes among Muslims and Christians, two important facts have to be taken into account: firstly, no differences between groups was found regarding the majority of predictors and, secondly, even when the differences have been found, they do not represent large effects, but slight inclinations according to which some predictors are only a bit stronger in one sample, and this happens to be sufficient to declare one coefficient significant, and another insignificant.

Figure 4.9: Odds ratios of anti-democratic attitudes in the Christian sample (WVS 2010-14)



Figure 4.9 (WVS 2010-2014). Odds ratios, from regression, with 95% confidence interval calculated for youth (left) and adult (right) sample. All variables standardised. GDP=Gross Domestic Product per capita, WGI=Mean of World Governance Indicators. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.17-20.

[86] Exp(B) = 1.27, 95% CI [1.04, 1.57] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 1.90, 95% CI [1.37, 2.65] for 'bad versus very good'.

[87] Exp(B) = 1.31, 95% CI [1.05, 1.63] for 'bad versus fairly good' and exp(B) = 1.40, 95% CI [1.01, 1.94] for 'bad versus very good'.

4.6.5 MYPLACE (2012-13)

Although four items in the MYPLACE questionnaire measured attitudes towards autocratic and democratic government systems (how good they were for a country), confirmatory factor analysis failed to confirm their single-factor structure. Therefore, only items related to democratic system ('having a democratic, multi-party system' and 'having the opposition that can freely express their opinions') were used as operationalisation of anti-democratic attitudes. Two variables were moderately correlated (r = .40). Both were measured on a 1-4 scale with higher value indicating more negative opinion on the presented option. Two variables were averaged to get the final score, In order to make the results directly interpretable and visually easier to understand, we subtracted 1 from the results, so the new scale had a possible range between zero, indicating positive attitudes towards democracy, and four, indicating negative attitudes towards democracy. The results are presented in Figure 4.10.

Figure 4.10: Mean Anti-Democratic attitude (0-4) by location, MYPLACE 2012-13



Figure 4.10 (MYPLACE 2012-13), N=8583, Locations with country code in brackets.

The MYPLACE column in the correlations table (Table 4.1), is largely empty, which indicates the absence of correlations of proposed predictors with the anti-democratic attitudes. The strongest relationship was found between not coping on income and anti-democratic attitudes (*r*=.11), with participants having more problems with coping on income also having less positive attitudes towards democracy. However, the two variables share less than 1.5% of variance, which indicates the low practical value of these findings. The following regression analyses (Figure 4.11), which take into account the location-level differences in average anti-democratic attitudes, were used to assess the issue of predictors of anti-democratic attitudes more precisely.

Allowing the intercepts to vary across locations yielded an ICC of .17, confirming that a meaningful amount of variance of anti-democratic attitudes can be attributed to the characteristics of locations. Additionally, we tested if the regression slopes varied significantly across locations, i.e whether the magnitude or direction of the effect of each variable was the same in the different locations in the sample. Holding other predictors fixed, one regression slope by one was allowed to vary across locations, followed by testing the significance of this variation using anova. The results implied that only two of the slopes did not vary across locations: slopes of not being employed nor in education and experiencing discrimination, with the slope of age being marginally significant.

Figure 4.11: Regression coefficients: Negative attitudes to democracy (MYPLACE 2012-13).



Figure 4.11 (MYPLACE 2012/13). Regression coefficients, with 95% confidence interval. All variables standardised. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.21.

As Figure 4.11 shows, the variable with the strongest positive relationship with anti-democracy attitudes is work or education, with unemployed participants who are not in education exhibiting more negative opinions on democracy (β = 0.12, 95% CI [0.06, 0.18]). Similarly, those with lower socio-economic status at the age of 14 held more anti-democratic views (β = 0.08, 95% CI [0.06, 0.10]). However, the overall slopes of change are quite weak, indicating weak associations rather than strong relationships. Considering the limitations of the applied scales for the predictor, even the most extreme changes of the most potent predictors would not be related to a change in the anti-democratic attitudes scale equal to one standardised point (or even half of the point, if we exclude

age). In terms of slope variation, all of the slopes except the slopes of gender and being employed or in education differed significantly across countries, although the differences were of minor practical value as generally the coefficients were relatively small and their significance reflect the sample sizes rather than meaningful effect sizes.

4.7 Discussion

The results of these studies show that anti-democratic attitudes are not easy to predict based on socio-demographic and economic characteristics, as most of the relationships are weak. However, there are some results which are fairly consistent across datasets, and worth highlighting,

The findings for under 30 year olds from all the datasets we analysed are summarised in Table 4.2.

4.7.1 Sociodemographic characteristics

Firstly, we see very few consistent effects of socio-demographic characteristics. There were no substantial differences in the proportions of anti-democratic attitudes between the under 30s and older respondents in ether the EVS or the WVS. Similarly, the results of age within the younger age group, once other variables are controlled for was largely non-significant, or inconsistent (negative in the EVS and positive in MYPLACE). This inconsistency matches that of the literature on the relationship between age and attitudes to democracy (Boräng et al., 2017; Foa and Mounk, 2016, 2017; Inglehart, 2016; Magalhães, 2014; Norris,2017). Similarly, there are no discernible effects of gender, except for a very weak effect in the EVS 2017 which, contrary to much of the literature (Boräng et al., 2017; Magalhães, 2014) indicates that men may be slightly more negatively disposed to democracy. There was also a weak effect of living in a rural or less populated area in both EVS surveys and among Christians in the WVS, but not among Muslims in the WVS.

4.7.2 Economic disadvantage and inequality

The effects of economic disadvantage are more consistent across datasets, with more individual and household economic disadvantage being largely associated with more negative attitudes to democracy, as previous studies have found (Cordero and Simon, 2015; Konte and Klasen 2016; Magalhães, 2014). However, the results are still mixed, and there are several non-significant, and one contradictory, results which are more supportive of Boräng et al.'s (2017) inconsistent findings.

Firstly, not being in work or education is associated with negative attitudes to democracy in the EVS, in MYPLACE and among Christians, but not Muslims in the WVS. Secondly, financial difficulty in childhood was also slightly predictive of lower support for democracy, in every dataset where the question was asked. Thirdly, a lower household income is associated with slightly more negative attitudes to democracy in both EVS datasets and among Muslims in the WVS. However, among Christians in the WVS, those with lower household income are more likely to say democracy is 'very good' (rather than 'bad') than those with higher income. We also find that *perceived* low household income, i.e. how difficult it is to get by on one's income, is not significantly associated with attitudes to democracy in any of the datasets.

4.7.3 Socio-political disadvantage

In all the analysed samples of the WVS, and MYPLACE, experienced or perceived discrimination is associated with anti-democratic attitudes, supporting the findings of Davies and Weber (2018) from their study of the US, and Levitt's (2015) study of six Latin American countries. This finding is particularly strong among Muslims in the WVS, where the question covered racist behaviour and police or military interference in the respondent's neighbourhood. The EVS did not ask about discrimination, but did ask about the respondent's immigrant background. There was no effect being born abroad or of having immigrant parents. this indicates that minority status per se is not associated with anti-democratic attitudes, but the experience or perception of unjust treatment is. As Anderson and Guillery (1997) argue, those with lower status in a political system are more likely to be dissatisfied with it.

4.7.4 Attitudes and values

The most consistent finding on the effects of attitudes on anti-democracy, is that people who feel like they do not have much control over their lives, are more likely to be anti-democratic. This was found in both EVS surveys, as well as both the Muslim and Christian samples of the WVS. According to compensatory control theory, on the one hand one might expect people whose perceived personal control is low to be quicker to defend the socio-political system they are in (Kay et al. 2008). On the other hand, if the democratic system seems random, disorderly unstable and untrustworthy, they may prefer to support alternative systems or ideologies which appear more purposeful (Kay and Eibach 2013). This is also consistent with Anderson and Guillery's (1997) finding that lower status is associated with dissatisfaction.

Anti-democracy is also slightly more common among those who have more materialist values in the EVS, and those who are politically more on the right, particularly Christians in the WVS.

National, or citizenship pride is also consistently associated with higher support for democracy. This makes intuitive sense. Most of the respondents are citizens of democracies, and an expression of support for democracy is also support for one of their country's core principles. Civic nationalism and democracy have a shared origin (Ipperciel 2007), and Norris (1999) describes a basic attachment to the nation as the most diffuse form of support for a political community. However, it is worth noting that this is incompatible with regarding patriotism as a feature only of authoritarian ideologies and values, in opposition to diversity, globalisation and liberal democracy. While the extreme right is often both anti-democratic and patriotic, these attitudes are not associated with one another in the general population. Instead, right wing extremism is more uniquely characterised by exclusionary forms of nationalism, which can also be combined with opposition to democracy (see for example Carter, 2018).

The effect of religiosity is one of the strongest, but also most inconsistent and difficult to interpret. In the EVS there is no effect of importance of religion in 2008, and a very small positive effect in 2017. However, in the WVS there are more substantial negative coefficients for the importance of religion among both Christians and Muslims. This inconsistency may be due to the differences of the sample with regard to religious affiliation. In the EVS a substantial proportion of the sample have no religious affiliation (27% of under 30 year olds in 2008, and 35% of under 30 year olds in 2017), whereas in the WVS the analysis was restricted to those who identify as either Muslim or Christian. It may be that having a religion is not associated with democratic attitudes, but among those who do have a religion, the more important it is in their life, the more supportive they are of democracy. It may also simply be due to other differences in the sample and question wordings, as previous findings on the relationship are also inconsistent (Bloom and Arikan, 2012; Meyer et al. 2008; Valenta and Strabac, 2012).

4.7.5 Country level variables

There is no significant effect of the Gini coefficient of income inequality in either the EVS or the WVS. There is also generally little evidence of a consistent effect of country level economic variables. In the 2017, there were weak positive effects of reverse GDP per capita, welfare spending, the world governance and migrant integration indices, such that people in poorer countries with less welfare spending and integration policies, and lower governance quality were more anti-democratic. However, these variables are too strongly correlated with one another to tell which, if any, of these are most important. Moreover, in the WVS' Christian sample, there was a larger negative effect of reverse GDP and reverse WGI, suggesting that richer countries with higher governance quality have more anti-democratic (Christian) populations. There were no significant effects at all of the country level variables in the EVS 2008. Taken together, these results suggest no clear relationship between country level inequality and attitudes to democracy, and lend little support to Boräng and colleagues' (2017) findings that higher governance quality is associated with more support for democracy.

Table 4.2 Summary: General Anti-democratic attitudes among under 30 year olds (Regression coefficients, P<0.05)

Survey	**European Values Study**		**World Values Survey**				**MYPLACE**
Year / Sample	2008	2017	2010/14 Muslims		2010/14 Christians		2012/13
Question	a) Evaluate political systems: democratic b) Democracy better than other forms of govt.	a) Evaluate political systems: democratic b) How important for you to live in democracy?	Evaluate political systems: democratic		Evaluate political systems: democratic		Evaluate: a) Having a democratic, multi-party system. b) Having the opposition that can freely express their opinions.
Type of question	Lack of support for / negative view of democracy		Bad vs. Fairly good	Bad vs. Very good	Bad vs. Fairly good	Bad vs. Very good	Negative view of democracy
Sociodemographic							
Age	**-0.016**	**-0.016**	No	No	No	No	**0.068**
Female	No	**-0.065**	No	No	No	No	No
Rural area	**0.050**	**0.056**	No	No	No	**0.129**	
Economic disadvantage							
Not in work not in education	**0.052**	**0.058**	No	No	**0.232**	No	**0.121**
Difficult on household income			No	No	No	No	No
Reverse Household income	**0.023**	**0.024**	**0.192**	No	No	**-0.158**	
Financial difficulty/poverty in	**0.067**	**0.021**					**0.080**
Socio-political disadvantage							
Immigrant	No	No					
Immigrant parents	No	No					
Experience of discrimination							**0.055**
Perceived group discrimination			**0.312**	**0.450**	**0.164**	**0.233**	
Attitudes							
Religion important	No	**0.031**	**-0.245**	**-0.292**	No	**-0.200**	
Rightwing	No	**0.036**	No	No	No	**0.180**	
National pride	**-0.043**	**-0.054**	**-0.211**	**-0.190**	No	No	
Low control	**0.049**	**0.043**	**0.177**	**0.193**	No	**0.123**	
Postmaterialist values	**-0.040**	**-0.073**	No	No	No	No	
Country level							
Gini	No	No			No	No	
Reverse Welfare spending	No	**0.109**					
Reverse GDP	No	**0.079**			No	**-0.354**	
Reverse WGI	No	**0.088**			No	**-0.305**	
Reverse MIPEX	No	**0.086**					

Table 4.2 All coefficients are from analysis of samples under 30 years old. The coefficients are from random intercept, fixed slopes models, except for the country level variable coefficients from the EVS, which are from random intercept, random slopes models. For the EVS and WVS analysis: attitude variable coefficients are from Model 2, while all other coefficients are from Model 1. Positive regression coefficients are in blue, negative in red, with stronger colours indicating larger coefficients. 'No'= no significant coefficient. For details see regression tables in Appendix 2.

4.8 Summary

In summary, the findings from five different samples in four different surveys, have shown some evidence for individual experiences of economic and social inequality being associated with anti-democracy among young people, although the findings are inconsistent. Unemployment and low household income are weakly associated with anti-democratic attitudes in most of the samples, as are childhood experience of poverty. Moreover, experienced and perceived discrimination, and feeling lack of control over one's own life are weakly associated with more negative attitudes to democracy.

However, the effect sizes are very small. Further, we find no clear evidence that country level inequality contributes directly to this relationship.

5. Anti-Muslim attitudes

There has been a surge of research in recent years on attitudes towards Muslims in non-Muslim majority countries. Freedom and accommodation of Islam as a religion, its visibility in the public space and its appropriation for Islamist inspired terrorism, have become topics of a divisive public debate in many countries, as well as fuel for right wing extremist politics. At the same time hostility, hate crime and political campaigns against Muslims have grown in frequency and visibility. These developments have been accompanied by growing scholarly interest in understanding the determinants of such attitudes and the differences in tolerance and hostility towards Muslim minorities both within and between countries. As a result, questions about attitudes to Muslims have been asked in many large scale international social surveys from the 2000s onwards.

In the following we consider what we know about anti-Muslim attitudes based on previous studies in this area - how to define and measure such attitudes, the main predictors, and to what extent they have been associated with measures of inequality - before presenting the results from large scale survey analysis and discussing the implications.

5.1 What are anti-Muslim attitudes?

Studies of Islamophobia and prejudice against Muslims differ with regard to the extent to which they view anti-Muslim attitudes as part of a general negative attitude to all 'outgroups' and minorities or as something unique. Much anti-Muslim rhetoric and behaviour has similar patterns, similar advocates, similar targets and similar consequences to ethnic and racial prejudice (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Zick, Küpper and Höverman, 2011). There are also political and policy reasons to treat Islamophobia as a form of racism (ethnic or cultural), as in the recent definition by the All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims (APPGBM, 2018), which aims to increase the rights and protection of victims of Islamophobic discrimination and abuse. That said, anti-Muslim attitudes are generally more widespread than other forms of racism, and occur among people who do not otherwise display evidence of prejudice, social distance to outgroups or anti-immigrant attitudes (Heath and Martin, 2013; Meuleman et al., 2019b; Storm, Sobolewska and Ford, 2017; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Voas and Ling, 2010: 80). If we are to thoroughly understand what drives anti-Muslim attitudes, and the political movements that capitalise on these attitudes, they should be studied separately from, as well as together with, other forms of prejudice (Meuleman et al., 2019b).

That said, because there is a great deal of overlap, it may be instructive to start by examining more general studies of prejudice, in order to subsequently define and demarcate anti-Muslim attitudes. An important reason for this approach is that several studies have found that prejudice is a fairly general trait. Individuals who are prejudiced against one outgroup tend to be prejudiced against other outgroups as well, whether these are based on ethnicity, religion or sexuality (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008: 272; Zick, Küpper and Höverman, 2011). In social psychology this has been understood as an effect of personality orientation (Altemeyer, 1994; Levy, 1999) and associated with measures such as Altemeyer's (1981) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA). However, it is equally clear that ingroup members usually show different levels of prejudice against different outgroups, and more interestingly 'there is a fairly high level of consensus in the ranking of different groups in a social distance or prejudice hierarchy' (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008: 272). Such consensus on ethnic bias among all members of a society both within and between groups (Hagendoorn, 1995) is consistent with social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) and suggests that prejudice should be analysed from a social perspective - as a collective as well as an individual phenomenon.

Anti-Muslim attitudes have in recent years formed a large part of the motivation and argumentation of political movements variously labelled as 'the far right', 'right wing populist' and 'right wing extremist'. This movement ranges in type from political parties who take part in the democratic process, such as *Dansk Folkeparti* in Denmark and *Front National* in France, to online and offline fringe movements. They also vary in ideological stance, from exclusively anti-immigration or anti-diversity movements to outright biologically racist neo-Nazi groups, and in the extent to which they employ violent and illegal means. These movements include single issue anti-Islam or anti-Islamist movements such as the Defence Leagues, and the pan European 'stop Islamisation' movements (Pegida, SIAN etc). Finally, the identitarian movement argues that there is a pan-European identity and way of life which needs to be defended from 'intruders' (Azmanova and Dakwar, 2019: 494).

The vast majority of such movements in Europe and North America take a very negative stance to the perceived influence of Islamic culture, which they see as incompatible with western values, and in many cases this hostility extends to Muslim individuals (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Meuleman et al., 2019b). One of the chief concerns of such groups is the impact of large-scale immigration. This is also one of the biggest political concerns of European populations in general, and Muslims have received particular attention in public debates about immigration (Ivarsflaten, 2008). According to Casanova (2007: 61) the term 'immigration' is used interchangeably with the term 'Islam' to the extent that they are almost synonymous in much of Western Europe. It is against the background of these public discourses that the Christian heritage and identity of Western European countries is mobilised as an argument against the immigration and integration of Muslims and other religious minorities.

5.2 What are the main determinants of Anti-Muslim attitudes?

Several studies (Hainmuller and Hopkins, 2014; Obaidi et al., 2018; Sides and Citrin, 2007) have found that public opinion on immigration in Europe and North America, is rooted in concerns about national identity and cultural values. A sudden increase in ethnic diversity represents a challenge to previous conceptions of national identity, and the idea of cultural and political unity upon which the nation state is premised. Regardless of how real or fictitious the imagined cultural community of values may be, there is, according to Werbner (2005:7) 'little question that the impulse towards cultural homogenization exists in most modern nation states'. This premise of a cultural or symbolic threat, affects Muslim immigrants more than immigrants from other cultural backgrounds (Hellwig and Sinno, 2015), as the public discourse focuses upon the ways in which Muslim cultural practices are incompatible with, and deviant from, western values and norms. As Meuleman et al. (2019b:227) put it 'Anti-Islam discourse depicts Islam as a monolithic, inherently violent, and uniquely sexist religion, whose followers are seen as the ultimate cultural 'other' that will never be able to cope with democratic and liberal values of Western society'.

Security fears are another factor that could motivate anti-Muslim attitudes (Hellwig and Sinno, 2015). Terrorist attacks committed by Islamist extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and Boko Haram, and the media coverage of these events, are sources of worry. Despite research showing very few Muslims support extremism or terrorism, such events may fuel existing prejudice, and give people the impression that they have reason to fear ordinary Muslim citizens or immigrants. Wike and Grim (2010) found that fear of Islamic extremism is the primary driver of negative views of Muslims in Western countries. Hellwig and Sinno (2015) also found that security threats impacted attitudes towards Muslim immigrants in Western Europe, while it did not affect attitudes to East European immigrants. However, other studies have shown that (worries about) terrorist attacks by Islamists, do not necessarily lead to more anti-Muslim sentiment. Ford and Sobolewska (2015) polled people in the UK before and after the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks and found a slight increase in positive attitudes towards Muslims and diversity after the attack. Obaidi et al. (2018) found that while perceived cultural incompatibility or economic threat by Muslims in the West was associated with increased anti-Muslim hostility, perceived terror threat was not. Many researchers also argue that anti-Muslim attitudes and hate crimes were on the rise well before the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 (Borell,

2015; Poynting and Mason, 2007). While this research indicates that such violent events do not broadly shift attitudes in the population from positive to negative, terrorist attacks may nevertheless intensify hostile attitudes, or even encourage expression of that hostility among those who already had a negative view of Muslims (Borell, 2015). The media coverage of Islamist terrorism, and of Muslims in general, has also been argued to be a potentially important factor for explaining individual variation in anti-Muslim attitudes (Das et al. 2009; Shaver et al. 2017). However, Schlueter, Masso and Davidov (2019) found media coverage of Muslims and immigrants did not explain any of the cross-national variation on attitudes to Muslim immigrants in Europe.

It is possible that the unique targeting of Muslims as 'cultural other' is partly to do with Muslims as a religious group rather than a nationality or race, or ethnic group. For example some of the objections towards the accommodation of Islam could be based on a general aversion towards religious presence in the public sphere (Modood, 1994; van der Noll and Saroglou, 2015). In this sense there are strong parallels with anti-Semitic attitudes, which are both associated with, but distinct from racism, not least in their perceived legitimacy. While there are strong social norms against expressions of biological racism and ethnic superiority in the mainstream public debates, expressions of anti-religious sentiments, even those that target specific religious minorities are more widely accepted (Meer and Modood, 2009). Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) argue that such 'subtle' racism against minorities based on cultural difference, has replaced more 'blatant' or overt biological racism. Muslim minorities in the West observe on average more socially conservative norms on gender roles and sexuality than the majority populations (Norris and Inglehart, 2012), and one of the chief allegations against Islam, is that its religious texts and cultural practices are inherently sexist and oppressive of women and sexual minorities. Similarly, Islam is perceived as a threat against other values that are endorsed by the higher educated middle class. 'In the eyes of this presumably tolerant group, Islam scepticism becomes legitimate as a defence of tolerance, liberal democracy, and Enlightenment' (Meuleman, 2019b:228).

5.2.1 Contact and conflict

The theories about the causes of prejudice can be classified into two main approaches. One can be labelled the 'contact hypothesis', the other the 'conflict hypothesis'. The contact hypothesis focuses on individual attitudes and has as its basic assumption that increased contact between ethnic groups will reduce xenophobia (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Rydgren, 2008: 756). Contact and interaction between different groups is on the one hand hypothesised to increase awareness of the heterogeneity of the outgroup, and on the other hand to generate intergroup personal relationships, which increase solidarity and empathy. This theory thus supports the integration policy agenda. However, the evidence is mixed (Dustmann and Preston, 2001: 354). Although much research has shown that intergroup interaction reduces prejudice (Hayes and Dowds, 2006: 464; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010: 287; Schneider, 2007), some studies also find that ethnic heterogeneity reduces social cohesion, solidarity and trust (Dustmann and Preston, 2001; Putnam, 2007: 142-3). The alternative 'conflict hypothesis' is based firstly on the premise that group identities are important to individuals and create ingroup favouritism (Tajfel and Turner, 1979); and secondly that groups have interests that can conflict with those of other groups, creating competition between them (Campbell, 1965). From the perspective of social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory (RGCT), increased contact and proximity only increases the chance of competition for the same resources and introduces power and status hierarchies between groups, potentially accounting for the consensus in ethnic bias observed by Hagendoorn (1995).

One way of testing these different hypotheses is to measure the association between anti-minority attitudes and size of the minority population in different societies. In a study focusing specifically on anti-Muslim attitudes in the European Social Survey, Schlueter, Masso and Davidov (2019) found that a larger relative size of the Muslim population was associated with more positive attitudes to Muslim immigrants. However, a previous study of the European Values Study found no relationship between Muslim population size and attitudes to Muslim immigration (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008). It is possible

that the different results stem from the mechanisms of prejudice formation being more nuanced than these two opposing hypotheses allow. In a Dutch study, Schuelter and Scheepers (2010) found evidence for both contact and conflict theory, and showed how both these mechanisms were at work simultaneously in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes. On the one hand, larger immigrant group size in a municipality facilitates intergroup contact which reduced the perceived threat and anti-immigrant attitudes. On the other hand, larger immigrant group size was associated with increased perceptions of threat to group interests which again were positively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes. In a longitudinal study, Laurence, Schmid, Rae and Hewstone (2019) found that ethnic concentration of local communities in England moderates the effect of relative group size. In general, a greater number of out-group members was only associated with prejudice among people living in areas with high residential segregation. They found prejudice in these areas to be driven by both lower positive contact and higher perceived threat.

The degree of urbanisation could also be expected to be associated with attitudes to immigration and minorities. Urban areas tend to be more ethnically diverse, which could attract people who are open-minded and increase positive contact with ethnic minorities. On the other hand, cities also tend to have higher crime rates and more intense competition over jobs and housing, which could stimulate conflict and perceptions of ethnic threat. A number of studies find anti-immigration attitudes to be associated more with rural than urban areas even when controlling for education level and employment (Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte, 2014; Garcia and Davidson, 2013; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016). However, Schneider (2008) finds no effect of urbanisation once size of immigrant population and number of immigrant friends is controlled for.

However, it is also important to note that prejudice is often based on limited amounts of information, and hence one should be careful to expect clear correlations between attitudes and population statistics. Sides and Citrin (2007: 477) found that European opinion about immigration depends mostly on '"symbolic" attitudes about the nation ("identities") and on misperceptions of the size of the immigrant populations'. In other words what matters most in predicting attitudes is the perception of immigrant population size (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2019; Sides and Citrin, 2007: 500) rather than the actual size, and the perception of threat (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998: 120) rather than actual conflict of interest or resource competition. That is not to say that such perceptions are completely unfounded in reality, but that distortions in estimations resulting from misrepresentations in the media for example can have a detrimental effect on intergroup relations. Another important finding, consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and RGCT (Bobo 1983) is that threats to the group interests, or 'national identity' (Sides and Citrin, 2007: 501), are just as, if not more, important than threats to the individual in predicting levels of prejudice.

In summary, both the contact and conflict mechanisms seem to be operating simultaneously, but only through the experiences, perceptions and ideological frameworks of individuals.

5.3 Is inequality associated with Anti-Muslim attitudes?

Several studies have found relationships between measures of economic or socio-political deprivation, and negative attitudes to immigration and minorities. However, few of these are specifically focused on *inequality* and *anti-Muslim* attitudes. By inequality we mean 'the objectively unequal, or subjectively perceived, unjust distribution of valued outcomes, resources, power, chances (such as income, health, education, employment, political representation, legal and civil rights) or the gaps in access to opportunities.' (Franc and Pavlović, 2018). There are a number of theoretical reasons why we believe inequality may be an important predictor of anti-Muslim attitudes.

Realistic group conflict theory (RGCT), based on a series of experiments by the psychologist and sociologist Muzafer Sherif (1966) is premised on the idea that *competition* between groups forms the basis of intergroup hostility (Campbell, 1965; Jackson, 1993; Meuleman et al., 2019a; Sherif, 1966). By highlighting the competition for tangible values and interests like status and resources, this theory

rejects the idea that symbolic prejudice and norms of socialisation are at the heart of the problem of dysfunctional group relations. RGCT has been criticised on the grounds that there is lack of support for the proposition that direct conflict of individual interests increases prejudice (Kinder and Rhodebeck, 1982). However, Bobo (1983) makes an important modification in pointing out that to determine individual outgroup hostility and prejudice, threats to the survival and status of the group as a whole is just as, if not more, important than threats to individual members. Campbell (1965: 291) also points out that it is the *perception* of threat from an outgroup that is crucial for the increase in ingroup solidarity and outgroup hostility whether or not this perception is founded on a real conflict of interest between the groups. Other versions of group conflict theory suggest the threat does not have to be 'realistic' competition over material resources, but can also be a 'symbolic threat' to status, identity, power, culture or tradition (Stephan and Stephan, 1996; Hjerm and Nagayoshi, 2011; Obaidi et al., 2018).

In a series of studies, specifically measuring the impact of different types of perceived threat on willingness to persecute Muslims and join anti-Muslim movements, Obaidi et al. (2018) found that perceived symbolic (cultural) and realistic (socio-economic) threat were both associated with anti-Muslim hostility. The results were consistent across samples from the US, Norway and Denmark (and were also consistent with Muslims' hostility to non-Muslims in Denmark, Sweden, Turkey and Afghanistan). They further found that the strength of participants' religious group identification was associated with a higher experienced level of threat, which in turn impacted on their expression of anti-Muslim hostility.

Similar arguments about the importance of group status and group identities have been made by social psychologists Sidanius and Pratto (1999). According to their social dominance theory, insititutional and individual discrimination are expressions of the same socio-psychological orientation towards maintaining the 'arbitrary set group-based hierarchies' (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999: 35) that exist in any given society. Even members of the oppressed groups in a society will contribute to the persistence of inequalities between groups, and there is often a high degree of consensus across the social hierarchy as to which groups are dominant and which subordinate (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999:52). The authors argue that although the exact group distinctions (race, class, lineage etc.) are socially constructed and vary between historical and geographical contexts, the basic principles of social dominance are universal in large-scale human societies.

Theories of relative deprivation (Blumer, 1958; Meuleman et al., 2019a; Runciman, 1966) argue that a key factor contributing to prejudice is the experience of threat and injustice resulting from perceiving oneself or one's group as being in a worse position relative to others in the society. Although group conflict theories imply a conflicting relation between groups in a social hierarchy, their studies often lack attention to relative deprivation. By focusing on absolute measures of social and economic security or status, such as income, education, or the state of the national economy, they imply that groups compete over material resources locked in a zero-sum game. The issue that causes grievances and conflict to emerge, however, may not be one's objective situation per se, but the perception that one's own or others' relative position in the social or economic hierarchy is unjust, unearned or illegitimate. Crucially, this could either be a feeling of being unfairly disadvantaged as an individual relative to others, or the feeling that the group one identifies with is disadvantaged compared to other groups (Pettigrew, Wagner and Christ, 2007; Runciman, 1966).

Below we will look, first, at the relationship between economic inequality, and general economic conditions, and anti-Muslim attitudes, before turning our attention to the relationship between socio-political inequality and anti-Muslim attitudes.

5.3.1 Economic inequality

Most studies examining the predictors of anti-Muslim or anti-minority attitudes, insofar as they consider economic variables at all, focus on the absolute economic insecurity or deprivation of the individual, or the size and performance of the national economy. In other words, economic inequality

or relative economic deprivation is relatively understudied as an explanatory factor in cross national studies of intergroup relations (Meuleman et al., 2019a). In the following we will first look at the evidence for a relationship between general economic conditions and prejudice, and then the specific relationship between inequality and prejudice.

Individuals who experience financial insecurity in some way are generally more likely to express negative attitudes to immigration and minorities. Unemployed and low skilled workers in Europe are more likely to express negative attitudes to Muslims (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008) and to oppose immigration (Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte, 2014; Kunovich, 2004; Meuleman et al., 2019a; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008). Those who struggle to meet their economic needs on their current income are also more likely to oppose immigration generally (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; McLaren and Paterson, 2019; O'Connell, 2005: 64), and Muslim immigration specifically (Schlueter, Masso and Davidov, 2019). General anti-Muslim prejudice is also associated with low income in some, but not all European countries (Zick, Küpper and Höverman, 2011:90-3).

However, perceived economic threat could also arise from the economic context. Difficult economic conditions could make distribution of resources more challenging and increase competition among ethnic and social groups (Meuleman et al., 2019a: 5). Country level predictors that have been found to be important for attitudes to immigration include the unemployment rate (Meuleman et al., 2019a) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (O'Connell, 2005). Storm (2018) found that national unemployment rates and low GDP are associated with thinking immigration is bad for the economy, but not with cultural concerns about immigration. Meuleman et al. (2019a) also found that the relationship between national level economic variables and attitudes to immigration was mediated by an experience of group relative deprivation, specifically the perception that immigrants were better treated by the government (ESS 2014). Sides and Citrin (2007) also found that individual perceptions and attitudes, such as satisfaction with the national economy, was a more important predictor of anti-immigration than objective national level economic conditions. Jacobs, Boukes and Vliegenthart (2019) further found that negative perceptions and emotions about the national economy predict negative attitudes towards Muslims.

