

# Moving Forward in Zimbabwe: Reducing Poverty and Promoting Growth

2<sup>nd</sup> Edition  
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## Acknowledgements

This report is the updated and revised second edition of the report written by Admos Chimhowu, based on background papers written by a group of Zimbabwean academics and development practitioners that came together with the intention of contributing in their own small way to the discussions and debates on the best way forward for our country. Thirteen people contributed background papers. Contributors included: Tendai Bare – Civil Service; Admos Chimhowu – Land and Rural Development; Blessing Chiripanhura – Employment and Labour Markets; Beth Chitekwe-Biti – Urban Development in Post-Crisis Recovery; Fay Chung – Education; Tapiwa Magure – Health; Lance Mambondiyani – Financial Markets; Jeannette Manjengwa – Environment and Natural Resources; Innocent Matshe – Agriculture; Ngoni Munemo – Social Protection; Sobona Mtisi – Water Resources; Mike Nxele – ICTs and Poverty-focused Reconstruction; and Desire Sibanda – Public Finances, Recovery and Reconstruction.

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## **Forward for the Second Edition, October 2010**

The Report was launched by the Brooks World Poverty Institute in December 2009, in Manchester, UK. An Executive Summary was produced in hard copy, while an electronic version of the main Report was available on the Brooks World Poverty Institute website.

Realising the importance of the Report to contribute towards policy making in Zimbabwe, the Institute of Environmental Studies (IES), University of Zimbabwe, in collaboration with the Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester, developed a proposal 'Moving Zimbabwe Forward: An Evidence-Based Policy Dialogue Initiative' which was accepted by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for funding. The Policy Dialogue Initiative seeks to initiate and encourage policy dialogue for poverty focused sustainable development in Zimbabwe; disseminate policy relevant information to a wider audience in Zimbabwe especially among the policy and decision makers; and generate and disseminate policy relevant knowledge on the nature of poverty and well-being in Zimbabwe through a sample survey to determine the nature of poverty and well-being in selected Districts in Zimbabwe

One of the first activities under this Policy Dialogue Initiative was to produce hard copies of the Report for dissemination. The purpose of the Report is to lay the base for discussion in the identified priority areas that is not prescriptive, but rather to stimulate dialogue. Some of the suggestions may be controversial and unconventional and are meant to tease minds and encourage debate and discussion. The Policy Dialogue Initiative will provide an opportunity for a wide range of ideas, new knowledge, research findings, best practices and experiences to be put on the table and discussed by a wide range of stakeholders, including policy and decision-makers, with a vision of a better, sustainable future for all Zimbabweans

The Report, written in 2009, has been updated and revised by the Institute of Environmental Studies (IES), in this Second Edition, October 2010. This main Report, containing eleven chapters on a wide range of sectors, is accompanied by shorter Summary Report 'Moving Zimbabwe Forward: Reducing Poverty and Promoting Sustainable Development through Policy Dialogue'.



## Table of Contents

<i>CHAPTER 1 : Zimbabwe's Economy and the Causes of the Crisis .....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>CHAPTER 2 : Employment and Labour Markets.....</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>CHAPTER 3 : Agriculture and Land Reform.....</i>	<i>52</i>
<i>CHAPTER 4 : Water.....</i>	<i>90</i>
<i>CHAPTER 5 : Environment and Development.....</i>	<i>102</i>
<i>CHAPTER 6 : Education .....</i>	<i>117</i>
<i>CHAPTER 7: Health .....</i>	<i>139</i>
<i>CHAPTER 8: Social Protection in Zimbabwe.....</i>	<i>151</i>
<i>CHAPTER 11: Policy priorities: moving forward with an agriculture-led strategy .....</i>	<i>191</i>
Bibliography	204

### **About the Brooks World Poverty Institute**

The Brooks World Poverty Institute is a multidisciplinary centre of global excellence researching poverty, poverty reduction, inequality and growth in both the developed and developing worlds. At a time of heightened public, media and political interest in poverty issues, it is imperative that the most serious minds, drawing on long-standing experience of the complex issues involved in a variety of world settings, come together to work towards sustainable long-term solutions. Manchester has the potential to make a substantial, distinctive and durable contribution.

We live in a world that is affluent in terms of resources, knowledge and technology but well over one billion people, around a fifth of the world's population, live in absolute poverty. They cannot obtain even their minimum needs – access to food and clean water, basic health services, primary education, shelter. These people struggle every day to meet these needs and to improve the prospects of their children. However, economic, social and political processes often make their efforts ineffective and block off pathways out of poverty. To eliminate global poverty we need a better understanding of how and why people are poor and the conversion of that knowledge into policies and actions that achieve the goal of poverty reduction. This is the mission of the Brooks World Poverty Institute.

### **About the Institute of Environmental Studies**

The Institute of Environmental Studies (IES) was established in 1994 as an independent, non-faculty unit within the University of Zimbabwe in response to national concerns about the ecological, social and economic consequences of environmental change. Recognising the inextricable link between poverty, environment and natural resources, the mission of IES is to contribute to the sustainable use of natural resources, poverty alleviation and prosperity of stakeholders by providing research, education, advisory services and networking on the environment

## List of Tables

Table 1.1: Main features of the five natural farming regions of Zimbabwe	17
Table 1.2: Distribution of population by natural region in communal and commercial farmland	18
Table 1.3: ESAP targets and actual performance of key economic indicators	24
Table 1.4: Poverty by natural region in rural areas	29
Table 2.1: Average annual employment growth (percentage), 1997-2004	34
Table 2.2: Percentage sectoral formal employment, 1980-2005	34
Table 2.3: Real consumption wage index, 1990-2003	36
Table 2.4: Sectoral wage differentials, 1997-2002	37
Table 3.1: Beef cattle population trend between 1997 and 2002 (in million head)	63
Table 3.2: Zimbabwe national cattle herd disaggregated by province and farm sub sector in 2002	63
Table 3.3: Land distribution and holdings size (million ha) patterns (1980-2004)	67
Table 3.4: Models for resettlement in Zimbabwe during the 1980s	69
Table 3.5: Land acquired for resettlement and households resettled, 1980-1997	70
Table 3.6: National strategic land holding structure	72
Table 3.7: New models of land resettlement proposed in land reform and resettlement programme 2	73
Table 3.8: Key enabling legal instruments for fast track land reform	74
Table 3.9: Maximum farm sizes for A2 resettlement	75
Table 3.10: Ad Hoc commissions that have commented on resettlement in Zimbabwe	76
Table 3.11: Main findings of external and internal evaluation reports	81
Table 4.1: Distribution of irrigation schemes by sector	93
Table 6.1: Number of schools and teachers and school enrolment, 1980-2007	117
Table 5.1: Transfrontier conservation areas in Zimbabwe	107
Table 6.2: Percentage of <i>grade 6 pupils in classrooms with selected teaching materials and classroom furniture in 1995</i>	119
Table 6.3: Grade 7 examination percentage pass by subject, peak performance year compared to 2000	120
Table 6.4: “O” Level results 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006	121
Table 6.5: “A” Level results, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006	121
Table 6.6: Tertiary education enrolments, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2006	122
Table 6.7: Enrolments in non-formal education courses, 2007	123
Table 6.8: Expenditure on education (Millions of Z\$ and US\$) for selected years	124
Table 7.1: Public health facilities as of 30 April 2006	139
Table 7.2: Main demographic feature of Zimbabwe 1982-2008	140
Table 8.1: Aspects of social protection	152
Table 8.2: Legislated monthly minimum wage (nominal Z\$), 1980-1986	153
Table 8.3: Beneficiaries and cost of drought relief programmes	155
Table 8.4: Change in policy environment following adjustment in Zimbabwe	156
Table 8.5: Average maize, wheat and sorghum prices by decade	158
Table 8.6: Urbanisation, exchange rates, inflation and per capita income in Zimbabwe, 1985-2005	159

## **List of Figures**

Figure 1.1: Natural Farming or Eco-agricultural Regions of Zimbabwe	16
Figure 1.2: Structure of GDP in 1985	19
Figure 1.3: Structure of GDP in 2002	20
Figure 1.4 Key economic trends 1980-2005	21
Figure 1.5: Contribution of agriculture, manufacturing and mining to GDP	22
Figure 1.6: Employment growth plus agriculture and manufacturing contribution to GDP	22
Figure 3.1: Maize yields by farm type	55
Figure 3.2: Total maize production in Zimbabwe, 1993 – 2007, by farm type	56
Figure 4.1: Catchments in Zimbabwe	95
Figure 7.1: Crude death rate trends	142
Figure 7.2: Trends in HIV and AIDS prevalence and incidence, 1980-2007	143

## List of Abbreviations

AFC	Agricultural Finance Corporation
AGRITEX	Agricultural Technical and Extension Services
AMA	Agricultural Marketing Authority
AREX	Agriculture Research and Extension Services
ART	Anti-retroviral Treatment
BIG	Basic Income Grant
C&AG	Comptroller and Auditor General
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources
CCs	Catchment Councils
CMB	Cotton Marketing Board
CSC	Cold Storage Commission
CSFP	Child Supplementary Feeding Programme
CSO	Central Statistical Office
DDCP	Diarrhoeal Disease Control Programme
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
DMB	Dairy Marketing Board
EEC	European Economic Commission
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FFD	Free Food Distribution
FFW	Food for Work
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HPI	Human Poverty Index
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
IWRM	Integrated Water Resources Management
LSC	Large scale commercial
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOH	Ministry of Health
NECF	National Economic Consultative Forum
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Overseas Development Association
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRSP	Public Service Reform Programme

QFAs	Quasi Fiscal Activities
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
SACMEQ	Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDCs	School Development Committees
SSC	Small-scale commercial
TMP	Traditional Midwives Programme
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VHW	Village Health Worker
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
ZIMACE	Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange
ZIMDEV	Zimbabwe Development
ZIMFEP	Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production
ZIMRA	Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
ZINWA	Zimbabwe National Water Authority

# CHAPTER 1: Zimbabwe's Economy and the Causes of the Crisis

## 1.1. Introduction

When Zimbabwe signed up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in September 2000 and adopted targets to (a) halve by 2015 the proportion of people with income levels below the Total Consumption Poverty Line,<sup>1</sup> and also to: (b) halve by 2015, the proportion of people living in poverty as measured by the Human Poverty Index (HPI),<sup>2</sup> the country was already experiencing the socio-economic decline that is now commonly referred to as a crisis. Triggered partly by a programme to redistribute land from mainly white commercial farmers to the majority black Zimbabweans and by reactions to this programme, the crisis quickly assumed multiple dimensions that have undermined any remnant of progress toward this goal.

About 72 per cent of the population already lived below the total consumption poverty line by 2003<sup>3</sup> and current monitoring reports suggest the country will be one of several African countries that will fail to meet these crucial goals on poverty. A look at the HPI trends clearly shows the impact of the decade long economic crisis. From an impressive HPI of 17 per cent in 2000 available data suggest a more than doubling in poverty rates to 40.9 per cent by 2006. Similarly the country has been sliding down the UNDP Human Development Index ranking. From a respectable 52 in 1990, the country was ranked 108 in 1992, 129 in 1997 and by 2005 it was ranked at 155 of the 177 countries. On current evidence it is clear that a majority of Zimbabweans are emerging from this crisis worse off and poorer than they have ever been at any time since independence.

The formation of the transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) in March 2009 created prospects for stabilisation and can lay the foundation for long-term socio-economic development. One of the key issues the GNU needs to deal with is the general welfare of an impoverished nation. Experience in similar situations elsewhere in Africa shows that if care is not taken to deliberately formulate welfare policies that address poverty, such concerns are soon subsumed under a myriad of problems that the State has to deal with. In order to make rapid progress toward achieving MDGs the GNU will need to identify the areas of policy that can quickly stabilise incomes and reduce the numbers of people living in poverty.

In a modest way this report seeks to generate debate and add to contemporary discussions on how to stabilise and develop Zimbabwe with a particular focus on a pro-poor agenda. The idea is not to argue for a narrow poverty agenda but to ensure that in discussions about the need for stabilisation and economic growth there is due attention paid to how this growth will translate into better lives for a majority of Zimbabweans. In doing this we make the plausible assumption that increasing impoverishment of the

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<sup>1</sup> The level of income at which people can meet basic food and non-food needs (shelter, education, health etc).

<sup>2</sup> Composite index measuring deprivation computed from three dimensions namely probability of not surviving till 40, adult literacy and unweighted mean of number of people without sustainable access to an improved water source and children under weight for age.

<sup>3</sup> GOZ 2005:5.

majority of Zimbabweans is among the most potent threats to long term national stability. We therefore seek to explore ideas and generate discussion about a general development strategy and the mechanisms for transmission of the benefits of growth to those currently living in poverty. In short, our aim is intellectual engagement with policy issues to ensure that future development efforts are crafted in a way that ensures that the benefits of economic growth will improve the welfare of those living in poverty.

While the country has been gripped by this crisis the global poverty agenda has progressed and new ideas on how to reduce and in some cases eradicate poverty have begun to influence how countries in Africa respond to the welfare challenges within their borders. Our intention is to review some of these experiences and to see how their lessons can benefit the rebuilding process in Zimbabwe. Before taking a look at the effects of the economic crisis and prospects for stabilisation and development it is important to give a brief background to the country as a context to discussions.


## **1.2. Physical context of development**

Zimbabwe has an area of 390,757 square kilometres. An outstanding feature of its physical geography is the central plateau (also called the highveld). This has an altitude of 1,200 m and stretches for 650 km from the southeast toward the northeast of the country. On either side of this central plateau is the middleveld that has an altitude ranging between 600 m and 1,200 m above sea level. The lowveld, with an altitude below 600 m, is mainly located along the Zambezi river valley and the stretch of land between the Limpopo and Save river valleys. Rainfall in Zimbabwe is broadly related to altitude, making the identification of high, middle and lowvelds useful in characterising areas of agro-ecological potential. This is a critical observation in a country where dry land farming based on one natural growing season (October to March) provides a livelihood for to up to 70 per cent of the population.

In the 1960s an official study of the relationship between physical attributes and farming potential published a report that divided the country into five agro-ecological regions. This has since been adopted as the official indicator of natural farming potential. Figure 1.1 shows the five natural farming regions while Table 1.1 shows the main features of the regions. We can draw out four key points pertinent to this report. First, more than fifty per cent of the country lies in regions classified as being generally unsuitable for dry land farming without additional investment in water technology. Regions IV and V were deemed too dry for crop production without irrigation. Small grains particularly millet and sorghum could be produced in some parts of the regions although seasonal and periodic droughts are a common feature afflicting most farm based livelihoods pursuits. With changing production practices and innovations, regions IV and V have seen increased production of high value tourism products based on wildlife farming (Moyo, 2000).



Figure 1.1: Natural Farming or Eco-agricultural Regions of Zimbabwe



Source: Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Zimbabwe

**Table 1.1: Main features of the five natural farming regions of Zimbabwe**

<b>Natural Region</b>	<b>Per cent of total area</b>	<b>Main Features</b>	<b>Natural Agricultural Potential</b>
I	1.56	Rainfall in excess of 1,050 mm, precipitation in all months of the year, relatively low temperatures.	Specialised and diversified farming Forestry, fruit, intensive livestock, tea, coffee
II	18.68	Rainfall between 700 mm-1,050 mm per year mainly in summer	Intensive farming Crops and intensive livestock production
III	17.43	Rainfall between 500-700 mm, infrequent but heavy falls of rainfall, seasonal droughts, relatively high temperatures	Semi-intensive farming Livestock, fodder and staple and cash crops like maize, tobacco, cotton
IV	33.03	Rainfall between 450-600 mm per year, frequent seasonal droughts, relatively high temperatures	Semi-extensive farming Livestock farming, drought tolerant crops
V	29.3	Rainfall less than 500 mm, erratic. Northern Lowveld may have higher rainfall but topography and poor soils make it unsuitable for arable agriculture	Extensive farming Extensive cattle ranching, wildlife farming, crops only possible with irrigation
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>		

*Source: Vincent and Thomas, 1961*

Secondly, only 38 per cent of the country is deemed to have natural farming potential. Region I is seen as suitable for specialized and diversified farming, especially activities related to forestry, fruit and intensive livestock production. Region II is suitable for diversified farming that includes production of flue-cured tobacco, maize, cotton, sugar beans, coffee, sorghum, groundnuts, seed maize, barley and related horticultural crops. It also has potential for irrigated winter wheat, poultry, beef and dairy production. Some parts of Natural Region III with suitable terrain are marginally suitable for semi-intensive farming especially the production of grains and livestock. Therefore this 38 per cent of the country that is less prone to seasonal and periodic droughts is highly desirable for those pursuing agriculture-based livelihoods. However, the issue of carrying capacity must be viewed in relation to the financial capital and technology available to users of this land. Where users apply modern and higher productivity technologies, the carrying capacity of the area can be higher than situations where subsistence low productivity technology is used, as is the case in much of Zimbabwe. Farming technologies in communal areas have not changed significantly over the past hundred years, and have remained effectively non-mechanised, labour intensive and of low productivity. These factors have resulted in inadequate rural incomes and thus pose a challenge for policy.

Thirdly, where a family is located has significant implications for its capacity to make a living off the land. Table 1.2 shows the interplay between population distribution, land use and agro-ecological potential. With up to 74 per cent of all communal lands located in the drier regions IV and V it is not too difficult to see why this marginality, when combined with high population densities and relatively basic production technologies has implications on the ability of these families to make a living and stay out of poverty. Consequently, if poverty is to be addressed, either future policy efforts need to influence the movement of rural agricultural activity away from the more fragile zones, or new technologies will have to be found to make these areas more productive.

**Table 1.2 Distribution of population by natural region in communal and commercial farmland**

<b>Natural Region</b>	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Communal Areas</b>						
Population in natural region (x10 <sup>3</sup> )	51.7	625.5	939.9	1,857.7	798.0	4,272.8
Percentage of population in communal area	1.2	14.6	22.0	43.5	18.7	100.0
Total area (km <sup>2</sup> x10 <sup>3</sup> )	0.9	16.0	31.1	78.3	44.2	170.5
Population density (people per km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>57.4</b>	<b>39.1</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>18.1</b>	<b>25.1</b>
<b>Commercial Farmland</b>						
Population in natural region (x10 <sup>3</sup> )	172.1	735.6	261.5	243.9	144.1	1,557.2
Percentage of population in commercial area	11.1	47.2	16.8	15.7	9.3	100.0
Total area (km <sup>2</sup> x10 <sup>3</sup> )	8,500	42.3	37.9	46.1	32.9	167.7
Population density (people per km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>20.2</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>9.3</b>

*Source: Mchreti and Mutambirwa, 2006*


A fourth point to note about the designation of these eco-agricultural regions is that the analysis was based on natural farming potential alone. This however disregards other livelihood activities that can be pursued outside agriculture. The country is endowed with mineral resources that, apart from generating foreign currency and formal sector employment, have over the past decade emerged as an important livelihood diversification strategy by rural households – mainly through artisanal mining.

### **1.3. Economic context of development in Zimbabwe**

The economy exhibits what Mhone (2000) aptly describes as segmentation and enclavity typical of most post-settler colonial states in southern Africa. Segmentation refers to the existence of an urban and a rural segment of the economy. The urban economy is characterised largely by manufacturing and value addition while the rural sector is mostly about raw material production. The term enclavity refers to the co-existence of a regulated formal sector alongside a loosely regulated non-formal sector (consisting of the communal subsistence sector and the informal sector). We shall return to the implications of this in our discussion of labour markets in Chapter 3. Official measurements of the Zimbabwean economy often only reveal what happens in the formal sector despite the informal sector having become a large part of the ‘real economy’.


The structure of the economy has been changing, largely in response to the economic policies adopted by the State. Analyses of the post-Independence economic policy show that the economy has gone through three distinct policy swings – from interventionism (1980-1990), to structural adjustment (1991-1995), to reactive management (1997 to 2008). At Independence in 1980 the post-colonial State inherited and maintained a diversified import substituting economy that had endured more than a decade of economic sanctions. Characterised by State intervention in markets, during this time manufacturing, agriculture and distributive services drove the economy. Figure 1.2 shows a typical structure from the interventionist years.

**Figure 1.2: Structure of GDP in 1985**



The country adopted an IMF inspired economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1990. ESAP is often credited with deindustrialisation of the economy following a decline in the contribution of manufacturing to the economy. By 2002 the contribution of manufacturing to GDP had declined to 13 per cent (see Figure 1.3). The main sectors of the economy were agriculture and manufacturing but the contribution of the services sector had grown substantially especially finance and insurance, the social sectors (especially education) and transport and communication. Surprisingly, although the country is well endowed with minerals, the share of mining has changed little over time. Although showing a slight increase in its contribution to GDP in the 2002 data, at 6 per cent of the GDP, this is actually down from the 8.8 per cent share at independence in 1980. When Figures 1.2 and 1.3 are compared the rank order change in the structure of the economy is clear. The Figures depict an economy that transformed from a manufacturing base to an agrarian- and service-industries-based economy. It is also clear that sectors dependent on foreign currency were not doing well. By 2002 the economy had become less diverse and contemporary evidence suggests that the nearly ten years of decline have changed the structure even further.

Figure 1.3: Structure of GDP in 2002




Formation of the GNU in March 2009 and dollarization of the economy brought a measure of stability to an economy that had been characterised by instability and unprecedented decline. Hyper-inflation that reached 231 million per cent per year in July 2008<sup>4</sup> showcases how unstable the economy had become, which was also characterised by a poor performance in all productive sectors, especially the key drivers – manufacturing, agriculture and mining. This is reflected in the recorded decline in gross domestic product (GDP) from US\$2,892 in 2000 to US\$2,212 by 2007.<sup>5</sup> The first decade of Independence can be described as one of growth while the second was one of stagnation followed by decline in the post-2000 period. Figure 1.4 illustrates growth trends in GDP, manufacturing, and agriculture between 1980 and 2005. It shows positive but fluctuating growth for nearly two decades till the late 1990s when the economy went into an extended recession. The Figure also shows that manufacturing growth is related to agriculture growth especially in earlier years till the early 1990s. This is because manufacturing depends on agricultural raw materials. Estimates suggest that as much as 60 per cent of raw materials for the manufacturing sector come from agriculture.

<sup>4</sup> Official figure issued by the CSO in July 2008 before formation of the GNU. Estimates suggest that the figure for November of that year was much higher.

<sup>5</sup> Source IMF data Tables.

**Figure 1.4 Key economic trends 1980-2005**




*Data sourced from WB tables and are based on 2000 prices. Note this uses value-added figures derived from the difference between output price and cost of intermediate inputs*

GDP growth is driven by the performance of the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Each time a drought occurs (about once every four years) these two sectors of the economy under-perform and drag GDP growth down.<sup>6</sup> Figure 1.5 shows the fluctuations in their contributions to GDP. The three sectors which contributed over 40 per cent of GDP in any given year, significantly influence what happens to the economy. The link here is with rainfall patterns. Analysis of GDP growth and rainfall data for the first 16 years of Independence has found a correlation co-efficient of 70 per cent.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Between 1980 and 2000, Zimbabwe has experienced four major droughts: 1982-3, 1986-7, 1991-2 and 1994-5. After 2000 on average every other year has been a deficit rainfall year. In some years, such as 2007/2008, the timing of the rainfall has been at issue more than the total amount of rainfall.


<sup>7</sup> See Richardson (2007).

**Figure 1.5: Contribution of agriculture, manufacturing and mining to GDP**



Performance of agriculture and manufacturing also influences what happens to employment growth in the formal sector as Figure 1.6 shows. It is clear that formal employment had also shrunk substantially from about 3.6 million in 2003 to an estimated 480,000 by 2008.

**Figure 1.6: Employment growth plus agriculture and manufacturing contribution to GDP**



In the next section we look at some of the key causes of this socio-economic decline that is now commonly referred to as a crisis.

#### 1.4. Multiple causes of the Zimbabwe crisis

The causes of Zimbabwe's crisis are as complex as they are multiple and there is little scope to do justice to all of them in this section. Rather we aim to identify the main factors that we can link directly to some of the key themes of this report. Even as we draw out particular social, economic and political events we

are mindful of the fact that it is how these are managed that ultimately influences the severity of their impact and hence their contribution to the economic decline. The main point though is that there is not one factor that caused the crisis but a combination of factors. Further, as will become apparent, although the crisis worsened since 2000 its economic origins predate the political manifestations that emerged at the turn of the millennium.