That said, what creates a sense of threat or insecurity is not just the size of the economy or the level of unemployment, but also their growth, decline and fluctuations. Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet (2009) argue that it is economic changes rather than static levels that are most predictive of anti-immigration attitudes. For example, Turner and Cross (2015) found that attitudes to immigration became more negative in Europe in the period since 2006, and in the countries that were most strongly affected by the economic recession.

Some studies also found interactions between individual and country level economic indicators. For example, both Kunovich (2004) and Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte (2014) found that the individual level effects of income and occupation on attitudes to immigration were stronger in richer countries, and countries with higher GDP growth. They explain this finding with feelings of relative deprivation; when the country's economy is in trouble, everyone feels insecure, whatever their personal finances or occupational status. In contrast, when most people are experiencing improvement in their economic situation, 'the unemployed may feel (relatively) more deprived' (Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte, 2014: 153). Studies in Switzerland and Australia by Jetten, Mols and Postmes (2015) also find that both relative gratification and relative deprivation is more associated with opposition to immigration, in a 'v-curve', such that those who felt relatively poor or wealthy were more opposed to immigration than those who felt moderately wealthy.

The importance of relative deprivation and gratification, could also indicate that economic inequality could be an important variable. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) describe how economic inequality can lead to greater levels of insecurity, lack of generalised trust and a greater sense of competition, which in turn can lead to a host of social ills. This includes lower tolerance for homosexuality (Andersen and Fetner, 2008), increased nationalism (Solt 2011) and greater support for populist radical right parties

(Inglehart and Norris, 2017). However very few studies have specifically examined its effects for attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities. O'Connell (2005) finds that attitudes to immigration are more positive in more egalitarian countries in Europe. Doebler (2015) found no effect of inequality on racial intolerance in Europe. We are not aware of any studies to date that directly measure the impact of objective economic inequality on anti-Muslim attitudes specifically.

In addition to vertical inequalities one should also consider the impact of horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2000), that is economic inequalities between socially salient groups. Structural inequalities and discrimination between minority groups and the majority is a widespread and well documented problem in many Western countries (Connor and Koenig, 2015; Ford, 2016; Heath et al., 2008; Stefan et al., 2018). Muslims have on average lower socioeconomic status than non-Muslims, and many of them are immigrants. These are both factors which could contribute to the popular perception of Muslims as contributing less to society, 'abusing' the welfare system, and being less entitled to social rights and benefits (Ford 2016; Jacobs, Boukes and Vliegenhart, 2019; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008).

Resentment of perceived injustice or relative deprivation on behalf of one's group could be an important factor in anti-Muslim attitudes even among individuals who are not personally disadvantaged economically. In a European study, Zick, Küpper and Höverman (2011) found that anti-minority attitudes were associated with 'fraternal relative deprivation', that is the perception that the economic situation of natives was worse than that of immigrants, but not with feeling personally disadvantaged compared to other people.

5.3.2 Socio-political inequality

Inequality and relative deprivation need not be economic to have an impact on trust and tolerance. Social status and socio-political rights can be unevenly distributed among groups and individuals. Further, experiences of intolerance, discrimination, marginalisation and fear in daily life can have an impact on how one perceives one's relative position in society.

While studies have shown that perceived prejudice and discrimination is more harmful for the psychological well-being of members of disadvantaged groups than they are for members of privileged groups (Schmitt and Branscombe, 2002), they can also have considerable impact on ethnic majority groups. Perceived marginalisation and discrimination are important factors motivating right wing as well as other forms of radicalisation (Koomen and Van der Pligt, 2015). Pauwels and De Waele (2014) find that adolescents who perceive their group to be discriminated against are more likely to engage in politically motivated violence, including right wing extremism. Furthermore, people who feel politically powerless are more likely to target weak groups than those who feel they are able to influence political decisions (Zick, Küpper and Höverman, 2011:100).

One way of measuring socio-political inequality between groups is through policy measures of accommodation of minority rights and integration. From a group conflict perspective which sees competition for resources as the main driver of attitudes, such policies could be seen as a threat to the majority population. On the other hand, policies could also function as 'normative expectations about appropriate intergroup relations' (Schlueter, Masso and Davidov, 2019), and several studies have found a positive relationship between permissive immigrant integration policies, and positive attitudes to immigrants by the majority population (Schlueter, Meuleman and Davidov, 2013). There could also be an interaction between government policies and personal contact. For example, Green et al. (2019) found that tolerant integration policies were related to both more everyday contact with immigrants, and lower threat perceptions.

5.4 Survey Measures of Anti-Muslim Attitudes

The large cross-national surveys use many different questions to indicate anti-Muslim attitudes, and these can be categorised into three main types: immigration questions; iocial distance questions; and general attitude questions. These arguably measure different types or aspects of anti-Muslim attitudes, and examining them together and comparing the results may give us a fuller picture of which

predictors are important for anti-Muslim attitudes generally, rather than for specific question wordings.

5.4.1 Immigration questions

The European Social Survey Round 7 (2014) asks about attitudes to Muslim immigrants as part of a set of questions about general attitudes to immigration. Specifically, the respondent is asked whether they think the country should 'allow many or few Muslims to come and live in country'. The four answer categories are 'Many', 'Some', 'Few' or 'None'. Respondents were also asked the same question about other types of immigrants: Jewish, Roma (Gypsies), people from poorer countries in Europe, people from poorer countries outside Europe, people of the same race or ethnic group as the respondent, and people of a different race or ethnic group. (The latter four questions were also asked in Round 1, 2002). Muslims, along with Roma and people from poorer countries outside Europe were consistently least welcomed as immigrants among Europeans in 2014 (ESS, 2016). These additional questions about other immigrant groups may allow us to isolate the anti-Muslim component from general anti-immigration sentiments or racial preferences.

5.4.2 Social distance

A second group of questions asks about interpersonal social distance to Muslims. These questions ask to what extent the respondent would accept Muslims occupying roles which require the respondent to have regular social contact with them and treat them with respect, e.g. neighbour, boss or in-law (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Storm, Sobolewska and Ford, 2017).

Four waves of the European Values Study from 1990 to 2017 (EVS, 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2018)) showed respondents a response card and asked: 'On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?'. As well as Muslims, the other types of neighbours on the list including people of a different race, immigrants and foreigners, Christians, Jews and Roma. Analysing EVS data from 1999, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) found that anti-Muslim neighbour sentiments were higher than anti-immigrant neighbour sentiments in most European countries. The questions about other racial and religious outgroups may allow us to isolate the anti-Muslim component from general anti-outgroup (or anti-neighbour) sentiments.

The Special Eurobarometer 437 (2015) asks two questions about social distance to Muslims: how comfortable the respondent would be if one of their colleagues at work was Muslim; and how comfortable they would be if their child was in a love relationship with a Muslim. All respondents were asked, regardless of whether they were working or not and whether or not they had children. Both questions were also asked about other racial and religious groups. One in eight respondents (13%) say they would be uncomfortable working with a Muslim person, and 30% of respondents say they would be uncomfortable with a son or daughter's relationship with a Muslim person. These figures were both higher than for any of the other religious groups (Eurobarometer 2015).

5.4.3 Explicit attitude to Muslims

Finally, some questionnaire items ask outright what the respondent's opinion is of Muslims as a group. The International Social Survey Programme from 2008 (ISSP, 2018) asks simply 'What is your personal attitude towards members of the following religious groups?' where Muslims are listed along with Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews and Atheists or non-believers. The five response categories range from 1. Very positive to 5. Very negative. Negative attitudes to Muslims by this measure are considerably higher than negative attitudes to other religious groups and previously have been found to be strongly associated with negative attitudes to immigration (Storm, 2011; Voas and Ling, 2010).

The MYPLACE (2014) survey of young people in Europe also includes two questions on approval and disapproval of Muslims, specifically agreement with the statements 'Muslims make a positive contribution to society' and 'It is right to be suspicious of Muslims', with five response categories ranging from 1. Strongly agree to 5. Strongly disagree. Respondents are also asked similar questions

about Jews and Roma. The questions about Muslims are strongly correlated with each other (MYPLACE, 2014: 304) as well as with those about Roma but not about Jews (MYPLACE, 2014: 301).

5.4.4 Individual level predictors of anti-Muslim attitudes

Aside from measures of inequality and socio-economic status, previous studies using survey research have found age, gender, education, religion, political ideology and value orientations to be important individual predictors of anti-Muslim attitudes.

5.4.5 Age

Although DARE is primarily concerned about young people's attitudes, given their association with radicalisation and political violence (Pauwels and De Waele, 2014), most studies find that younger people are less likely than older people to hold negative attitudes to Muslims. Strabac and Listhaug (2008) found a strong positive relationship between age and anti-Muslim prejudice in the EVS (1999). In Western Europe in particular, the odds of expressing negative attitudes towards the prospect of Muslim neighbours increase by 12% for each additional decade of age (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008: 280). Kaya (2015) finds similar results in the 2008 wave of the EVS. Schlueter, Masso and Davidov (2019) find that age is associated with negative attitudes to Muslim immigration in the ESS (2014). This matches other studies which find that attitudes to immigration is generally more negative among older respondents (McLaren and Paterson, 2019; Pettigrew, Wagner and Christ, 2007). Zick, Küpper and Höverman (2011:80) find anti-Muslim prejudice to be associated with age in a similar pattern to other group specific prejudices.

This age difference raises the question of whether it is due to changes over the individual life time (age effect), generational replacement (cohort effect) or a change in events or political landscape that affects the whole population simultaneously (period effect). The answer to that question could determine how attitudes to Muslims and immigration will change over the coming decades (McLaren and Paterson, 2019). Inglehart and Norris (2017) argue that the support for authoritarian xenophobic political movements is a combination of cohort and period effects; while older generations are in general more likely to hold xenophobic attitudes, large swathes of the population, including the younger generations have been adversely affected by economic inequality and insecurity, motivating them to support authoritarian political alternatives. McLaren and Paterson (2019) similarly argue that younger cohorts, while generally more positive towards immigration, are susceptible to influence of far-right politics in contexts where these movements have had a strong presence in their formative years.

Another related question is whether younger cohorts who have come of age in the period where the salience of Muslims as an outgroup has increased in Western countries, may be more affected by this. However, at least in a British study of social distance to minority groups (using the British Social Attitudes Survey, 2010), the cohorts born in the 1980s and 90s were in fact less likely than their parents' cohort to single out Muslims (Storm, Sobolewska and Ford, 2017). Similarly, looking at group specific prejudice in the Belgian EVS (2008), Meuleman et al. (2019b) finds an opinion gap between younger and older cohorts on Islamophobia and homonegativity, but no significant age difference in anti-Semitism or anti-immigration attitudes. This suggests that despite the increased negative political and media coverage of Muslims in their lifetime, younger people are not just generally less xenophobic, but also more specifically positive to Muslims than older people. A possible explanation is that in the same period, personal contact between ethnic groups has increased; younger people are more likely than older people to have personal connections with Muslims, and are more used to seeing ethnic diversity in public life (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008; Storm, Sobolewska and Ford, 2017).

5.4.6 Gender

One might expect gender to play a role in the formation of anti-Muslim attitudes for two reasons. On the one hand men are slightly more likely to vote for the radical right than women, although the exact reasons are unknown (Immerzeel, Coffé and van der Lippe, 2015; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015). On the

other hand, one of the chief accusations against Islam is its alleged sexism and oppression of women (Meuleman, 2019b), an argument which one may expect to appeal more to women than men. However, the effect of the respondent's gender on attitudes to Muslims is much less consistent than the effect of age. Strabac and Listhaug (2008) and Kaya (2014) find that men are generally more likely to have anti-Muslim attitudes than women in Western Europe, but not Eastern Europe. Zick, Küpper and Höverman (2011:80) and Wike and Grim (2010) find slightly more anti-Muslim prejudice among women. Schlueter, Masso and Davidov (2019) do not find any significant effect of gender. The results for general attitudes to immigration are similarly inconclusive. For example, Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte (2014) find that men are more likely to perceive ethnic threat from immigration, Coenders and Scheepers (2003) find that women are slightly more opposed to immigration, while McLaren and Paterson (2019) find no effect of gender.

5.4.7 Education

Education is strongly and persistently associated with more positive attitudes to outgroups in most of the studies reported above. Strabac and Listhaug (2008) found that education has a strong negative effect on anti-Muslim prejudice in both Eastern and Western Europe. Other studies using different datasets, also find attitudes to Muslims to be more positive among people with higher levels of education (Kaya, 2014; Schlueter, Masso and Davidov, 2019; Zick, Küpper and Höverman, 2011:83).

The education effect is similar for attitudes to immigration and outgroups more generally (Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte, 2014; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; McLaren and Paterson, 2019). There are at least two reasons why we would expect education to have an impact on attitudes to outgroups. Firstly, the lower educated could be more prone to perceived economic threat, as they are more likely to be in direct competition with low skilled immigrants on the job market. Secondly, education also increases knowledge about and exposure to cultural and ethnic diversity (Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte, 2014: 138). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) argue that the latter effect is more important. Using ESS data, they find no evidence that the relationship is affected by expected immigrant skill levels. Higher education and skills are associated with support for all types of immigrants, both poorer and richer, European, and non-European. Rather they find that the relationship it is driven by friendships with immigrants as well as beliefs about the positive value of cultural diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).

There are also some indications of an interaction between education and age. McLaren and Paterson (2019) find that it is the most educated amongst the youngest cohorts who are persistently more positive about immigration (except in contexts where the far right have had a strong political presence). However, a study of social distance to ethnic minorities in Britain (Storm, Sobolewska and Ford, 2017) found that education had the largest effect on the social acceptance of interethnic marriage in cohorts born between 1930 and 1970. Among younger cohorts, acceptance is near universal. Nonetheless, specific anti-Muslim social distance (subtracting social distance to Black ethnic minorities), was found to be held by relatively younger and more educated people, who do not have general high levels of ethnic prejudice, but who still show considerable social distance to Muslims (Meuleman, 2019b; Storm, Sobolewska and Ford, 2017).

5.4.8 Political and value orientations

Many studies identify moral and political value orientations as important predictors of attitudes towards minorities. For example, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) find that cultural values, particularly beliefs about multiculturalism and diversity mediate the relationship between education and positive attitudes to immigration. In most countries, right-wing political parties are more likely to be restrictive on immigration and their supporters are more likely to hold negative attitudes to outgroups. Zick, Küpper and Höverman (2011:95) find an almost linear relationship between self-stated ideological orientation on a scale from left to right, and anti-Muslim attitudes.

Altemeyer's (1981) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA) measures the extent to which people are motivated by maintaining or establishing collective security (i.e. societal order, cohesion, stability, and tradition). People high in RWA are more likely to be negative to outgroups that they perceive to threaten collective security. Another measure, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), describes the value of maintaining or establishing group dominance and superiority in a competitive hierarchy. Persons high in SDO are particularly negative toward lower status groups, in order to justify their existing intergroup superiority, as well as toward outgroups that are perceived to challenge their position in the hierarchy. People high in SDO are often also supportive of politics that promote inequality (Duckitt and Sibley, 2010).

Both trait scales are strongly associated with prejudice, but are mediated and moderated by threat. For example, authoritarians are more likely to perceive threat to their in-group, but also more likely to be concerned by this threat (Cohrs and Ibler, 2009). In an American study, Dunwoody and McFarland (2018) found that both RWA and SDO were strongly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes and support for anti-Muslim policies, and that the relationship was partially mediated through the effect upon perceived threat from Muslims.

Collective identity and need for belonging to a group have also been shown to be a universal human trait which motivates attitudes and behaviour (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). Haidt and Joseph (2007) identified ingroup loyalty as one of the primary foundations of moral decision making and behaviour. Among the values in Schwartz's (1994; 2006) theory of basic human values, Davidov et al. (2014) and Meuleman et al. (2019a) identify two value types that are particularly relevant for the perception of ethnic threat, namely Universalism (appreciating individual differences and promoting universal welfare), and Conformity-tradition (maintaining one's cultural norms, beliefs and practices). Such value priorities can influence how much one seeks or avoids contact with out-groups, as well as whether one is likely to feel that one's majority culture is threatened by the presence of minorities (Meuleman et al., 2019a).

Inglehart and Norris (2017) (see also Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) argue that the generational growth of postmaterialist values after the second world war has led to populations that are 'less conformist, more open to new ideas, less authoritarian, and more tolerant of outgroups', including attitudes to immigration (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). However, they also caution that these values depend on high levels of economic and physical security, and that substantial socio-economic inequality may pose a threat to these values.

5.4.9 Religion

One would expect an individual's attitude to a religious group, such as Muslims, to be coloured in some way by their own religiosity or lack thereof. In anti-Muslim political rhetoric, Islam is variously argued to be incompatible both with Western nations' Christian heritage (Hervieu-Leger, 2000: 161) and their current secular states and populations (Werbner, 2005: 8). The evidence, however, is somewhat mixed, and indicates that religion may both promote and attenuate prejudice (Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005), and that the relationship may be context dependent (Bohman and Hjerm, 2014; Storm, 2018).

Strabac and Listhaug (2008) find no clear evidence of a religious effect on anti-Muslim attitudes. Schlueter, Masso and Davidov (2019) find that Protestants and Catholics are more negative to Muslim immigrants than other religious denominations are. However, this may be because they are more likely to belong to the majority religion. Storm (2018) found that religious people in religious countries are more worried about immigration, but so are non-religious people in less religious countries. Bohman and Hjerm (2014) similarly find that people belonging to majority denominations in religiously homogenous contexts are more likely to be negative towards immigration. Storm (2018) argues that it is not religiosity per se that is related to concerns about immigration, but rather the degree to which religion represents cultural conformity.

Negative attitudes to Muslims among Christians could be related to a religious conception of national identity. In European samples of the ISSP, Christians are more likely to think a Christian affiliation is a prerequisite for belonging to the nation (Kunovich, 2006; Storm, 2011). Kunovich (2006: 452) also found that Christianity was more salient for national identity in European countries with large Muslim populations, except when there was significant presence of other non-Christian religions. In other words, when the Muslim minority is seen as a single united group it is more likely to be interpreted as a threat to majority culture.

The role of religion in prejudicial attitudes also depends on how it is measured. Previous studies have found that while majority religious affiliation is positively associated with prejudice and ethnic threat, religious beliefs (Doebler, 2015; Scheepers et al., 2002) and religious service attendance (Storm, 2011; 2018) are negatively associated with such measures. This may be because 'cultural religion' (Demerath, 2000), that is religious affiliation without practice or belief, could represent identification with the majority ethno-national group (Storm, 2018).

5.5 Results

After discussing the potential roles of the selected predictors in the previous section, this section provides an overview of their effects on the anti-Muslim attitudes from analysis of several international studies. Although primarily focused on the general effects, these analyses also accounted for some country-specific (and location-specific) differences in order to produce more precise results. Table 5.1 below shows the bivariate correlations between Anti-Muslim attitudes and all the independent variables in the model - including the country level variables, for under 30 year old in each dataset. The correlations for the anti-Muslim attitudes are from the samples excluding Muslims (which were used for analysing anti-Muslim attitudes). All the independent variables are standardised. For an overview of the variables including question wording, coding and sample size, see Appendix 1.

Table 5.1 Anti-Muslim attitudes among under 30 year olds (Pearson's correlations, P<0.05)

Survey	**European Values Study**		**European Values Study**		**European Social Survey**		**Eurobarometer**	**ISSP**	**MYPLACE**
Year / Sample	2008		2017		2014		2015	2008	2012/13
Question	Would not like to have Muslim neighbours	Would not like to have Muslim neighbours CORRECTED	Would not like to have Muslim neighbours	Would not like to have Muslim neighbours CORRECTED	Would not allow Muslim immigration	Would not allow Muslim immigration CORRECTED	Would not like a Muslim colleague / own child's love interest	Negative attitude to Muslims	Negative attitude to Muslims (2 items)
Type of question	Social distance	Social distance CORRECTED	Social distance	Social distance CORRECTED	Anti-immigration	Anti-immigration CORRECTED	Social distance	Negative attitude	Negative attitude
Sociodemographic									
Age	**-0.03**	**-0.04**	No	No	**0.06**	No	No	**0.05**	**0.02**
Female	**-0.03**	**-0.03**	**-0.02**	No	**-0.01**	No	No	**-0.03**	No
Rural area	**0.04**	**0.03**	**0.09**	**0.10**			**0.04**	**0.08**	
Economic disadvantage									
Low social class							**0.03**	No	
Not in work not in education	No	No	**0.07**	**0.07**	No	No	No	No	**0.08**
Difficult on household income					**0.23**	**0.09**	**0.09**		**0.23**
Reverse Household income	No	No	No	No					
Financial difficulty/poverty in childhood	No	No	No	No	**0.12**	No			**0.12**
Socio-political disadvantage									
Immigrant	**-0.04**	**-0.04**	**-0.07**	**-0.07**	**-0.04**	No			
Immigrant parents	**-0.03**	**-0.03**	**-0.08**	**-0.08**	**-0.03**	No			
Ethnic or religious minority							No		
Experience of discrimination	No	No	No	No					**-0.05**
Perceived group discrimination					No	No	No		
Perceived low political influence					**0.25**	No	**0.08**		
Attitudes									
Religion important	**0.05**	**0.05**	**0.07**	**0.08**					
Rightwing	**0.12**	**0.12**	**0.13**	**0.12**					
National pride	**0.03**	**0.03**	**0.02**	**0.03**					
Low control	**0.06**	**0.06**	**0.04**	**0.05**					
Postmaterialist values	**-0.07**	**-0.07**	**-0.13**	**-0.11**					
Country level									
Gini	No	No	No	No	No	**0.10**	No	No	
Reverse Welfare spending	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.28**	**0.24**	**0.26**	**0.17**	**0.24**	No	
Reverse GDP	**0.12**	**0.12**	**0.25**	**0.24**	**0.27**	**0.19**	**0.23**	No	
Reverse WGI	**0.11**	**0.10**	**0.20**	**0.19**	**0.34**	**0.21**	**0.22**	No	
Reverse MIPEX	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.25**	**0.22**	**0.29**	**0.14**	**0.26**	No	

Table 5.1 Results from non-Muslim under 30 year olds in EVS 2017, EVS2008, MYPLACE 2012/13, ESS2014, Eurobarometer 2015 and ISSP 2008. Positive correlations are in blue, negative in red, with stronger colours indicating larger correlations. 'No'= no significant correlation. Note that that because of large samples some very low correlations (under 0.1) are statistical significant.

5.5.1 European Values Study

The European Values Study from 2017 and 2008 asks the same question about attitudes to Muslims. In a question about neighbours, respondents are given a list of categories of people, including Muslims, and are asked to indicate any that they would *not* like to have as neighbours[88] (EVS, 2018; EVS, 2010). The outcome variable is a binary variable (dislike vs. not mentioned), and the analysis is accordingly a logistic regression model. The question was optional in countries with Muslim majorities. Being Muslim is a strong negative predictor of hostility to Muslims. Less than 4% of Muslim under 30s in the EVS 2017 mention Muslims as neighbours they would not like, compared to 21% of non-Muslims. However, because the number of Muslim respondents was too small in some countries to include as a control variable in the analysis, the analysis conducted here was only conducted on non-Muslims.

Both in the EVS 2017 and 2008, 23% of respondents (of all ages) mentioned Muslims as someone they did not want as neighbours, but young respondents (under 30) were generally less likely to do so (21% in 2017 and 22% in 2008) than those aged 30 or over (25%). The country samples are not the same, so we cannot compare overall change over time in the nine years between the two surveys.

The graph suggests that in 26 out of the 29 countries where the question was asked in 2017 (all except Albania, Croatia and the Netherlands), under 30s were less likely than older people to hold anti-Muslim views by this measure. In 2008, it was 29 out of 44 countries. The country differences, shown in Figure 5.1 and 5.2, are generally similar for both age groups.

It should be noted that the question was not asked in Azerbaijan in 2017. In the analysis of the 2008 data, we excluded Muslim majority countries Turkey and Northern Cyprus from this analysis even though they were asked the question, as there were fewer than 25 non-Muslims in each of the age groups in these two countries.

The multivariate analysis presented below is done by including sociodemographic and economic variables in model 1, attitudes and values in model 2, random slopes in model 3, and country level variables one by one in models 4-7.

[88] The other categories are: *People of a different race; Heavy drinkers; Immigrants/foreign workers; Drug addicts; Homosexuals; Christians; Jews* and *Gypsies*. In 2008, the list further included *People with a criminal record; Left wing extremists; Right wing extremists; People with large families; Emotionally unstable people* and *People who have AIDS*.

Figure 5.1: Percentage who would not like Muslim neighbours by country, EVS 2017



Figure 5.1 (EVS 2017), 30+ N=40158, under 30 N=7428

Figure 5.2: Percentage who would not like Muslim neighbours by country, EVS 2008



Figure 5.2 (EVS 2008), 30+ N=44478, under 30 N=11149

In order to measure specific anti-Muslim attitudes, we also constructed an additional outcome variable by calculating the mean of all the mentions of other groups of neighbours (drug addicts, heavy drinkers, homosexuals, immigrants, Christians, Jews, and Gypsies (Roma)) a respondent did not like, and subtract it from their attitude to Muslim neighbours. The result a binary variable where (1) is someone who specifically would not like a Muslim neighbour, but who would not mind other groups on the list, and (0) is someone who is equally or more negative to other groups. By this measure, 21.9% of the 47566 non-Muslims in the EVS 2017 sample are more negative to Muslims than to other types of neighbours. When the sample is restricted to people under the age of 30, the figure is 19.6%. In the EVS 2008, 21% of under 30 year old non-Muslims are more negative to Muslim neighbours than other groups of neighbours.

Bivariate correlations

The most pronounced bivariate correlations (shown in Table 5.1) in both the EVS datasets are with the country level variables. The largest ones are welfare spending as a proportion of GDP (*r(6391)*=0.29, *P*<0.001) in EVS 2017, and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) *r(7155)*= .15, *P*<0.001) in EVS 2008. In contrast, there was only a very weak correlation with the Gini coefficient (*r(8072*)=.07, *P*<0.001 in EVS 2017 and *r(11012*)=.03, *P*<0.001 in EVS 2008) The individual level economic variables have generally weaker correlations. The largest one was with reverse household income (*r(8415)*= .06, P<.001) in EVS 2008. There are no bivariate correlations between anti-Muslim attitudes and sociodemographic variables larger than .1 in either EVS 2017 or EVS2008. The largest bivariate correlations with sociodemographic variables in EVS2017 were with living in rural area (*r(6734)*=.10, *P*<.001) and having parents born abroad (*r(7373)*=.10, *P*<.001). Attitudinal variables have slightly larger correlations, particularly right-wing political orientation ((*r(6535)*=.12, *P*<.001 in EVS 2017 and *r(8196)*=.12, *P*<.001 in EVS 2008), and postmaterialist values (*r(7575)*=.12, *P*<.001) in EVS 2017. In order to control for some of the other variables that may account for these associations, and the fact that some of the variation may be between countries as well as between individuals, we conduct multilevel regression analyses.

Sociodemographic and individual economic variables

From the multilevel regression analysis of the EVS 2017 we find that there are three main individual level sociodemographic predictors of anti-Muslim attitudes among young people. One is that people whose parents are immigrants are less likely to express social distance towards Muslims (*OR*=0.61 *95% CI*=0.45, 0.83). The odds of expressing social distance to Muslims is reduced by 39% for children of immigrants. Secondly, those who are not in either work or education are more likely to hold anti-Muslim views (*OR*=1.30; *95% CI* = 1.08, 1.58), but this is not a large effect. The odds of objecting to a Muslim neighbour is 30% higher for an under 30 year old who is unemployed compared to one who is employed or in fulltime education. Translated into probabilities, someone under 30 who is not in work or education is on average only 4% more likely to mention that they do not want Muslim neighbours, compared to an under 30-year-old who is employed[89]. Thirdly, women were slightly less likely than men to oppose Muslim neighbours (*OR*=0.85; *95% CI* =0.74, 0.98). Living in a town with fewer than 5000 people was also associated with anti-Muslim views (*OR*=1.25; *95% CI* =1.06, 1.48), but this variable was not available in the UK and Netherlands[90]. Age, household income and experiences of poverty as a child were not significant predictors. The results are presented graphically in Figure 5.3. For full results, see Appendix 2, Table A2.22-23.

In 2008 similarly, Model 1 shows that among under 30 year olds, children of immigrants (*OR*=0.75; *95% CI* = 0.60, 0.94), women (*OR*=0.88; *95% CI* = 0.78, 0.98), and those living in urban areas (*OR*=1.18;

[89] Predicted probabilities are based on non-standardised coefficients.

[90] The Urban / Rural variable was excluded in order to include the UK and the Netherlands where the variable was not available. Including this variable does not substantially affect the results of the models. Living in a town with a population of less than 5000 was significantly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in Model 1 (*b*=.226, *SE*=.084, *P*=.007) and slightly less so with attitudes controlled for in Model 2 (*b*=.216, *SE*=.099, *P*=.029).

95% CI = 1.04, 1.35*)*, are less likely to object to Muslim neighbours. In addition, in this dataset the older the respondents the less likely they were to dislike Muslims (*OR*=0.93; *95% CI* = 0.88, 0.98). However, none of the individual economic variables were statistically significant predictors. The results of the individual level predictors can be seen presented graphically in Figure 5.4. see Appendix 2, Table A2.25-26.

Figure 5.3: Regression coefficients: Social distance to Muslim neighbours (EVS 2017)



Figure 5.3 (EVS 2017). Regression coefficients with 95% confidence interval. All variables standardised. Muslim respondents excluded. Model 4-8 controls for all variables from Model 3. GDP=Gross Domestic Product, WGI=Mean of World Governance Indicators, MIPEX=Migrant Integration Policy index. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.22-23.

Figure 5.4: Regression coefficients: Social distance to Muslim neighbours (EVS 2008)



Figure 5.4 (EVS 2008). Regression coefficients with 95% confidence interval. All variables standardised. Muslim respondents excluded. Model 4-8 controls for all variables from Model 3. GDP=Gross Domestic Product, WGI=Mean of World Governance Indicators, MIPEX=Migrant Integration Policy index. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.25-26.

Attitudinal variables

In the second model of EVS 2017 data, we found that religiosity (*OR*=0.85; *95% CI* = 0.77, 0.95*)* and postmaterialist values[91] (*OR*=0.82; *95% CI* = 0.75, 0.98*)* were associated with less social distance to Muslim neighbours. Those who reported right wing political views (*OR*=1.29; *95% CI* =1.19, 1.41), and low control over their lives (*OR*=1.13; *95% CI* = 1.04, 1.22*)* were more likely to object to Muslims as their neighbours. In EVS 2008 similarly, right wing politics, low life control and materialist values were also significantly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes, but religiosity was not significant in this dataset.

There was no significant association with national pride in either dataset. The effects of two of the attitudinal variables- right-wing political orientation and low personal control - varied significantly[92] between the countries in 2017, and these variables were included as random slopes in model 3. In

[91] The postmaterialist values index is based on two variables, where respondents were asked to indicate the most and second most important priorities from a list of four: 1) maintaining order in nation; 2) giving people more say in important government decisions; 3) fighting rising prices; 4) protecting freedom of speech. According to the choice of materialistic (1 and 3) or postmaterialistic (2 and 4) aims, respondents were coded as materialistic or postmaterialistic persons. Those who chose one of each were coded as mixed. There was a slight difference in the wording of the question in the different surveys. In the EVS 2008 it was specified that this was aims for the country for the next 10 years, whereas in EVS 2017 respondents were given no context and simply asked which aim they would say was most (and second most) important if they had to choose).