#### *Economic growth and the structural adjustment programme*

Up to the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991, Zimbabwe had a fairly diversified economy in which manufacturing played a much bigger role than in other African economies. The economic strategy was interventionist, premised on growth with equity (Ncube, 1995). After Independence, GDP growth between 1980 and 1989 averaged 3.2 per cent but needed to be higher to provide for a growing population and huge programmes of social expenditure by the State. Although poor export performance and the lack of meaningful foreign investment resulted in serious shortages of foreign currency before the implementation of ESAP, controls on imports and capital repatriation protected the domestic industry and the balance of payments. Interest rate controls kept domestic liquidity cheap to finance budget deficits and service debts. However, the inadequate level of economic growth, attributed to structural problems in the economy in the face of mounting demands on the fiscus, spurred the country to embark on the economic reforms (Mumvuma, 2002). Trade liberalisation was forecasted to create high and sustainable levels of export growth and open the country to external competition, earning the country foreign currency and increasing productivity (Hess, 2001).

Introduced as a five year programme ESAP actually saw a decline in average real GDP, the growth of which averaged 1.7 per cent between 1991 and 1996 while per capita income actually contracted by -1.9 per cent to Z\$1,992 compared to Z\$2,998 just before ESAP. Similarly, average inflation rose from 15 per cent to 25 per cent, while interest rates trebled (Moore, 2003). Implementing ESAP reforms required US\$3.5 billion in new foreign loans over five years. This was in addition to an existing debt of US\$2.5 billion. Even worse, during the 1992/93 fiscal year, interest payments on both foreign and domestic debt increased 15 per cent more than projected due to the interest and exchange rate volatility (World Bank 1995). Table 1.3 shows the deteriorating macroeconomic indicators during the reforms.



**Table 1.3: ESAP targets and actual performance of key economic indicators**

Indicator	1991		1992		1993		1994		1995	
	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
<b>GDP per cent</b>	4.3	3.2	4.4	-5.5	4.6	2	4.8	5.3	5	-0.2
<b>Exports US\$ m</b>	1,825	1,642	1,982	1,527	2,159	1,625	2,363	1,969	2,593	2,718
<b>Imports US\$ m</b>	1,606	1,564	1,746	1,776	1,860	1,526	1,986	1,798	2,115	2,882
<b>Overall Balance US\$ m</b>	136	-103	114	-32.7	123	208.3	108	270.5	114	44
<b>Total Revenue as percentage of GDP</b>	39.3	33.5	39.6	35.7	39.2	31	38.9	30.4	38.3	30.1
<b>Total Expenditure as percentage of GDP</b>	46.9	42.7	45.7	44.1	44	41.4	42.6	38	41.5	42.4
<b>Government Deficit as percentage of GDP(excluding grants)</b>	9.3	-9.2	7.8	-8.4	6.6	-10.4	5.5	-7.6	5.0	-12.2
<b>Inflation percentage</b>	16	39.7	14	46.3	12	18.6	10	21.1	10	22.6

*Source: GoZ, 1998. Zimbabwe Programme For Economic and Social Transformation, (1996-2000).*

Under ESAP, Zimbabwe also suffered what has been described as ‘deindustrialisation’. This was evident in several key manufacturing sectors, such as textiles, which saw a 61 per cent contraction between 1990 and 1995 (Carmody, 1998) and manufacturing output in general fell more than 20 per cent between 1991 and 2000 (Ismi, 2004). Reduction in social spending by the State also affected basic social services and a parallel programme of reforming the civil service saw 25 per cent of public workers laid off. Unemployment reached 50 per cent by 1997. In spite of a programme to mitigate the social effects of adjustment the percentage of people living below the poverty line rose from 50 per cent to 75 per cent.

These social costs created a public backlash culminating in what the media termed ‘IMF Riots’, the most severe of which were the 1994/5 bread riots in the capital city, Harare. Public workers went on strike in 1996, followed by numerous other trade union organised strikes in 1997. The public unrest fermented resentment mostly among the urban dwellers hardest hit by the impact of the reforms. In some ways, although ESAP had some successes its failure to drive GDP growth during the 1990s could have laid the foundations for the unstable economic environment that led to the rapid economic decline that is evident in the GDP growth trends from the year 2000 onward. However, there is need to balance this point with the unknown trajectory of the economy if ESAP had not been implemented.

#### *Economic management and ‘Black Friday’*

On the 14<sup>th</sup> of November 1997 (now called Black Friday) the Zimbabwe dollar lost 71.5 per cent of its value against the US Dollar and the stock market crashed, wiping off 46 per cent from the value of shares as external investors lost confidence in the currency. Debates are inconclusive on the real cause of Black Friday but these include economic management decisions (Gopinant, 1998), the failure of the IMF’s structural adjustment programmes and attendant decline in investor confidence (Mambondiyani 2006).



**November 2008, up to 80 per cent of the population survived on less than US\$2 per day.  
(Photo © Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi).**

### *Land reform and its impact on the economy*

The timing and execution of the Fast Track Land Reform programme is seen by some as the immediate trigger of the full blown political and economic crisis. In 1980 the Government had embarked on a programme to correct historical imbalances in land ownership. Although by 1998 some 78,000 black families had been resettled on land purchased via the market from former white commercial farmers, most fertile land still remained in the hands of the 4,500 commercial farmers. By the time a donor conference was called in September 1998, the land redistribution programme had all but stalled. In addition to donor funds drying up and implementation capacity issues, there was also resistance by some white commercial farmers to sell land. Although it was later regularised into a Government programme, the fact that the Fast Track Land Reform Programme had been preceded by spontaneous land invasions, created insecurity. Controversy over compensation soured relations with some international donors,<sup>8</sup> while commercial farm production was disrupted. With the newly settled farmers severely under-capitalised, the foreign exchange earnings from agriculture declined.

### *Withdrawal of aid*

Through ESAP Zimbabwe had come to rely a lot more on international finance for balance of payments support. More generally, donors supported the various State social development programmes and

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<sup>8</sup> The State would only promise to pay when able to – even then for improvements and not for the land.

estimates suggest that by the time of the land invasions up to 18 per cent of recurrent expenditure budget was financed this way. The Government's social programmes channelled money into improving education, healthcare, land redistribution and infrastructural developments. Aid volumes had been falling in Zimbabwe since 1994 and declined further when the Fast Track Land Reform Programme started. The volatility of aid increased and amplified the macro-economic and balance of payment crises. This decline in aid occurred when the Zimbabwean economy needed international support the most.

### *Economic and political sanctions*

The contribution of political and economic sanctions to the Zimbabwean economic crisis is a controversial subject which needs further analysis. Sanctions are often cited by the Government as the major cause of Zimbabwe's economic collapse. A closer look at the country's import and export activities between 1990 and 1999, (before the onset of the land redistribution programme), reflects the emergence of South Africa as a major trading partner for the country. This is largely attributed to the opening up of South Africa in 1994. However, whilst imports showed a marked increase between 1990 and 1999, export performance dragged behind over the same period. Therefore, it became apparent as far back as 1998 that the growing balance of payment deficit was largely a result of struggling exports whilst the import bill gained momentum.

There appears to be two types of sanctions on Zimbabwe. The first could be called political sanctions. They restrict movement and freeze assets of some members of the ZANU PF party and private individuals and companies accused of human rights violations. These have been applied by Australia, New Zealand, the EU countries and the US. The second type is indirect sanctions such as the withdrawal of aid, balance of payments support and termination of lines of credit. The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 passed in the US, for example, specifically bans any economic support to the country. The International Finance Corporation of the World Bank suspended funding of infrastructural and private sector projects in the country. The IMF and World Bank limited their interactions to technical assistance and analytical work, focusing on macro-economic policy, food security issues, social sector expenditure, social delivery mechanisms and HIV and AIDS projects.

The deterioration of political conditions after a disputed Presidential and Parliamentary election on 28 March, 2008 has led to an intensification of the sanctions. Apart from private companies cutting off business ties (Tesco, the world's third largest supermarket, announced soon after the election standoff that it was to stop sourcing fresh produce worth £1 million a year from Zimbabwe, and a German firm, Giesecke and Devrient, which had regularly supplied Zimbabwe with bank note paper for over 40 years, also announced it was stopping any link) the general perception that the country was imploding also led to a number of foreign missions either downgrading their missions or relocating them elsewhere in the region.

Although the western countries have argued that targeted sanctions are directed at political leaders, it is usually the vulnerable groups of society who suffer rather than the targeted group. Sanctions have constricted key economic sectors with disastrous consequences. Most of these have manifested themselves in the form of shortages of foreign currency, resulting in the country accumulating external payment arrears and failing to import critical supplies. Between 1966 and 1999, Zimbabwe registered capital account surpluses largely in the form of project finance, as well as budgetary aid and balance of payment support. However, by 2000, the country had started experiencing capital flight reflecting the suspension of balance of payment support and project finance by the multilateral financial institutions

and other donors. As a result, Zimbabwe's capital account has been in persistent deficits since 2000. The current account deficits and the reduced capital inflows, resulted in excessive pressure on foreign currency reserves, which as a result declined from US\$830 million (3 months import cover in 1996) to less than one month of import cover by 2006 (RBZ, 2007). The shortages in foreign currency constrained the country's capacity to meet foreign payment obligations and finance critical imports. This in turn has caused a build up in foreign payments arrears from US\$109 million in 1999 to US\$1.5 billion by the end of 2006. This development affected the country's creditworthiness and worsened its risk profile, as a result of which traditional sources of external finance from bilateral and multilateral sources dried up. The IMF, which had suspended technical assistance in June 2002 due to arrears of more than US\$132 million, has only now resumed liaising with the country following the establishment of the GNU.

#### *Fiscal and economic governance*

One of the major drivers of inflation has been fiscal mismanagement over the past 10 years. According to IMF reports, the budget deficit, including grants, stood at 10.0 per cent of estimated GDP in 2006.<sup>9</sup> This figure is more than triple the figure of 3.0 per cent of GDP achieved in 1998. In the 2008 budget announced on 29<sup>th</sup> November 2007, the forecast budget deficit was approximately 11 per cent of expected GDP of Z \$16 quadrillion. According to IMF estimates, Government expenditure had reached 53.5 per cent of GDP in 2006 – more than double the expected value of 24.7 per cent. To the extent that the quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs) drove inflation over and above what was expected (given that the average Government fiscal deficit for 2003-2005 has been below 3 per cent of GDP and since 2001 the primary balance has been in surplus in all years except 2004), problems in economic governance may have made an already unstable economic environment worse. The economic governance issues point mainly to some structural inadequacies in the legislative environment, particularly the distinction of roles between the Reserve Bank and the Ministry of Finance.

#### *Political governance*

Analysis of how political governance failings led to the economic crisis can be traced to the nature of the Zimbabwe constitution. A failed attempt to reform this constitution in early 2000 is often seen as the main trigger of the political dimensions of the crisis. However, what is clear is that since the formation of the MDC in 1999 as an opposition, capable of contesting political power, the political landscape changed significantly. In addition to a strong opposition there was also a growth in the number of, and direct public actions by, civil society organisations that campaigned for greater civil liberties. Faced with a deteriorating economy, a determined political opposition, growing civil society militancy and real prospects of losing political power, the State responded through acts that closed down what political space existed. Apart from constitutional amendments to absolve the State of any responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, other key pieces of legislation that created controversy included the Public Order Security Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act both passed in 2002. This was after restructuring of the judiciary done from March 2001 that created a perception of a compromised State institution.

It is clear from this discussion that there was no single factor that led to the economic crisis in Zimbabwe. Rather it resulted from the interplay of long term structural problems with the economy, coupled with

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<sup>9</sup> IMF, Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa April 2007, Washington DC.

deterioration in political and economic governance. The following section examines the impact the economic crisis had on Zimbabwe's poor.