[92] To determine the model specification, variables were included as random slopes one by one, and those that were a significant improvement in fit from likelihood ratio test (P<.05) compared to the random intercept, fixed slopes model (Model 2) were included as random slopes in Model 3 in the under 30 sample. In the 30+ sample this method resulted in too many random slopes so the model would not converge. Hence for this sample, only random slopes which improved the model significant at the 0.1% level (P<.001) were included in Model 3.

2008 it was only the effect of right-wing political attitudes that varied significantly between countries, and were included as random slopes in model 3. When the attitudinal variables are controlled for in model 2 and 3, the sociodemographic and economic variables are no longer significant, suggesting that the attitudes and values capture some of the same variation as these variables. For example those not in work, or education may be more likely to feel low control over their lives (*r(54890)*=.113, *P*<0.001 in EVS 2017), which in turn is associated with anti-Muslim attitudes, but once that is taken into account, lack of participation in the labour market is not by itself associated with objecting to Muslim neighbours.

Country level variables

The multi-level model shows that 27% of the variance in anti-Muslim attitudes in the EVS 2017 was at the country level rather than individual level. Economic inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient (World Bank, 2019) was not significantly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in either the EVS 2017 or the EVS 2008. However in both years, young residents of countries with lower GDP, less spending on social welfare (as a percentage of GDP) (Eurostat, 2019), lower WGI (WGI, 2019) and lower MIPEX (MIPEX, 2015) were all more likely to express social distance towards Muslims compared to people in countries with larger economies, more social welfare spending[93], more social and economic rights, and more rights specifically for migrants[94]. To give an illustration of the size of the effects - an increase in the GDP of 10000 international dollars per capita is associated with a 3-7% reduction in the probability of objecting to Muslim neighbours. The predicted probability of objecting to Muslim neighbours is 7% for a country which spends about 30% of its GDP on social welfare, whereas it increases to 24% for a country that spends 20% of the GDP on welfare. With the 2017 data, it does not make a difference to these coefficients whether attitudinal variables (introduced in model 2) were included in these models or not. However, in 2008, not including attitudes in the model made a slight difference to the contextual variables; welfare spending, GDP, WGI and MIPEX all had larger standardised coefficients (by about .1), and were significant at a lower level (P<.001). This suggests that part of the variation between more and less developed countries lies in more general attitudes and values which in turn impacts on specific attitudes to Muslims. The reason we did not see this in 2017 data, may be to do with the smaller number of countries and narrower spread in economic and socio-political development in the 2017 sample. The coefficients, which were introduced to the model one by one to avoid collinearity, are shown in Figure 5.5 and 5.6. For full results see Appendix 2, Table A.X.

Specifically negative attitudes to Muslims

The main predictors of specific anti-Muslim attitudes were generally the same as for general anti-Muslim attitudes among under 30 year olds in the EVS 2017. It is worth noting that being out of work, having a non-immigrant background, right wing political attitudes, materialist values, and a sense of lack of control over one's own life were significant predictors, even when subtracting general negativity to out-groups. The importance of religion in life was also significant at P<.05 in all models (P=.022 in Model 3), with less religious people being more opposed to Muslim neighbours. In EVS 2008, right wing political orientation was the the only significant predictor of specific anti-Muslim attitudes at the individual level. In both datasets, country-level variables remained significant predictors when general outgroup attitudes were subtracted. For full results, see Appendix 2 Table A2.24 and A2.27.

[93] Eurostat's measure of social expenditure as a percentage of GDP was not available for the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia and Ukraine (Eurostat 2019), and these countries were excluded from Model 5.

[94] Note that the most recent MIPEX used for the 2017 analysis was from 2014 and it was not available in five of the countries in the sample: Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Serbia which were consequently excluded from model 8. In 2008, the closest available MIPEX was from 2010 and was not available in the following 12 countries, which were thus excluded from model 8: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine (MIPEX 2015).

Difference between younger and older respondents

When conducting the same analysis on those aged 30 or over, there were a few notable differences. The main one in the EVS 2017 and EVS 2008 was that individual economic variables were more important for the older age group (e.g. Reverse income: *OR*=1.17; *95% CI*=1.13, 1.21) for 30+ and *OR*=0.95; *95% CI*=0.87, 1.04 for u30 in EVS 2017)[95], while contextual variables were less important. It is worth noting here that the size of the 30+ sample is much larger than the under 30 sample, which generally reduces the confidence intervals, and increases the measure of statistical significance (P-value) even when the effects are equally small. That said, the results for the older age group would have been significant even with larger confidence intervals, so the difference in sample size does not account for the differences between the samples. Age, sex and income are the main predictors for over 30s in 2017, with older, male and lower income respondents being the most likely to object to Muslim neighbours. In the 2008 data, the sex difference in the older age group (*OR*=0.78; *95% CI*=0.73, 0.83) was more pronounced than in 2017 (*OR*=0.83; *95% CI*=0.78, 0.89). Not being in work, education or retirement, lower household income and living in a rural area were also predictive of anti-Muslim attitudes for this age group in a way they were not for the under 30s.

The sociodemographic and economic variables were also still significant when including attitudes and values, which were all predictive of social distance to Muslim in the same direction as for the younger respondents in both datasets. Right wing, materialist values and low life control were as important for this age group as for the under 30s. Religiosity had slightly weaker negative association with anti-Muslim attitudes in the older age group (OR_{30+}=0.92; *95% CI*=0.89,0.96, OR_{u30}=0.86; *95% CI*=0.78,0.95 in EVS 2017), while national pride had a more significant positive association (OR_{30+}=1.07; *95% CI*=1.03,1.11, OR_{u30}=1.07; *95% CI*=1.12, 1.41 in EVS 2008). In contrast, none of the contextual economic variables were significant. The MIPEX was the only significant country level variable for the over 29s in both 2017 and 2008, with better conditions for immigrant participation being associated with lower hostility to Muslims.

5.5.2 MYPLACE 2012-13

In the MYPLACE study, prejudice against Muslims were operationalised by two items: 'Muslims make a positive contribution to society' and 'It is right to be suspicious about Muslims'. Both of these items were measured on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from completely agree (1) to completely disagree (5). Since the variables were reversely coded (i.e. one measured positive, while the other measured negative attitudes towards Muslims), the second variable ('It' is right…') was recoded in a way that higher values indicated more negative attitudes towards Muslims. In the final step, an average of these two variables was calculated, with higher value also indicating more anti-Muslim prejudice. In order to make the results directly interpretable and visually easier to understand, we subtracted 1 from the results, so the new scale had a possible range between zero, indicating positive attitudes towards Muslims, and four, indicating negative attitudes towards Muslims. These results of the non-Muslim sample, in line with the previous analyses where the number of Muslims in the sample was insufficient for precise analyses, are presented in Figure 5.5.

[95] The coefficients reported are all from Model 3 unless otherwise indicated.

Figure 5.5 Mean Anti-Muslim prejudice (0-4), MYPLACE 2012-13



Figure 5.5 (MYPLACE 2012/13). N = 7919

Although without ascertaining measurement invariance of the applied items across locations one should be reluctant in declaring any significant differences, the pattern shown above reveals that participants from the Western European countries tended to have less negative attitudes towards Muslims than participants from Eastern European countries, although the majority of results is close to the value of two, which would indicate the 'neither agree, nor disagree' answer. Therefore, the graph actually suggests that the overall opinion in majority of the countries was neutral, with some countries inclining more to the negative opinion, and others towards the positive opinion on Muslims.

The correlations table (Table 5.1) shows that the majority of variables have a very weak relationship with anti-Muslim prejudice, which indicates that their predictive power in the upcoming regression models will also be weak. The most serious contender for the role of predictor of anti-Muslim attitudes is coping on income, with participants having more problems with coping on their income having more negative attitudes towards Muslims, although this relationship is also quite weak and reflects 5.3% of shared variance between the two variables ($r(7917)$ = .23, P < .001). The indicators of a participant's foreign origin were not included in the following analyses due to inadequate variability, which can lead to biased and unreliable estimates. The following regression analyses, which take into account the location-level differences in average anti-Muslim attitudes, were used to assess the issue of predictors of anti-Muslim attitudes more precisely.

Before adding the predictors into regression equations, the intercepts were allowed to vary across location, which yielded an ICC of .21, confirming that a meaningful amount of variance (21%) of anti-Muslim attitudes can be attributed to the specific locations. The regression slopes were additionally tested for invariance in the context of other predictors: holding other predictors fixed, one regression slope by one was allowed to vary across locations, followed by testing the significance of this variation using anova. The results implied that only two of the slopes did not vary across locations - being neither employed nor in education and experiencing discrimination - with the slope of age being marginally significant.

Figure 5.6: Regression coefficients: Negative attitudes to Muslims (MYPLACE 2012-13)



Figure 5.6 (MYPLACE 2012/13) Standardised regression coefficients for country level variables on under 30 year olds, based on the model with fixed slopes and random intercept, with 95% confidence interval. SES=Socio-economic status. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.28.

As Figure 5.6 shows, the strongest positive relationship with anti-Muslim attitudes is socio-economic status (SES) at 14, with participants with lower early SES exhibiting more prejudice towards Muslims. Coping on income was also related to anti-Muslim prejudice, with those who during the time of the study had more problems with coping on income expressing stronger anti-Muslim prejudice. However, although some significant effects have been named, their effect sizes are very small and most of them

have little (or no) practical value. For instance, a change of more than 11 standard deviations in SES at the age of 14 (β = .09, *95% CI* = 0.07, 0.11]) would be related to a change of one SD in anti-Muslim attitudes, which has the probability of randomly occurring equal to 6.05 multiplied by 10^{-28} (which indicates an extreme change that is practically impossible). Therefore, although significant, these variables would not be sufficient to practically distinguish between individuals having anti-Muslim prejudice and those who are more open towards Muslims. Although there was some variation in slopes, except for experienced discrimination and being in education or work, with respect to locations, all of the estimates are generally small, while the differences are significant primarily due to large number of participants per group. However, if the goal of analysis is to predict the anti-Muslim attitudes as correctly as possible, these differences should be taken into account.

5.5.3 European Social Survey (2014)

General attitudes to Muslim immigration

The European Social Survey (2014), rather than asking about Muslim neighbours, asks respondents what they think about Muslim immigration, or specifically, whether they think Muslims should be allowed to come and live in the country. The four response categories range from (1) many to (4) none. Immigration and immigrant integration is a much discussed topic, and in many European countries conflated with questions about Islam and religious diversity. Some of the antipathy towards Muslims may be due to concern about immigration in general, while some anti-immigrant attitudes may originate in Islamophobia (Hellwig and Sinno, 2015). It is thus useful to look at questions that specifically measure negative attitudes to Muslim immigration to see if they have the same predictors as other anti-Muslim attitudes.

The 6669 non-Muslims under 30 years old in the sample are quite evenly spread over the four categories. While 19% would allow no Muslim immigrants into the country, and 16% would allow many, the majority (65%) falls somewhere between these, opting instead for ‘some’ or ‘a few’. In comparison, 28% of over 30 year olds would not allow any Muslim immigrants, while 11% would allow many, meaning they are slightly more negative to Muslim immigration.

There are also substantial differences in the mean value between the 21 countries in the sample (Figure 5.7), ranging from Sweden (1.7), and Israel, Hungary and the Czech Republic (all above 3.3). As with the questions about Muslim neighbours in EVS, the countries with the most negative views are Eastern European and countries with a recent history of ethnoreligious conflict.

As with the EVS, the largest bivariate correlations are between anti-Muslim attitudes and country level variables in the ESS (see Table 5.1); specifically, the reverse mean World Governance Index (*r(6667)*=.34, *P*<.001). The reverse GDP, MIPEX, and welfare spending have correlations between .26 and .29. As with the EVS studies, the Gini (*r(6256)*=.07, *P*<.001) has a much weaker correlation with the outcome variable. Of the individual level variables, the strongest correlations are with struggling to get by on household income (*r(6515)*=.23, *P*<.001) and weak political influence (*r(6667)*=.26, *P*<.001).

The multilevel regression model of under 30 year olds showed that 20% of the variation is at the country level (*ICC*=.20, *SE*=.05). As with the EVS data, older and male respondents, and those who are neither born abroad nor have immigrant parents, were more negative towards Muslims entering the country. Young people struggling to get by on their household income were more negative to Muslim immigration. However, financial difficulties in childhood, or being out of work was not significantly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in this data, unlike in the EVS 2017. In this model we also included experiences of socio-political inequality, namely belonging to a group that is discriminated against, and feeling like one has no influence over politics in the country. The former was not a significant predictor, but the latter was; those who experience a lack of political power and influence

are more negative towards Muslim immigration[96]. There is an average difference of .8 points from one end of the scale to the other, such that those who feel completely able to influence politics score on average 2 ('allow some Muslims into the country'), whereas those who feel not at all able to influence politics score on average 2.8, closer to 'allow a few'. The effects of four of the variables: struggling on household income, financial difficulties in childhood, born abroad and cannot influence politics, varied significantly between the countries, and these variables were included as random slopes.

As for the country level variables, in line with the other datasets, the Gini coefficient was not a significant predictor, while reverse welfare expenditure, GDP, WGI and MIPEX were all associated with a preference for restricting Muslim immigration. Including the country level variables, did not substantially change the individual level coefficients[97].

Figure 5.7: Mean opposition to Muslim immigration by country (1-4), Non-Muslim respondents under 30, ESS 2014



Figure 5.7 (ESS 2014), N=6669

[96] Not including these variables does not change the coefficients for the socioeconomic and demographic variables in the model.

[97] Israel was not included in the analysis of country level variables (Model 3-6) as these variables were not available for Israel in the dataset.

Specifically negative attitudes to Muslim immigration

Some of the variation, and relationships we found in this model may be due to anti-immigration per se, or general xenophobia, rather than specifically negative attitudes to Muslims. To see whether the same variables are predictive of specific objection to Muslims, we also created a variable for specific anti-Muslim immigration attitudes, by subtracting the mean value of another variable, opposition to immigrants from a different ethnic group[98], and creating a dichotomous variable. 27% of the under 30 year olds (and 32% of the older respondents) would place higher restrictions on Muslim immigration than they would for immigration of ethnic minorities. Figure 5.8 shows the between country variation in this attitude, which accounts for just under 10% of the overall variation in responses. The general tendency is the same – populations which are generally opposed to Muslim immigration, such as Israel, also tend to be specifically opposed to Muslims.

Figure 5.8: Percentage specific opposition to Muslim immigration by country, Non-Muslim respondents under 30, ESS 2014



Figure 5.8 (ESS 2014), N=6595

The multilevel logistic regression model, however, reveals some notable differences (see Figure 5.9). Age and gender appear to be more predictive of general anti-immigration attitudes, rather than specific attitudes to Muslims. Moreover, being an immigrant is positively associated with specific anti-Muslim attitudes (*OR*=1.35; *95% CI*= 1.08, 1.69), whereas it had the opposite association with general anti-Muslim immigration (*b*=-.159 *SE*=.064). This is presumably because immigrants (and immediate

[98] As with the anti-Muslim immigration variable, respondents are asked whether they think people from a different ethnic group should be allowed to come and live in the country. The four response categories range from (1) many to (4) none.

descendants of immigrants) are more likely to be positive to immigration overall, but may still have a negative bias towards Muslims in particular.

That said, struggling to get by on one's household income is a significant predictor of both specific (*OR*=1.09; *95% CI* = 1.02, 1.17) and general (*b*=.096 *SE*=.017) anti-Muslim attitudes. Perceived lack of political influence, however, predicts general, but not specific anti-Muslim attitudes.

The country-level variables, shown in Figure 5.10, have similar associations with specific and general anti-Muslim attitudes. While immigrant integration appears more predictive of general than specific attitudes, it remains significant (*P*<0.05) also for specific anti-Muslim attitudes.

The Gini coefficient of inequality does appear to have a positive association with specific anti-Muslim immigration attitudes, but the standard error is very large (*b*= .223, *SE*=0.112, *P*<0.05), and including the Gini, does not give the model significantly better fit according to the likelihood ratio test.

Overall, individual level economic and socio-political variables appear more significant predictors of attitudes to Muslim *immigrants* measured by the ESS question, than social distance towards Muslim neighbours measured by the EVS question, although this could also be an effect of the countries included, the precise wording of the questions.

The results can be seen presented graphically in Figure 5.9. For full results, see Appendix 2, Table A2.29-30.

Figure 5.9: Regression coefficients: Opposition to Muslim immigration (ESS 2014).



Figure 5.9 (ESS 2014). Regression coefficients, with 95% confidence interval. All variables standardised. Muslim respondents, and respondents 30 years old and over excluded. Models 3-7 control for all variables in Model 2 (random intercepts and random slopes). GDP=Gross Domestic Product, WGI=Mean of World Governance Indicators, MIPEX=Migrant Integration Policy index. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.29-30.

5.5.4 Eurobarometer 2015

The Eurobarometer 83.4 (2015), asks two questions about social distance to Muslims. Respondents are asked to what extent they are comfortable with having a colleague who is Muslim, and their child being in a love relationship with a Muslim person (as well as other ethnic, religious and minority groups). The questions ask them to imagine their response regardless of their employment situation or whether or not they have children. The response categories for both questions range from (1) totally comfortable to (10) not at all comfortable[99]. The variables are closely correlated (*r=.61, P<0.001*), and were combined into a single variable, by taking the mean of both. The mean response for the 4222 under 30 years old non-Muslims in the sample was 4.27 (*St.d*.=2.79).

Figure 5.10: Mean negative attitude to Muslims by country (1-10), Non-Muslim respondents under 30, Eurobarometer 2015



Figure 5.10 (Eurobarometer). N=4222

[99] Two more spontaneous response categories 'Indifferent' and 'It depends' were included in the scale, as category 5 and 6 respectively.

This varies between the 28 countries[100] from 2.3 in the UK to 7.4 in the Czech Republic, as shown in Figure 5.11. As in many of the other datasets, there is a general East / West divide, where respondents in Eastern European countries express more discomfort with Muslims than respondents in Western Europe.

As with the other datasets, the bivariate correlations are largest between anti-Muslim and country level variables, such as reverse welfare spending (*r(4083)*=.24, *P*<.001). Once again, the exception is the correlation with the Gini, which is weak and in the opposite direction. (*r(4083)*=-.06, *P*<.001). All the individual level variables have weak or non-significant correlations with social distance to Muslims. The largest correlation is with financial difficulty (*r(4061)*=.09, *P*<.001).

The multilevel regression model (see Figure 5.11) also showed very few significant coefficients. Unlike the other datasets, there is no significant effect of age, gender or employment status. However, low social class (*b*=.146, *SE*=.061, *P*=.017) and difficulty paying the bills (*b*=.122, *SE*=.048, *P*=.011), were both statistically significant (*P<.05*). Moreover, rural areas were more likely to express negative attitudes to Muslims. The three measures of socio-political inequality included in the model - being an ethnic or religious minority, being discriminated against, and feeling like their voice did not count in the country - were not significant. Four of the variables had effects which varied significantly across countries and were thus included as random slopes in Model 2: *Not in work or education, Low social class, Discriminated against,* and *Voice does not count*.

There was considerable variation at the country level, as can be seen from Figure 5.10 (*ICC*=.18, *SE*=.04), and the country level results follow the same pattern as most of the other datasets (see Figure 5.13). Populations of countries with lower welfare expenditure, GDP, WGI and MIPEX scores are slightly more negative to Muslims. However, there is no significant effect of country level inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.

Figure 5.11: Regression coefficients: Social distance to Muslims (Eurobarometer 2015).



[100] The sample was originally split between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, and between Eastern and Western Germany, but these were combined in order to use the country level variables, which were measured at state level.

Figure 5.11 (Eurobarometer 2015). Regression coefficients with 95% confidence interval. All variables standardised. Muslim respondents and respondents 30 years old and over excluded. Models 3-7 control for all variables in Model 2 (random intercepts and random slopes). GDP=Gross Domestic Product, WGI=Mean of World Governance Indicators, MIPEX=Migrant Integration Policy index. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.31.

5.5.5 International Social Survey Programme 2008

The International Social Survey Programme (2008), asks respondents 'What is your personal attitude towards members of the following religious groups?' and lists a series of religious groups, including Muslims. The response categories range from (1) Very positive to (5) Very negative. The question was only asked in 20 out of the 40 countries in the survey, and the analysis is done on 19 of these. Turkey was excluded from the analysis, as there are only 6 non-Muslims under 30 years old in the sample.

28.5% of the under 30 year olds say they have a somewhat or very negative attitude towards Muslims, and the mean value on the 5 point scale is 2.95 (*St.d.*= 1.126). The mean value for each country is shown in Figure 5.12. In addition to being a more global sample, the country distribution of European countries does not follow the same pattern as the results from EVS and ESS. Finland and Russia, which were both somewhere in the middle in attitudes to Muslim immigrants and neighbours, are the most and least negative respectively when asked about general attitudes.

Figure 5.12: Mean negative attitude to Muslims by country, ISSP 2008



Figure 5.12 (ISSP). N=5581

The bivariate correlations (see Table 5.1) showed only weak and insignificant associations between the variables. The largest correlation with negative attitudes to Muslims was with the Gini coefficient, and that was negative (*r(5468)*=-.14, *P*<.001). The multilevel regression model, (see Figure 5.13) showed that, similar to the other analysis, older respondents, male respondents and respondents in rural areas were more likely to express negative attitudes to Muslims. However, economic variables,

low social class and not in work or education were not significant[101]. Many of the variables included in the analysis of the other datasets, such as, household income and socio-political injustice, were either not available at all or only available in some countries in the ISSP, and had to be excluded.

The intraclass correlation coefficient (*ICC*=.07, *SE*=.02) showed that only 7.2% of the variance in personal attitudes to Muslims is at the country level. Moreover, none of the country level variables (Gini, GDP, welfare expenditure, WGI and MIPEX) were statistically significant predictors. In some ways, this is a departure from the other analysis in this chapter. On the other hand, although statistically significant, it would be unexpected that coefficients with such small effects would be consistently found in samples with great variation in countries, years, and question wording.

Figure 5.13: Regression coefficients: Negative attitudes to Muslims (ISSP 2008).



Figure 5.13 (ISSP 2008). Regression coefficients with 95% confidence interval. All variables standardised. Muslim respondents, and respondents 30 years old and over excluded. Models 3-7 control for all variables in Model 2 (random intercepts and random slopes). GDP=Gross Domestic Product, WGI=Mean of World Governance Indicators, MIPEX=Migrant Integration Policy index. For full tables see Appendix 2, Table A2.32.

5.6 Discussion

Taken together the results of these studies paint a picture of anti-Muslim attitudes as difficult to predict with much confidence on the basis of sociodemographic, economic and contextual characteristics. However, we do see some commonalities in the results, even if the question wording, country samples and years differ between the surveys. Table 5.2 summarises the findings for under 30 year olds from all the datasets we analysed.

[101] The effects of *Rural* and *Low social class* varied significantly between the countries and were included as random slopes in Model 2.

Table 5.2 Summary: General Anti-Muslim attitudes among under 30 year olds (Regression coefficients, P<0.05)

Survey	European Values Study		European Values Study		European Social Survey		Euro-barometer	ISPP	MYPLACE
Year / Sample	2008		2017		2014		2015	2008	2012/13
Question	Would not like to have Muslim neighbours	Would not like to have Muslim neighbours CORRECTED	Would not like to have Muslim neighbours	Would not like to have Muslim neighbours CORRECTED	Would not allow Muslim immigration	Would not allow Muslim immigration CORRECTED	Would not like a Muslim colleague / child's love interest	Negative attitude to Muslims	Negative attitude to Muslims (2 items)
Type of question	Social distance	Social distance CORRECTED	Social distance	Social distance CORRECTED	Anti-immigration	Anti-immigration CORRECTED	Social distance	Negative attitude	Negative attitude
Sociodemographic									
Age	**-0.073**	No	No	No	**0.039**	No	No	**0.031**	**0.070**
Female	**-0.129**	No	**-0.160**	No	**-0.063**	No	No	**-0.058**	**-0.240**
Rural area	**0.169**	No	**0.226**	**0.244**			**0.215**	**0.073**	
Economic disadvantage									
Low social class							**0.152**	No	
Not in work not in education	No	No	**0.265**	**0.264**	No	No	No	No	**0.084**
Difficult on household income					**0.092**	**0.086**	**0.120**		No
Reverse Household income	No	**-0.085**	No	No					
Financial difficulty/poverty in	No	No	No	No	**0.025**	No			**0.029**
Socio-political disadvantage									
Immigrant	No	No	No	No	**-0.165**	**0.302**			
Immigrant parents	**-0.284**	No	**-0.491**	**-0.596**	**-0.153**	No			
Ethnic or religious minority							No		
Experience of discrimination	No	No	No	No					**0.169**
Perceived group discrimination					No	No	No		
Perceived low political influence					**0.137**	No	**0.105**		
Attitudes									
Religion important	No	No	**-0.158**	**-0.129**					
Rightwing	**0.221**	**0.113**	**0.256**	**0.271**					
National pride	No	No	**0.094**	No					
Low control	**0.110**	No	**0.120**	**0.111**					
Postmaterialist values	**-0.195**	No	**-0.201**	**-0.176**					
Country level									
Gini	No	No	No	No	No	**0.223**	No	No	
Reverse Welfare spending	**0.429**	**0.125**	**0.864**	**0.791**	**0.157**	**0.310**	**0.726**	No	
Reverse GDP	**0.329**	**0.118**	**0.760**	**0.726**	**0.173**	**0.384**	**0.555**	No	
Reverse WGI	**0.247**	**0.100**	**0.653**	**0.624**	**0.196**	**0.395**	**0.741**	No	
Reverse MIPEX	**0.392**	**0.147**	**0.809**	**0.646**	**0.162**	**0.232**	**0.731**	No	

Table 5.2. All coefficients are from analysis of samples restricted to non-Muslim respondents under 30 years old. The individual level coefficients are from random intercept, fixed slopes models. The country level variable coefficients are from random intercept, random slope models. For the EVS analysis: attitude variable coefficients are from Model 2, while all other coeffiecients are from Model 1. Positive regression coefficients are in blue, negative in red, with stronger colours indicating larger coefficients. 'No' = no significant coefficient. For details see regression tables in5.

5.6.1 Sociodemographic characteristics

While we find that older respondents are generally more negative to Muslims, in line with previous research (Kaya, 2015; Schlueter, Masso and Davidov, 2019; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008), age is not a consistent significant predictor within the 18-30 year old age range. From the six datasets reviewed here, three have no effect of age, two are positive and one has a negative effect. The gender effect is somewhat more consistent with males being more negative to Muslims in four out of six datasets. We found no instances where this result was reversed, despite some previous research having found contrary effects (Wike and Grim, 2010; Zick, Küpper and Höverman, 2011:80).

One of the most consistent findings in these studies is that living in a rural, or less densely populated area is associated with more negative attitudes to Muslims. This is the case in all four surveys which measured it, three of which asked about social distance, and one which asked a general attitude question. These findings are consistent with previous studies which find general anti-immigration attitudes to be associated more with rural than urban areas (Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte, 2014; Garcia and Davidson, 2013; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016). Schneider (2007:58) points out that living in urban areas increase both the potential for contact and competition with immigrants and ethnic minorities. However, immigration is a much newer phenomenon in rural areas, people who live in low populated areas are often poorer, less educated, more conservative and work in industries that are more under threat from labour market competition (Garcia and Davidson 2013).

5.6.2 Economic disadvantage and inequality

The results of individual measures of economic disadvantage are neither large nor consistently significant across the datasets. That said, the significant relationships are all in one direction, with more individual and household economic disadvantage being associated with more negative attitudes to Muslims. Finding it difficult to pay bills and get by on one's household income is associated with social distance to Muslims in the Eurobarometer (2015), general attitudes to Muslims in MYPLACE (2015) and opposition to Muslim immigration in the ESS (2014). It is also associated with social distance in the EVS, but only for respondents who are 30 years old and older.

Being out of work or full-time education is associated with social distance to Muslim neighbours in the EVS2017, but not in any other survey, and not when controlling for other political attitudes and values. Education per se was not controlled for because the respondents are young enough that many have not completed their education, but we know from previous studies that education level is associated with positive attitudes to Muslims and other minorities (Billiet, Meuleman and DeWitte, 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Schlueter, Masso and Davidov, 2019; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008) as well as an increased probability of being in full time employment (Livanos and Nuñez, 2014), and this may account for some of the relationship. It is thus somewhat surprising that the effect is not more consistent across the surveys.

Similarly, previous experience of economic disadvantage is also not a reliable predictor of anti-Muslim attitudes. Only in one of the four surveys where it was asked, MYPLACE 2012/13, are those who experienced lower socio-economic status in childhood more likely to express negative attitudes to Muslims, whereas it is was insignificant in the ESS 2014, EVS 2008 and 2017. Current social class is only asked about in two of the surveys, and it is a significant predictor of social distance in the Eurobarometer 2015 and not of general attitude to Muslims in the ISSP 2008.

In sum, there seems to be a very slight effect of economic disadvantage on attitudes to Muslims. From these studies we can conclude that low economic status, and financial difficulty either marginally

increases negative attitudes (all else being equal), or has no discernible effect on the anti-Muslim attitudes of young people in Europe. Our results are broadly consistent with previous literature in the field which finds a relationship between individual level economic insecurity and negative attitudes to Muslim (Sclueter, Masso and Davidov, 2019; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008). This is also consistent with theories of perceived group conflict (Obaidi et al., 2018; Sherif, 1966) relative deprivation (Blumer, 1958; Meuleman et al., 2019a) and system justification theory (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). While one could imagine an alternative account where economic deprivation increased solidarity with Muslims as a disadvantaged minority through for example class solidarity (Astor, 2012; 345), this is not supported at all. Instead our results indicate that among majority populations, economic difficulty increases, albeit only slightly, ethnoreligious group identity and hostility towards minorities. This echoes findings from qualitative studies where those who have negative perceptions of Muslim often also show strong feelings of resentment toward local government and other authorities for failing to prioritise working class neighbourhoods. The conscious recognition of structural inequalities, in other words, does not preclude a sense of competition with other disadvantaged groups (Astor, 2012).

5.6.3 Socio-political disadvantage

Our results for socio-political disadvantage are also mixed. One consistent result is that, despite all of the Muslim respondents being excluded from the analysis, having an immigrant background reduces the probability of having a negative attitude to Muslims, whether that is Muslim neighbours (EVS, 2008; 2017) or Muslim immigration (ESS, 2014). When we controlled for attitudes to immigration generally, by subtracting other immigrant groups from the score, we find that non-Muslim immigrants are more likely to be specifically opposed to Muslim immigration (i.e. being more negative to Muslims than to other immigrant groups). However, they were less likely to be specifically opposed to Muslim neighbours compared to other types of neighbours. Being of an ethnic or religious minority had no significant association with social distance to Muslims in the Eurobarometer 2015. In other words, it does not appear that having an immigrant or minority status generally increases negative perceptions of Muslims. If anything, there appears to be a slight element of sympathy with fellow 'immigrants'. This is an interesting contrast to the economic variables, where a shared 'lower status' appears to increase conflict and competition for resources rather than solidarity.

One aspect which could increase solidarity with Muslims is a shared experience of discrimination. However, there is no significant effect of discrimination in any of the three surveys that measured this. If one were to speculate it is possible to imagine that experienced discrimination could both increase positive and negative attitudes to Muslims through different mechanisms, such as solidarity and group conflict. However, we have no basis in our data to make such claims, and testing such a hypothesis would require more research.

Another aspect of socio-political disadvantage and perceived injustice is a feeling of powerlessness. Respondents who felt that their voice was not heard, and that they lacked political influence were slightly more opposed to Muslim immigration (ESS, 2014), although there was no significant effect on social distance (Eurobarometer, 2015). People who experienced a lack of control over their own lives were also slightly more likely to express social distance to Muslims (EVS, 2008; 2017), although it should be noted that this result was not statistically significant for young people in EVS 2017.

5.6.4 Attitudes and values

Our analysis of the EVS datasets showed that right wing political ideology and materialist values, as well as low religiosity are all associated with anti-Muslim attitudes. Right wing political parties in Europe are on the whole more conservative and more likely to pursue restrictive immigration policies than left wing political groups, and thus it is not surprising that those who align themselves with the political right also express greater social distance to Muslims. Materialist values have similarly been associated with anti-immigration attitudes (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). As previous research has shown, while majority religious affiliation is sometimes positively associated with negative attitudes to religious minorities, religious activity and religious beliefs can have the opposite association

(Doebler, 2015; Scheepers et al., 2002; Storm, 2011; 2018). These attitudinal variables may mediate some of the relationship between socio-demographic and economic variables and anti-Muslim attitudes, since these had smaller effects and were less significant once the attitudinal variables were controlled for. Since the wording and availability of attitudinal variables varied more than the other variables from one data source to the next, we restricted this analysis to the EVS datasets.

5.6.5 Country level variables

The key question we aim to answer in this report is whether and how inequality affects attitudes associated with radicalisation. While we can to some extent measure perceived social and economic disadvantage at an individual level, in order to assess the effect of *inequality* per se, we need to look at the macro-level. The only direct measure we have of inequality that is available in enough countries and years to be of use is the Gini coefficient, and this did not have any statistically significant result on any of the measures of anti-Muslim attitudes in any of the years. There are several limitations to this measure. It has attracted criticism for focusing on relative income distributions rather than real levels of poverty and prosperity (Osberg, 2017) and it is possible that some forms of inequality not captured by this would significantly impact on anti-Muslim attitudes[102]. That said, the consistency of this null-result does not provide any support for the hypothesis that country-level economic income inequality affects anti-Muslim attitudes.

However, another way to approach social equality is to look at welfare and redistribution of resources to those in need, rather than income inequality. For this we included a measure of expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP. This measure includes pensions, disability, housing unemployment and child benefits as well as other forms of social protection financed by taxes (Eurostat 2019). Countries with lower spending on social welfare as a percentage of GDP were consistently more anti-Muslim on average in the data analysed here, with the exception of the ISSP 2008.

What also seems to matter is the general size of the national economy as measured by the GDP. This measure also has important limitations and has attracted criticism. Countries with lower GDP per capita have populations which are consistently more negative to Muslims on average. The one exception is the ISSP 2008 survey, which asks a very general question about 'personal attitude towards Muslims', and where the between-country variation is generally very small. The finding is consistent with previous studies of the relationship between GDP and attitudes to immigration (O'Connell 2005; Storm 2018), and suggests that national level economic insecurity (if not inequality) increases anti-Muslim attitudes. There is some support in previous studies (see for example Meuleman et al. 2019a) for the argument that the mechanism by which the national economy impacts on individual attitudes, could be feeling of relative deprivation and perceived inequality.

Socio-political stability and human rights tend to be associated with economic growth, and these are also potential explanations for why countries with larger GDP per capita have more tolerant populations. Our results show that like GDP and social welfare spending, a lower average of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) consistently predicts slightly more anti-Muslim attitudes, with the exception of the ISSP. While GDP is a stronger predictor for attitudes to Muslim neighbours (EVS 2008; 2017), the WGI average is a slightly better predictor of attitudes to Muslim immigration (ESS 2014).

Previous literature suggests that specific social policies regarding immigrant integration which are more prominent in wealthier and more politically stable countries, could account for some of the effects of the GDP and WGI (see for example Green et al. 2019). The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which is only available for some of the countries, is associated with less negative attitudes to Muslims in all surveys except the ISSP. Notably however, it appears to have a somewhat greater effect

[102] For a full discussion of GINI, GDP and their limitations, see pp. 21-23 in Chapter 2.

for the social distance and general attitude variables (EVS 2008 EVS 2017 and Eurobarometer 2015) than for the specific question about Muslim immigration (ESS 2014), although all the effects are small.

As already noted, most of the country level measures are strongly correlated with one another: richer and politically stable countries spend on average more on welfare and migrant integration. Because these measures are so strongly correlated they have to be analysed separately, and thus we have no clear answer to the question of whether it is political stability, economic development, social welfare or migrant integration which is the most influential factor.

5.7 Summary

The analysis of anti-Muslim attitudes in six different surveys, has shown a weak and somewhat inconsistent relationship between inequality and anti-Muslim attitudes among under-30 year olds. We can confidently say that richer countries with more welfare spending, political stability and migrant integration policies, have populations that are broadly less negative to Muslims, both in general and as prospective immigrants, neighbours, employers and in-laws. However, we are not confident that this is due to differences in equality between the countries, rather than for example difference in overall living standards. Within each country we also see that attitudes to Muslims are slightly more negative among young people with financial difficulties and lower social class, and those who feel like they lack power, both politically and over their own lives.

6. Discussion

In this section we consider the main findings regarding the relationship between inequality, social attitudes and radicalisation based on analyses of international datasets, and to what extent the systematic approach to secondary analysis of several datasets can enable valid answers about this relationship. We start by summarising our main method and findings on the question of how economic and socio-political inequality (on the individual and macro level) impacts on cognitive radicalisation in young people, and consider these in light of the literature reviewed earlier in this report, as well as other parts of the DARE project. Then, other findings that the results have highlighted, such as the effects of sociodemographic and attitudinal variables are summarised, before we consider the limitations, questions that still remain to be explored, and the implications for future research.

6.1 The DARE project

The secondary data analysis presented here is part of a larger project, Dialogue About Radicalisation and Equality (DARE), which includes ethnographic studies of online and offline milieus of radicalisation, systematic literature reviews, historical case studies and evaluation of deradicalisation and prevention programmes. The DARE project defines inequality as 'objectively unequal, or subjectively perceived, unjust distribution of resources, power or opportunities' (Franc and Pavlović, 2019). This is a complex and multifaceted concept which can be difficult to measure using questionnaire items and economic variables. The systematic literature review and meta-ethnographic synthesis demonstrated that the relationship between inequality and radicalisation is neither clear nor consistent across studies (Franc and Pavlović, 2018; Poli and Arun, 2019).

In order to examine the relationship between inequality and *cognitive* radicalisation, or *attitudes* often associated with far right and / or Islamist radicalisation, we identified three types of outcome variables which were available in a number of cross national surveys, namely attitudes to political violence, attitudes to democracy and attitudes to Muslims. We also identified four different types of inequality indicators: individual level indicators of economic 'inequality', or disadvantage, which are measures of the survey respondent's personal economic situation and status and include low household income, experienced financial difficulty and unemployment; measures of individual level socio-political 'inequality', which include perceived lack of political influence and experienced discrimination;

country level indicators of economic inequality, redistribution, economic wealth; and country level governance quality and inclusiveness, which are measures of country level socio-political inequality.

We tried to match the variables for all the datasets as closely as possible, because a similar model enables us to better compare the results across different datasets. This is a rather unique approach. Most published studies on the effects of disadvantage, deprivation or inequality on radicalisation are based only on one dataset. Our systematic comparison of a number of different datasets, allows us to not only say something about the size and direction of the relationship, but also the robustness and consistency across different samples of countries, years and question wordings.

An additional characteristic of our approach is the focus on young people. Young people are seen as particularly vulnerable to radicalisation processes (Loza, 2007; Schils and Verhage, 2017; Silke, 2008; Urdal, 2006). By exploring the attitudes and circumstances of young people under 30 separately, as well as comparing them to older people in some of the analysis, we can identify whether the indicators of economic and social disadvantage relate to radical attitudes in a unique way among young people, or whether these relationships are similar to that of the rest of the population.

6.2 How is inequality associated with cognitive radicalisation?

In our research, we examined the effects of both country level indicators of inequality and individual level indicators of disadvantage. At the macro level, we find that richer countries with more welfare spending, political stability and migrant integration policies are less negative to Muslims, and more supportive of democracy. However, we do not have evidence that this is directly due to differences in economic equality. The only direct measure of economic inequality, the Gini coefficient, is the one country level variables that does not have a significant relationship with any of the outcome variables in any of the datasets. Moreover, because these country level variables are closely correlated with one another it is impossible to distinguish between the general effects of economic differences and socio-political differences between countries, much less specific measures, like welfare spending and governance quality. There is also an additional limitation in that some of these variables, such as welfare spending and migrant integration policies, were only available for Western or European countries, and could not be included in the analysis of the World Values Survey.

We also find some evidence for individual level effects of economic deprivation although these are less consistent. Attitudes to Muslims and democracy are somewhat more negative among young people who have current or former experiences of financial difficulty and lower social class, and these groups are also slightly more likely to justify political violence. However, the effects are small to very small[103], and only statistically significant in some of the datasets.

Indicators of social and political disadvantage on the individual level are also not uniformly associated with the outcome variables. We found that experienced discrimination, both being personally a victim of it and a perception that a group one identifies with is treated unfairly, was consistently associated with support for political violence and opposition to democracy. It was, however, only significantly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in one of out of six analysed dataset (MYPLACE). This difference could arise because the measures of anti-Muslim attitudes differed from the other datasets (it was more explicit), because the measure of discrimination differed (it asked about being threatened) or because the sampling was different (from specific locations rather than random national population samples).

Experiences of discrimination can motivate a strong wish political change, and can also feed into feelings of inferiority and grievance, which in turn may stimulate a search for radical solutions (Koomen and van der Pligt, 2015; Pauwels and De Waele, 2014; Schils and Pauwels, 2016). Finally, a perceived threat to one's group may motivate stronger identification with, and defence of that group identity (Klandermans, 2002; Meuleman et al., 2019a; Obaidi et al., 2018; Pettigrew, Wagner and

[103] Many of the coefficients are below 0.05, and none are above 0.4.

Christ, 2007), as seen in the case of both Islamist's heightened identification with religious symbols and narratives, and in the identification with ethnic and national groups on the far right. From our results, it seems that such perceived horizontal inequalities are just as, if not more, important than vertical economic inequalities.

Despite the importance of group identity and experienced group inequality, minority status does not in itself appear to be motivating factor for support for radical political action. A possible reason for this is that low numbers of minority participants in population surveys, reduces the probability of finding significant differences between them and the rest of the population. Being from an immigrant background was generally not associated with support for either anti-democracy or political violence (except in the Young in Oslo study), and was overall negatively associated with anti-Muslim attitudes. Even though we excluded Muslims from the study of anti-Muslim attitudes, other immigrants and ethnic minorities appear to have a more sympathetic view of them than the majority populations.

It should also be noted that there are many other potential sources of perceived inequality and injustice that have not been measured in the surveys analysed here, and thus not considered in this report. For example, some may have a sense that certain people's values, perspectives and cultural symbols are privileged in the society they live in (Deere, Kanbur and Stewart, 2018: 87), without classifying this as 'discrimination'. As well as social inequalities, some experiences of injustice could stem from more subtle personal and relational experiences, including family dynamics. We also have not measured stigma and group identity associated with local areas, accents, clothing and so forth.

Conversely, it is important to emphasise that experiences of inequality do not necessarily motivate political attitudes or action at all, much less extreme views or radicalised behaviour. Other factors we have not measured typically need to be present, such as chance life events (Kruglanski et al., 2018), certain personality traits (Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2019), and exposure to communities and narratives which serves as a framework for their experiences (Hogg and Adelman, 2013). However, our results also show that there some demographic characteristics and prior attitudes may play a role.

6.3 Which other factors are important?

We controlled for age and gender in all models, as well size of town where that was available. Additionally, we included attitudinal variables in the EVS and WVS analysis (political orientation, religion's importance in life, national pride, postmaterialist values and low control over one's life). In the analysis of support for political violence and anti-Muslim attitudes, the socio-demographic and economic variables at both the individual and country level, had smaller effects and were less significant once the attitudinal variables were controlled for, which indicates that they may mediate some of the relationship between inequality and these outcome variables.

Even though younger people are seen as more vulnerable to radicalisation processes (see for example Schils and Verhage, 2017), age is not consistently associated with the outcome variables in this study. Younger people are more likely to support political violence in some of the countries we have data from, but not others. There are also no consistent age differences in anti-democratic attitudes, and younger people are generally *less* likely to express anti-Muslim attitudes. When comparing those under 30 to the older age groups, we find no consistent differences in predictors. There are some significant differences, which have been discussed in the results chapters, but these vary between the different datasets and outcome variables. Within the under 30-year old age groups, the effect of age is also inconsistent or non-existent for all the outcome variables.

Gender is another variable which has been found to make a difference to radicalisation (Pearson and Winterbotham, 2017; Schils and Pauwels, 2014), but which does not appear to predict the attitudes examined here. Men seem to be slightly more likely than women to hold anti-Muslim attitudes, but there is no consistent effect for either support for political violence or anti-democracy.

A more consistent predictor is that people who live in less populated and rural areas are generally more likely to justify political violence, oppose democracy, and express social distance and negative

attitudes to Muslims. This may be related to differences in education and social status, as those who live outside cities and large towns are on average poorer and less educated than those in urban areas (Garcia and Davidson, 2013; Shucksmith et al., 2009).

We also examined the effects of religious affiliation and religiosity. There seems to be very little difference between Christians and Muslims in the WVS in the levels of support for either (interpersonal) violence or democracy. Moreover the relationships between the other independent variables and pro-violence and anti-democracy was generally quite similar in these two samples, although there were some distinctions: Unemployment, economic disadvantage and discrimination seemed to play a slightly greater role in support for (interpersonal) violence among Muslims than Christians, while right-wing political orientation was more significant among Christians. Among both samples, the greater role religion played in their lives, the less likely they were to justify (interpersonal) violence or anti-democratic attitudes. Similarly, the more religion made a difference in the lives of non-Muslims in the EVS, the less likely they were to express social distance to Muslims. This is consistent with previous studies which have shown that majority religious affiliation can be associated with negative attitudes to religious minorities, while religious activity and beliefs have the opposite association (Doebler, 2015; Scheepers et al., 2002; Storm, 2011; 2018). In the Young in Oslo dataset, all those who affiliated with a religion, and particularly minority religions were more supportive of political violence than the nonreligious, which is likely an effect of minority status rather than religiosity per se (Pedersen et al., 2018).

Political orientation on the left-right spectrum was also included in the analysis of EVS and WVS data. Right-wing orientation is strongly predictive of anti-Muslim attitudes in both EVS datasets. Negative attitudes to immigration and minorities, generally and Muslims particularly, is a feature of many right-wing political parties across Europe (Rydgren, 2017). It is also predictive of pro-violent and anti-democratic attitudes among Christians in the WVS, but has very weak or no relationship with these in the other samples.

Both the mainstream right-wing political parties and movements, and the more extreme or 'radicalised' groups, appeal to a sense of national identity, and belonging in their members and supporters. While pride in citizenship is associated with negative attitudes to Muslims in one of the EVS surveys, we also found it to be also associated with more positive attitudes to democracy and lower support for political violence. This points to an important distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. Although both may be associated with concern about the preservation of national culture, and both can be exclusivist and hostile (Kahn, 2008; Tinsley 2018), civic pride is nevertheless more often associated with respect for democratic values and processes, than in radical appeals to violence.

A more general prioritisation for materialist concerns such as economic and security issues over postmaterialist concerns such as free speech and democratic participation, was associated with social distance to Muslims, but had only a very weak association with anti-democracy, and no significant relationship with justification for political violence.

What seems to be even more important than either socio-economic or attitudinal values, is a perceived lack of influence and control. Support for political violence, anti-democratic and anti-Muslim attitudes were all shown to be more prominent among people who feel like they lack power, both politically and over their own lives. This is consistent with previous research which shows that perceived lack of control (Kay and Eibach 2014), and loss of personal significance and meaning (Hogg and Adelman, 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2014; 2018, McGregor et al., 2013), may be contributing factors in identification with extremist ideology, groups and movements. This result is also consistent the findings from the systematic literature review and ethnographic synthesis (Franc and Pavlović 2018; Poli and Arun 2019), namely that perceived injustice appeared to be more consistently influential on radicalisation, than objective inequality. That said, objective inequality on the macro- or meso-level may contribute to a feeling of perceived lack of control and security (Höllinger and Muckenhuber

2019). For example, in countries where people regularly hear about fellow citizens experiencing crime, unemployment, hunger etc. 'there emerges a general feeling that our human fate is determined by exterior forces' (Höllinger and Muckenhuber 2019: 29), even among those who are not personally affected. This may explain why, in the case of young people's anti-Muslim attitudes, we see that the effects of the country level indicators are larger and more consistent than individual level indicators.

6.4 Which questions remain?

Although we find some evidence that (perceived) inequality is predictive of attitudes associated with radicalisation, both the systematic reviews (Franc and Pavlović 2018; Poli and Arun 2019), and the secondary data analysis suggest that the direct relationship between inequality (objective or perceived) and radicalisation is very weak, to the extent it is there at all. Many of the people who hold extreme attitudes, or commit radical actions, do not experience what we commonly understand as inequality. Presumably they experience some sort of dissatisfaction with the status quo, but whether that is perceived injustice our data cannot always say. Conversely and more importantly perhaps, the vast majority of people who experience inequality do not become radicalised. Without the ambition to cover an exhaustive list of all possible relevant influences, in the following we consider what other variables which we have not analysed in this comparative study, may be important to examine in future research.

6.4.1 What is the role of insecurity?

One of the main reasons we would expect there to be a relationship between inequality and radicalisation is that high levels of inequality can lead to a pessimistic outlook, and insecurity about one's continued survival and prosperity (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Hogg and Blaylock 2015; Hohman and Hogg 2015). Insecurity could lead to increased group identification, which in turn could lead to adoption of extreme ideologies, negative attitudes to out-groups and illegal or violent political responses (Hogg and Adelman, 2013). However, this leaves open the question of the role of insecurity relative to that of inequality. If most of the relationship between inequality and radicalisation can be explained by lack of control and confidence in the future, or uncertainty about what they can do, or how they will be treated by others, then perhaps that is a more appropriate focus for research and policy. Further research should attempt to differentiate more clearly between a sense of injustice, i.e. fear of relative deprivation, and insecurity, i.e. fear of absolute deprivation, both at the group and individual level.

6.4.2 What is the role of generalised trust and civil society?

A second reason why inequality could be related to radicalisation is that large class and income differences can lead to a reduced sense of solidarity and shared fate (Uslaner and Brown, 2005: 869). With the absence of generalised trust, people are less likely to take part in civic society outside of close-knit ethnic and political interest groups, and the result is a less vibrant civil society and potentially also internal conflict and radicalisation (Kawachi et al., 1997; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011). Equality could also increase trust in social institutions, which enables efficient democracy and universal welfare systems (Gärtner and Prado, 2016; Uslaner and Brown, 2005). Conversely, increases in inequality could reduce trust, which in turn reduces support for, and the efficiency of equality levelling policies (Gärtner and Prado, 2016). This dynamic feedback loop, makes the relationship particularly difficult to disentangle in cross-sectional survey data such as the datasets used in this report. Moreover, because low participation and contact may reduce trust, but less trusting people are less likely to participate in diverse groups (van Ingen and Bekkers, 2015), clarifying the role of trust and participation in the relationship between inequality and radicalisation, requires longitudinal or experimental data.

6.4.3 What is the role of ideology and prior attitudes?

One of the difficulties with examining the negative effects of inequality, is that inequality per se is not necessarily perceived as negative. On the contrary, it may well be seen as just and appropriate, and

thus unlikely to motivate any radical beliefs, attitudes or social action (e.g. Jetten et al., 2017). System justification theory suggests that many people have an inherent bias towards the status quo, and that persistent inequalities can be seen as justified, even among oppressed and deprived groups (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), particularly in the face of insecurity and lack of personal control (Jost et al. 2003; Kay et al. 2008). Inequality is thus not by itself enough to motivate people to social action – radical or otherwise. For that to happen, people must have a sense that the system is not only unequal, but also unfair. People become morally outraged and strongly motivated to restore justice when they perceive something as unfair (Haidt and Joseph 2007), and what is perceived as unfair can be influenced by ideology (Hoyt et al. 2018). Experimental evidence shows that support for social change in the face of inequality is most likely among people who believe the economic system influencing status and wealth is unfair (Kay et al. 2008). Perceived injustice has also been associated with support for radical action (Schils and Pauwels 2016; Tausch 2011). While our results indicate that right-left political orientation and religion both may play a part in mediating the relationship between perceived inequality and radical attitudes, more in depth research is needed to understand the precise mechanisms of this relationship.

6.4.4 Would the results differ between different types of radicalisation?

The research reported here is based on data from the general population, and there is no information about the 'radicalisation' of participants beyond their reported attitudes to violence, democracy etc. Thus we were not able to answer whether the effects of inequality and other predictor variables on these attitudes, vary between for example Islamist sympathisers, participants in far right movements, and non-radicalised individuals. That said, we did find that there seemed to be larger differences between countries and larger effects of country level variables on the anti-Muslim attitudes than the other variables. The results from the WVS analysis where we compared Christian and Muslim sub-samples, also showed that experienced discrimination had larger effects on both anti-democracy and support for (interpersonal) violence in the Muslim sample. There may be also be different mechanisms and personal journeys to radicalisation among different extremist movements. According to their own testimonies, many Islamists start from a collective experience and identification with Islam as a religion, then perceive a threat to their group as a whole, which they feel compelled to act on. In contrast those on the far-right often have the opposite sequence of experiences, starting with a personal grievance and feeling of powerlessness, which is subsequently interpreted as a collective and societal problem (Schils and Verhage 2017: 8-9). Seeing our results in this light, this might indicate that deprivation and vertical inequality at the country level may be more important for far-right radicalisation, whereas discrimination and horizontal inequality between groups may be more important for Islamist radicalisation. Whether this is generally the case, and whether it is a result of minority status of Muslims in the countries surveyed or differences in the ideology itself are both questions that would require further research.

6.5 Limitations

As mentioned, most of the findings discussed here have very small effect sizes, and this must be taken into account when considering any policy impacts. Because the samples are very large, some relationships appear significant even though they have little practical value. The very weak relationships we find between indicators of inequality and indicators of radical attitudes means that any change to a variable (for example higher household income, or less discrimination) would not necessarily result in any measurable change in attitudes. Moreover most of the variables we use are measured using single items which represent operationalisations of attitudes, which in turn are proxies of radicalisation. In other words the significant relationships in this analysis should not be read as measuring direct influences on radicalisation. As also mentioned above there may be intervening variables and mechanisms that have not been included in the models that are just as or more influential.

The variability of items was sometimes limited, which meant the range of opportunities for analysis was limited. Future survey questions focussing on attitudes to violence for example, should carefully consider question wording as well as the scale. Because the vast majority wants nothing to do with violence when asked in a questionnaire, the distributions of answers easily ends up very skewed to one end of the scale. The low numbers who supported political violence may be a true reflection of popular opinion, but may also be partly due to social desirability bias, and other influences of the interview setting or the placement of the question within the context. We did not control for any such contextual influences here.

Finally there was substantial numbers of missing data on many of the variables that were included, which was either dealt with by excluding the missing respondents, or omitting the variable from the model altogether, and substituting it for a similar one where available. There were no imputations of values. Where available, using multiple item constructs (such as factor scores) rather than single items may reduce the problem of missing values, as well as increasing the effectiveness of the operationalisation. However, this is dependent on structural equivalence in cross-national multilevel analysis.

6.6 Summary

The secondary data analysis conducted in this report shows that there is no straightforward relationship between inequality and cognitive radicalisation, measured as support for political violence, opposition to democracy, and negative attitudes to Muslims. Most notably, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient was not significant in any of the analyses. However, this does not mean that there is no relationship at all between inequality and attitudes associated with radicalisation. We find that indicators of individual level financial difficulty, as well as lower welfare, GDP and governance quality at the country level are predictors of some, but not all of the outcome variables. Moreover, as well as the previously documented perceived injustice, and experiences of discrimination, a sense of powerlessness is one of the most consistent factors across datasets.

Perceived inequality and lack of control could increase group identity, which in turn can increase experienced horizontal inequality and radicalised narratives to frame and make sense of such experiences. However, it is important to note that this is only one of many possibilities. Mainstream groups, institutions and narrative could fulfil the same search for compensatory control, order and purpose as extremist movements (Kay and Eibach, 2013). None of the variables in our models, can reliably distinguish between those who hold extremist attitudes and not, much less who acts on them. This difference, although it can be influenced by social and economic disadvantage, seems largely dependent on situational and idiosyncratic factors (such as who and what comes along at the specific time), and other unobserved and variables like personality and prior experience.

It should be noted that most of the relationships reported here are very weak, and this combined with the other limitations mentioned above, makes it difficult to extract any practical or policy implications, without considering the wider literature and research in more specific milieus of radicalisation.

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8. Appendices

8.1 Appendix A1: List of variables used in the analysis

Table A1.1 European Values Study 2017

European Values Study 2017					
Variable	**Question**	**Original Categories**	**Recoded Categories**	***Mean(SD)***	**N**
Justify Political Violence	Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. - Political violence	Range [1) Never - 10) Always]	*No recoding*	*U30* 1.82*(1.67)* *30+* 1.63*(1.57)*	*U30* 8532 *30+* 43985
Anti-Democracy	a) How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important" what position would you choose? b) I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system	Range [1) Not at all important - 10) Absolutely important] 1) Very good, 2) Fairly good 3) Fairly bad 4) Very bad	*Mean of recoded a) + b)* 1) Very important (10) / good (1) 2) Fairly important (7-9)/good (2) 3) Fairly unimportant (4-6)/ bad (3) 4) Not important (1-3)/ bad (4)	*U30* 1.61*(.63)* *30+* 1.51*(.62)*	*U30* 8667 *30+* 44514
Social distance to Muslim Neighbours	On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours? - Muslim (optional in countries with Muslim majority)	1) Mentioned 2) Not mentioned	0) Not mentioned (2) 1) Mentioned (1)	*Excl. Muslims:* *U30* .21*(.41)* *30+* .25*(.43)*	 *U30* 7428 *30+* 40158
Specific social distance to Muslim neighbours	On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours? - People of a different race - Heavy drinkers - Immigrants / Foreign workers - Drug addicts - Homosexuals - Christian (optional in countries with Christian majority)		*All neighbour questions recoded as above* *Mean of all other categories of neighbour subtracted from NoMusNei, and scored as -1/0=* 0) Equally or more positive to Muslims (-1-0) 1) More negative to Muslims (0.1-1)	*U30* .20*(.40)* *30+* .22*(.42)*	*U30* 7428 *30+* 40155

	- Jews (optional) - Gypsies (optional)				
Age*	Respondent's age in years	Range [18,82]	*No recoding*	*U30* 23.75 *(3.43)* *30+* 54.88 *(14.60)*	*U30* 9191 *30+* 46858
Female*	Sex of respondent	1) Male 2) Female	0) Male [Ref] (1) 1) Female (2)	*U30* .53*(.50)* *30+* .55*(.50)*	*U30* 9190 *30+* 47121
Not in work, education (or retirement)*	Are you yourself gainfully employed at the moment or not? Please select from the card the employment status that applies to you.	1) 30 hours a week or more 2) Less than 30 hours a week 3) Self employed 4) Military service 5) Retired / pensioned 6) Homemaker not otherwise employed 7) Student 8) Unemployed 9) Disabled 10) Other	*U30* 0) In work or study (1-4, 7) 1) Unemployed or inactive (5-6, 8-10) *30+* 0) In work, study or retirement (1-5, 7) 1) Unemployed or inactive (6, 8-10)	*U30* .19*(.40)* *30+* .14*(.35)*	*U30* 9100 *30+* 46662
Reverse household income*	Here is a list of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions.	Range [1) A 1st decile - 10) J 10th decile	Range [-10 J 10th decile,-1 A 1st decile]	*U30* -4.94(2.78) *30+* -5.10*(2.75)*	*U30* 7537 *30+* 41383
Parents struggled financially when R 14*	When you think about your parents when you were about 14 years old, could you say whether these statements correctly describe your parents? - My parent(s) had problems making ends meet	1) Yes 2) To some extent 3) A little bit 4) No	1) No (4) 2) A little bit (3) 3) To some extent (2) 4) Yes (1)	*U30* 1.91*(1.04)* *30+* 2.24*(1.13)*	*U30* 8443 *30+* 43221
Rural*	Size of town (Filled in by interviewer)	1) under 2000 2) 2 - 5.000 3) 5 - 10.000 4) 10 - 20.000 5) 20 - 50.000 6) 50 - 100.000 7) 100 - 500.000 8) 500.000 and more	0) over 5000 (3-8) 1) under 5000 (1-2)	*U30* .25*(0.43)* *30+* .29*(.45)*	*U30* 8410 *30+* 41687
Parents born abroad*	a) Were you born in [COUNTRY]? b) Was your father born in [COUNTRY]? c) Was your mother born in [COUNTRY]?	1) Yes 2) No 1) Yes 2) No 1) Yes 2) No	0) Parents born in country or respondent born abroad (all other combinations) 1) One or both parents born abroad, but respondent born in country (1+1+2 / 1+2+1 / 1+2+2)	*U30* .09*(.29)* *30+* .06*(.25)*	*U30* 9119 *30+* 46596
R born abroad*	Were you born in [COUNTRY]?	1) Yes	0) Respondent born in country (1)	*U30*	*U30*

		2) No	1) Respondent born abroad (2)	.07*(.25)* *30+* .08*(.28)*	9119 *30+* 46596
Religion important*	Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life - Religion	1) Very important 2) Quite important 3) Not important 4) Not at all important	1) Not at all important (4) 2) Not important (3) 3) Quite important (2) 4) Very important (1)	*U30* 2.28*(1.04)* *30+* 2.48(*1.03)*	*U30* 9031 *30+* 46426
Rightwing*	In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	Range [1) Left - 10) Right	*No recoding*	*U30* 5.31*(2.19)* *30+* 5.45*(2.29)*	*U30* 7323 *30+* 39245
National pride*	How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen?	1) very proud 2) quite proud 3) not very proud 4) not at all proud	1) not at all proud (4) 2) not very proud (3) 3) quite proud (2) 4) very proud (1)	*U30* 3.28*(.74)* *30+* 3.36*(.73)*	*U30* 8474 *30+* 43966
Low control over life*	Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out?	Range [1) None at all - 10) A great deal	Range [1) A great deal - 10) None at all	*U30* 3.54*(2.00)* *30+* 3.84*(2.10)*	*U30* 9107 *30+* 46315
Postmaterialist values*	a) If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? b) And which would be the next most important?	1) Maintaining order in the nation 2) Giving people more say in important government decisions 3) Fighting rising prices 4) Protecting freedom of speech	1) Materialist (1+3/3+1) 2) Mixed (all other combinations) 3) Postmaterialist (2+4/4+2)	*U30* 1.99*(.63)* *30+* 1.92*(.63)*	*U30* 8453 *30+* 42550

*Note that all independent variables have been rescaled in the analysis such that the mean equals 0, and the standard deviation equals 1.