### **1.5. Poverty impact of the crisis**

By the time the GNU was formed in March 2009 key macro-economic fundamentals pointed to a deep seated economic crisis that had simmered since the late 1990s before accelerating to become a general pattern of decline at the turn of the millennium. This pattern of economic performance is also reflected in any analysis of the poverty trends. There is no doubt that by 2009, a majority of Zimbabweans were poorer than they had ever been since attaining Independence in 1980. Data from the three major poverty surveys (Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey of 1991, Poverty Assessment Study Surveys of 1995 and 2003) are not accurately comparable over time due to methodological issues,<sup>10</sup> but they do suggest that by 2000, poverty in Zimbabwe was already on the rise after initial impressive progress made during the 1980s. From 25.8 per cent in 1991 the number of households living below the food poverty line rose to 34.9 per cent by 1995 before a dramatic rise to 63 per cent by 2003.<sup>11</sup> There was a similar rise in the number of people living below the total consumption poverty line. These increased from 55 per cent in 1995 to 72 per cent in 2003. Since the Poverty Assessment Study Survey of 2003 there has not been any further official surveys on the levels of poverty in Zimbabwe, but some estimates suggest that by the time the economic crisis reached its high point in November 2008 up to 80 per cent of the population survived on less than US\$2 a day.<sup>12</sup>

In general, available data suggest that poverty in Zimbabwe is predominantly rural. This is not surprising given that up to 70 per cent of the population still reside in rural areas. They are mostly smallholder farmers living off the land. Current estimates show that there are about 1.3 million smallholder farms occupying nearly 75 per cent of all agricultural land. Of these about 1.1 million are located in communal lands while the rest subsist on land in the 'original' resettlement areas (72,000 households) and A1 Fast Track resettlement farms (141,000 households). A majority of the rural poor are found among these smallholder households (especially those in communal lands as well as some landless displaced former commercial farm workers).

If we consider data on the incidence of rural poverty according to agro-ecological regions it is clear that the more marginal an area is, the greater the rates of poverty (Table 1.4). As the largest number of rural residents is found in Natural Region IV, it is clear that this is also where the largest number of rural poor is to be found.

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<sup>10</sup> Especially how poverty is measured.

<sup>11</sup> GoZ, 2005. The initial rise has often been attributed to ESAP and the massive job losses experienced.

<sup>12</sup> USAID Health Report.

**Table 1.4: Poverty by natural region in rural areas**

Natural Region	Prevalence (per cent) of	
	Poverty	Extreme Poverty
I	62.4	36.2
II	71.6	41.2
III	77.3	51.4
IV	81.6	57.2
V	79.5	55.7

*Source: Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (1997)*

The Central Statistical Office (2003) also calculates that the highest incidence of rural poverty is to be found in Matabeleland North (88.2 per cent of households), followed by Mashonaland Central (85.2 per cent),<sup>13</sup> Matabeleland South (86.6 per cent) and Masvingo (84.0 per cent). As Table 1.4 suggests, poverty follows types of farming system and consequently natural or regional agro-ecological conditions.

The National Food Early Warning Unit (NFEWU) surveys show some differentiation within the rural areas where some households were more vulnerable than others. Specifically, female headed households, grandparent headed households, child headed households and those headed by young male adults were found to be the most vulnerable (USAID, 2008). More generally, poverty was found to be worse in marginal and remote rural districts of the country than those near the line of rail.

A major cause of the poverty in rural areas is low incomes from farm livelihood activities due to a combination of productivity challenges and poor market returns. Given that smallholder farmers now occupy 75 per cent of all agricultural land, it is clear that part of the solution to poverty will be in making farm livelihoods work for these families. Urban areas were generally found to have lower poverty rates, although increasingly the severity and depth of poverty is now much greater than in rural areas due to the sharp decline in the formal employment sector. With unemployment estimated at 80 per cent at the time the GNU was formed, it is clear that getting the formal economy working again will be the most direct way to deal with urban poverty. In the next chapters this report looks at the impact of the economic crisis on the various sectors, starting with labour markets.

## **1.6. Conclusion**

Two main points emerge clearly from this discussion so far. First is the fact that although the appropriation of white owned commercial farms is often seen as the main cause, and indeed was the ultimate trigger mechanism, the Zimbabwe economic crisis emerged from a combination of structural problems inherent within the key productive sectors of the economy (agriculture, manufacturing and mining).

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<sup>13</sup> Mashonaland Central has 74 per cent of households in NRI and II, is located fairly close to Harare and is well served by transport so it is rather contradictory for it to have such high levels of poverty. Back in 1995 the World Bank (1995) had noted that Mashonaland Central also fared badly in nutritional surveys. However, recalculation of poverty levels based on 1990 ICES data showed Mashonaland Central to have one of the lowest incidences of poverty in the country.

Secondly, it has been shown that poverty was already increasing by the time of the farm invasions in 2000. There is no doubt that poverty rates increased during the economic crisis and by all measures a majority of Zimbabweans were poor by the time the GNU was formed. Most of the poverty in Zimbabwe today is still rural and is largely a function of underperformance of smallholder agriculture that has led to low agricultural incomes and a lack of alternative sources to make a living. Deep pockets of poverty now exist in the major urban centres. By the time of the formation of the GNU most people in the urban areas made a living through the informal sector. A key implication of this is that rural poverty reduction will probably be achieved by the revitalisation of agriculture and increased earnings from the smallholder farms. Similarly urban poverty reduction will necessarily be underpinned by the revitalisation of manufacturing on the back of agricultural productivity growth. The next chapter examines the issue of labour markets and employment in more detail.

## CHAPTER 2: Employment and Labour Markets

### 2.1. Introduction

In this chapter we examine employment, labour markets implications of the economic crisis for social protection in Zimbabwe. The chapter highlights the structure of employment in Zimbabwe and considers labour markets dynamics and employment during this period. This is followed by a discussion on social protection for the poor and vulnerable in Zimbabwe, highlighting developments on social protection. It then considers some scenarios for social protection in the future.

### 2.2. The labour market and employment

One of the key pathways out of poverty is income growth. Although there are different ways of achieving this depending on individual and economic contexts, a sure way to stabilise household incomes is through employment. For Zimbabwe this applies more directly to urban poverty and indirectly to rural poverty, where income growth will have to come from agriculture and other rural non-farm activities. This section examines developments in the labour market and suggests possible policy actions to revive the labour market. We focus on the labour market because of its importance as a linkage between production and consumption, in addition to its role of transmitting policy impacts on development. Further, given the high level of poverty described in Chapter 1, knowledge of the current state, structure and performance of the labour market is vital to inform future policy formulation for recovery. We have argued that the economic crisis started as far back as 1997 and will show how this decline affected labour markets. The structure of the economy, which determines the structure of employment, is then examined together with the labour market structure and the regulatory changes that were introduced. We end by proposing what we feel are the most important policy changes needed to revitalise the labour market.

#### *Contextual background*

We argued earlier that the economy has gone through three distinct policy swings – from interventionism (1980-1990) to structural adjustment (1991-1995) to reactive management (1997 to present). Despite the policy swings and accompanying economic policies, the foundation of the economy largely remained unchanged, and this foundation was and still is characterised by segmentation and enclavity, which are also reflected in the labour market. In discussing the labour market we shall focus on the economic crisis period.

The labour market structure, like the mainstream economy, is segmented. Workers in the formal sector, particularly those in top positions, are able to prosper and live off their wages, while those in the non-formal economy have very low average wages and hence have to rely on other sources of income in order to survive. Furthermore, during the crisis period, workers in the lower part of the formal sector were worst hit by rampant inflation which in July 2008 reached 231 million per cent. A majority of workers left formal employment around this time to try and make a living in the non-formal economy. Available data suggest that by December 2008 only 480,000 workers remained employed in the formal sector. The formal sector is capital intensive and has low labour absorptive capacity, resulting in the non-formal sector being the principal source of employment creation. The formal sector in Zimbabwe has often been described as part of ‘grafted capitalism’ (LEDRIZ, 2004). This is a capitalist mode of production imposed



on African countries by colonialism and not meant to equally benefit all inhabitants of the economy. Thus, while there is total commodification under endogenous capitalism (the type of capitalism found in Europe) commodification is low in African countries (under grafted capitalism) and only restricted to the formal sector, thus leaving a big part of the economy operating informally. The consequence of this relationship is the absence of a significant relationship between the formal and non-formal sectors.


The non-formal sector provides a market and a pool of surplus labour to the formal sector. It also offers a buffer for spent formal sector labour given the absence of an effective social security system in the economy. The informal economy is found in both rural and urban areas, and can be divided into two (Ranis and Stewart, 1999): one part which is dynamic and relatively more productive, and another that is traditional and moribund.

The non-formal sector's larger part is the communal (including resettlement areas) sub-sector, which is principally subsistence in nature. It dwarfs the formal economy both spatially and in terms of employment, but it lags behind in terms of value-addition. Treatment of informal employment, found in both urban and rural areas, changed during the structural adjustment period. The informal economy was forbidden in urban areas during the colonial period, and after independence the Government was hesitant about its development (ILO/SATEP, 1985). As a result employment in the formal sector remained low at around 10 per cent of total employment. Following structural adjustment, in the 1990s, and combined with declining real wages in the formal sector over the years, many people joined the informal sector. In addition the high rate of urbanisation in Zimbabwe that saw the urban population growing by 88 per cent between 1980 and 1990 (World Bank, 2008), and the sluggish formal sector employment growth, forced many people to join the informal economy. Economic decline and hyperinflation from 2002 onwards further forced more people to join the informal economy. In the next section we examine the dynamics of formal and non-formal sector employment in Zimbabwe. The analysis will mainly focus on the formal sector because of data availability, its potential to create quality and decent jobs, and because of its capacity to be the engine for economic recovery.

#### *Employment structure and dynamics*

Figure 2.1 shows employment and GDP growth between 1980 and 2005. It illustrates that there was a high degree of co-variation between employment and GDP growth. Thus, employment, like GDP, declined during periods of covariant shocks such as drought. The extent to which both employment and GDP growth were driven by the agricultural sector has already been examined in Chapter 1. Suffice to say, the decline in the agricultural sector is one of the reasons that the total employment declined from 1999.

**Figure 2.1: Employment and GDP growth, 1980-2005**



*Source: Based on statistics from CSO, 2004*

*Employment growth is measured on the right axis.*

Employment growth was sluggish in the 1980s because of high employment protection (Fallon and Lucas, 1991). Despite weak unions, employment protection laws shielded incumbent workers from competition from the unemployed, thereby causing unemployment to become long term (Lazear, 1990). It also discriminated against young workers, resulting in rising youth unemployment. It was only in the late 1980s that the trade union movement became stronger and critical of the Government. Thereafter tensions with the State worsened especially when unions opposed the implementation of ESAP. During the 1990s, the unions became a galvanising force which led to the formation of the main opposition party as a project of the unions.

The high employment protection is often seen as having prohibited employment flexibility in line with changes in demand brought about by ESAP (Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). This caused formal sector employers to shoulder high labour costs during downturns. While the protection might have encouraged insiders to extract a premium on wages, wage increments were gazetted by the Government, thus disadvantaging both workers and employers. Firms responded by substituting work process flexibility for numerical flexibility, thereby increasing work intensity which workers opposed because they felt they were not being adequately compensated. Notwithstanding this, employment protection did have a positive effect of shielding workers from economic, social and psychological effects of losing jobs. It also helped to preserve incomes and skills, thus providing insurance to labour market risks. From a firm perspective, workers with secure tenure are inclined to accept workplace modernisation without feeling threatened. They are also likely to put in more effort, thus reducing supervision costs.

For the period 1997-2008, employment declined significantly across all sectors due to the economic recession. There were significant firm closures that led to considerable job losses, especially in Harare and Bulawayo. The result was growth in long-term unemployment and significant under-employment, especially in the informal economy where skills were under-utilised because of a lack of resources. In response to the economic crisis, many workers migrated to seek better jobs and incomes regionally and internationally. Table 2.1 shows average employment growth in the agriculture, mining, manufacturing and construction sectors.