Table A1.2 European Values Study 2008

European Values Study 2008					
Variable	**Question**	**Original Categories**	**Recoded Categories**	***Mean(SD)***	**N**
Anti-Democracy	a) I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system	1) Very good, 2) Fairly good 3) Fairly bad 4) Very bad	Mean of recoded a) + b) 1) Very good (1) / Agree strongly (1) 2) Fairly good (2)/ Agree (2) 3) Fairly bad (3) /Disagree(3) 4) Very bad (4) / Diagree strongly (4)	*U30* 1.76*(.62)* *30+* 1.72*(.63)*	*U30* 13108 *30+* 48752
	b) I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly,	1) Agree strongly 2) Agree			

	agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.	3) Disagree 4) Disagree strongly			
Social distance to Muslim Neighbours	On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours? - Muslims	1) Mentioned 2) Not mentioned	0) Not mentioned (2) 1) Mentioned (1)	*Excl. Muslims* *U30* .22*(.42)* *30+* .24*(.42)*	 *U30* 11334 *30+* 45092
Specific social distance to Muslim Neighbours	On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours? - People with a criminal record - People of a different race - Left wing extremists - Heavy drinkers - Right wing extremists - People with large families - Emotionally unstable people - Immigrants / Foreign workers - People who have AIDS - Drug addicts - Homosexuals - Jews - Gypsies - Christians		*All neighbour questions recoded as above Mean of all other categories of neighbour subtracted from NoMusNei, and scored as -1/0=* 0) Equally or more positive to Muslims (-1-0) 1) More negative to Muslims (0.1-1)	*Excl. Muslims* *U30* .21*(.41)* *30+* .23 *(.42)*	 *U30* 11331 *30+* 45090
Age*	Respondent's age in years	Range [15,108]	Range [18,82]	*U30* 23.47 *(3.38)* *30+* 53.09*(14.59)*	*U30* 14016 *30+* 51974
Female*	Sex of respondent	1) Male 2) Female	0) Male [Ref] (1) 1) Female (2)	*U30* .54*(.50)* *30+* .56*(.50)*	*U30* 14016 *30+* 52253
Not in work, education (or retirement)*	Are you yourself gainfully employed at the moment or not? Please select from the card the employment status that applies to you.	1) 30 hours a week or more 2) Less than 30 hours a week 3) Self employed 4) Military service 5) Retired / pensioned 6) Homemaker not otherwise employed 7) Student 8) Unemployed 9) Disabled 10) Other	*U30* 0) In work or study (1-4, 7) 1) Unemployed or inactive (5-6, 8-10) *30+* 0) In work, study or retirement (1-5, 7) 1) Unemployed or inactive (6, 8-10)	*U30* .24*(.43)* *30+* .20*(.40)*	*U30* 13874 *30+* 51909
Reverse household income*	Here is a list of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages,	Range [1) - 15)	Range [-11) - 0)	*U30* -.69(.75)	*U30* 10665

	salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions.	*(different values and currencies for each country in the questionnaire, converted into Monthly household income in Euros (x1000) corrected for PPP in the dataset*	*Monthly household income in Euros (x1000) corrected for PPP and household size by dividing it with the square root of number of people in the household, and reversed by multiplying it with -1.*	*30+* -.80*(.83)*	*30+* 43486
Parents not in work when R 14*	When you were 14, was your father [mother] employed, self employed or not?	1) Yes, employed 2) Yes, self employed 3) Without employment	0) Employed (1-2) 1) Not employed (3)	*U30* .09*(.28)* *30+* .10*(.30)*	*U30* 13140 *30+* 48340
Rural*	Size of town (Filled in by interviewer)	1) Under 2000 2) 2 - 5.000 3) 5 - 10.000 4) 10 - 20.000 5) 20 - 50.000 6) 50 - 100.000 7) 100 - 500.000 8) 500.000 and more	0) Over 5000 (3-8) 1) Under 5000 (1-2)	*U30* .27*(0.44)* *30+* .32*(.47)*	*U30* 13004 *30+* 48574
Parents born abroad*	a)Were you born in [COUNTRY]? b) Was your father born in [COUNTRY]? c) Was your mother born in [COUNTRY]?	1) Yes 2) No 1) Yes 2) No 1) Yes 2) No	0) Parents born in country or respondent born abroad (all other combinations) 1) One or both parents born abroad, but respondent born in country (1+1+2 / 1+2+1 / 1+2+2)	*U30* .08*(.27)* *30+* .06*(.23)*	*U30* 13903 *30+* 51877
R born abroad*	Were you born in [COUNTRY]?	1) Yes 2) No	0) Respondent born in country (1) 1) Respondent born abroad (2)	*U30* .07*(.26)* *30+* .08*(.27)*	*U30* 13903 *30+* 51877
Religion important*	Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life - Religion	1) Very important 2) Quite important 3) Not important 4) Not at all important	1) Not at all important (4) 2) Not important (3) 3) Quite important (2) 4) Very important (1)	*U30* 2.56*(1.05)* *30+* 2.72 (*1.04)*	*U30* 13786 *30+* 51539
Rightwing*	In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	Range [1) Left - 10) Right	*No recoding*	*U30* 5.48*(2.15)* *30+* 5.43*(2.23)*	*U30* 9868 *30+* 39177
National pride*	How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen?	1) Very proud 2) Quite proud 3) Not very proud 4) Not at all proud	1) Not at all proud (4) 2) Not very proud (3) 3) Quite proud (2) 4) Very proud (1)	*U30* 3.27*(.78)* *30+* 3.34*(.75)*	*U30* 12451 *30+* 48099
Low control over life*	Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out?	Range [1) None at all - 10) A great deal	Range [1) A great deal - 10) None at all	*U30* 4.03*(2.25)* *30+* 4.30 *(2.35)*	*U30* 13726 *30+* 50917

Postmaterialist values*	a) There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. If you had to choose, which of the things on this card would you say is most important? b) And which would be the next most important?	1) Maintaining order in the nation 2) Giving people more say in important government decisions 3) Fighting rising prices 4) Protecting freedom of speech	1) Materialist (1+3/3+1) 2) Mixed (all other combinations) 3) Postmaterialist (2+4/4+2)	*U30* 1.84*(.60)* *30+* 1.77*(.61)*	*U30* 13399 *30+* 49977

*Note that all independent variables have been rescaled in the analysis such that the mean equals 0, and the standard deviation equals 1.

Table A1.3 World Values Survey 2010-2014

World Values Survey 2010-2014					
Variable	**Question**	**Original Categories**	**Recoded Categories**	***Mean(SD)***	**N**
Justification of violence	Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. - Violence against other people	Range [1) Never justifiable – 10) Always justifiable]	1) Never (1) 2) Rarely (2-3) 3) Sometimes (4-10)	*Muslim U30* 1.70 *(0.70)* *Muslim 030* 1.71 *(0.70)* *Christian U30* 1.78 *(0.74)* *Christian O30* 1.71 *(0.68)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Anti-democratic attitudes	I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (Read out and code one answer for each): - Having a democratic political system	1) Very good 2) Fairly good 3) Fairly bad 4) Very bad	1) Very good (1) 2) Fairly good (2) 3) Bad (3-4)	*Muslim U30* 1.62 *(0.69)* *Muslim 030* 1.64 *(0.70)* *Christian U30* 1.64 *(0.71)* *Christian O30* 1.67 *(0.69)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Age*	This means you are _____ years old.	15-98	*No recoding*	*Muslim U30* 23.26 *(3.35)* *Muslim 030* 44.91 *(11.17)* *Christian U30* 23.48 *(3.40)* *Christian O30* 50.66 *(13.79)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Female*	Sex (coded by the interviewer)	1) Male	0) Male [Ref] (1)	*Muslim U30*	*Muslim U30*

		2) Female	1) Female (2)	0.47 *(0.50)* *Muslim 030* 0.47 *(0.50)* *Christian U30* 0.52 *(0.50)* *Christian O30* 0.54 *(0.50)*	2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Satisfaction with income*	How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?	Range [1) Completely dissatisfied – 10) Completely satisfied]	*Range* [1) Completely satisfied – 10) Completely dissatisfied]	*Muslim U30* 5.22 *(2.30)* *Muslim 030* 5.24 *(2.33)* *Christian U30* 5.10 *(2.51)* *Christian O30* 5.18 *(2.56)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Income level*	On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.	Range [1) Lowest group – 10) Highest group]	Range [*1)* Highest group – 10) Lowest group]	*Muslim U30* 5.69 *(1.94)* *Muslim 030* 5.95 *(1.48)* *Christian U30* 6.15 *(2.12)* *Christian O30* 6.42 *(2.09)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Experience of discrimination	How frequently do the following things occur in your neighborhood? a) Police or military interfere with people's private life b) Racist behavior	1)Very frequently 2) Quite frequently 3) Not frequently 4) Not at all frequently	1) Not at all frequently & Not at all frequently (4+4) 2) Other combinations 3) Very frequently & Very frequently (1+1)	*Muslim U30* 1.76 *(0.83)* *Muslim 030* 1.73 *(0.83)* *Christian U30* 1.82 *(0.83)* *Christian O30* 1.68 *(0.80)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Town size*	Coded size of the town	1) Under 2,000 2) 2,000 - 5,000 3) 5 - 10,000 4) 10 - 20,000 5) 20 - 50,000 6) 50 - 100,000 7) 100 - 500,000 8) 500,000 and more	1)500,000 and more (8) 2) 100 - 500,000 (7) 3) 50 - 100,000 (6) 4) 20 - 50,000 (5) 5) 10 - 20,000 (4) 6) 5 - 10,000 (3) 7) 2,000 - 5,000 (2) 8) Under 2,000 (1)	*Muslim U30* 4.66 *(2.33)* *Muslim 030* 4.76 *(2.49)* *Christian U30* 4.24 *(2.42)* *Christian O30* 4.09 *(2.50)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059

Not in work, education or retirement*	Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a week? If more than one job: only for the main job	Yes, has paid employment: 1) Full time employee (30 hours a week or more) 2) Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week) 3) Self employed No, no paid employment: 4) Retired/pensioned 5) Housewife not otherwise employed 6) Student 7) Unemployed 8) Other (write in):_____	0) 1, 2, 3 & 6 1) 4, 5, 7 & 8	*Muslim U30* 0.31 *(0.46)* *Muslim 030* 0.42 *(0.49)* *Christian U30* 0.29 *(0.46)* *Christian O30* 0.43 *(0.49)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Importance of religion*	For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: - Religion	1) Very important 2) Rather important 3) Not very important 4) Not at all important	1) Not at all important (4) 2) Not very important (3) 3) Rather important (2) 4) Very important (1)	*Muslim U30* 3.76 *(0.75)* *Muslim 030* 3.50 *(0.80)* *Christian U30* 3.45 *(0.80)* *Christian O30* 3.27 *(0.89)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Political orientation*	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	1) Left – 10) Right	*No recoding*	*Muslim U30* 5.85 *(2.20)* *Muslim 030* 6.05 *(2.24)* *Christian U30* 5.51 *(2.50)* *Christian O30* 5.69 *(2.43)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
National pride*	How proud are you to be [citizen of a country]?	1) Very proud 2) Quite proud 3) Not very proud 4) Not at all proud 5) (Not a citizen)	1) (Not a citizen) (5) 2) Not at all proud (4) 3) Not very proud (3) 4) Quite proud (2) 5) Very proud (1)	*Muslim U30* 4.53 *(0.71)* *Muslim 030* 4.53 *(0.65)* *Christian U30* 4.63 *(0.65)* *Christian O30* 4.48 *(0.79)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059
Postmaterialist values	Post-materialist index	1) Materialist 2) Mixed 3) Post-materialist	*No recoding*	*Muslim U30* 1.62 *(0.58)* *Muslim 030* 1.55 *(0.56)* *Christian U30* 1.82 *(0.60)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654

				Christian O30 1.76 *(0.60)*	*Christian O30* 12059
Low control over life*	Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.	Range [1) No choice at all - 10) A great deal of choice]	Range [1) A great deal of choice – 10) No choice at all]	*Muslim U30* 4.06 *(2.09)* *Muslim 030* 3.99 *(2.15)* *Christian U30* 3.71 *(2.15)* *Christian O30* 3.75 *(2.25)*	*Muslim U30* 2363 *Muslim 030* 3791 *Christian U30* 5654 *Christian O30* 12059

*Note that these variables have been rescaled in the analysis such that the mean equals 0, and the standard deviation equals 1.

Table A1.4 MYPLACE 2012-2013

MYPLACE 2012/13					
Variable	**Question**	**Original Categories**	**Recoded Categories**	***Mean(SD)***	**N**
Support for political violence*	In which of the following cases would you consider violence as appropriate or inappropriate? 1) To protect workplaces from closing 2) To protect human rights 3) To stop global warming 4) To stop poverty 5) To protect one's own ethnic group 6) To keep a stable government 7) To overthrow government 8) To respect and protect animal rights	Range [1) Always appropriate - 5) Never appropriate]	Common factor of the mentioned items multiplied by -1, with achieved partial strong invariance across locations	0.39 *(0.92)*	8583
Anti-democracy*	We will describe several types of political system and ask you to think about each of them as a way of governing this country. What would you say for each of the following types of government? a) Having a democratic, multi-party system. Having the opposition that can freely express their opinions.	Range [1) Very good - 4) Very bad]	*Mean of a) and b)* -1	0.99 *(0.74)*	8583
Negative attitudes to Muslims*	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? a) Muslims positively contribute to the society. b) It is OK to be suspicious towards Muslims.	Range [1) Completely agree - 5) Completely disagree]	*Mean of a) and reversely coded b)* Range [1) positive attitude - 5) negative attitude]	*Excl. Muslims:* 1.78 *(0.84)*	7919
Age*	Respondent's year of birth	Range [1986, 1997]	Range [1986, 1997]	1991.33 *(2.78)*	8583
Gender	Sex of respondent	1) Male 2) Female	-0.5) Male [Ref] 0.5) Female	0.50 *(0.50)*	8583

Not in work or education	Which of the following descriptions fits your situation best?	1) Full-time employed 2) Part-time employed 3) In school 4) Inactive, but looking for a job 5) Inactive, wanting a job, but not looking for one 6) Chronically ill or with disabilities 7) In community or military service 8) Taking care of the household or babysitting 9) Something else	0) In work or study (1-3) 1) Unemployed or inactive (4-9)	0.13 *(0.34)*	8583
Coping on income*	Which of these descriptions fits closest to what you feel about income of your household?	1) I live well with current income 2) I can manage with current income 3) I'm having some difficulties with current income 4) I'm having lots of difficulties with current income	*No recoding*	1.91 *(0.86)*	8583
SES at 14*	When you were 14, was your father employed, self-employed, or not working at all? When you were 14, was your mother employed, self-employed, or not working at all? What is the highest level of education achieved by your father? What is the highest level of education achieved by your mother?	Combination of mother's and father's education and employment status at participants age of 14 was used as the estimate of early SES. If mother/father was employed or self-employed, the variable was coded as 1, else 0. The variable value was calculated as reversed (multiplied by -1) sum of products of mother's employment status and her education and father's employment status and his education.	(-1)*(mother's education * mother's employment status + father's education * father's employment status)	-7.09 *(3.90)*	8583
Experienced discrimination	Have you ever felt threatened because of…? 1) Your support for specific political movement 2) Belonging to an ethnic or religious minority 3) Your sexual orientation 4) Belonging to a specific subculture 5) Your gender	1) Never 2) Sometimes 3) Often	*If participants chose 2 or 3 on any of the items, their response was coded as 1, otherwise the response was coded as 0.*	0.25 *(0.43)*	8583

*Note that these variables have been rescaled in the analysis such that the mean equals 0, and the standard deviation equals 1.

Table A1.5 Young in Oslo 2015

Young in Oslo 2015					
Variable	**Question**	**Original Categories**	**Recoded Categories**	***Mean(SD)***	**N**
Justify political violence	To what extent do you think use of violence can be justified a) to attract attention to a political cause that many people think is important b) to achieve political change in today's Norway c) to achieve political change elsewhere in today's Europe	1) Not at all 2) To a small extent 3) To some extent 4) To a great extent 5) To a very great extent	*Mean value of a), b) , c)*	*U30* 1.40 *(.77)*	*U30* 16003
Support violence in Syria	In the past few years, some young people have gone from Norway to the war in Syria. To what extent do you support the young people who -have gone to fight with weapons	1) Not at all 2) To a small extent 3) To some extent 4) To a great extent 5) To a very great extent	*No recoding*	*U30* 1.63 *(1.04)*	*U30* 15171
Age*	How old are you?	1) 16 2) 17 3) 18 4) 19 5) 20 6) 21 7) 22 or older	*No recoding*	*U30* 17.17 *(1.13)*	*U30* 19091
Female*	Are you a boy or a girl?	1) Boy 2) Girl	*No recoding*	*U30* 1.53*(.50)*	*U30* 20026
Family struggling financially*	Has your family's financial situation been good or bad for the past two years?	1) Our finances have been good the whole time 2) Our finances have been good most of the time 3) Our finances have been neither good nor bad 4) Our finances have been bad most of the time 5) Our finances have been bad the whole time	*No recoding*	*U30* 1.92*(.99)*	*U30* 20037
Expects to be unemployed*	How do you think your future will be? Do you think that you - will ever be unemployed?	1) Yes 2) No 3) Don't know	1) No (2) 2) Don't know (3) 3) Yes (1)	*U30* 1.71*(.70)*	*U30* 18623
Parent(s) unemployed*	a)Is your father in work now b) Is your mother in work now?	1) Yes, full time 2) Yes, part time 3) No 1) Yes, full time 2) Yes, part time 3) No	1) Both in work (1/2+1/2) 2) One parent works (1/2+3) (3+1/2) 3) Neither in work (3+3)	*U30* 1.32 *(.57)*	*U30* 18024
Parents born abroad*	Where are your parents born?	1) Both are born in Norway 2) One is born in Norway, the other abroad	0) Parents born in Norway (1) 1) One or both parents born abroad (2/3)	*U30* .47 *(.50)*	*U30* 20325

		3) Both are born abroad			
Christian*	Which religion or faith do you belong to?	1) I don't belong to any religion or faith 2) Christianity 3) Islam 4) Hinduism 5) Buddhism 6) Other	0) Non-Christian (1, 3-6) 1) Christian (2)	*U30* .35 *(.48)*	*U30* 18727
Muslim*	Which religion or faith do you belong to?	1) I don't belong to any religion or faith 2) Christianity 3) Islam 4) Hinduism 5) Buddhism 6) Other	0) Non-Muslim (1-2, 4-6) 1) Muslim (3)	*U30* .19 *(.39)*	*U30* 18727
Other religion*	Which religion or faith do you belong to?	1) I don't belong to any religion or faith 2) Christianity 3) Islam 4) Hinduism 5) Buddhism 6) Other	0) Nonreligious, Christian or Muslim (1-3) 1) Other religion (4-6)	*U30* .07 *(.26)*	*U30* 18727
Experienced harassment / violence*	a) Are you the victim of harassment, threats or ostracising by other young people at school or in your free time? Tick the box that fits best. b) Are you the victim of harassment or threats from other young people through the internet or mobile phone? c) Have you in the course of the past 12 months been a victim of any of the following? - I have been a victim of threats of violence d) – I have been hit without getting any visble marks e) – I have been hurt or wounded because of violence without needing medical treatment f) - I have been so badly hurt because of violence that it required medical treatment	1) Yes, several times a week 2) Yes, about once a week 3) Yes, about every two weeks 4) Yes, about once a month 5) Almost never 6) Never 1) No 2) Once 3) 2-5 times 4) 6 times or more	0) No (a=5-6, b=5-6, c=1, d=1, e=1 and f=1) 1) Yes (*either* a = 4-6, b=4-6, c=2-4, d=2-4, e=2-4 *or* f=2-4*)*	*U30* .22 *(.42)*	*U30* 20439
Experienced discrimination / hate crime*	How often does this happen to you? *(only asked of people with two parents born abroad)* a) I don't feel accepted by Norwegians b) I feel that Norwegians have something against me c) I have been harassed or insulted because of my immigrant background d) I have been threatened or attacked because of my immigrant background e) I have been harassed or insulted because of my religious faith	1) Very often 2) Often 3) Sometimes 4) Rarely 5) Never	0) No (a-f=4-5 OR *one parent born in Norway* – see Parborn) 1) Feel disliked (a=1-3 and/or b=1-3, c=4-5 d=4-5, e=4-5, f=4-5) 2) Insulted or harassed (c=1-3 and/or e=1-3, d=4-5, f=4-5) 3) Threatened or attacked (d=1-3 and/or f=1-3)	*U30* .23 *(.68)*	*U30* 20439

	f) I have been threatened or attacked because of my religious faith				
Rightwing*	In politics, we often talk about the "right" and the "left". Generally, where would you place your political standpoints? *(only asked of a random 1/3 of the sample)*	Range [1) Extreme left - 10) Extreme right	*No recoding*	*U30* 5.42 *(2.21)*	*U30* 3193
War between Islam and the West*	To what extent would you say you agree or disagree with the following statements? *(only asked of a random 1/3 of the sample – same as Rightwing)* - I think that today there is a war between Islam and the West	1) Completely disagree 2) Disagree a little 3) Agree a little 4) Completely agree	*No recoding*	*U30* 2.90 *(1.00)*	*U30* 3981
Support nonviolent in Syria	In the past few years, some young people have gone from Norway to the war in Syria. To what extent do you support the young people who -have gone to help in a nonviolent way	1) Not at all 2) To a small extent 3) To some extent 4) To a great extent 5) To a very great extent	*No recoding*	*U30* 3.43 *(1.67)*	*U30* 16793

*Note that all independent variables have been rescaled in the analysis such that the mean equals 0, and the standard deviation equals 1.

Table A1.6 European Social Survey 2014

European Social Survey 2014 (Muslims excluded)					
Variable	**Question**	**Original Categories**	**Recoded Categories**	***Mean(SD)***	**N**
Opposition to Muslim immigration	I am going to ask you about different groups of people who might come to live in [country] from other countries. Using this card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow - Muslims from other countries to come and live in [country]?	1) Allow many 2) Allow some 3) Allow a few 4) Allow none	*No recoding*	*U30* 2.50*(.97)*	*U30* 6669
Specific opposition to Muslim immigration	How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? Still use this card.	1) Allow many to come and live here 2) Allow some 3) Allow a few 4) Allow none	*Value subtracted from Almuslv, and scored as -1/0* 0) Equally or more positive to Muslims (-1-0) 1) More negative to Muslims (0.1-1)	*U30* .27*(.44)*	*U30* 6595
Age*	Respondent's age in years	Range [14,114]	Range [18,82]	*U30* 22.44 *(4.22)*	*U30* 6888
Female*	Sex of respondent	1) Male 2) Female	0) Male [Ref] (1) 1) Female (2)	*U30* .49*(.50)*	*U30* 6888
Not in work or education*	a) Using this card, which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? Select all that apply.	1) in paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)	0) In work or study (1-2, 7) 1) Unemployed or inactive (3-6, 8)	*U30* .15*(.36)*	*U30* 6872

	(If more than one:) And which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven days)? Please select only one.	2) in education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation 3) unemployed and actively looking for a job 4) unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job 5) permanently sick or disabled 6) retired 7) in community or military service 8)doing housework, looking after children or other persons			
	b) In your main job are/were you…	1)An employee 2)Self employed 3)Working for your own family's business	*If missing on variable a)* 0) In work or study (1-3)		
Reverse household income*	Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?	1) Living comfortably on present income 2) Coping on present income 3) Difficult on present income 4) Very difficult on present income	*No recoding*	*U30* 1.85*(.81)*	*U30* 6712
Financial difficulties in childhood*	Using the same card, please tell me how often you and your family experienced severe financial difficulties when you were growing up?	1) Always 2) Often 3) Sometimes 4) Hardly ever 5) Never	1) Never (5) 2) Hardly ever (4) 3) Sometimes (3) 4) Often (2) 5) Always (1)	*U30* 2.02*(1.06)*	*U30* 6761
Parents born abroad*	a) Were you born in [COUNTRY]?	1) Yes 2) No	0) Parents born in country or respondent born abroad (all other combinations) 1) One or both parents born abroad, but respondent born in country (1+1+2 / 1+2+1 / 1+2+2)	*U30* .11*(.31)*	*U30* 6888
	b) Was your father born in [COUNTRY]?	1) Yes 2) No			
	c) Was your mother born in [COUNTRY]?	1) Yes 2) No			
R born abroad*	Were you born in [COUNTRY]?	1) Yes 2) No	0) Respondent born in country (1) 1) Respondent born abroad (2)	*U30* .08*(.27)*	*U30* 6888
Discriminated against*	Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?	1) Yes 2) No	0) No (2) 1) Yes (1)	*U30* .08*(.27)*	*U30* 6841
Can't influence politics*	a) How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?	Range [0) Not at all - 10) Completely	*Mean of a)-f) multiplied by -1* Range [-10) Completely - 0) Not at all	*U30* -3.58*(1.67)*	*U30* 6883
	b) How able do you think you are to take an active role in a group involved with political issues?	Range [0) Not at all able - 10) Completely able			
	c) And how much would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like you to have an influence on politics?	Range [0) Not at all - 10) Completely			
	d) And using this card, how confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?	Range [0) Not at all confident - 10) Completely confident			
	e) How much would you say that politicians care what people like you think?	Range [0) Not at all - 10) Completely			

	f) Using this card, how easy do you personally find it to take part in politics?	Range [0) Not at all easy - 10) Extremely easy

*Note that all independent variables have been rescaled in the analysis such that the mean equals 0, and the standard deviation equals 1.

Table A1.7 Eurobarometer 83.4 2015

Eurobarometer 83.4 2015 (Muslims excluded)					
Variable	**Question**	**Original Categories**	**Recoded Categories**	***Mean(SD)***	**N**
Social distance to Muslims	a) Regardless of whether you are actually working or not, please tell me, using a scale from 1 to 10, how comfortable you would feel if one of your colleagues at work belonged to each of the following groups? '1' means that you would feel, "not at all comfortable" and '10' that you would feel "totally comfortable" - A Muslim person b) Regardless of whether you have children or not, please tell me, using a scale from 1 to 10, how comfortable you would feel if one of your children was in a love relationship with a person from each of the following groups. '1' means that you would feel, "not at all comfortable" and '10' that you would feel "totally comfortable". - A Muslim person	Range [1) Not at all comfortable- 10) Totally comfortable Range [1) Not at all comfortable- 10) Totally comfortable	*Mean of a) and b), reverse coded* Range [1) Totally comfortable- 10) Not at all comfortable	*U30* 4.27 *(2.79)*	*U30* 4222
Age*	Respondent's age in years	Range [15,96]	*No recoding*	*U30* 22.73 *(4.18)*	*U30* 4239
Female*	Sex of respondent	1) Male 2) Female	0) Male [Ref] (1) 1) Female (2)	*U30* .53*(.50)*	*U30* 4239
Not in work or education*	What is your current occupation?	1) Responsible for ordinary shopping, etc. 2) Student 3) Unemployed, temporarily not working 4) Retired, unable to work 5) Farmer 6) Fisherman 7) Professional (lawyer, etc.) 8) Owner of a shop, craftsmen, etc. 9) Business proprietors, etc. 10) Employed professional (employed doctor, 11) General management, etc. 12) Middle management, etc. 13) Employed position, at desk	0) In work or study (2, 5-18) 1) Unemployed or inactive (1,3,4)	*U30* .15*(.36)*	*U30* 4239

		14) Employed position, travelling 15) Employed position, service job 16) Supervisor 17) Skilled manual worker 18) Unskilled manual worker, etc.			
Difficult paying bills*	During the last twelve months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month…?	1) Most of the time 2) From time to time 3) Almost never / never	1) Almost never / Never (3) 2) From time to time (2) 3) Most of the time (1)	*U30* 1.51*(.66)*	*U30* 4078
Low social class*	Do you see yourself and your household belonging to…?	1) The working class of society 2) The lower middle class of society 3) The middle class of society 4) The upper middle class of society 5) The higher class of society	1) The higher class of society (5) 2) The upper middle class of society (4) 3) The middle class of society (3) 4) The lower middle class of society (2) 5) The working class of society (1)	*U30* 3.56*(.96)*	*U30* 3962
Rural*	Would you say you live in a...?	1) Rural area or village 2) Small or middle sized town 3) Large town	0) Town or city (2-3) 1) Rural area or village (1)	*U30* .29*(.45)*	*U30* 4235
Ethnic or religious minority*	Where you live, do you consider yourself to be part of any of the following? Please tell me all that apply. a) An ethnic minority b) A religious minority c) A sexual minority (like being gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender or transsexual) (M) d) A minority in terms of disability e) Any other minority group f) None	*For each of a)-f)* 0) Not mentioned 1) Mentioned	0) No (a+b=0) 1) Yes (a=1 and/or b=1)	*U30* .08*(.28)*	*U30* 4239
Discriminated against*	In the past 12 months have you personally felt discriminated against or harassed on one or more of the following grounds? Please tell me all that apply. a) Ethnic origin b) Gender c) Sexual orientation (being gay, lesbian or bisexual) d) Being over 55 years old e) Being under 30 years old f) Religion or beliefs g) Disability h) Gender identity (being transgender or transsexual) i) For another reason j) No	*For each of a)-j)* 0) Not mentioned 1) Mentioned	0) No (if j=1) 1) Yes (if j=0)	*U30* .26*(.44)*	*U30* 4239
Voice does not count*	Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. - My voice counts in (OUR COUNTRY)	1) Totally agree 2) Tend to agree 3) Tend to disagree 4) Totally disagree	*No recoding*	*U30* 2.41*(1.00)*	*U30* 3921

*Note that all independent variables have been rescaled in the analysis such that the mean equals 0, and the standard deviation equals 1.