**Table 2.1: Average annual employment growth (percentage), 1997-2004**

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Overall employment growth	3.9	1.9	-2.4	-6	-4.3	-5.8	-9.1	-1.4
Agriculture and fishing	2.3	-2.8	-2.1	-3.9	-10.8	-23.8	-28.5	-2.3
Mining and quarrying	-1.2	3.2	-2.5	-25	-4.3	0.2	-2.1	19
Manufacturing	7.8	5.0	-3.3	-9.6	-1.5	-4	-17.7	-3.5
Construction	0.8	1.3	-12.5	-22.3	0	0	-37.6	-6.5

*Source: CSO Quarterly Digest of Statistics 2003; IMF Country Report 5/359 Statistical Appendix.*

The decline in agricultural employment from 2000 was a result of the displacement of some farm workers by new landowners, most of whom were not able to adopt the employment contracts between the workers and previous land owners. A decline in manufacturing employment was mainly caused by the shortage of foreign currency to import raw materials and machinery. Loss of employment affected major urban centres where manufacturing activities were concentrated. Construction sector employment was one of the worst hit sectors because of a shortage of building materials, mortgage finance, and because the Government stopped financing new construction projects. The decline of employment in low skill sectors like agriculture and construction caused unemployment to rise among unskilled workers. To drive the points raised here further, we examine the dynamics of employment structure over time.

#### *Structure of employment*

Changes in employment can be explored further by analysing sectoral employment contributions as shown in Table 2.2. It shows that in 1980, agriculture was the biggest employer, followed by manufacturing and private domestics. During that period, the private sector was quite competitive and had a significant presence on the export market. The composition of employment changed over time. The proportion of agricultural workers declined to 24.3 per cent in 1990. Long-term employment in the sector declined between 1980 and 1990 as it was substituted with casual labour on large scale commercial farms, particularly among women (Adams 1991). The contribution of agricultural employment increased to 26.9 per cent of total in 1995, an indication of the positive employment response to structural adjustment. The sector had a competitive advantage in horticulture, tobacco and cotton production that saw the country achieving remarkable presence on the world market. Agriculture remained the largest employer and earner of foreign currency until 2000. Thereafter, its contribution to employment declined, reaching almost half its 2000 contribution in 2005.

**Table 2.2: Percentage sectoral formal employment, 1980-2005**

Sector	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
Agriculture	32.4	26.3	24.3	26.9	26.3	19.8	15.6	15.5	14.2
Mining and quarrying	6.6	5.2	4.3	4.8	3.6	3.9	4.2	5.0	5.4
Manufacturing	15.8	16.1	16.5	15	14.7	15.4	13.9	13.6	12.5
Electricity and water	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1
Construction	4.2	4.3	6.4	5.8	4.4	3.8	2.6	2.5	2.3
Finance and insurance	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.7	2.8	2.5	3.8	3.8	3.8
Distribution and restaurants	7	7.4	8.1	8.1	8.4	9.4	11.5	11.4	10.4
Transport and communication	4.5	4.8	4.5	4.1	3.6	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.5
Public Administration	7	8.6	7.8	6.2	4.7	5.8	6.5	6.8	7.3
Education	4.1	8.5	9.1	9.3	11.3	13.4	14.9	15.1	16.3

Health	1.5	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.6
Private domestics	10.7	9.4	8.6	8.2	8.3	9.2	10.1	10.2	10.2
Other Services	4.3	5.5	6.2	6.9	8.6	9.4	9.4	8.8	8.9

*Source: Calculated From Quarterly Digest of Statistics and National Accounts, CSO, 2003; IMF Country Report No. 05/359*

The proportion of manufacturing employment changed marginally during the 1980s and 1990s. There was a slight decline in manufacturing employment during the structural adjustment period because of firm restructuring and high competition on the domestic market which forced some firms to reduce capacity utilisation or to close down. Manufacturing employment continued to decline through to 2005 because of foreign currency shortages and Government price controls. Overall, employment in most tradable sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) declined from 1995 onwards, while non-tradable sectors' (all other sectors in Table 2.2) employment increased, especially in the education and distribution sectors. This was in part because of foreign currency shortages, high inflation, exchange rate over-valuation, and reduced export competitiveness. As controls increased from 2000 onwards, there was also an outflow of foreign capital, thus reducing the level of investment in the economy. Further, the level of gross national savings persistently declined over this period.

In the social sectors, health and education experienced growth in their contribution to total employment, with the most growth coming from education. There was massive expansion and enrolment in education in the first decade, and it remained comparatively high through to 2005.

Dividing employment between private and public sectors shows that private formal sector employment declined from the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) reform period onwards for reasons cited above, including declining domestic demand and low technology adoption. Although public sector employment declined marginally during the ESAP reform period, it increased by 21 per cent between 1995 and 2005. This growth was a result of changing employment dynamics that resulted in the public sector remaining the only stable form of employment in the face of economic recession. However, as the economic crisis deepened, some people in the public sector left formal employment, mainly because of low pay, to migrate to the informal economy.

Employment in the informal economy grew consistently over time. Despite the lack of time series data, we know that informal employment accounted for 10 per cent of the labour force in 1985<sup>14</sup> (ILO/SATEP, 1985). By 1998, 62 per cent of the labour force was in informal employment, and by 1999, it was twice the size of formal employment. It is believed to have grown further during the crisis period.

While the discussion above has focused on changes in numbers of employment, it is also important to look at changes in the laws of employment, because we know employment law affects the level and composition of employment (Fallon and Lucas, 1991) and affects the attractiveness of the economy as an investment destination. Furthermore, any attempts to revitalise the labour market when stability is achieved requires that the law of employment be supportive of the new economic regime. The following section explores changes to the employment legal framework.

#### *The employment legal framework and wage formation*

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<sup>14</sup>Note that the informal sector referred to here does not include rural agricultural activities.

The employment legal framework, just like the economic policy framework, also experienced changes between 1980 and 2008. We will not go into the details of the changes introduced in the 1980s and 1990s, except to the extent to which they are linked with current regulations. Anyone interested in these changes should consult work by Sachikonye (1987), Kanyenze (1993), and Madhuku (2001), among others. Suffice to mention that regulations in the 1980s institutionalised employment security which created inflexibility in the labour market. This was followed by labour market liberalisation (from 1991) which introduced flexibility that allowed firms to adjust their levels of employment in line with changes in demand (Velenchik, 1997; Bjurek and Dureval, 2000).

Liberalisation also introduced collective bargaining as the medium for setting wages. Wage bargaining was maintained during the economic crisis period, but the Government retained power to review the wage agreements, including power to set a minimum wage. Despite collective bargaining and the occasional introduction of national minimum wages, real wages declined significantly during this period, as shown in Table 2.3.

**Table 2.3: Real consumption wage index, 1990-2003**

	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003
Agriculture	100	55.5	65.2	64.5	73.5	57.2	37	-
Mining	100	82.2	79	93.8	121	71.7	85.9	38.7
Manufacturing	100	80.6	72.6	66.1	76.9	61	60.8	21
Electricity and Water	100	79.2	89.8	161.7	346.7	233.3	172.6	56.8
Construction	100	86	66.9	70.9	89.7	66.4	38.9	-
Finance and Insurance	100	100.9	103.3	110.4	149.7	171.4	119.7	36.7
Distribution	100	86.3	75.1	77.1	94.2	78.5	73.3	22.8
Transport & Communication	100	72.6	66.5	58.7	67.9	65	46.9	13.9
Public Administration	100	68.1	47.6	61.5	80.1	104.8	74.5	29.3
Education	100	79.7	61.9	88.8	124.5	146.5	112.9	38.2
Health	100	77.9	64.2	78.4	124.3	169.3	141.6	42.7
Domestic services	100	59.1	37.9	25.4	16.3	6.6	2	0.3
Other	100	92.3	84.4	90.6	116.6	119.1	101.9	32.1
Total	100	78.7	69.2	75.4	97.6	94.2	76.6	24.9

*Source: own calculations from CSO Quarterly Digest of Statistics 2003*

Table 2.3 shows that in real terms, collective bargaining was not a perfect medium for income distribution given that in twelve years from 1990 to 2002, workers lost nearly a quarter of the real value of their earnings, notwithstanding the reduction in collective job action incidences. The only sector that performed reasonably well up to 2002 was the electricity and water sector. While the wage outcomes in part reflect the power that employers wielded in the bargaining process, they, in large part, reflect the impact of economic recession which reduced firms' profitability. Further, there were rising wage differentials between and within sectors (PWHC, 2000), with skilled and managerial workers increasingly earning more than other workers. There were also growing inter-sectoral wage differentials as illustrated in Table 2.4.

**Table 2.4: Sectoral wage differentials, 1997-2002**

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Manufacturing/agriculture	5.60	5.15	5.17	5.65	3.42	6.23
Mining/agriculture	5.32	5.62	5.62	5.51	3.36	7.19
Manufacturing/domestic	18.95	23.76	34.08	53.16	90.05	181.3
Mining/domestic	18.01	25.94	37.07	51.80	88.46	209.20
Agriculture/domestic	3.39	4.62	6.60	9.41	26.33	29.08

*Source: own calculations from Quarterly Digest of Statistics 2003*

Table 2.4 shows that the manufacturing sector wage was on average 5.6 times higher than the agricultural wage in 1997. By 2002, it was 6.2 times higher. The mining-agriculture wage differentials reached a maximum factor of 7.2 in 2002. Assuming that agriculture represents the rural sector and manufacturing the urban sector, it is clear from the Table that rural wages lagged behind urban wages. Based on the textiles sector and 2005 household survey datasets, on average, urban workers earned US\$1,922.52 annually, which was 73 times more than the rural annual average labour income (US\$26.23) (Chiripanhura, 2008). These differentials arise from the fact that rural wages are very low, and that while urban workers predominantly rely on labour income for sustenance, the proportion of labour income in rural household incomes is small. The Table also shows that the domestic sector experienced accelerating wage decline relative to other sectors.

Since Independence wage differentials increased between the private and public sectors. In the 1980s, wage differentials were compressed because the Government wanted, among other things, to discourage the substitution of private sector for public sector employment. After the introduction of economic reforms, wage setting in the private sector became collective bargaining-based. In the public sector, the Government's austerity measures resulted in reduced wage growth relative to the private formal sector. As a result, wage differentials increased. The Government responded by awarding hefty increments of over 150 per cent from 2000 onwards. It was going to take several years of such hefty increments for the public sector wages to become similar to private formal sector wages. While lower level Government employees earned more than their private formal sector colleagues, top Government workers earned far less than their private formal sector counterparts.

From the discussion above, low skill sectors of agriculture, construction and domestic services were the worst losers through to 2008. By 2005, most of the sectors' earnings were well below the poverty datum line (which stood at \$1,747,226 as at July that year),<sup>15</sup> signalling increasing impoverishment that was evident in both urban and rural areas. The decline in urban real incomes reduced the flow of transfers into the rural economy, thus reducing use of productivity-enhancing inputs and consumption of manufactured goods. The outcomes included declining living standards, failure to access health services, and reduced labour productivity. In the urban sector, the bulk of people in formal employment in 2008 were minimum wage earners striving hard to make ends meet because of hyperinflation. This resulted in increased frequency of collective bargaining across all sectors to an average of four times a year. By the first half of 2008, some firms were already running two payrolls in one month. Yet this did not reduce

<sup>15</sup>The CSO calculates monthly poverty datum lines for a family of five persons.

inter- and intra-sector wage inequality because firms offered efficiency wages to their critical staff to discourage them from leaving. This was particularly so in the mining, manufacturing and health services sectors. A study into textile and clothing sector operations in 2005 (Chiripanhura, 2008) found that most companies had resorted to offering free or subsidised midday meals to their workers, both to maintain productivity and as a non-wage benefit. Others offered free transport to and from work.

Changes introduced during the economic crisis period reached a peak when the harmonised Labour Act was passed in 2002, however, this did not cover the informal sector. In the formal sector, the far-reaching outcomes of the reforms included the introduction of retrenchment regulations, which were enhanced by the 2002 Act; the abolition of the 'one industry - one union' principle (despite its potential to complicate the collective bargaining process (Madhuku, 2001)); the creation of the Labour Court to replace the Labour Tribunal which had been created in the 1990s to deal with the backlog of industrial relations cases; and the prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of one's HIV status (through Statutory Instrument 202 of 1998). The new Act also updated and consolidated various pieces of employment regulations that existed, and for the first time, civil servants were governed under the same law as workers in the private formal sector, although disciplinary issues remained the preserve of the Public Service Commission. This was, however, reversed by Amendment 7 of 2005 which took public sector industrial relations back to the Public Service which does not recognise collective bargaining rights for the workers, hence its decisions are largely unilateral. Despite the existence of various associations in the public sector, they do not have union rights, and their contributions to wage negotiations through the Joint Negotiating Forum are merely advisory.