Table A1.8 International Social Survey Programme 2008

International Social Survey Programme 2008 – Religion (Muslims excluded)					
Variable	**Question**	**Original Categories**	**Recoded Categories**	***Mean(SD)***	**N**
Negative attitude to Muslims	What is your personal attitude towards members of the following religious groups?	1) Very positive 2) Somewhat positive 3) Neither positive nor negative 4) Somewhat negative 5) Very negative	*No recoding*	*U30* 2.98 *(1.11)*	*U30* 5474
Age*	Respondent's age in years	Range [15,98]	*No recoding*	*U30* 23.51 *(3.59)*	*U30* 11296
Female*	Sex of respondent	1) Male 2) Female	*No recoding*	*U30* 1.55*(.50)*	*U30* 11296
Not in work or education*	What is your current occupation or your current economic position? *(wording varies between countries)*	1) Employed, full-time 2) Employed, part-time 3) Employed, less than part-time 4) Helping family member 5) Unemployed 6) Student, school, vocational training 7) Retired 8) Housewife, -man, home duties 9) Permanently disabled 10) Other, not in labour force.	0) In work or study (1,2,6) 1) Unemployed or inactive (3-5,7-10)	*U30* .23*(.42)*	*U30* 11216
Low social class*	In our society one sometimes talk about, that there are some groups which are perceived as higher ranked in society and other groups which are perceived as lower ranked. Below there is a scale which runs from top to bottom. If you should place yourself on this scale where 1 is bottom of society and 10 is top of society, where would it be? *(wording varies between countries)*	Range [1) Lowest- 10) Highest	Range [1) Highest- 10) Lowest	*U30* 5.71*(1.78)*	*U30* 9645
Rural*	Would you describe the place where you live as a ...? *(wording varies between countries)*	1) Urban, a big city 2) Suburb, outskirt of a big city 3) Town or small city 4) Country village 5) Farm or home in the country	*No recoding*	*U30* 2.48*(1.30)*	*U30* 10950

*Note that all independent variables have been rescaled in the analysis such that the mean equals 0, and the standard deviation equal

8.2 Appendix A2: Regression Models

Table A2.1 Multilevel logistic regression: Justify Political Violence, EVS 2017, under 30 year olds

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1: sociodemographics** *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2: attitudes** *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3: random slopes** *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4: Gini** *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5: Welfare expenditure** *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6: GDP** *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7: WGI** *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8: MIPEX** *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-0.912*	0.129	-0.933*	0.150	-0.784*	0.170	-0.776*	0.170	-0.777*	0.170	-0.732*	0.167	-0.753*	0.160	-0.778*	0.166	-0.775*	0.166
Age			-0.097*	0.029	-0.109*	0.033	-0.110*	0.034	-0.110*	0.034	-0.126*	0.038	-0.110*	0.034	-0.110*	0.034	-0.125*	0.038
Female			-0.271*	0.057	-0.208*	0.066	-0.212*	0.066	-0.212*	0.066	-0.271*	0.075	-0.214*	0.066	-0.214*	0.066	-0.277*	0.075
Not in work or education			0.017	0.082	0.096	0.096	0.093	0.097	0.093	0.097	0.029	0.119	0.105	0.097	0.099	0.097	-0.039	0.122
Reverse HH income			0.014	0.030	0.017	0.035	0.019	0.035	0.019	0.035	0.019	0.037	0.017	0.035	0.019	0.035	0.018	0.037
Parents struggling when R 14			0.018	0.030	0.012	0.035	0.010	0.035	0.010	0.035	0.018	0.040	0.012	0.035	0.011	0.035	0.022	0.040
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.072	0.100	-0.101	0.113	-0.099	0.114	-0.099	0.114	-0.140	0.123	-0.110	0.114	-0.104	0.114	-0.144	0.124
R born abroad			0.005	0.115	0.081	0.182	0.068	0.184	0.068	0.184	-0.013	0.194	0.054	0.183	0.061	0.184	-0.106	0.199
Religion important in life					-0.063	0.038	-0.054	0.056	-0.054	0.056	-0.003	0.057	-0.047	0.056	-0.051	0.056	0.007	0.058
Right wing political views					0.056	0.035	0.058	0.035	0.058	0.035	0.009	0.041	0.060	0.035	0.059	0.035	0.004	0.041
National pride					-0.099*	0.035	-0.096*	0.035	-0.096*	0.035	-0.085*	0.039	-0.098*	0.035	-0.097*	0.035	-0.087*	0.040
Low life control					0.143*	0.034	0.146*	0.035	0.146*	0.035	0.156*	0.043	0.148*	0.035	0.147*	0.035	0.161*	0.044
Post materialist values					-0.044	0.035	-0.046	0.035	-0.046	0.035	-0.070	0.040	-0.050	0.035	-0.049	0.035	-0.083*	0.040
Gini									-0.003	0.127	-0.006	0.129	0.067	0.117	0.035	0.125	-0.044	0.125
Reverse Welfare expenditure											-0.102	0.120						
Reverse GDP													-0.373*	0.136				
Reverse WGI															-0.217	0.141		
Reverse MIPEX																	-0.076	0.109
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	0.688		0.692		0.702		0.695		0.695		0.169		0.618		0.669		0.522	
Religion important in life							0.213		0.213		0.544		0.208		0.211		0.172	
ICC	0.126		0.127		0.130		0.128		0.128		0.083		0.104		0.120		0.077	
AIC	9840.3		7568.1		5749.2		5740.9		5742.9		4467.2		5738.0		5742.6		4358.2	
BIC	9854.4		7629.3		5840.2		5838.4		5846.9		4572.6		5848.6		5853.1		4463.1	
Log likelihood	-4918.2		-3775.0		-2860.6		-2855.4		-2855.4		-2216.6		-2852.0		-2854.3		-2162.1	
N individuals	8,532		6626		4926		4926		4926		3654		4926		4926		3,537	
N countries	30		30		30		30		30		24		30		30		23	
LR chi			34.97		32.56		10.28		0.00		0.72		6.88		2.30		0.48	
P			0.000		0.000		0.001		0.983		0.398		0.009		0.129		0.488	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.1.

Table A2.2 Multilevel logistic regression: Justify Political Violence, EVS 2017, 30 + year olds

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.360*	0.130	-1.416*	0.137	-1.359*	0.142	-1.357*	0.143	-1.353*	0.142	-1.316*	0.144	-1.320*	0.142	-1.354*	0.143	-1.325*	0.141
Age			-0.161*	0.014	-0.171*	0.017	-0.170*	0.017	-0.170*	0.017	-0.201*	0.018	-0.170*	0.017	-0.170*	0.017	-0.201*	0.018
Female			-0.298*	0.027	-0.255*	0.031	-0.254*	0.031	-0.254*	0.031	-0.298*	0.034	-0.255*	0.031	-0.254*	0.031	-0.302*	0.034
Not in work or education			0.070	0.041	0.064	0.048	0.061	0.048	0.060	0.048	0.045	0.056	0.061	0.048	0.060	0.048	0.048	0.057
Reverse HH income			0.031*	0.015	0.043*	0.017	0.041*	0.017	0.040*	0.017	0.048*	0.019	0.041*	0.017	0.040*	0.017	0.052*	0.019
Parents struggling when R 14			-0.006	0.014	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.016	-0.003	0.017	0.001	0.016	0.000	0.016	-0.002	0.018
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.110*	0.054	-0.074	0.060	-0.073	0.060	-0.072	0.060	-0.059	0.065	-0.073	0.060	-0.072	0.060	-0.074	0.065
R born abroad			-0.060	0.050	-0.061	0.070	-0.067	0.071	-0.067	0.071	-0.072	0.075	-0.068	0.071	-0.067	0.071	-0.117	0.076
Religion important in life					-0.059*	0.017	-0.058*	0.017	-0.058*	0.017	-0.026	0.019	-0.057*	0.017	-0.058*	0.017	-0.030	0.019
Right wing political views					0.048*	0.016	0.046*	0.016	0.046*	0.016	0.049*	0.018	0.046*	0.016	0.046*	0.016	0.046*	0.018
National pride					-0.138*	0.016	-0.135*	0.016	-0.135*	0.016	-0.145*	0.017	-0.135*	0.016	-0.135*	0.016	-0.138*	0.018
Low life control					0.096*	0.016	0.109*	0.033	0.109*	0.033	0.123*	0.038	0.109*	0.033	0.109*	0.033	0.123*	0.039
Post materialist values					-0.043*	0.016	-0.050	0.031	-0.049	0.031	-0.072	0.033	-0.050	0.031	-0.049	0.031	-0.070	0.034
Gini									0.118	0.127	0.158	0.141	0.151	0.127	0.117	0.129	0.095	0.137
Reverse Welfare expenditure											-0.124	0.133						
Reverse GDP													-0.160	0.140				
Reverse WGI															0.005	0.135		
Reverse MIPEX																	-0.006	0.121
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	0.703		0.717		0.726		0.735		0.724		0.636		0.710		0.724		0.620	
Low life control							0.149		0.149		0.156		0.149		0.149		0.160	
Post materialist values							0.139		0.139		0.132		0.139		0.139		0.135	
ICC	0.131		0.135		0.138		0.141		0.138		0.109		0.133		0.138		0.105	
AIC	40761.7		35600.3		27637.1		27562.05		27563.2		22790.6		27563.9		27565.19		22407.9	
BIC	40778.9		35676.7		27752.5		27693.85		27703.2		22935.4		27712.2		27713.47		22552.3	
Log likelihood	-20378.8		-17791.1		-13804.6		-13765.0		-13764.6		-11377.3		-13764.0		-13764.6		-11186.0	
N individuals	40,745		36066		27936		27936		27936		23079		27936		27936		22,423	
N countries	30		30		30		30		30		24		30		30		23	
LR chi			265.66		143.24		79.07		0.86		0.85		1.28		0.00		0.00	
P			<.001		<.001		<.001		0.354		0.356		0.258		0.971		0.958	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.1.

Table A2.3 Multilevel logistic regression: Justify Violence, WVS 2010, Muslim sample, under 30 year olds

	Never vs. Rarely						*Never vs. Sometimes*					
	Model 0a		**Model 1a:** sociodemographics		**Model 2a:** attitudes		**Model 0b**		**Model 1b**: sociodemographics		**Model 2b:** attitudes	
	Random intercept		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	0.071	0.213	-0.728*	0.263	-0.694*	0.255	-0.667*	0.315	-1.866*	0.360	-1.698*	0.348
Female			-0.191	0.130	-0.193	0.131			-0.209	0.172	-0.281	0.177
Age			0.047	0.063	0.045	0.063			-0.027	0.083	-0.049	0.086
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			-0.015	0.068	-0.035	0.071			0.161*	0.091	0.133	0.096
Income level (Reversed)			-0.161*	0.070	-0.169*	0.071			-0.199*	0.093	-0.238*	0.096
Experienced discrimination			0.395*	0.076	0.384*	0.077			0.581*	0.100	0.483*	0.104
Town size (Rural)			0.088	0.069	0.089	0.069			0.188*	0.095	0.173	0.098
Not in work or education			0.392*	0.148	0.360*	0.151			0.386*	0.191	0.331	0.198
Importance of religion					-0.088	0.081					-0.284*	0.088
Political orientation					0.065	0.064					-0.071	0.085
National pride					-0.070	0.067					-0.295*	0.083
Post materialist values					0.047	0.064					0.062	0.088
Low control over life					0.108	0.068					0.101	0.089
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.492		0.473		0.443		0.744		0.645		0.592	
ICC (country)	0.069		0.064		0.056		0.144		0.112		0.096	
AIC	1551.3		1522.5		1526.2		963.2		927.7		905.4	
BIC	1550.9		1520.6		1523.3		962.7		925.9		902.5	
Log likelihood	-773.7		-752.3		-749.1		-479.6		-454.9		-438.7	
N individuals	1151		1151		1151		835		835		835	
N countries	6		6		6		6		6		6	
LR chi			42.82		6.33				49.41		32.37	
P			<.001		0.275				<.001		<.001	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.4 Multilevel logistic regression: Justify Violence, WVS 2010, Muslim sample, 30+ year olds

	Never vs. Rarely						*Never vs. Sometimes*					
	Model 0a		**Model 1a**: sociodemographics		**Model 2a**: attitudes		**Model 0b**		**Model 1b:** sociodemographics		**Model 2b:** attitudes	
	Random intercept		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	0.001	0.170	-0.552*	0.201	-0.470*	0.185	-1.036*	0.218	-2.111*	0.230	-2.024*	0.212
Female			0.114	0.086	0.087	0.087			-0.148	0.127	-0.170	0.129
Age			0.044	0.042	0.041	0.042			-0.027	0.063	-0.015	0.063
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			-0.184*	0.092	-0.168	0.093			-0.116	0.135	-0.086	0.138
Income level (Reversed)			0.098*	0.043	0.091*	0.044			-0.005	0.062	0.002	0.064
Experienced discrimination			0.025	0.042	0.088*	0.044			-0.149*	0.064	-0.103	0.066
Town size (Rural)			-0.251*	0.056	-0.228*	0.056			-0.601*	0.073	-0.557*	0.074
Not in work or education			-0.050	0.044	-0.064	0.044			-0.230*	0.064	-0.238*	0.065
Importance of religion					-0.249*	0.020					-0.148*	0.069
Political orientation					0.009	0.042					0.138*	0.059
National pride					-0.155*	0.044					-0.199*	0.059
Post materialist values					-0.056	0.042					0.152*	0.059
Low control over life					0.131*	0.044					0.136*	0.061
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.522		0.525		0.461		0.664		0.524		0.433	
ICC (country)	0.077		0.077		0.061		0.118		0.077		0.054	
AIC	3754.0		3730.0		3682.5		1993.7		1916.6		1893.1	
BIC	3754.6		3732.7		3686.7		1994.3		1919.3		1897.4	
Log likelihood	-1875.0		-1856.0		-1827.2		-994.9		-949.3		-932.6	
N individuals	2839		2839		2839		1843		1843		1843	
N countries	10		10		10		10		10		10	
LR chi			37.98		57.53				91.08		33.47	
P			<.001		<.001				<.001		<.001	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.5 Multilevel logistic regression: Justify Violence, WVS 2010, Christian sample, under 30 year olds: *Never vs. Rarely*

	Model 0a		**Model 1a:** sociodemographics		**Model 2a:** attitudes		**Model 3a:** GDP		**Model 4a:** GINI		**Model 5a:** WGI	
	Random intercept		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	0.254	0.223	0.145	0.285	-0.185	0.233	-0.287	0.189	-0.183	0.233	-0.014	0.290
Female			0.062	0.067	0.087	0.080	0.085	0.080	0.087	0.080	0.090	0.067
Age			-0.016	0.009	-0.050	0.039	-0.051	0.039	-0.049	0.039	-0.013	0.010
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			-0.100	0.081	0.012	0.044	-0.014	0.044	0.013	0.045	-0.086	0.082
Income level (Reversed)			-0.080*	0.037	-0.043	0.044	0.040	0.044	-0.043	0.044	-0.077*	0.038
Experienced discrimination			-0.056	0.037	0.195*	0.049	0.196*	0.049	0.195*	0.049	-0.041	0.038
Town size (Rural)			-0.191*	0.042	0.050	0.049	-0.049	0.049	0.049	0.049	-0.192*	0.042
Not in work or education			-0.059	0.040	0.047	0.094	0.052	0.094	0.046	0.094	-0.060	0.040
Importance of religion					-0.139*	0.046	0.139*	0.046	-0.140*	0.046	-0.190*	0.040
Political orientation					0.186*	0.041	0.184*	0.040	0.186*	0.041	0.160*	0.035
National pride					-0.030	0.044	0.027	0.044	-0.031	0.044	-0.008	0.038
Post materialist values					-0.020	0.039	-0.020	0.039	-0.021	0.039	-0.009	0.034
Low control over life					0.052	0.043	-0.055	0.043	0.052	0.043	0.103*	0.037
Reverse GDP							-0.518*	0.157				
GINI									0.053	0.165		
Reverse WGI											-0.009	0.133
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.818		0.822		0.769		0.562		0.768		0.728	
ICC (country)	0.169		0.171		0.153		0.088		0.152		0.139	
AIC	4079.1		4070.6		4049.8		4043.9		4051.7		4050.4	
BIC	4080.3		4076.4		4058.8		4053.4		4061.3		4060.0	
Log likelihood	-2037.5		-2026.3		-2010.9		-2006.9		-2010.9		-2010.2	
N individuals	3410		3410		3410		3410		3410		3,410	
N countries	14		14		14		14		14		14	
LR chi			22.41		30.8		7.99		0.11		1.43	
P			<.001		<.001		0.005		0.744		0.233	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.6 Multilevel logistic regression: Justify Violence, WVS 2010, Christian sample, under 30 year olds: *Never vs. Sometimes*

	Model 0b		**Model 1b:** sociodemographics		**Model 2b:** attitudes		**Model 3b:** GDP		**Model 4b:** GINI		**Model 5b:** WGI	
	Random intercept		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-0.421	0.210	-1.025*	0.262	-1.054*	0.262	-1.053*	0.281	-1.043*	0.256	-1.043*	0.265
Female			-0.111	0.092	-0.103	0.093	-0.103	0.093	-0.103	0.093	-0.103	0.093
Age			-0.156*	0.046	-0.141*	0.046	-0.141*	0.046	-0.141*	0.046	-0.142*	0.046
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			-0.025	0.051	-0.062	0.053	-0.062	0.053	-0.060	0.053	-0.062	0.053
Income level (Reversed)			-0.227*	0.052	-0.232*	0.054	-0.232*	0.054	-0.230*	0.054	-0.232*	0.054
Experienced discrimination			0.334*	0.055	0.321*	0.056	0.321*	0.056	0.320*	0.056	0.321*	0.056
Town size (Rural)			0.115*	0.057	0.109	0.058	0.109	0.058	0.107	0.058	0.110	0.058
Not in work or education			0.070	0.107	0.072	0.108	0.071	0.108	0.068	0.108	0.072	0.108
Importance of religion					-0.051	0.056	-0.051	0.056	-0.055	0.056	-0.051	0.056
Political orientation					0.246*	0.048	0.246*	0.048	0.246*	0.048	0.246*	0.048
National pride					-0.128*	0.050	-0.128*	0.050	-0.129*	0.050	-0.128*	0.050
Post materialist values					-0.004	0.049	-0.004	0.049	-0.005	0.049	-0.004	0.049
Low control over life					0.245*	0.049	0.245*	0.049	0.246*	0.049	0.245*	0.049
Reverse GDP							0.001	0.210				
GINI									0.164	0.176		
Reverse WGI											0.058	0.251
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.879		0.851		0.841		0.849		0.815		0.840	
ICC (country)	0.190		0.180		0.228		0.180		0.168		0.177	
AIC	3103.0		3036.7		2991.1		2993.1		2992.2		2993.0	
BIC	3104.2		3042.5		3000.0		3002.7		3001.8		3002.6	
Log likelihood	-1549.5		-1509.4		-1481.5		-1481.5		-1481.1		-1481.5	
N individuals	2729		2729		2729		2729		2,729		2,729	
N countries	14		14		14		14		14		14	
LR chi			80.24		55.62		0.00		0.85		0.05	
P			<.001		<.001		0.954		0.357		0.817	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.7 Multilevel logistic regression: Justify Violence, WVS 2010, Christian sample, 30+ year olds: *Never vs. Rarely*

	Model 0a *Random intercept*		**Model 1a:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2a:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3a:** GDP *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 4a:** GINI *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 5a:** WGI *Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	0.172	0.185	-0.391*	0.197	-0.395*	0.196	-0.415*	0.196	-0.393*	0.197	-0.391*	0.199
Female			0.236*	0.048	0.249*	0.049	0.249*	0.049	0.247*	0.049	0.247*	0.049
Age			-0.109*	0.028	-0.108*	0.028	-0.107*	0.028	-0.108*	0.028	-0.109*	0.028
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			0.016	0.027	-0.004	0.028	-0.004	0.028	-0.004	0.028	-0.003	0.028
Income level (Reversed)			-0.001	0.028	-0.013	0.028	-0.013	0.028	-0.013	0.028	-0.013	0.028
Experienced discrimination			0.217*	0.031	0.213*	0.031	0.213*	0.031	0.213*	0.031	0.213*	0.031
Town size (Rural)			0.035	0.028	0.037	0.028	0.037	0.028	0.037	0.028	0.038	0.028
Not in work or education			0.120*	0.056	0.112	0.056	0.111*	0.056	0.112*	0.056	0.113*	0.056
Importance of religion					-0.057*	0.027	-0.058*	0.027	-0.057*	0.027	-0.057*	0.027
Political orientation					0.089*	0.025	0.089*	0.025	0.089*	0.025	0.091*	0.025
National pride					-0.085*	0.026	-0.085*	0.026	-0.085*	0.026	-0.085*	0.026
Post materialist values					-0.126*	0.024	-0.126*	0.024	-0.126*	0.024	-0.126*	0.024
Low control over life					0.097*	0.026	0.097*	0.026	0.097*	0.026	0.097*	0.026
Reverse GDP							0.164	0.204				
GINI									0.006	0.181		
Reverse WGI											-0.026	0.189
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.858		0.867		0.863		0.853		0.865		0.724	
ICC (country)	0.183		0.186		0.184		0.181		0.185		0.185	
AIC	10947.5		10860.5		10801.0		10802.4		10803.0		10803.0	
BIC	10949.6		10870.3		10816.3		10818.8		10819.4		10819.4	
Log likelihood	-5471.7		-5421.2		-5386.5		-5386.2		-5386.5		-5386.5	
N individuals	8960		8960		8960		8960		8960		8960	
N countries	22		22		22		22		22		22	
LR chi			101.00		69.42		0.61		0.00		0.02	
P			<.001		<.001		0.436		0.969		0.887	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.8 Multilevel logistic regression: Justify Violence, WVS 2010, Christian sample, 30+ year olds: *Never vs. Sometimes*

	Model 0b *Random intercept*		**Model 1b:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2b:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3b:** GDP *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 4b:** GINI *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 5b:** WGI *Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.087*	0.221	-1.880*	0.223	-1.897*	0.232	-1.960*	0.212	-1.857*	0.220	-1.938*	0.207
Female			-0.061	0.071	-0.022	0.072	-0.020	0.072	-0.020	0.072	-0.022	0.072
Age			-0.120*	0.041	-0.115*	0.042	-0.111*	0.042	-0.113*	0.042	-0.111*	0.042
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			0.024	0.040	-0.022	0.041	-0.025	0.041	-0.021	0.041	-0.025	0.041
Income level (Reversed)			-0.148*	0.039	-0.172*	0.039	-0.171*	0.039	-0.172*	0.039	-0.171*	0.039
Experienced discrimination			0.439*	0.043	0.415*	0.043	0.415*	0.043	0.414*	0.043	0.414*	0.043
Town size (Rural)			0.114*	0.043	0.120*	0.043	0.121*	0.043	0.121*	0.043	0.125*	0.043
Not in work or education			0.022	0.081	0.010	0.082	0.011	0.082	0.010	0.082	0.011	0.081
Importance of religion					-0.198*	0.041	-0.203*	0.041	-0.202*	0.042	-0.201*	0.041
Political orientation					0.119*	0.036	0.119*	0.036	0.120*	0.036	0.120*	0.036
National pride					-0.105*	0.040	-0.105*	0.040	-0.108*	0.040	-0.106*	0.040
Post materialist values					-0.004*	0.036	-0.003	0.036	-0.005	0.036	-0.002	0.036
Low control over life					0.262*	0.038	0.262*	0.038	0.263*	0.038	0.261*	0.038
Reverse GDP							0.572*	0.236				
GINI									0.344	0.192		
Reverse WGI											0.556*	0.205
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	1.026		0.937		0.981		0.869		0.917		0.847	
ICC (country)	0.243		0.211		0.226		0.187		0.203		0.179	
AIC	5476.2		5346.4		5263.0		5259.5		5262.0		5258.7	
BIC	5478.3		5356.2		5278.3		5276.2		5278.4		5275.0	
Log likelihood	-2736.1		-2664.2		-2617.5		-2614.9		-2616.0		-2614.3	
N individuals	5626		5626		5626		5626		5626		5626	
N countries	22		22		22		22		22		22	
LR chi			143.73		93.38		5.22		3.02		6.37	
P			<.001		<.001		0.022		0.082		0.012	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.9 Multilevel logistic regression: Justify Political Violence, MYPLACE 2012/13

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	0.030	0.070	0.091	0.077	-0.068	0.083
Female			-0.240*	0.020	-0.238*	0.020
Age			0.070*	0.010	0.070*	0.014
Not in work or education			0.084*	0.030	0.078*	0.030
Coping on income			0.021	0.012	0.017	0.019
SES at 14			0.029*	0.011	0.027*	0.010
Experienced threat			0.169*	0.023	0.186*	0.035
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Location	0.430		0.415		0.423	
Age					0.054	
Coping on income					0.078	
Experienced threat					0.140	
Residual	0.918		0.905		0.899	
ICC (intercept)	0.179		0.174		0.176	
AIC	23026.1		22791.1		22761.6	
BIC	23047.2		22854.6		22888.6	
Log likelihood	-11510.0		-11386.5		-11362.8	
N individuals	8583		8583		8583	
N locations	30		30		30	
LR chi			247.00		47.51	
P			<.001		<.001	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.4.

Table A2.10 Linear regression: Support Political Violence, Young in Oslo 2015

	Generalised support for political violence				*Specific support for political violence in Syria*					
	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 1**		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
JustViol	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Intercept	1.694*	0.022	1.754*	0.053	2.059*	0.031	2.081*	0.070	2.092*	0.066
Age	-0.028*	0.011	-0.046	0.026	-0.156*	0.015	-0.052	0.034	-0.008	0.032
Female	-0.107*	0.008	-0.097*	0.020	-0.052*	0.012	-0.047	0.027	-0.086*	0.025
Family struggling financially	0.035*	0.007	0.074*	0.017	0.050*	0.009	0.063*	0.022	0.059*	0.021
Thinks will be unemployed in the future	0.034*	0.006	0.024	0.015	0.013	0.009	0.036	0.020	0.023	0.019
Parent(s) unemployed	0.016*	0.007	0.025	0.018	-0.005	0.010	-0.039	0.024	-0.027	0.023
Parents born abroad	0.062*	0.016	0.010	0.036	-0.033	0.022	-0.095	0.048	-0.073	0.045
Christian	0.007	0.014	-0.040	0.033	0.076*	0.020	0.091*	0.044	0.106*	0.042
Muslim	0.084*	0.023	0.073	0.059	0.307*	0.032	0.487*	0.079	0.513*	0.074
Other religion	0.151*	0.027	0.341*	0.069	0.276*	0.038	0.505*	0.090	0.450*	0.084
Experienced harassment or violence	0.150*	0.015	0.110*	0.035	0.125*	0.021	0.184*	0.047	0.139*	0.044
Experienced discrimination / hate crime	0.038*	0.007	-0.022	0.020	0.023*	0.010	-0.013	0.026	-0.004	0.024
Right wing political views			-0.001	0.016			0.006	0.022	0.043*	0.021
War between Islam and West			0.039*	0.015			0.062*	0.020	0.066*	0.018
Support nonviolent in Syria									0.362*	0.019
R sq	0.044		0.051		0.027		0.048		0.180	
N	14491		2415		13798		2345		2303	
LR chi			7.47				10.81		342.39	
P	<.001		0.024		<.001		0.005		<.001	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.5.

Table A2.11 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, EVS 2017, under 30 year olds

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	1.630*	0.036	1.642*	0.042	1.649*	0.044	1.658*	0.044	1.658*	0.044	1.617*	0.038	1.652*	0.042	1.658*	0.041	1.632*	0.040
Age			-0.016*	0.007	-0.025*	0.008	-0.026*	0.008	-0.026*	0.008	-0.025*	0.009	-0.026*	0.008	-0.026*	0.008	-0.026*	0.009
Female			-0.065*	0.015	-0.075*	0.016	-0.072*	0.016	-0.072*	0.016	-0.072*	0.018	-0.072*	0.016	-0.072*	0.016	-0.073*	0.018
Not in work or education			0.058*	0.020	0.071*	0.023	0.075*	0.023	0.075*	0.023	0.085*	0.029	0.073*	0.023	0.073*	0.023	0.084*	0.029
Reverse HH income			0.024*	0.008	0.015	0.009	0.014	0.009	0.014	0.009	0.015	0.009	0.015	0.009	0.014	0.009	0.013	0.009
Parents struggling financially when R 14			0.021*	0.008	0.017*	0.008	0.016	0.008	0.016	0.008	0.017	0.010	0.015	0.008	0.015	0.008	0.021*	0.010
Parent(s) born abroad			0.024	0.027	0.015	0.029	0.015	0.028	0.015	0.028	-0.006	0.030	0.017	0.028	0.017	0.028	-0.002	0.030
R born abroad			-0.040	0.031	-0.002	0.046	0.001	0.046	0.001	0.046	-0.011	0.047	0.004	0.046	0.004	0.046	-0.006	0.047
Religion important in life					0.031*	0.009	0.032*	0.009	0.032*	0.009	0.040*	0.011	0.030*	0.009	0.030*	0.009	0.036*	0.011
Right wing political views					0.036*	0.008	0.038*	0.012	0.038*	0.012	0.042*	0.014	0.037*	0.012	0.037*	0.012	0.045*	0.014
National pride					-0.054*	0.009	-0.053*	0.012	-0.053*	0.012	-0.048*	0.015	-0.053*	0.012	-0.053*	0.012	-0.052*	0.015
Low life control					0.043*	0.008	0.052*	0.015	0.052*	0.015	0.058*	0.015	0.052*	0.015	0.051*	0.015	0.055*	0.016
Post materialist values					-0.073*	0.009	-0.072*	0.009	-0.072*	0.009	-0.077*	0.010	-0.072*	0.009	-0.072*	0.009	-0.081*	0.010
Gini									-0.005	0.033	-0.068*	0.028	-0.019	0.032	-0.019	0.031	-0.054	0.030
Reverse Welfare expenditure											0.109*	0.026						
Reverse GDP													0.079*	0.037				
Reverse WGI															0.088*	0.035		
Reverse MIPEX																	0.086*	0.026
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	0.193		0.197		0.184		0.184		0.184		0.113		0.170		0.166		0.126	
Right wing political views							0.042		0.042		0.043		0.042		0.042		0.043	
National pride							0.044		0.044		0.051		0.044		0.044		0.049	
Low life control							0.062		0.062		0.050		0.063		0.063		0.052	
SD Residual	0.601		0.588		0.564		0.558		0.558		0.540		0.558		0.558		0.537	
ICC	0.094		0.101		0.097		0.098		0.098		0.042		0.085		0.081		0.052	
AIC	15886.0		12008.4		8627.4		8593.7		8595.7		6149.7		8593.4		8591.9		5922.9	
BIC	15907.2		12076.5		8725.2		8711.1		8719.6		6274.3		8723.8		8722.4		6046.8	
Log likelihood	-7940.0		-5994.2		-4298.7		-4278.8		-4278.8		-3054.9		-4276.7		-4276.0		-2941.5	
N individuals	8,667		6692		5031		5031		5031		3747		5031		5031		3630	
N countries	30		30		30		30		30		30		30		30		23	
LR chi			54.15		158.48		39.69		0.02		13.65		4.30		5.72		8.77	
P			<.001		<.001		<.001		0.893		<.001		0.038		0.017		0.003	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.1.

Table A2.12 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, EVS 2017, 30+ year olds

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	1.544*	0.044	1.513*	0.043	1.490*	0.040	1.497*	0.041	1.498*	0.040	1.450*	0.032	1.475*	0.037	1.479*	0.036	1.450*	0.032
Age			-0.035*	0.003	-0.036*	0.003	-0.035*	0.008	-0.035*	0.008	-0.044*	0.008	-0.035*	0.008	-0.034*	0.008	-0.047*	0.008
Female			0.000	0.006	-0.003	0.006	-0.003	0.009	-0.003	0.009	-0.004	0.010	-0.003	0.009	-0.003	0.009	-0.001	0.010
Not in work or education			0.047*	0.009	0.034*	0.010	0.036*	0.010	0.036*	0.010	0.034*	0.012	0.036*	0.010	0.036*	0.010	0.035*	0.012
Reverse HH income			0.074*	0.003	0.060*	0.004	0.057*	0.007	0.057*	0.007	0.062*	0.007	0.056*	0.007	0.056*	0.007	0.063*	0.008
Parents struggling financially when R 14			0.016*	0.003	0.014*	0.003	0.013*	0.006	0.013*	0.006	0.012*	0.006	0.013*	0.006	0.013*	0.006	0.012*	0.006
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.033*	0.012	-0.036*	0.013	-0.038*	0.013	-0.038*	0.013	-0.033*	0.013	-0.037*	0.013	-0.037*	0.013	-0.038*	0.013
R born abroad			-0.052*	0.011	-0.059*	0.015	-0.059*	0.015	-0.059*	0.015	-0.061*	0.015	-0.058*	0.015	-0.058*	0.015	-0.068*	0.015
Religion important in life					0.000	0.004	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.006
Right wing political views					0.012*	0.003	0.013	0.008	0.013	0.008	0.020	0.009	0.013	0.008	0.013	0.008	0.019*	0.010
National pride					-0.035*	0.003	-0.044*	0.007	-0.044*	0.007	-0.046*	0.008	-0.044*	0.007	-0.044*	0.007	-0.047*	0.008
Low life control					0.054*	0.003	0.055*	0.007	0.055*	0.007	0.060*	0.007	0.055*	0.007	0.055*	0.007	0.058*	0.007
Post materialist values					-0.062*	0.003	-0.057*	0.006	-0.057*	0.006	-0.064*	0.005	-0.057*	0.006	-0.056*	0.006	-0.062*	0.005
Gini									0.027	0.037	-0.041	0.032	0.005	0.034	0.006	0.033	-0.019	0.032
Reverse Welfare Expenditure											0.114*	0.030						
Reverse GDP													0.106*	0.037				
Reverse WGI															0.106*	0.035		
Reverse MIPEX																	0.086*	0.028
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
Country intercept	0.239		0.231		0.209		0.215		0.213		0.144		0.189		0.186		0.143	
Age							0.037		0.037		0.036		0.037		0.037		0.032	
Female							0.034		0.034		0.034		0.034		0.034		0.032	
Reverse HH income							0.035		0.035		0.031		0.035		0.035		0.032	
Parents struggling financially when R 14							0.025		0.025		0.023		0.025		0.026		0.023	
Religion important in life							0.024		0.024		0.020		0.025		0.024		0.021	
Right wing political views							0.041		0.041		0.041		0.041		0.041		0.042	
National pride							0.029		0.029		0.032		0.029		0.029		0.033	
Low life control							0.034		0.034		0.026		0.034		0.034		0.026	
Post materialist values							0.029		0.029		0.015		0.029		0.029		0.014	
Residual	0.570		0.553		0.523		0.516		0.516		0.508		0.516		0.516		0.501	
ICC	0.149		0.149		0.148		0.147		0.146		0.075		0.118		0.115		0.075	

AIC	76441.9	60383.1	44012.2	43605.79	43607.3	35308.6	43602.0	43601.2	33694.0
BIC	76468.0	60468.2	44136.0	43803.91	43813.7	35518.3	43816.7	43815.8	33903.0
Log likelihood	-38218.0	-30181.6	-21991.1	-21778.9	-21778.6	-17628.3	-21775.0	-21774.6	-16821.0
N individuals	44514	31914	28424	28424	28424	23523	28424	28424	22864
N countries	30	30	30	30	30	24	30	30	23
LR chi		692.10	732.1	424.39	0.51	11.30	7.24	8.11	8.01
P		<.001	<.001	<.001	0.475	0.001	0.007	0.004	0.005

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.1.