Some of the provisions of the Labour Act severely limit trade union activities, including possible deregistration and/or suspension from conducting their work. Yet there are also some positives from it: the new regulations removed the power to issue disposal orders (in the event of collective job action) from the Minister to the newly created Labour Court. This allowed for non-partisan handling of industrial actions. The Labour Court also acted as the final court of appeal for all employment cases, thus removing the High Court from industrial relations matters. The Labour Court was empowered, like the High Court, to review its decisions. Appeals against the Labour Court's decisions on matters of law could be taken to the Supreme Court. In employment, the probation period length was limited to no longer than one week for casual or seasonal workers and no more than three months in all other cases, and that the period was to be one block not subject to extension. The new Act also introduced and defined the concept of constructive dismissal, and notice pay was increased from one month to three months. On retrenchment, the Act improved on existing regulations by allowing for easier retrenchment of less than five employees without referring to an authority. Further, the new Act extended sick leave from an initial one month on full pay to three months. It allowed a further three months of sick leave on half pay. Given the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, this provision shielded workers from immediate loss of income when struck by the disease. On maternity leave, the new Act increased it from 75 per cent to 100 per cent of monthly salary without loss of benefits.

The changes highlighted above have significant influence on the functioning of the labour market now and in the future. The next sections analyses the demographic structural dynamics experienced since the onset of the economic crisis and examines the potential outcomes in the labour market after stabilisation.

#### *Demographic and labour force structural dynamics*

The country's population at independence was 7.3 million people. It reached 10.4 million in 1992, and 11.6 million in 2002 (CSO, 2004). Thereafter, it had grown to 13.2 million by 2006 (World Bank, 2008). The 2004 labour force survey reported a reduced total population of 10.8 million that year, mainly because of emigration and high death rates (CSO, 2006a).<sup>16</sup> The population structure in 2004 is illustrated in Figure 2.2. It indicates that there is a dominance of young persons, and this has been a familiar characteristic of the population since Independence. This indicates a high dependency ratio problem which has adverse effects on income distribution and living standards. The broad bottom of the graph may be indicative of the impact of the high AIDS-related death rates, and the high volume of migration (see Figure 2.3). With respect to migration, although official migration statistics are low, there has been significant unrecorded migration to neighbouring countries and to the United Kingdom (Chetsanga and Muchenje, 2003; IOM, 2005).

**Figure 2.2: Population structure, 2004**



*Source: CSO, 2006a*

Figure 2.2 shows that in 2004, 40 per cent of the population was below 15 years of age. This was slightly lower than the 2002 percentage (40.6) and the 1992 percentage of 47 per cent (CSO, 2004). The high

<sup>16</sup>The decline could also be attributed to the data collection method that excluded students in boarding school and visitors.



proportion of young persons demands that the economy provides certain services like adequate education and training and health facilities which, since the onset of the economic crisis, the Government has not been able to adequately provide.

Population growth averaged 3.8 per cent between 1975 and 1984, and this was higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average of 3 per cent (World Bank, 2008). While the regional average growth rate declined to 2.8 per cent between 1985 and 1994, Zimbabwe's rate declined to 3.1 per cent (World Bank, 2008). However, over the period 1995 to 2006, the country's population growth averaged 1.1 per cent compared to the region's 2.5 per cent (World Bank, 2008). Several factors explain these changes, including the wide availability and accessibility of family planning information and methods, the high level of literacy, and the adverse impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The slow growth rate may also be due to emigration during the economic crisis period.

The labour force in 1982 consisted of 3.97 million people of which 26 per cent were employed in the formal sector. The labour force increased to 4.96 million in 1999, and of this, 37 per cent was in paid employment (CSO, 2004). The remainder constituted persons either unemployed or in the informal economy. In 2004 the labour force consisted of 5.6 million people, with a participation rate of 87 per cent, having increased from 64 per cent in 1982 and 71 per cent in 1999 (CSO, 2004). The rising rate of economic activity during the crisis period may be an indication of the instability in the labour market rather than rising efficiency.


#### *Occupational and skills dynamics*

Comparing the occupational surveys of 1986 and 1999 reveals interesting statistics. In 1986, 6 per cent of those employed were professionals, 15 per cent were skilled, 28 per cent semi-skilled, 50 per cent unskilled, and 2 per cent staff-in-training (CSO, 2000; 2004). By 1999, the proportion of professionals had increased to 14.2 per cent. The skilled workers constituted 9.5 per cent of the employed, while the semi-skilled and unskilled constituted 10.6 per cent and 61.5 per cent respectively. By 2004, the proportion of professionals had declined to 5 per cent, that of skilled workers to 8.3 per cent, that of semi-skilled to 7.5 per cent (CSO, 2006). Only the proportion of unskilled workers increased (78.7 per cent). The declines were mainly due to emigration and HIV/AIDS-related deaths.

The non-formal labour market was mainly dominated by unskilled labour in the 1980s, but there was reasonable growth in skill level in the informal economy in the 1990s and more so after 2000 because of retrenchments and resignations from the formal sector. From 2004, people left formal employment voluntarily, especially in the public sector, because earnings therein were lower than those in the informal economy.

A comparison of the 1999 and 2004 figures reveals the toll of the economic crisis on the labour market. The number of professionals declined by 65 per cent, that of skilled workers by 13 per cent, and that of semi-skilled workers by 29 per cent. The decline in numbers of professional and skilled workers is cause for concern given the importance of skilled labour in economic growth and development. The growth in unskilled labour is detrimental to economic initiatives seeking industrial growth, global competitiveness and improved living standards. In fact, Chiripanhura (2008), reported that in 2005 the majority of employers in the textile sector lamented that productivity in their enterprises was held back by the lack of skilled workers, the majority of who had emigrated to South Africa.

**Figure 2.3: Migration of economically active persons, 1990-2002**




*Source: Statistics from CSO Labour Statistics, 2004*

Figure 2.3 shows that emigration started increasing from 1996, exceeding immigration from 1997 onwards. The figures do not capture people who left for neighbouring countries through illegal exit/entry points dotted around the country, especially in 2007 and 2008 when economic decline increased. It is estimated that over three million people, among them professionals like teachers, nurses and doctors, left the country (IOM, 2005; Bloch, 2006). Although the majority of emigrants went to South Africa, growing numbers also went to Mozambique and Zambia.

Despite the lack of official statistics for the period beyond 2002, it is apparent that migration increased during that period. On the basis of Statistics SA data, Makina (2007) extrapolated migration statistics to South Africa that are represented in Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4: Extrapolated migration statistics to South Africa



Source: Makina, 2007.

The Figure shows significant migration to South Africa as economic crisis deepened. The migrants' skill base covered the whole spectrum, but there was a relatively larger proportion of unskilled and semi-skilled labour.<sup>17</sup>

The growth of unskilled labour in Zimbabwe may also be due to reasons other than emigration. For example, the introduction of cost recovery measures in education and training since the introduction of economic reforms in 1991, reduced both State and personal investment in education. Other factors include, the decline in the economy, rising poverty and shortage of training staff in vocational education and training institutions. In addition, unskilled labour is not tradable and as such has no demand internationally. Where such labour has emigrated to neighbouring regional economies, it has been accused of under-cutting local wage rates.

Notwithstanding the above, one negative aspect of the economic crisis was making access to education costly. From 2004, school fees, especially at boarding schools, increased tremendously, resulting in some parents pulling their children out of such schools and placing them in less expensive but poorly equipped

<sup>17</sup> It should be noted that there is no data on intra-country migration, making it impossible to gain quantitative insight into rural-urban migration.

schools, while others pulled their children out of education altogether. Further, there was low morale among teachers who were striving to survive economically. Teachers left schools in large numbers because their salaries were not adequate to provide a decent standard of living, resulting in the closure of many schools by the second half of 2008.

The structural growth in the labour force, together with high participation rates in the face of economic recession, resulted in unemployment growth. The nature, dynamics, and controversies of unemployment are examined below.

### *The problem of unemployment*

Unemployment has been a problem in the economy since Independence. The rate reported for the 1980s is 11.6 per cent. It increased during the structural adjustment period to reach a peak of 21.8 per cent in 1992 before decreasing to 6 per cent in 1999 (CSO, 2004). The 1992 peak was partly a result of the drought that year. According to the 1999 labour force survey, unemployment in Harare and Bulawayo was 13 per cent and 14 per cent respectively, and the average for other provinces ranged between 1 and 3 per cent, including communal farmers. Harare and Bulawayo are industrial satellites that attract labour from the rest of the country, and company closures due to economic decline contributed to the concentration of unemployment in these cities.

According to the most recent labour force survey, the unemployment rate for 2004 was 9 per cent (CSO, 2006a). The CSO mainly uses the narrow definition of unemployment which classifies a person as unemployed if he/she is aged 15 years or older, and during the reference period was without work, was available for work, and was actively seeking employment. Other institutions use broader definitions when measuring unemployment and consequently come up with much higher figures. Using productive economic activity to define unemployment can be problematic because often people engage in many types of activities, some of them survivalist in nature, but would still prefer to be employed. Thus, using the strict definition, very few people will be (statistically) regarded as unemployed. This is supported by Serneels (2004) and Krishnan *et al* (1998)'s assertion that unemployment in Africa may be restricted to wealthier households whose members can afford to stay away from any economic activity while looking for suitable employment.

The important questions arising from this discussion are: how useful for policy are unemployment statistics, even the ones based on a broader definition? When we look at the measurement of unemployment, some categories into which respondents are classified (own account worker and unpaid family worker) pose a problem in calculating unemployment statistics since they are likely to hide people who may otherwise be unemployed. Further, the condition that the respondent must have been seeking employment during the reference period can also be problematic, especially since job search is not necessarily a continuous process. This is particularly so in the rural sector where infrastructure is poor, production seasonal, and the dominant type of employment casual.

Suitable concepts that can indicate the hardships faced in the labour market are under-employment and whether or not existing jobs can be called decent work. As reported by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2005), there are many people disguised as employed in the informal economy who are in fact under-employed, and are striving to make ends meet. Under-employment and decent work are complicated to measure. Decent work implies safe work in a healthy environment with guaranteed income and employment security, a concept very important for the improvement of conditions in the

informal economy. Under-employment is defined as the proportion of employees working part-time, that is, those working for hours less than a given limit, usually less than 20 hours per week. Official statistics record under-employment in formal employment only. Under employment is reported to have increased from 11 per cent of total employment in 1990 to 15 per cent in 2000. It is anticipated to have increased during the recession, though the statistics are under-estimations since they exclude the informal economy. We contend that under-employment should also capture people engaged in activities that fail to fully utilise their skills. This includes skilled people who, for various reasons, cannot fully utilise their skills especially in the informal economy.

Under-employment related to the misallocation and/or ineffective use of skills has grown significantly over the past few years as professionals have left formal employment to join the informal economy. This has not been measured, but can clearly illustrate the degree of waste in the economy. Thus, in order to capture under-employment in the informal economy, its definition needs to be expanded to include 'skilled workers working too hard to produce very little from informal activities'. If the informal economy is included, under-employment measured in terms of hours worked, generates biased statistics because the problem in the informal economy is due to underutilisation of skills and use of inappropriate equipment (low productivity), not shortage of time. Thus, the definition can be varied to cover people whose productivity falls significantly below the industry average. The definition needs to reflect prevailing conditions in the country rather than be a 'straight jacket' tailored for the sake of comparability.

Given the above, we can argue that while the CSO figures and underlying definitions are statistically correct, they may not be very useful to the local situation for various reasons. Firstly, the situation on the ground shows massive open unemployment, which many observers and commentators estimate at over 70 per cent (Kanyenze, 2006; US Department of State, 2005). Secondly, the strict definition of unemployment is too strict to be relevant in the African context where there is massive underemployment, multiple activity, and subsistence production. Since people have to engage in different types of activities for survival, counting such persons as employed irrespective of how intermittent the activities may be results in statistics that are not useful for policy. It is apparent that unemployment has generally been high, posing a serious challenge to the economy. In fact, the decrease in unemployment shown by official statistics is accompanied by increase in poverty, indicating that unemployment is an inadequate indicator of labour market problems in the economy.