Table A2.13 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, EVS 2008, under 30 year olds

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	1.754*	0.029	1.793*	0.036	1.771*	0.042	1.784*	0.042	1.792*	0.043	1.843*	0.048	1.796*	0.043	1.797*	0.043	1.791*	0.053
Age			-0.016*	0.006	-0.024*	0.008	-0.021*	0.008	-0.021*	0.008	-0.032*	0.009	-0.021*	0.008	-0.021*	0.008	-0.030*	0.010
Female			-0.005	0.013	-0.013	0.015	-0.013	0.015	-0.009	0.015	0.001	0.018	-0.009	0.015	-0.009	0.015	-0.008	0.019
Not in work or education			0.052*	0.016	0.052*	0.020	0.049*	0.020	0.050*	0.020	0.049	0.026	0.049*	0.020	0.050*	0.020	0.063*	0.027
Reverse HH income			0.023*	0.007	0.021*	0.009	0.029*	0.011	0.029*	0.011	0.026*	0.011	0.027*	0.011	0.028*	0.011	0.026*	0.012
Parents struggling when R 14			0.067*	0.023	0.077*	0.028	0.081*	0.028	0.077*	0.029	0.143*	0.040	0.076*	0.029	0.076*	0.029	0.087*	0.043
Rural (fewer than 5000 people)			0.050*	0.015	0.062*	0.018	0.072*	0.023	0.078*	0.023	0.092*	0.026	0.078*	0.023	0.078*	0.023	0.108*	0.025
Parent(s) born abroad			0.002	0.024	-0.020	0.029	-0.016	0.029	-0.012	0.030	-0.009	0.035	-0.011	0.030	-0.012	0.030	-0.013	0.038
R born abroad			-0.050	0.027	-0.071	0.045	-0.066	0.045	-0.063	0.046	-0.074	0.052	-0.062	0.046	-0.062	0.046	-0.115	0.059
Religion important in life					0.003	0.009	0.001	0.012	0.003	0.011	-0.006	0.014	0.002	0.012	0.002	0.012	0.000	0.015
Right wing political views					-0.008	0.008	-0.008	0.010	-0.008	0.010	0.000	0.014	-0.008	0.010	-0.008	0.010	-0.004	0.013
National pride					-0.043*	0.008	-0.046*	0.011	-0.041*	0.010	-0.038*	0.012	-0.040*	0.010	-0.041*	0.010	-0.040*	0.013
Low life control					0.049*	0.008	0.054*	0.010	0.053*	0.010	0.069*	0.012	0.053*	0.010	0.053*	0.010	0.076*	0.012
Post materialist values					-0.040*	0.008	-0.036*	0.010	-0.037*	0.010	-0.038*	0.012	-0.036*	0.010	-0.036*	0.010	-0.039*	0.012
Gini									0.030	0.033	0.041	0.039	0.022	0.033	0.022	0.034	0.070	0.041
Reverse Welfare expenditure											0.067	0.036						
Reverse GDP													0.039	0.037				
Reverse WGI															0.028	0.034		
Reverse MIPEX																	0.007	0.039

Random effects (SD)	Estim.	Estim.	Estim.	Estim.	Estim.	Estim.	Estim.	Estim.	Estim.
Country intercept	0.189	0.193	0.201	0.195	0.199	0.177	0.195	0.196	0.194
Reverse HH income				0.037	0.038	0.032	0.037	0.037	0.035
Rural (fewer than 5000 people)				0.084	0.081	0.078	0.080	0.080	0.053
Religion important in life				0.043	0.038	0.041	0.039	0.038	0.045
Right wing political views				0.038	0.037	0.048	0.037	0.037	0.040
National pride				0.041	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.042
Low life control				0.035	0.034	0.035	0.034	0.034	0.027
Post materialist values				0.036	0.037	0.036	0.037	0.037	0.040
Residual	0.594	0.589	0.573	0.565	0.564	0.564	0.564	0.564	0.556
ICC	0.092	0.097	0.110	0.107	0.110	0.089	0.107	0.108	0.109
AIC	23378.8	16012.3	10266.9	10238.8	9814.6	7025.6	9815.5	9815.9	6270.4
BIC	23401.2	16090.3	10373.8	10392.4	9973.9	7183.1	9981.4	9981.8	6425.5
Log likelihood	-11686.4	-7995.1	-5117.5	-5096.4	-4883.3	-3487.8	-4882.7	-4883.0	-3110.2
N individuals	12,937	8917	5871	5871	5636	4022	5636	5636	3648
N countries	45	45	45	45	43	33	43	43	31
LR chi		61.86	96.00	42.08	0.82	3.22	1.08	0.65	0.03
P		<.001	<.001	<.001	0.365	0.073	0.300	0.420	0.862

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.2.

Table A2.14 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, EVS 2008, 30+ year olds

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	1.721*	0.034	1.745*	0.033	1.706*	0.031	1.704*	0.031	1.698*	0.032	1.693*	0.033	1.700*	0.030	1.699*	0.031	1.691*	0.038
Age			-0.002	0.003	-0.002	0.004	-0.004	0.004	-0.004	0.004	-0.007	0.004	-0.004	0.004	-0.004	0.004	-0.009*	0.004
Female			0.014*	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.010	0.007	0.012	0.008	0.010	0.007	0.010	0.007	0.015	0.008
Not in work, educ. or retirement			0.011*	0.003	0.010*	0.004	0.011*	0.005	0.011*	0.005	0.013*	0.005	0.011*	0.005	0.011*	0.005	0.013*	0.005
Reverse HH income			0.058*	0.004	0.047*	0.004	0.055*	0.009	0.052*	0.009	0.046*	0.010	0.050*	0.009	0.050*	0.009	0.047*	0.010
Parents struggling when R 14			0.055*	0.011	0.053*	0.013	0.060*	0.022	0.051*	0.022	0.063*	0.021	0.048*	0.021	0.049*	0.021	0.067*	0.022
Rural (fewer than 5000 people)			0.031*	0.007	0.043*	0.008	0.042*	0.018	0.049*	0.017	0.060*	0.019	0.049*	0.017	0.049*	0.017	0.060*	0.021
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.003	0.013	-0.014	0.015	-0.019	0.015	-0.017	0.015	-0.010	0.017	-0.017	0.015	-0.017	0.015	-0.007	0.017
R born abroad			0.004	0.012	-0.028	0.016	-0.042*	0.020	-0.047*	0.021	-0.041	0.021	-0.046*	0.021	-0.047*	0.021	-0.043	0.023

Religion important in life			-0.018*	0.004	-0.020*	0.007	-0.022*	0.006	-0.013*	0.005	-0.022*	0.006	-0.022*	0.006	-0.012*	0.005
Right wing political views			-0.016*	0.004	-0.015*	0.008	-0.014	0.009	-0.011	0.010	-0.014	0.009	-0.014	0.009	-0.010	0.010
National pride			-0.045*	0.004	-0.046*	0.006	-0.045*	0.007	-0.045*	0.008	-0.045*	0.007	-0.045*	0.007	-0.045*	0.008
Low life control			0.044*	0.004	0.041*	0.006	0.041*	0.006	0.050*	0.006	0.041*	0.006	0.041*	0.006	0.049*	0.007
Post materialist values			-0.059*	0.004	-0.052*	0.006	-0.050*	0.006	-0.051*	0.007	-0.050*	0.006	-0.050*	0.006	-0.050*	0.007
Gini							0.035	0.031	0.005	0.034	0.019	0.029	0.016	0.030	0.032	0.038
Reverse Welfare expenditure									0.098*	0.032						
Reverse GDP											0.067*	0.028				
Reverse WGI													0.067*	0.030		
Reverse MIPEX															0.031	0.037
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**	**Estim.**	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
Country intercept	0.225	0.209	0.193		0.189		0.190		0.165		0.177		0.178		0.190	
Not in work, educ. or retirement					0.019		0.019		0.000		0.019		0.019		0.004	
Reverse HH income					0.045		0.041		0.045		0.041		0.041		0.044	
Parents struggling when R 14					0.100		0.095		0.060		0.086		0.092		0.063	
Rural (fewer than 5000 people)					0.101		0.092		0.094		0.091		0.091		0.101	
R born abroad					0.069		0.071		0.047		0.068		0.070		0.050	
Religion important in life					0.032		0.026		0.010		0.026		0.026		0.011	
Right wing political views					0.048		0.050		0.050		0.049		0.049		0.051	
National pride					0.032		0.033		0.036		0.033		0.033		0.036	
Low life control					0.031		0.032		0.025		0.032		0.032		0.026	
Post materialist values					0.032		0.031		0.031		0.031		0.031		0.032	
Residual	0.585	0.578	0.554		0.546		0.544		0.533		0.544		0.544		0.531	
ICC	0.129	0.116	0.108		0.107		0.109		0.087		0.096		0.097		0.114	
AIC	85216.07	62196.6	42309.8		41936.7		40825.2		32009.2		40822.1		40822.5		29986.8	
BIC	85242.42	62289.9	42440.0		42148.4		41044.5		32230.5		41049.4		41049.8		30206.4	
Log likelihood	-42605.0	-31087.3	-21138.9		-20942.3		-20385.6		-15976.6		-20383		-20383.2		-14965.4	
N individuals	48,123	35590	25391		25391		24825		19980		24825		24825		18814	
N countries	45	45	45		45		43		33		43		43		31	
LR chi		338.71	613.92		393.08		1.27		8.17		5.18		4.74		0.91	
P		<.001	<.001		<.001		0.259		0.004		0.023		0.030		0.340	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.2.

Table A2.15 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, WVS 2010, Muslim sample, under 30 year olds

	Bad vs. Fairly good						*Bad vs. Very good*					
	Model 0a		**Model 1a**: sociodemographics		**Model 2a**: attitudes		**Model 0b**		**Model 1b:** sociodemographics		**Model 2b:** attitudes	
	Random intercept		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.085*	0.017	-1.507*	0.266	-1.475*	0.272	-1.239*	0.295	-1.941*	0.379	-1.824*	0.353
Female			-0.072	0.176	-0.081	0.180			-0.234	0.174	-0.294	0.179
Age			0.003	0.083	-0.014	0.085			0.011	0.084	0.015	0.086
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			0.069	0.088	-0.003	0.092			0.033	0.087	-0.041	0.092
Income level (Reversed)			0.192*	0.092	0.140	0.094			0.044	0.088	0.023	0.090
Experienced discrimination			0.312*	0.103	0.259*	0.107			0.450*	0.106	0.377*	0.108
Town size (Rural)			0.032	0.086	0.026	0.088			-0.005	0.092	-0.013	0.094
Not in work or education			-0.368	0.197	-0.389	0.202			-0.027	0.195	-0.129	0.203
Importance of religion					-0.245*	0.082					-0.292*	0.088
Political orientation					-0.076	0.091					0.019	0.084
National pride					-0.211*	0.081					-0.190*	0.082
Post materialist values					0.026	0.084					0.077	0.089
Low control over life					0.177*	0.089					0.193*	0.089
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.354		0.332		0.342		0.692		0.732		0.644	
ICC (country)	0.037		0.034		0.039		0.127		0.140		0.112	
AIC	915.9		912.0		896.8		947.9		941.3		922.8	
BIC	915.5		909.8		893.9		947.5		939.4		919.9	
Log likelihood	-455.9		-446.8		-434.4		-471.9		-461.7		-447.4	
N individuals	806		806		806		949		949		949	
N countries	6		6		6		6		6		6	
LR chi			18.2		24.84				20.58		28.51	
P			0.011		<.001				0.004		<.001	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.16 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, WVS 2010, Muslim sample, 30+ year olds

	Bad vs. Fairly good						*Bad vs. Very good*					
	Model 0a		**Model 1a:** sociodemographics		**Model 2a:** attitudes		**Model 0b**		**Model 1b:** sociodemographics		**Model 2b:** attitudes	
	Random intercept		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-0.883*	0.151	-1.363*	0.217	-1.355*	0.217	-1.226*	0.254	-2.166*	0.306	-2.023*	0.273
Female			-0.111	0.123	-0.168	0.126			-0.058	0.127	-0.071	0.131
Age			0.080	0.057	0.076	0.059			0.131*	0.060	0.138*	0.620
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			0.024	0.059	-0.072	0.063			0.021	0.062	-0.073	0.067
Income level (Reversed)			0.170*	0.062	0.214*	0.064			0.159*	0.065	0.202*	0.067
Experienced discrimination			0.243*	0.076	0.204*	0.079			0.437*	0.076	0.358*	0.078
Town size (Rural)			0.097	0.063	0.116	0.064			0.056	0.065	0.060	0.067
Not in work or education			0.093	0.131	0.127	0.135			0.276*	0.134	0.213	0.139
Importance of religion					-0.394*	0.062					-0.416*	0.062
Political orientation					0.131*	0.063					0.157*	0.061
National pride					-0.132*	0.057					-0.186*	0.058
Post materialist values					0.107	0.061					0.041	0.060
Low control over life					0.161*	0.063					0.204*	0.062
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.429		0.387		0.355		0.777		0.794		0.651	
ICC (country)	0.053		0.043		0.037		0.155		0.161		0.114	
AIC	1889.9		1878.4		1818.6		1971.4		1933.8		1858.8	
BIC	1890.5		1881.1		1822.9		1972.0		1936.5		1863.0	
Log likelihood	-942.9		-930.2		-895.3		-983.7		-957.9		-915.4	
N individuals	1592		1592		1592		1929		1929		1929	
N countries	10		10		10		10		10		10	
LR chi			25.52		69.74				51.60		84.99	
P			<.001		<.001				<.001		<.001	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.17 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, WVS 2010, Christian sample, under 30 year olds, *Bad vs. Fairly good*

	Model 0a		**Model 1a**: sociodemographics		**Model 2a**: attitudes		**Model 3a**: GDP		**Model 4a**: GINI		**Model 5a**: WGI	
Under 30 year olds	*Random intercept*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-0.950*	0.164	-1.238*	0.206	-1.267*	0.205	-1.2875*	0.1973	-1.256*	0.2066	-1.2669*	0.205
Female			-0.174	0.096	-0.160	0.097	-0.160	0.097	-0.160	0.097	-0.160	0.097
Age			-0.029	0.047	-0.026	0.047	-0.025	0.047	-0.026	0.047	-0.026	0.047
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			0.040	0.053	0.025	0.054	0.020	0.054	0.025	0.054	0.025	0.054
Income level (Reversed)			-0.069	0.053	-0.076	0.054	-0.075	0.054	-0.076	0.054	-0.076	0.054
Experienced discrimination			0.164*	0.059	0.156*	0.059	0.157*	0.059	0.155*	0.059	0.155*	0.059
Town size (Rural)			0.077	0.056	0.081	0.056	0.083	0.056	0.080	0.056	0.081	0.056
Not in work or education			0.232*	0.107	0.234*	0.108	0.233*	0.108	0.233*	0.108	0.234*	0.108
Importance of religion					-0.056	0.051	-0.062	0.051	-0.058	0.051	-0.056	0.051
Political orientation					0.042	0.054	0.042	0.054	0.041	0.054	0.042	0.054
National pride					-0.079	0.048	-0.083	0.047	-0.080	0.048	-0.079	0.048
Post materialist values					-0.033	0.050	-0.030	0.050	-0.033	0.050	-0.033	0.050
Low control over life					0.073	0.050	0.070	0.050	0.073	0.050	0.073	0.050
Reverse GDP							0.225	0.148				
GINI									0.060	0.157		
Reverse WGI											0.011	0.155
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.646		0.644		0.632		0.588		0.629		0.632	
ICC (country)	0.113		0.112		0.108		0.095		0.107		0.108	
AIC	2802.5		2797.9		2800.6		2800.4		2802.4		2802.5	
BIC	2804.1		2805.4		2812.2		2812.9		2814.9		2815.1	
Log likelihood	-1399.2		-1390.0		-1386.3		-1385.2		-1386.2		-1386.3	
N individuals	2522		2522		2522		2522		2522		2522	
N countries	17		17		17		17		17		17	
LR chi			18.57		7.35		2.15		0.14		0.01	
P			0.010		0.196		0.143		0.705		0.942	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.18 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, WVS 2010, Christian sample, under 30 year olds, *Bad vs. Very good*

	Model 0b		**Model 1b**: sociodemographics		**Model 2b:** attitudes		**Model 3b:** GDP		**Model 4b:** GINI		**Model 5b:** WGI	
Under 30 year olds	*Random intercept*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-0.959*	0.221	-1.413*	0.257	-1.487*	0.244	-1.674*	0.239	-1.485*	0.246	-1.567*	0.239
Female			-0.055	0.097	-0.029	0.098	-0.029	0.098	-0.028	0.098	-0.029	0.098
Age			-0.087	0.048	-0.073	0.049	-0.074	0.049	-0.073	0.049	-0.073	0.049
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			0.083	0.053	0.056	0.055	0.060	0.055	0.056	0.055	0.058	0.055
Income level (Reversed)			-0.158*	0.054	-0.152*	0.055	-0.150*	0.055	-0.152*	0.055	-0.151*	0.055
Experienced discrimination			0.233*	0.059	0.237*	0.060	0.236*	0.060	0.236*	0.060	0.239*	0.060
Town size (Rural)			0.129*	0.059	0.132*	0.060	0.129*	0.060	0.132*	0.060	0.124*	0.060
Not in work or education			0.197	0.110	0.186	0.111	0.189	0.111	0.186	0.111	0.188	0.111
Importance of religion					-0.200*	0.052	-0.197*	0.052	-0.201*	0.052	-0.201*	0.052
Political orientation					0.180*	0.051	0.178*	0.051	0.180*	0.051	0.178*	0.051
National pride					-0.054	0.050	-0.048	0.050	-0.054	0.050	-0.050	0.050
Post materialist values					-0.068	0.052	-0.068	0.052	-0.068	0.052	-0.067	0.052
Low control over life					0.123*	0.050	0.127*	0.050	0.123*	0.050	0.125*	0.050
Reverse GDP							-0.354*	0.161				
GINI									0.010	0.160		
Reverse WGI											-0.305*	0.203
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.886		0.88		0.834		0.729		0.833		0.779	
ICC (country)	0.193		0.200		0.175		0.139		0.174		0.156	
AIC	2864.9		2842.3		2817.7		2815.3		2819.6		2817.5	
BIC	2866.5		2847.8		2829.3		2827.8		2832.1		2830.0	
Log likelihood	-1430.4		-1412.2		-1394.8		-1392.7		-1394.8		-1393.8	
N individuals	3085		3085		3085		3085		3085		3085	
N countries	17		17		17		17		17		17	
LR chi			36.55		34.65		4.32		0		2.14	
P			<.001		<.001		0.038		0.949		0.143	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.19 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, WVS 2010, Christian sample, 30+ year olds, *Bad vs. Fairly good*

	Model 0a		**Model 1a:** sociodemographics		**Model 2a:** attitudes		**Model 3a:** GDP		**Model 4a:** GINI		**Model 5a:** WGI	
	Random intercept		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.119*	0.146	-1.193*	0.167	-1.202*	0.166	-1.177*	0.155	-1.182*	0.165	-1.199*	0.153
Female			0.007	0.065	0.015	0.066	0.018	0.066	0.017	0.066	0.016	0.066
Age			-0.067	0.036	-0.066	0.037	-0.064	0.037	-0.065	0.037	-0.064	0.037
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			0.028	0.036	0.008	0.037	0.006	0.037	0.009	0.037	0.008	0.037
Income level (Reversed)			0.029	0.036	0.023	0.036	0.022	0.036	0.022	0.036	0.021	0.036
Experienced discrimination			0.024	0.041	0.019	0.041	0.020	0.041	0.018	0.041	0.017	0.041
Town size (Rural)			-0.018	0.038	-0.014	0.038	-0.012	0.038	-0.013	0.038	-0.009	0.038
Not in work or education			0.049	0.073	0.050	0.073	0.048	0.073	0.048	0.073	0.050	0.073
Importance of religion					-0.031	0.037	-0.037	0.037	-0.034	0.037	-0.035	0.037
Political orientation					-0.042	0.033	-0.043	0.033	-0.043	0.033	-0.043	0.033
National pride					-0.023	0.035	-0.023	0.035	-0.024	0.035	-0.025	0.035
Post materialist values					0.019	0.033	0.019	0.033	0.019	0.033	0.019	0.033
Low control over life					0.073*	0.034	0.072*	0.034	0.073*	0.034	0.073*	0.034
Reverse GDP							0.235*	0.106				
GINI									0.131	0.144		
Reverse WGI											0.263*	0.114
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.641		0.638		0.631		0.562		0.617		0.559	
ICC (country)	0.114		0.110		0.108		0.088		0.104		0.087	
AIC	6294.3		-3142.1		6303.5		6301.1		6304.7		6300.7	
BIC	6296.3		6302.2		6318.2		6316.8		6320.4		6316.4	
Log likelihood	-3145.1		6311.6		-3137.8		-3135.5		-3137.4		-3135.4	
N individuals	5968		5968		5968		5968		5968		5968	
N countries	21		21		21		21		21		21	
LR chi			6.05		8.66		4.44		0.83		4.83	
P			0.534		0.123		0.035		0.363		0.028	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.20 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, WVS 2010, Christian sample, 30+ year olds, *Bad vs. Very good*

	Model 0b		**Model 1b: sociodemographics**		**Model 2b:** attitudes		**Model 3b:** GDP		**Model 4b:** GINI		**Model 5b:** WGI	
	Random intercept		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-0.984*	0.179	-1.657*	0.192	-1.672*	0.195	-1.760*	0.161	-1.657*	0.192	-1.711*	0.183
Female			0.199*	0.068	0.233*	0.068	0.234*	0.068	0.234*	0.068	0.233*	0.068
Age			-0.136*	0.039	-0.134*	0.039	-0.129*	0.039	-0.133*	0.039	-0.132*	0.039
Satisfaction with income (Reversed)			0.037	0.038	0.002	0.039	-0.002	0.039	0.003	0.039	0.001	0.039
Income level (Reversed)			-0.022	0.037	-0.036	0.037	-0.035	0.037	-0.037	0.037	-0.036	0.037
Experienced discrimination			0.273*	0.042	0.258*	0.042	0.258*	0.042	0.257*	0.042	0.256*	0.042
Town size (Rural)			0.022	0.040	0.027	0.040	0.031	0.040	0.027	0.040	0.030	0.040
Not in work or education			0.204*	0.075	0.194*	0.076	0.193*	0.076	0.193*	0.076	0.195*	0.076
Importance of religion					-0.104*	0.037	-0.112*	0.037	-0.106*	0.038	-0.107*	0.037
Political orientation					0.061	0.034	0.061	0.034	0.061	0.034	0.061	0.034
National pride					-0.096*	0.037	-0.097*	0.037	-0.098*	0.037	-0.098*	0.037
Post materialist values					-0.089*	0.035	-0.087*	0.035	-0.089*	0.035	-0.088*	0.035
Low control over life					0.162*	0.035	0.160*	0.035	0.163*	0.035	0.161*	0.035
Reverse GDP							0.645*	0.169				
GINI									0.155	0.167		
Reverse WGI											0.339*	0.167
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Country intercept	0.803		0.767		0.779		0.587		0.764		0.709	
ICC (country)	0.164		0.152		0.156		0.095		0.151		0.133	
AIC	-2885.3		5715.0		5675.5		5666.3		5676.7		5673.7	
BIC	5774.6		5724.4		5690.2		568196.0		5692.3		5689.4	
Log likelihood	5776.7		-2848.5		-2823.8		-2818.2		-2823.3		-2821.9	
N individuals	5442		5442		5442		5442		5442		5442	
N countries	21		21		21		21		21		21	
LR chi			73.64		49.45		11.24		0.86		3.79	
P			<.001		<.001		<.001		0.353		0.052	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.3.

Table A2.21 Multilevel logistic regression: Anti-Democracy, MYPLACE 2012/13

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	0.051	0.068	0.021	0.069	0.047	0.068
Female			-0.019	0.020	-0.011	0.020
Age			0.068*	0.010	0.074*	0.017
Not in work or education			0.121*	0.031	0.101*	0.031
Coping on income			0.009	0.012	0.010	0.019
SES at 14			0.083*	0.011	0.073*	0.019
Experienced threat			0.055*	0.023	0.061	0.035
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Location	0.370		0.367		0.364	
Age					0.071	
Coping on income					0.076	
SES at 14					0.084	
Experienced threat					0.136	
Residual	0.925		0.918		0.908	
ICC (intercept)	0.138		0.138		0.134	
AIC	23139.3		23022.9		22972.1	
BIC	23160.4		23086.4		23134.4	
Log likelihood	-11566.6		-11502.4		-11463.0	
N individuals	8583		8583		8583	
N locations	30		30		30	
LR chi			128.37		78.81	
P			<.001		<.001	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.4.

Table A2.22 Do not want Muslim neighbours, EVS 2017, under 30 year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.592*	0.209	-1.881*	0.236	-1.751*	0.261	-1.802*	0.273	-1.806*	0.272	-2.346*	0.262	-1.822*	0.240	-1.759*	0.252	-2.241*	0.279
Age			-0.023	0.037	-0.022	0.043	-0.025	0.044	-0.025	0.044	-0.015	0.052	-0.024	0.044	-0.024	0.044	-0.019	0.053
Female			-0.160*	0.073	-0.113	0.085	-0.073	0.087	-0.072	0.087	-0.137	0.103	-0.068	0.087	-0.069	0.087	-0.134	0.105
Not in work or education			0.265*	0.098	0.206	0.117	0.212	0.119	0.211	0.119	0.179	0.154	0.194	0.119	0.204	0.119	0.176	0.160
Reverse HH income			-0.030	0.039	-0.050	0.045	-0.048	0.046	-0.048	0.046	-0.043	0.052	-0.044	0.046	-0.046	0.046	-0.066	0.053
Parents struggling when R 14			0.067	0.037	0.040	0.044	0.046	0.045	0.046	0.045	0.006	0.054	0.043	0.045	0.044	0.045	0.020	0.055
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.491*	0.154	-0.369*	0.174	-0.381*	0.179	-0.381*	0.179	-0.642*	0.227	-0.374*	0.179	-0.379*	0.179	-0.691*	0.235
R born abroad			-0.325	0.198	-0.050	0.277	-0.042	0.285	-0.042	0.285	-0.399	0.362	-0.031	0.285	-0.037	0.285	-0.358	0.365
Religion important in life					-0.158*	0.052	-0.152*	0.053	-0.153*	0.053	-0.189*	0.062	-0.167*	0.053	-0.161*	0.053	-0.182*	0.063
Right wing political views					0.256*	0.044	0.327*	0.106	0.328*	0.106	0.411*	0.123	0.332*	0.106	0.331*	0.106	0.408*	0.128
National pride					0.094*	0.046	0.069	0.047	0.069	0.047	0.034	0.055	0.070	0.047	0.071	0.047	0.043	0.057
Low life control					0.120*	0.041	0.089	0.055	0.088	0.055	0.091	0.055	0.085	0.055	0.086	0.055	0.070	0.057
Post materialist values					-0.201*	0.044	-0.184*	0.045	-0.183*	0.045	-0.255*	0.053	-0.183*	0.045	-0.181*	0.045	-0.225*	0.054
Gini									0.125	0.207	-0.210	0.160	-0.064	0.173	-0.042	0.190	-0.130	0.183
Reverse Welfare expenditure											0.864*	0.152						
Reverse GDP													0.760*	0.205				
Reverse WGI															0.653*	0.230		
Reverse MIPEX																	0.809*	0.173
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	1.098		1.062		1.069		1.133		1.126		0.662		0.485		0.979		0.778	
Right wing political views							0.479		0.480		0.512		0.147		0.482		0.515	
Low life control							0.151		0.151				0.890		0.149			
ICC	0.268		0.255		0.258		0.281		0.278		0.118		0.194		0.226		0.155	
AIC	6655.6		5041.6		3792.9		3731.3		3733.0		2694.0		3724.0		3727.8		2590.3	
BIC	6669.5		5101.4		3882.3		3833.5		3841.5		2804.9		3838.9		3842.7		2700.6	
Log likelihood	-3325.8		-2511.8		-1882.5		-1849.7		-1849.5		-1329.0		-1844.0		-1845.9		-1277.1	
N individuals	7428		5722		4369		4369		4369		3501		4369		4369		3393	
N countries	29		29		29		29		29		24		29		29		23	
LR chi			27.28		79.39		65.6		0.36		20.55		10.97		7.15		16.33	
P			<.001		<.001		<.001		0.547		<.001		0.001		0.008		<.001	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.1.