Examining the inverse relationship between poverty and unemployment in the economy actually gives a better understanding of the hardships faced by many households (UNECA, 2005). The existence of unemployment is a revelation of labour market allocative inefficiency. More importantly, its composition is cause for serious concern. It is characterised by a disproportionate representation of the youth (ILO, 2006). UNECA (2005) stated that sub-Saharan Africa's youth unemployment averaged 21 per cent in 2003. The extent of the problem in Zimbabwe was confirmed by Kanyenze (1997) who found that the youth constituted 62 per cent of the unemployed. By 1999, the proportion had increased to 73 per cent (CSO, 2000). In 2004, 42 per cent of the urban unemployed were youths. These high youth unemployment statistics not only reflect the demographics of a youthful population but also indicate that there are fundamental labour market problems hindering smooth school-to-work transition.

The principal causes of high unemployment include low economic growth, labour force growth, rural-urban migration, and a small private sector incapable of creating enough jobs and apprenticeship opportunities. In addition, the youth lack skills owing to an education system that has, for years, been failing to equip them with relevant practical skills for self-employment or for employment (UNECA,

2005). The situation is made worse by the lack of adequate paid attachment opportunities in the economy. Although one may argue that the youths could seek unpaid attachments to gain experience, most of them are too poor to engage in unpaid attachments, most of which are available in urban areas where the cost of living is high. The main effects of unemployment have been emigration (regionally and internationally), increase in remittance income, and increase in poverty.

Notwithstanding the issues discussed above, the question is: when stability is restored, what should be done to revitalise the labour market? This is a tricky and yet very important question: important because it encourages us to start debating about policies necessary to revive the labour market given that employment can be used as an instrument to fight poverty. The discussion below is premised on the fact that labour is an important resource at the disposal of households. It is important for income distribution, and acts as a linkage between production and consumption. Whatever labour market policy changes we suggest here should be part of an economic stabilisation and growth strategy because some of the proposals require change in other sectors of the economy for them to be successful.



*The decline in numbers of professional and skilled workers is cause for concern given the importance of skilled labour in economic growth and development (Photo © Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi).*

### 2.3. Policy options necessary for labour market stability

This section presents a package of labour market reform policy options that the Government of Zimbabwe may need to consider if it is going to address the labour market challenges discussed above. The Government can choose one of two approaches. It can choose a passive approach that allows the markets to shape the nature and form of employment and employment practices, or it can decide to adopt an active labour market policy. A passive approach may not be an option given the nature of the decline in employment over the past decade. The State will need to adopt active rather than passive labour market policies in order to deal with the challenges posed by unemployment and under-employment. The policy options we suggest include the revitalising of the national statistics collection system and the education and training system; the need for effective manpower planning; the need for small and medium-scale enterprises support, skills training and upgrading; and the implementation of an appropriate incomes policy. Some of the policies need to be implemented sequentially, with issues like incomes policy necessary at a later stage when a positive growth path has been attained.

#### *Focus on skills training and upgrading*

The problem of youth unemployment mainly originates from the shortcomings of the education system that produces academically qualified but unemployable youths because they lack the skills required in industry. In fact, the system is supply- rather than demand-driven. The result has been an overabundance of academically qualified individuals competing for very few jobs. Furthermore, while academic achievement makes one trainable, there have been declining opportunities for skills training in the economy. The centralisation of apprenticeship recruitment by the Government and the reluctance of employers to take on apprentices has resulted in declining training opportunities. Even where individuals have funded their skills acquisition through attending vocational colleges, most of them have ended up as semi-skilled workers because they do not go through the national skills grading and certification system.

Given this scenario, a two-pronged approach to dealing with the skills requirements of the economy is proposed. First, the apprenticeship training system should be made more efficient so that firms have more input into the system. Firms should be given incentives to encourage them to take on more apprentices. Second, vocational college graduates who swell the ranks of the semi-skilled need to be encouraged to go through trade testing so that their skill levels can be graded. One way to encourage them to be tested is for industry to offer an earnings premium on skilled labour. The unskilled should also be encouraged to go through vocational training so that they improve their skills.

As the economic meltdown took its toll, there was increasing pressure on the existing vocational training institutions. However, the fee requirements increasingly became unaffordable, making the institutions inaccessible. It is important that the Government sets up a loan and grant scheme to assist the needy so that they can borrow and finance their education. A similar system should be put in place for technical college and university education. There is need for the Government to create more opportunities for poor people in education and training. This is particularly important given that education can be used as a ladder out of poverty.

All education and training should be subject to a national manpower policy that examines the skills requirements of the economy and avails the information to potential trainees. Such a policy, with input from industry, should monitor the stock of skills and advise colleges and universities to modify their recruitment and training systems to respond to skills shortages and surpluses. Wide dissemination of

information on the skills requirements of the economy will be necessary through career guidance and counselling sessions so that students can make decisions with a full set of information. This makes education and training demand- rather than supply-driven, and the operation of market forces in this regard should improve allocative efficiency.

#### *Alternative routes to skills acquisition*

As already mentioned, the education system has often been criticised as being too academic oriented (Ncube, 2003; Chiripanhura, 2008). This orientation has placed hurdles in training, such that students who fail to achieve the minimum requirements of five O-level passes including English and Mathematics, cannot access college training. The existence of such a restrictive system without alternative routes for those who fail to make the grade leads to inefficiency in the labour market. They end up joining the ranks of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers despite the fact that some of them have aptitude to become skilled workers. We therefore propose the expansion of the existing system to offer indirect routes to skills acquisition. Such routes can be useful to those that fail to achieve minimum academic requirements but have the flair to follow certain skilled professions. Copying the good practices already existing in other systems, where access courses exist can help people with ambition to realise their goals. This approach can help rebuild the nation's dwindling skill base.

#### *Exploiting the nation's comparative advantage*

Although Zimbabwe is emerging from the economic crisis there is need to focus on how to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the current challenges. The nation experienced significant growth in unskilled and semi-skilled labour during the crisis period. While the growth of this type of labour is a cause for concern, there is a need to realise that this type of labour can be taken advantage of. The existence of such labour indicates that the economy has a comparative advantage in low-skill sectors like agriculture, construction and distribution. As such, economic policy should seek to promote growth in these areas so as to deal with the problem of unemployment.

#### *Revitalising agriculture*

Agriculture remains full of potential to kick-start economic growth, especially given the linkages between the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Thus, revitalisation of the agricultural sector should be top priority of dealing with the current labour market problems. The sector has potential to generate massive low-cost job opportunities, further enhanced by employment growth in downstream industries like agro-processing, clothing and textiles, and chemical manufacturing (e.g. fertilisers and pesticides).

#### *Promoting the construction sector*

The bulk of employment in the construction sector is low skill, and reviving the sector will employ more of the unskilled labour in the economy. Currently, the sector is one of the worst affected by the economic crisis, recording massive declines in employment and contribution to GDP. There exist construction projects that have not been completed for the past five or more years because of shortages of building materials. Revival of the construction sector rests on revival of the manufacturing sector that produces building materials, and growth in both sectors should create many jobs. A national housing strategy needs to be developed that allows councils, companies, and individuals to finance housing projects. This will not only create jobs, but will also assist in the long-term progress of living standards. Individuals, especially



those in the diaspora, are willing to contribute to the construction of houses but are constrained by the shortage of building materials, and where the materials are available, the prices are too high in foreign currency terms.

#### *Facilitating the orderly return of migrants*

The economic crisis generated waves of migrants leaving Zimbabwe for greener pastures both regionally and internationally. Most of these migrants are skilled workers who respond to world demand for their skills. The tradability of their skills implies that they are able to establish permanent settlement in their respective new nations. Yet differences in culture and other problems mean that many of the migrants may be willing to return to Zimbabwe once stability has been achieved. This may occur with a lag, therefore, investment in education and training needs to be stepped up in the short-term. While the return of skilled migrants can be beneficial, it needs to be managed properly so as to allow returnees to settle well and not crowd out existing workers, some of whom have vital experience managing the difficult economy. Returnees need to be incorporated into the system without being given preference over those that stayed in the labour market. The returnees' main advantages are the skills and experience gained from abroad which can be tapped into the economy.

The sustainable return of migrants should ensure that they do not re-migrate by ensuring that they secure employment in their areas of expertise. There is also need to ensure that the returnees who may be better endowed with money than those that remained in the economy do not push up the cost of services such as accommodation, education and health delivery.

#### *Need for an incomes stabilisation policy*

The current economic problems require that after stability is achieved, a comprehensive incomes policy be introduced. The collapse of real wages in the formal sector caused massive resignation of professionals, some of whom joined the informal economy while others emigrated. The existing earnings structure is skewed within and between sectors such that those at the bottom are most affected. Of particular interest are the differentials between private and public sector earnings: up to 2003, the differentials increased quickly, resulting in workers moving from the public to the private sector. The differentials were more pronounced among skilled workers making public sector employment second best. Once stabilisation is achieved, it is important that both the private and public sectors develop proper and attractive remuneration systems that can attract people back into formal employment. The market must be left to determine earnings rates, but evidence on the ground and from history shows that there is a need for active policy to deal with earnings inequality. The least the Government can do is to restore the image of public sector employment so that it can attract requisite skills.

A starting point will be to set up a Commission of Inquiry into Incomes, along the lines of one set up at Independence, the Riddell Commission, to look into the same issue. This should help in coming up with an acceptable and affordable incomes policy.

An incomes policy should serve both the rural and urban sectors. While minimum wage legislation may be difficult to implement in the rural and informal economies, other strategies need to be considered. An example is public works to redevelop rural infrastructure remunerated at the set minimum wage rate. Proper channelling of funds and management of public works programmes can help boost infrastructure

development while also raising household incomes, thus reducing both poverty and unemployment. The removal of maize, tobacco and cotton price controls can also help stimulate production that should have the spin off of higher employment and implicit wages.

#### *Promotion of the informal economy*

The informal sector has become the backbone of the economy. It must therefore be supported in so far as it creates and maintains jobs. However, there is need to deal with the problem of under-employment by creating adequate and relevant employment opportunities for people of varying skill levels. The formal sector alone cannot create adequate jobs, and its small size relative to the labour force has resulted in employers raising the minimum entry qualifications for jobs that require lower educational training (King, 1990). Those that cannot be employed formally are forced by circumstances to join the informal economy, resulting in this sector employing more people than the formal sector.

While the dominance of the informal sector over the formal one is undesirable because the former does not contribute to the fiscus; this disadvantage needs to be balanced with the need for massive job creation. Stability will likely, in the short term, result in sharp negative pay offs, especially in vulnerable and unprotected sectors. This must be taken into account at policy formulation stage so that Government puts in place programmes to alleviate the negative outcomes of stabilisation. The formal sector may require financial support to allow it to adjust smoothly towards a growth trajectory. Households may need to receive support to remain food secure during the early stages: this can be in the form of transfers (see Chapter 8) or public works programmes.

Studies conducted on the informal economy (Gemini, 1991, 1998; Kanyenze et al, 2003; Chiripanhura, 2008) highlight the problems affecting the sector, particularly lack of access to credit. It is paramount that the Government develops an informal economy framework that allows for easy access to credit, availability of sheltered working space, and reform of regulations to facilitate the growth and development of the informal economy. Operators in the sector also lack management skills, and it is important to focus on delivering such knowledge to the sector. Additional growth can be achieved by enhancing linkages between the formal and informal economies whereby the formal sector can sub-contract the informal sector in production. Not only will this introduce standardisation and quality improvements in the informal economy, but it will also increase the level of integration in the economy thus creating growth.

#### *Developing a national employment policy*

The country has operated without a coherent national employment policy for a long time. Thus the Government will need to develop a comprehensive national employment policy in consultation with relevant stakeholders (ILO Recommendation 122 on Employment Policy, 1964). Such a policy should focus, among other labour market issues, on the need for the following:

- a labour intensive growth strategy which should specifically tackle the problem of youth unemployment;
- a national minimum wage since current wage levels are well below living wages;
- development of a national health insurance scheme that covers all workers in the economy;
- addressing taxation issues to the extent to which they adversely affect the demand and supply sides of the labour market; and
- the promotion of work place partnerships for development and effective employment relations.