Table A2.23 Do not want Muslim neighbours, EVS 2017, 30+ year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.259*	0.193	-1.595*	0.202	-1.528*	0.212	-1.542*	0.215	-1.543*	0.213	-1.690*	0.150	-1.581*	0.207	-1.559*	0.210	-1.594*	0.168
Age			0.091*	0.015	0.097*	0.018	0.086*	0.018	0.086*	0.018	0.098*	0.020	0.086*	0.018	0.086*	0.018	0.095*	0.021
Female			-0.216*	0.029	-0.209*	0.033	-0.187*	0.034	-0.187*	0.034	-0.221*	0.037	-0.187*	0.034	-0.187*	0.034	-0.219*	0.038
Not in work, retirement or education			0.087	0.045	0.056	0.053	0.048	0.053	0.048	0.053	0.043*	0.064	0.047	0.053	0.048	0.053	0.036	0.065
Reverse HH income			0.159*	0.016	0.152*	0.019	0.156*	0.019	0.156*	0.019	0.152*	0.021	0.156*	0.019	0.156*	0.019	0.156*	0.021
Parents struggling when R 14			0.097*	0.015	0.099*	0.017	0.103*	0.017	0.103*	0.017	0.106*	0.019	0.102*	0.017	0.103*	0.017	0.112*	0.019
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.243*	0.061	-0.198*	0.070	-0.172*	0.071	-0.172*	0.071	-0.202*	0.079	-0.172*	0.071	-0.172*	0.071	-0.223*	0.081
R born abroad			-0.501*	0.066	-0.284*	0.089	-0.265*	0.090	-0.264*	0.090	-0.303*	0.099	-0.264*	0.090	-0.264*	0.090	-0.325*	0.101
Religion important in life					-0.076*	0.019	-0.079*	0.019	-0.079*	0.019	-0.099*	0.021	-0.080*	0.019	-0.080*	0.019	-0.103*	0.021
Right wing political views					0.268*	0.017	0.289*	0.054	0.289*	0.054	0.344*	0.055	0.289*	0.054	0.289*	0.054	0.350*	0.058
National pride					0.080*	0.018	0.070*	0.036	0.070*	0.036	0.074*	0.039	0.070*	0.036	0.070*	0.035	0.074	0.040
Low life control					0.151*	0.017	0.146*	0.017	0.145*	0.017	0.142*	0.020	0.145*	0.017	0.145*	0.017	0.148*	0.020
Post materialist values					-0.180*	0.018	-0.156*	0.018	-0.156*	0.018	-0.188*	0.020	-0.156*	0.018	-0.156*	0.018	-0.184*	0.020
Gini									0.148	0.195	-0.132*	0.140	0.075	0.195	0.093	0.201	-0.084	0.161
Reverse welfare expenditure											0.639*	0.133						
Reverse GDP													0.272	0.217				
Reverse WGI															0.191	0.221		
Reverse MIPEX																	0.506*	0.143
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	1.033		1.056		1.087		1.105		1.095		0.634		1.045		1.070		0.732	
Right wing political views							0.270		0.270		0.250		0.270		0.270		0.256	
National pride							0.155		0.155		0.157		0.155		0.155		0.160	
ICC	0.245		0.253		0.264		0.271		0.267		0.109		0.249		0.258		0.140	
AIC	39752.7		31483.9		23960.0		23734.6		23736.0		19831.3		23736.6		23737.3		19257.0	
BIC	39769.9		31559.5		24074.3		23865.2		23874.7		19975.6		23883.4		23884.2		19400.8	
Log likelihood	-19874.3		-15733.0		-11966.0		-11851.3		-11851.0		-9897.6		-11850.3		-11850.7		-9610.5	
N individuals	40,158		32880		25847		25847		25847		22383		25847		25847		21754	
N countries	29		29		29		29		29		24		29		29		23	
LR chi			392.56		502.92		229.42		0.57		16.20		1.47		0.72		10.01	
P			<.001		<.001		<.001		0.451		<.001		0.225		0.395		0.002	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.1.

Table A2.24 Specifically do not want Muslim neighbours, EVS 2017, under 30 year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.709*	0.198	-2.036*	0.231	-1.898*	0.256	-1.961*	0.266	-1.965*	0.265	-2.565*	0.265	-1.977*	0.234	-1.919*	0.246	-2.807*	0.305
Age			-0.024	0.038	-0.027	0.044	-0.028	0.045	-0.028	0.045	-0.012	0.053	-0.027	0.045	-0.028	0.045	-0.005	0.055
Female			-0.133	0.074	-0.086	0.086	-0.051	0.088	-0.050	0.088	-0.094	0.105	-0.045	0.088	-0.046	0.088	-0.110	0.109
Not in work or education			0.264*	0.100	0.223	0.118	0.225	0.121	0.224	0.121	0.188	0.156	0.205	0.121	0.216	0.121	0.165	0.167
Reverse HH income			-0.017	0.040	-0.034	0.046	-0.030	0.047	-0.030	0.047	-0.025	0.053	-0.026	0.047	-0.028	0.047	-0.009	0.055
Parents struggling when R 14			0.045	0.038	0.022	0.045	0.029	0.046	0.029	0.046	-0.013	0.055	0.025	0.046	0.027	0.046	-0.034	0.058
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.596*	0.162	-0.509*	0.184	-0.532*	0.189	-0.531*	0.189	-0.916*	0.253	-0.524*	0.189	-0.530*	0.189	-0.945*	0.268
R born abroad			-0.333	0.203	-0.055	0.282	-0.042	0.290	-0.043	0.290	-0.435	0.374	-0.031	0.290	-0.038	0.290	-0.882	0.474
Religion important in life					-0.129*	0.053	-0.123*	0.054	-0.125*	0.054	-0.155*	0.063	-0.141*	0.054	-0.134*	0.054	-0.154*	0.065
Right wing political views					0.271*	0.044	0.342*	0.102	0.343*	0.102	0.433*	0.118	0.347*	0.103	0.346*	0.103	0.453*	0.060
National pride					0.085	0.047	0.058	0.061	0.058	0.061	0.031	0.064	0.061	0.060	0.061	0.060	0.093	0.077
Low life control					0.111*	0.041	0.079	0.055	0.079	0.055	0.080	0.056	0.076	0.054	0.077	0.054	0.117*	0.059
Post materialist values					-0.176*	0.045	-0.163*	0.046	-0.162*	0.046	-0.229*	0.054	-0.161*	0.046	-0.159*	0.046	-0.227*	0.056
Gini									0.122	0.194	-0.204	0.147	-0.058	0.160	-0.037	0.177	-0.173	0.145
Reverse Welfare expenditure											0.791*	0.140						
Reverse GDP													0.726*	0.190				
Reverse WGI															0.624*	0.214		
Reverse MIPEX																	0.646*	0.139
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	1.038		1.014		1.012		1.055		1.047		0.595		0.814		0.902		0.687	
Right wing political views							0.455		0.456		0.478		0.462		0.458		0.474	
National pride							0.171		0.171				0.168		0.167			
Low life control							0.139		0.139				0.135		0.138			
ICC	0.247		0.238		0.237		0.253		0.250		0.097		0.168		0.198		0.126	
AIC	6441.7		4892.9		3698.9		3642.5		3644.1		2616.342		3634.6		3638.6		2519.09	
BIC	6455.5		4952.7		3788.2		3751.0		3759.0		2733.398		3755.8		3759.9		2635.55	
Log likelihood	-3218.8		-2437.4		-1835.4		-1804.2		-1804.1		-1289.17		-1798.3		-1800.3		-1240.5	
N individuals	7,428		5722		4369		4369		4369		3501		4369		4369		3393	
N countries	29		29		29		29		29		24		29		29		23	
LR chi			27.50		71.94		62.36		0.40		20.44		11.53		7.5		17.41	
P			<.001		<.001		<.001		0.529		<.001		0.001		0.006		<.001	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.1.

Table A2.25 Do not want Muslim neighbours, EVS 2008, under 30 year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** Sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** Attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** Random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 8:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.372*	0.101	-1.612*	0.143	-1.485*	0.172	-1.496*	0.174	-1.505*	0.177	-1.732*	0.215	-1.479*	0.173	-1.469*	0.175	-1.865*	0.251
Age			-0.073*	0.029	-0.071	0.038	-0.068	0.038	-0.070	0.038	-0.012	0.047	-0.068	0.038	-0.068	0.038	0.005	0.049
Female			-0.129*	0.058	-0.122	0.074	-0.120	0.074	-0.149*	0.075	-0.166	0.091	-0.146	0.075	-0.147	0.075	-0.199*	0.097
Not in work or education			0.008	0.073	-0.104	0.097	-0.103	0.098	-0.082	0.099	-0.318*	0.140	-0.093	0.099	-0.089	0.099	-0.318*	0.155
Reverse HH income			-0.021	0.033	0.046	0.042	0.050	0.042	0.055	0.043	0.045	0.045	0.036	0.042	0.040	0.043	0.028	0.046
Parents not in work when R 14			-0.079	0.120	-0.085	0.155	-0.104	0.156	-0.176	0.162	-0.306	0.240	-0.183	0.161	-0.180	0.161	-0.451	0.286
Rural (fewer than 5000 people)			0.169*	0.067	0.067	0.086	0.067	0.086	0.083	0.087	0.112	0.102	0.085	0.087	0.083	0.087	0.056	0.111
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.284*	0.113	-0.141	0.149	-0.130	0.150	-0.127	0.151	-0.165	0.183	-0.120	0.151	-0.130	0.151	-0.191	0.200
R born abroad			-0.249	0.139	0.138	0.219	0.150	0.220	0.170	0.221	0.097	0.272	0.178	0.221	0.169	0.221	0.068	0.324
Religion important in life					-0.037	0.046	-0.039	0.046	-0.051	0.047	-0.063	0.056	-0.062	0.047	-0.062	0.047	-0.112	0.059
Right wing political views					0.221*	0.039	0.229*	0.057	0.231*	0.059	0.288*	0.069	0.228*	0.058	0.230*	0.059	0.295*	0.072
National pride					0.078	0.040	0.067	0.040	0.078	0.041	0.048	0.050	0.083*	0.041	0.081*	0.041	0.041	0.053
Low life control					0.110*	0.038	0.111*	0.039	0.115*	0.039	0.137*	0.050	0.116*	0.039	0.115*	0.039	0.153*	0.053
Post materialist values					-0.195*	0.038	-0.192*	0.038	-0.201*	0.039	-0.255*	0.048	-0.197*	0.039	-0.197*	0.039	-0.241*	0.050
Gini									-0.040	0.110	-0.177	0.123	-0.102	0.104	-0.104	0.109	-0.071	0.128
Reverse Welfare expenditure											0.429*	0.103						
Reverse GDP													0.329*	0.110				
Reverse WGI															0.247*	0.104		
Reverse MIPEX																	0.392*	0.113
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	0.639		0.629		0.567		0.579		0.585		0.431		0.525		0.551		0.464	
Right wing political views							0.246		0.251		0.241		0.247		0.249		0.234	
ICC	0.110		0.107		0.089		0.092		0.094		0.053		0.077		0.084		0.061	
AIC	11378.0		7688.9		4875.0		4866.0		4769.7		3286.8		4763.4		4766.3		2937.9	
BIC	11392.6		7758.3		4972.7		4970.3		4880.1		3398.2		4880.2		4883.2		3047.4	
Log likelihood	-5687.0		-3834.5		-2422.5		-2417.0		-2367.9		-1625.4		-2363.7		-2365.2		-1450.9	
N individuals	11,149		7565		5001		5001		4886		3592		4886		4886		3244	
N countries	43		43		43		43		42		32		42		42		30	
LR chi			28.26		76.86		65.6		0.13		14.72		8.38		5.44		16.33	
P			<.001		<.001		<.001		0.714		<.001		0.004		0.020		<.001	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.2.

Table A2.26 Do not want Muslim neighbours, EVS 2008, 30+ year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		Model 1: sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		Model 2: attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		Model 3: random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		Model 4: Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		Model 5: Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		Model 6: GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		Model 7: WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		Model 8: MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.215*	0.078	-1.404*	0.088	-1.409*	0.097	-1.407*	0.100	-1.410*	0.101	-1.506*	0.106	-1.403*	0.099	-1.407*	0.100	-1.500*	0.117
Age			0.078*	0.014	0.053*	0.017	0.047*	0.017	0.044*	0.018	0.080*	0.020	0.045*	0.018	0.045*	0.018	0.088*	0.020
Female			-0.205*	0.027	-0.250*	0.033	-0.248*	0.034	-0.241*	0.034	-0.256*	0.038	-0.241*	0.034	-0.241*	0.034	-0.242*	0.040
Not in work or education			0.077*	0.015	0.071*	0.018	0.068*	0.019	0.062*	0.019	0.041	0.023	0.062*	0.019	0.062*	0.019	0.025	0.024
Reverse HH income			0.080*	0.018	0.076*	0.021	0.078*	0.021	0.078*	0.021	0.073*	0.022	0.073*	0.021	0.074*	0.021	0.073*	0.022
Parents not in work when R 14			0.136*	0.052	0.075	0.065	0.091	0.066	0.052	0.068	-0.011	0.080	0.048	0.068	0.049	0.068	-0.046	0.091
Rural (fewer than 5000 people)			0.149*	0.030	0.094*	0.037	0.098*	0.038	0.103*	0.038	0.159*	0.042	0.103*	0.038	0.103*	0.038	0.141*	0.043
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.182*	0.057	-0.146*	0.070	-0.153*	0.071	-0.144*	0.071	-0.137	0.083	-0.144*	0.071	-0.145*	0.071	-0.103	0.085
R born abroad			-0.452*	0.057	-0.337*	0.085	-0.348*	0.086	-0.340*	0.086	-0.344*	0.103	-0.340*	0.086	-0.341*	0.086	-0.355*	0.111
Religion important in life					-0.064*	0.020	-0.070*	0.020	-0.072*	0.020	-0.092*	0.022	-0.073*	0.020	-0.073*	0.020	-0.103*	0.023
Right wing political views					0.178*	0.017	0.191*	0.032	0.191*	0.033	0.236*	0.038	0.191*	0.033	0.191*	0.033	0.245*	0.041
National pride					0.072*	0.018	0.069*	0.018	0.076*	0.018	0.086*	0.021	0.077*	0.018	0.077*	0.018	0.087*	0.022
Low life control					0.105*	0.017	0.121*	0.032	0.123*	0.032	0.115*	0.033	0.123*	0.032	0.123*	0.032	0.129*	0.034
Post materialist values					-0.149*	0.017	-0.133*	0.028	-0.141*	0.028	-0.186*	0.025	-0.141*	0.028	-0.140*	0.028	-0.182*	0.027
Gini									-0.006	0.087	-0.154	0.095	-0.039	0.085	-0.039	0.087	-0.103	0.102
Reverse Welfare expenditure											0.298*	0.084						
Reverse GDP													0.146	0.077				
Reverse WGI															0.129	0.082		
Reverse MIPEX																	0.253*	0.093
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	0.503		0.489		0.490		0.503		0.507		0.414		0.483		0.491		0.451	
Right wing political views							0.170		0.172		0.179		0.173		0.173		0.186	
Low life control							0.165		0.168		0.134		0.167		0.167		0.132	
Post materialist values							0.139		0.131		0.081		0.131		0.131		0.087	
ICC	0.072		0.068		0.068		0.071		0.072		0.050		0.066		0.068		0.058	
AIC	46981.4		34419.8		23774.6		23661.3		23400.7		18383.5		23399.2		23400.3		17328.5	
BIC	46998.8		34503.8		23895.4		23806.3		23553.5		18540.2		23560.1		23561.2		17484.1	
Log likelihood	-23488.7		-17199.9		-11872.3		-11812.7		-11681.4		-9171.7		-11679.6		-11680.2		-8644.3	
N individuals	44,478		32907		23241		23241		22957		18737		22957		22957		17665	
N countries	43		43		43		43		42		32		42		42		30	
LR chi			254.55		253.97		119.32		0.00		10.65		3.45		2.36		6.66	
P			<.001		<.001		<.001		0.949		0.001		0.063		0.124		0.010	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.2.

Table A2.27 Specifically do not want Muslim neighbours, EVS 2008, under 30 year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** Sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** Attitudes *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 3:** Gini *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 4:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 5:** GDP *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 6:** WGI *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 7:** MIPEX *Random intercept, fixed slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	2.114*	0.123	1.964*	0.179	2.190*	0.228	2.202*	0.232	1.986*	0.255	2.242*	0.225	2.274*	0.226	1.928*	0.269
Age			-0.077	0.039	-0.071	0.049	-0.069	0.049	-0.083	0.053	-0.067	0.049	-0.066	0.049	-0.102	0.056
Female			-0.105	0.077	-0.236*	0.096	-0.240*	0.097	-0.204	0.104	-0.236*	0.097	-0.237*	0.097	-0.138	0.109
Not in work or education			-0.073	0.100	-0.117	0.129	-0.148	0.130	-0.100	0.149	-0.162	0.130	-0.158	0.130	-0.106	0.158
Reverse HH income			-0.085*	0.042	-0.044	0.051	-0.040	0.051	-0.064	0.053	-0.056	0.051	-0.054	0.051	-0.096	0.056
Parents not in work when R 14			-0.147	0.157	-0.168	0.201	-0.214	0.202	-0.231	0.238	-0.227	0.203	-0.224	0.203	-0.342	0.254
Rural (fewer than 5000 people)			-0.128	0.089	-0.115	0.111	-0.100	0.112	-0.133	0.120	-0.103	0.112	-0.105	0.112	-0.204	0.126
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.175	0.135	-0.091	0.175	-0.096	0.175	-0.236	0.186	-0.086	0.175	-0.099	0.175	-0.203	0.199
R born abroad			-0.144	0.146	0.085	0.271	0.164	0.277	0.195	0.298	0.179	0.277	0.168	0.277	0.163	0.324
Religion important in life					-0.058	0.058	-0.071	0.058	-0.112	0.063	-0.085	0.058	-0.086	0.058	-0.114	0.065
Right wing political views					0.113*	0.052	0.115*	0.052	0.127*	0.058	0.112*	0.052	0.113*	0.052	0.147*	0.062
National pride					0.003	0.052	0.013	0.053	0.025	0.058	0.015	0.053	0.015	0.053	0.006	0.060
Low life control					0.059	0.055	0.061	0.055	0.043	0.061	0.061	0.055	0.060	0.055	0.082	0.064
Post materialist values					-0.093	0.048	-0.090	0.049	-0.089	0.053	-0.086	0.049	-0.085	0.049	-0.065	0.055
Gini							0.144	0.161	0.056	0.189	0.052	0.150	0.042	0.151	0.107	0.180
Reverse Welfare expenditure									0.311*	0.168						
Reverse GDP											0.457*	0.155				
Reverse WGI													0.414*	0.145		
Reverse MIPEX															0.434*	0.160
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	0.774		0.844		0.857		0.858		0.764		0.767		0.770		0.722	
ICC	0.154		0.178		0.183		0.183		0.151		0.152		0.153		0.137	
AIC	7797.4		4941.0		3264.9		3215.2		2671.0		3209.2		3209.7		2443.7	
BIC	7812.0		5010.4		3362.7		3319.1		2776.2		3319.6		3320.1		2547.2	
Log likelihood	-3896.7		-2460.5		-1617.5		-1591.6		-1318.5		-1587.6		-1587.8		-1204.9	
N individuals	11149		7565		5001		4886		3592		3592		4886		3244	
N countries	43		43		43		42		32		32		42		30	
LR chi			17.39		10.94		0.80		3.30		8.07		7.55		6.55	
P			0.026		0.053		0.372		0.069		0.005		0.006		0.011	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.2.

Table A2.28 Anti-Muslim Attitudes, MYPLACE 2012-13, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	0.067	0.084	0.135	0.085	0.152	0.083
Female			-0.021	0.020	-0.035	0.026
Age			0.004	0.010	0.001	0.015
Not in work or education			0.059	0.030	0.066*	0.030
Coping on income			0.056*	0.011	0.053*	0.021
SES at 14			0.089*	0.010	0.084*	0.018
Experienced threat			-0.044	0.023	-0.043	0.023
Random effects (SD)	**Estimate**		**Estimate**		**Estimate**	
Location intercept	0.458		0.434		0.417	
Female					0.097	
Age					0.056	
Coping on income					0.094	
SES at 14					0.074	
Residual	0.881		0.875		0.865	
ICC (location)	0.213		0.197		0.186	
AIC	20606.3		20491.5		20443.3	
BIC	20627.3		20554.3		20603.7	
Log likelihood	-10300.2		-10236.8		-10198.6	
N individuals	7919		7919		7919	
N locations	30		30		30	
LR chi			126.79		76.26	
P			<.001		<.001	

*P<0.05. All continuous variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.4.

Table A2.29 Opposition to Muslim immigration, ESS 2014, under 30 year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 3:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	2.497*	0.094	2.363*	0.086	2.377*	0.081	2.294*	0.069	2.306*	0.062	2.299*	0.061	2.319*	0.059	2.301*	0.060
Age			0.039*	0.011	0.039*	0.011	0.043*	0.011	0.043*	0.011	0.042*	0.011	0.043*	0.011	0.042*	0.011
Female			-0.063*	0.021	-0.065*	0.021	-0.066*	0.022	-0.060*	0.022	-0.066*	0.022	-0.066*	0.022	-0.066*	0.022
Not in work or education			0.040	0.031	0.038	0.031	0.044	0.032	0.049	0.032	0.044	0.032	0.045	0.032	0.044	0.032
Struggling on household income			0.092*	0.012	0.096*	0.017	0.097*	0.019	0.092*	0.020	0.096*	0.019	0.096*	0.019	0.097*	0.019
Financial difficulties in childhood			0.025*	0.012	0.022	0.014	0.025	0.015	0.034*	0.013	0.025	0.015	0.025	0.015	0.025	0.015
Parent(s) born abroad			-0.153*	0.035	-0.155*	0.035	-0.197*	0.038	-0.185*	0.038	-0.196*	0.038	-0.196*	0.038	-0.198*	0.038
R born abroad			-0.165*	0.041	-0.159*	0.064	-0.180*	0.075	-0.176*	0.079	-0.157*	0.074	-0.160*	0.075	-0.170*	0.073
Discriminated against			-0.047	0.040	-0.051	0.040	-0.082	0.043	-0.075	0.044	-0.083	0.043	-0.083	0.043	-0.081	0.043
Can't influence politics			0.137*	0.012	0.135*	0.024	0.140*	0.025	0.133*	0.026	0.139*	0.025	0.138*	0.025	0.140*	0.025
Gini							0.031	0.062	-0.038	0.059	-0.050	0.059	-0.045	0.054	-0.010	0.053
Reverse GDP									0.157*	0.063	0.173*	0.059				
Reverse WGI													0.196*	0.058		
Reverse MIPEX															0.162*	0.053
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	0.429		0.369		0.336		0.261		0.217		0.217		0.202		0.212	
Struggling on household income					0.055		0.059		0.062		0.060		0.059		0.059	
Financial difficulties in childhood					0.036		0.037		0.011		0.037		0.037		0.038	
R born abroad					0.193		0.240		0.256		0.229		0.238		0.228	
Can't influence politics					0.095		0.095		0.096		0.096		0.096		0.095	
Residual	0.860		0.837		0.830		0.828		0.823		0.828		0.828		0.829	
ICC	0.199		0.163		0.141		0.091		0.065		0.064		0.056		0.061	
AIC	17011.8		15953.9		15907.1		14908.8		14035.3		14903.6		14901.5		14903.0	
BIC	17032.2		16035.0		16015.3		15022.6		14154.8		15024.1		15022.1		15023.6	
Log likelihood	-8502.9		-7965.0		-7937.6		-7437.4		-6999.6		-7433.8		-7432.8		-7433.5	
N individuals	6669		6382		6382		5987		5669		5987		5987		5987	
N countries	21		21		21		20		19		20		20		20	
LR chi			302.63		54.76		0.25		5.53		7.22		9.27		7.77	
P			<.001		<.001		0.618		0.019		0.007		0.002		0.005	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.6.

Table A2.30 Specific opposition to Muslim immigration, ESS 2014, under 30 year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0		**Model 1:** sociodemographics		**Model 3:** Gini		**Model 4:** Welfare expenditure		**Model 5:** GDP		**Model 6:** WGI		**Model 7:** MIPEX	
	Random intercept		*Random intercept, fixed slopes*		*Random intercept, random slopes*		*Random intercept, random slopes*		*Random intercept, random slopes*		*Random intercept, random slopes*		*Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	-1.075*	0.134	-0.894*	0.154	-0.943*	0.144	-0.975*	0.132	-0.947*	0.121	-0.904*	0.122	-0.940*	0.134
Age			-0.030	0.031	-0.022	0.032	-0.019	0.033	-0.023	0.032	-0.022	0.032	-0.023	0.032
Female			0.074	0.060	0.087	0.062	0.103	0.065	0.086	0.062	0.085	0.062	0.087	0.062
Not in work or education			0.016	0.086	0.050	0.090	0.032	0.092	0.053	0.089	0.051	0.089	0.051	0.090
Struggling on household income			0.086*	0.034	0.098*	0.036	0.110*	0.038	0.096*	0.036	0.096*	0.036	0.098*	0.036
Financial difficulties in childhood			0.031	0.033	0.028	0.035	0.050	0.036	0.026	0.035	0.029	0.035	0.028	0.035
Parent(s) born abroad			0.120	0.098	0.049	0.110	0.001	0.113	0.056	0.110	0.054	0.110	0.045	0.110
R born abroad			0.302*	0.115	0.405*	0.124	0.370*	0.124	0.422*	0.123	0.415*	0.123	0.404*	0.124
Discriminated against			0.016	0.110	-0.038	0.123	-0.006	0.125	-0.041	0.123	-0.038	0.123	-0.034	0.123
Can't influence politics			-0.007	0.033	0.017	0.035	-0.007	0.037	0.010	0.035	0.006	0.035	0.014	0.035
Gini					0.223*	0.112	0.071	0.105	0.049	0.092	0.079	0.089	0.165	0.103
Reverse Welfare expenditure							0.310*	0.112						
Reverse GDP									0.384*	0.093				
Reverse WGI											0.395*	0.095		
Reverse MIPEX													0.232*	0.103
Random effects (SD)	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	0.599		0.584		0.488		0.395		0.345		0.344		0.429	
ICC	0.098		0.094		0.067		0.045		0.035		0.035		0.053	
AIC	7280.6		6952.2		6405.9		5975.0		6395.6		6395.4		6403.4	
BIC	7294.2		7026.5		6486.1		6061.3		6482.5		6482.3		6490.3	
Log likelihood	-3638.3		-3465.1		-3190.9		-2974.5		-3184.8		-3184.7		-3188.7	
N individuals	6595		6382		5938		5634		5938		5938		5938	
N countries	21		21		20		19		20		20		20	
LR chi			21.82		3.6		6.48		12.28		12.51		4.48	
P			0.010		0.058		0.011		0.001		<.001		0.034	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.6.

Table A2.31 Anti-Muslim attitudes, Eurobarometer 2015, under 30 year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 3:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	4.247*	0.226	4.475*	0.244	4.481*	0.236	4.440*	0.233	4.459*	0.193	4.499*	0.203	4.497*	0.197	4.483*	0.186
Age			0.012	0.044	0.001	0.044	0.004	0.045	0.006	0.045	0.003	0.045	0.004	0.045	0.006	0.045
Female			0.130	0.085	0.131	0.085	0.110	0.087	0.109	0.087	0.108	0.087	0.109	0.087	0.108	0.087
Not in work or education			0.190	0.122	0.169	0.163	0.177	0.161	0.180	0.153	0.165	0.160	0.165	0.153	0.172	0.156
Difficulty paying bills			0.120*	0.048	0.122*	0.048	0.132*	0.049	0.135*	0.049	0.131*	0.049	0.127*	0.049	0.132*	0.049
Low social class			0.152*	0.047	0.146*	0.061	0.123*	0.059	0.117*	0.059	0.120*	0.058	0.122*	0.059	0.119*	0.060
Rural			0.215*	0.098	0.227*	0.098	0.246*	0.099	0.237*	0.099	0.246*	0.099	0.239*	0.099	0.239*	0.099
Ethnic or religious minority			0.263	0.155	0.268	0.154	0.226	0.157	0.220	0.157	0.226	0.157	0.224	0.157	0.225	0.157
Discriminated against			-0.025	0.099	-0.025	0.124	-0.024	0.126	-0.027	0.126	-0.018	0.126	-0.018	0.126	-0.024	0.126
Voice does not count			0.105*	0.046	0.109	0.061	0.098	0.060	0.097	0.060	0.099	0.059	0.095	0.059	0.095	0.060
Gini							-0.214	0.219	-0.404*	0.182	-0.323	0.189	-0.538*	0.199	-0.329	0.170
Reverse Welfare expenditure									0.726*	0.183						
Reverse GDP											0.555*	0.168				
Reverse WGI													0.741*	0.198		
Reverse MIPEX															0.731*	0.164
Random effects	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	1.177		1.199		1.148		1.123		0.887		0.940		0.908		0.842	
Not in work or education					0.537		0.507		0.440		0.498		0.437		0.462	
Low social class					0.196		0.168		0.174		0.163		0.168		0.179	
Discriminated against					0.381		0.390		0.384		0.388		0.389		0.385	
Can't influence politics					0.202		0.189		0.190		0.185		0.183		0.190	
SD Residual	2.531		2.501		2.475		2.482		2.483		2.482		2.483		2.482	
ICC	0.178		0.187		0.177		0.170		0.113		0.125		0.118		0.103	
AIC	19927.2		16948.1		16936.2		16451.9		16441.6		16444.8		16442.6		16438.9	
BIC	19946.3		17022.4		17035.2		16556.6		16552.4		16555.6		16553.5		16549.7	
Log likelihood	-9960.6		-8462.1		-8452.1		-8209.0		-8202.8		-8204.4		-8203.3		-8201.43	
N individuals	4222		3603		3603		3496		3496		3496		3496		3496	
N countries	28		28		28		28		28		28		28		28	
LR chi			53.55		19.93		0.93		12.34		9.13		11.30		15.04	
P			<.001		0.001		0.334		<.001		0.003		0.001		<.001	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.7.

Table A2.32 Anti-Muslim attitudes, ISSP 2008, under 30 year olds, non-Muslims

	Model 0 *Random intercept*		**Model 1:** sociodemographics *Random intercept, fixed slopes*		**Model 2:** random slopes *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 3:** Gini *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 4:** Welfare expenditure *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 5:** GDP *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 6:** WGI *Random intercept, random slopes*		**Model 7:** MIPEX *Random intercept, random slopes*	
	Coef.	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**Coef.**	**SE**
Intercept	3.025*	0.070	3.117*	0.076	3.121*	0.076	3.056*	0.078	3.221*	0.073	3.097*	0.078	3.087*	0.076	3.214*	0.079
Age			0.031*	0.015	0.031*	0.015	0.031*	0.015	0.054*	0.017	0.031*	0.015	0.031*	0.015	0.060*	0.018
Female			-0.058*	0.020	-0.057*	0.020	-0.057*	0.020	-0.092*	0.023	-0.057*	0.020	-0.057*	0.020	-0.097*	0.024
Not in work or education			0.043	0.037	0.047	0.037	0.049	0.037	-0.022	0.047	0.048	0.037	0.049	0.037	-0.013	0.053
Low social class			-0.002	0.016	0.010	0.024	0.011	0.024	0.018	0.021	0.010	0.024	0.011	0.024	0.028	0.022
Rural			0.073*	0.015	0.056*	0.021	0.055*	0.021	0.034	0.019	0.056*	0.021	0.056*	0.021	0.042*	0.020
Gini							-0.161	0.083								
Reverse Welfare expenditure									-0.024	0.066						
Reverse GDP											-0.069	0.068				
Reverse WGI													-0.104	0.065		
Reverse MIPEX															-0.087	0.079
Random effects	**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**		**Estim.**	
SD intercept	0.296		0.294		0.295		0.268		0.223		0.287		0.277		0.223	
Low social class					0.070		0.069				0.070		0.069			
Rural					0.057		0.057				0.057		0.057			
SD Residual	1.063		1.062		1.058		1.058		0.936		1.058		1.058		0.934	
ICC	0.072		0.071		0.072		0.060		0.054		0.069		0.064		0.054	
AIC	16248.0		15806.0		15794.4		15792.9		8620.0		15795.4		15794.0		7427.1	
BIC	16267.8		15858.6		15860.2		15865.3		8686.7		15867.8		15866.4		7492.1	
Log likelihood	-8121.0		-7895.0		-7887.2		-7885.5		-4299.0		-7886.7		-7886.0		-3702.5	
N individuals	5468		5320		5320		5320		3164		5320		5320		2729	
N countries	19		19		19		19		14		19		19		13	
LR chi			38.08		15.59		3.47		0.14		1.01		2.42		1.17	
P			<.001		<.001		0.062		0.711		0.316		0.120		0.280	

*P<0.05. All independent variables standardised. For details of the variables included in the model, see Appendix 1, Table A1.8.