The policy should tie in with regional directives on labour administration, and should also address the need for effective linkages between education and training, as well as employment and national manpower requirements.

#### *Reforming the system of economic management and labour administration*

The system of labour market administration has largely been centred on the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. However, there are overlaps with other ministries that deal with some elements of the labour market, like the ministries responsible for small and medium enterprises development, the one responsible for women's affairs, gender and community development, and that responsible for youth development and employment creation. To minimise fragmentation and for better coordination, there is need for consolidation of labour administration under one ministry with the intention of creating economies of scale in administration and policy formulation and implementation so as to address quickly the problems of unemployment and under-employment. Such consolidation under the Ministry of Labour will be important because the Ministry already has significant expertise which other ministries lack, and because of its tripartite approach to policy formulation and implementation (fostered by ILO conventions) which is more effective than approaches used by other ministries. Tripartism allows participation of other stakeholders in policy formulation, fostering ownership and successful implementation of programmes.

The new administrative system should make use of decentralised institutions like national employment councils (consisting of employee and employer representatives) in grassroots labour administration. Such councils should have an expanded mandate to deal with dispute resolution and the formulation of employment codes of conduct in order to avoid clogging of the system at ministry level. The divisive system that empowers firm level institutions over bipartite (and superior) employment councils must be removed so as to create a coherent and stable system of administration. The role of the Ministry of Labour should be supervisory rather than one where it deals with almost everything to do with employment.

#### *Institution building and the role of trade unions*

Building the institutions of labour administration should include an active role for the trade union movement. As highlighted previously, the trade union movement has been an important player in the campaign for social and economic justice, calling for good governance, and fighting for the protection on workers' rights. It has mobilisation and technical capacities that can be harnessed for the purposes of economic growth and development. Including it in labour administration, through tripartite arrangements like the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (where labour, Government and business come together to discuss policies) and national employment councils, enriches relations and reduces the occurrence of industrial action. Tripartism, which is currently unique to labour administration, can be extended to cover economic policy formulation, and in both cases there will be need to make the position of social partners stronger than what currently exists under the Tripartite Negotiating Forum. The labour movement has the capacity to contribute effectively to policy as shown by its 1996 critique of the structural adjustment programme. Since then, there has been close tripartite cooperation and synergy especially at a technical level that should be exploited for the benefit of the economy.

## **2.4. Conclusions**

Based on this discussion it is clear that the economic crisis had two major effects on labour markets. The first relates to labour market restructuring that started with ESAP and accelerated during the economic crisis. This reshaped the structure of employment and clearly formal sector employment has been dwarfed by a burgeoning informal sector. While informal sector employment can be robust and provide an income on which to live, we also know that unpredictability and low wages create levels of insecurity and vulnerability that now characterise the urban economy in Zimbabwe. For sustained poverty reduction, more and better paying formal sector jobs will have to be created within the manufacturing sector. This will not be easy, given the massive skills flight that occurred over the past decade. This has implications for the recovery of the manufacturing industry. There will need to be interplay between the formal and informal sector focused strategies during the recovery period. For the manufacturing sector to recover, the agricultural sector must also improve as the two are intimately linked in the Zimbabwean economy. It is therefore to the agricultural sector that we turn in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 3: Agriculture and Land Reform

### 3.1. Introduction

It was shown in Chapter 1 that a majority of the nearly 1.3 million families in rural Zimbabwe make a living through farm-related activities, although other non-farm non-agricultural activities are also increasingly important. It was also shown that the sector is the backbone of Zimbabwe's economy and has a strong influence on trends in GDP growth. Historically, close to half of total export earnings have originated from agriculture and natural resources, including forestry (GOZ, 1995). It is thus a key sector in determining overall economic performance and prospects for poverty reduction.

Before 2000 the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe was highly dualistic. Although after the 2000 land reform the smallholder sector now occupies most of the agricultural land, dualism has been maintained. In the commercial farming sector production is for the market, and farms are run as commercial profit-seeking enterprises. By contrast, for the majority in the smallholder sector much of the production activity is family-based and subsistence production remains an important part of livelihood strategies.<sup>18</sup> This dualism not only affects income distribution within the sector but also has important consequences for the rest of the economy, particularly through its impact on the labour market. Poverty prevalence also follows this structure, with high prevalence in the family based, subsistence sector (mostly in poor agro-ecological regions) and relatively low prevalence in the commercial sector (mostly in the agro-ecological areas with high rainfall and good agricultural soils).

This chapter provides an analysis of the land and the agricultural sector during the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, reviews agricultural policies during the crisis and considers the effects on productivity and production. It argues that, despite some well-known success stories, the agricultural sector has not yet, in practice, made a significant or sustained contribution to poverty reduction in post-independence Zimbabwe. The chapter makes some suggestions, and raises some key questions, regarding future scenarios. Its principle argument is that Government should focus on an agriculture-led recovery.

### 3.2. Agriculture and the economy

It was shown in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.5) that during the 1990s, the contribution of agriculture and forestry to GDP fluctuated between 13 and 19 per cent. With the exception of the second half of the 1980s, these fluctuations closely follow annual rainfall variations. After 2000 most major sectors of the Zimbabwean economy declined substantially as the economic crisis took root. Agriculture was one of the most affected of all sectors and the overall effect was a distinct slow-down in overall GDP growth. We saw in Chapter 2 that as well as providing a source of livelihood for approximately 70 per cent of the population agriculture also generated 30 per cent of formal employment before the major land reform programme.<sup>19</sup> It also

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<sup>18</sup> The commercial sector then could be disaggregated into large scale (LSC) and small-scale (SSC). The smallholder sector comprises communal (CA) and resettlement farms. Within communal areas rights of individual households to the arable land they farm have been strengthening over time. Grazing land remains in communal ownership and is steadily being encroached by the expanding number of cultivators.

<sup>19</sup> Official figures show just over 300,000 workers employed on LSC farms in the mid-1990s (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 1998). However, there is some dispute over these figures, not least because of an

supplies 60 per cent of the raw materials required by the industrial sector. When rainfall is good it generates 40-50 per cent of total export revenues, over half of which comes from tobacco. Thus agriculture remains the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy and with the general macro-economic down-turn during the crisis years the sector has had to deal with the largest disruptions both internally (brought about by policy decisions based on issues directly related to agriculture) and externally (brought about by policy decision based on more social than sectoral agricultural considerations). It is against this backdrop that we now examine individual elements of agricultural policy and their performance.

### 3.3. Agricultural performance

Agricultural production in Zimbabwe varies from year to year according to rainfall and performance is often linked to the weather patterns. Since independence, there have been droughts in the 1982-3, 1986-7, 1991-2 (most serious), 1994-5 and 2004/2005 agricultural seasons. Droughts generally affect lower potential agro-ecological zones more than higher potential ones and, therefore, the communal sector (taken as a whole) more than commercial producers. Official data show moderate growth in the value of agricultural output in both commercial (including SSC) and communal (including resettlement) areas over the 1982-97 period in contrast to the two years before that period. From 1999 production slumped to below levels of the mid 1980s, with major fluctuations in production depending on weather conditions. Official figures, though, show that between 1982-4 and 1996 the real value of production in communal areas grew by 40 per cent, whilst between 1983-4 and 1996 the real value of production in commercial areas grew by 35 per cent. During the economic crisis period there was a distinct reversal of this trend and real value of production fell by 33 per cent (CSO, 2006b). A comparison of agricultural production performance with population growth in communal and resettlement areas shows that since 1985-6 agricultural production growth has not kept pace with population growth in communal and resettlement areas. In addition, the economic crisis caused a further decline in Zimbabwean agriculture and the rural economy in general. Key causes of this decline include:

- **Decline in agricultural commodity marketing and pricing.** The hyper-inflation environment (231 million per cent) gravely affected returns on agriculture. This meant that many people who used to produce for the formal market were reluctant to do so as the delays in processing payments meant that by the time they were paid the money was worthless.
- **Asset attrition.** The protracted decline in the economy since 2000 has also resulted in some asset attrition as households sold off assets as a consumption smoothing strategy. This sometimes included selling off liquid assets that were also necessary for agricultural production. A decline in cattle numbers was particularly obvious in some areas although in other areas the economic crisis actually saw an increase (Mavedzenge *et al* 2008). Lack of cattle undermined availability of draught power and also compromised the income and consumption smoothing strategies.
- **Labour shortage.** There is a basic assumption that labour is abundant in rural Zimbabwe owing to displacement of former commercial farm workers. Available evidence suggests an inability to hire labour by the smallholder farmers resulted in labour shortage that limited production. Most able bodied young adults that provided family labour left rural Zimbabwe for other countries in the region

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
alleged shift towards hiring of casual workers within the sector. After 2000 this figure fell to less than 150,000 as the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme took its toll on commercial farming, the largest formal employer in agriculture.

or opted for non-farm rural activities like artisanal mining. This created labour constraints on production at the family farm. The lack of skills also became a limiting factor as experienced and trained smallholder farmers died due to old age and HIV/AIDS undermining the agricultural skills base significantly.

- **Declining soil fertility.** Initial productivity increases in communal lands after the liberation war could be accounted for by the virgin land effect. Once soil fertility declined due to use over time the high external inputs model of production (hybrid seeds and fertiliser) that was introduced became too expensive to maintain especially because of declining profitability due to poor pricing structure and lack of State support.
- **Drying out of private finance for agriculture.** Once the State stopped supporting the smallholder farmers with inputs, most became indebted and failed to secure private finance needed for inputs. It is clear that during the years following a drought when some free inputs were made available there was always a productivity spike especially in food crops like maize. In the post-2000 period lack of inputs among resettled farmers worsened the situation. Before the decline of large scale commercial farming some smallholder farmers could seek temporary employment on farms and use the income to purchase inputs. Others relied on urban formal employment to generate the inputs. Once the large scale farms were taken over during the Fast Track Land Reform Programme and the formal sector jobs began to decline due to the deteriorating economy this income smoothing strategy was no longer available.
- **Insecure tenure.** Even if private financing was still available, one of the key limiting factors was the terms under which land is accessed which did not give the owner tenure security. Thus apart from the State and agricultural commodity brokers, financial institutions did not extend credit facilities to the resettled and communal farmers due to this lack of tenure security. Financial institutions stopped supporting large scale commercial farmers when the land invasions started. The productivity effects of this and all of the above are apparent when we look at what has happened to maize production.

Figure 3.1 shows that average maize yields for communal smallholders have remained low –below one tonne per hectare since 2000 compared to an average yield of 1.5 tonnes per hectare in the 1990s. While total maize area is one million hectares, it is 25 per cent short of the 1.2 million hectares of the 1990s; hence, it is insufficient to restore food production to the 1990s levels unless maize yield increases by over 50 per cent to 1.5 tonnes per hectare.

**Figure 3.1: Maize yields by farm type**




Part of the reason for the decrease in the yields of maize in communal areas relates to declining soil fertility and general soil degradation as the farmers were failing to replenish the soil fertility through fertilisers (Mano 2006).

There has been a progressive decline in output of maize, a staple crop. Maize produced by the communal agriculture sector had risen to as high as 80 per cent of the marketed output in the post Independence years of the 1980s due to strong infrastructure, financial and other agricultural support provided by the State. However, State support was initially reduced during the early 1990s as a result of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and later due to the economic crisis post 2000. In addition there was significant weather related fluctuation in maize production, for example the marked reduction in output in 1995 and 2002 which were drought years. There was also a decrease in large scale commercial farming maize production from 2000 as a result of the land reform programme. The rise in output from the resettlement areas shows the effects of more and better land while the general decline in communal lands output from 2000 can be explained as the effects of the economic crisis that, by 2007, had left most of them too poor even to produce their own food crops.



**Figure 3.2: Total maize production in Zimbabwe, 1993 – 2007, by farm type**



After 2000 the agricultural sector was fraught with complex domestic institutional and market challenges ranging from the skyrocketing rate of inflation and the economic contraction that begun in the 1990s, a worsening macroeconomic situation, social and political upheaval surrounding national elections, and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Acute shortages of foreign currency crippled the national economy and affected the domestic supply of essential agricultural inputs as well as the ability to import supplements to ensure food security in the face of below normal rainfall seasons and lack of strategic grain reserves. In response, the Government reintroduced controls in maize marketing and pricing policies.

### 3.4. Agricultural policies

The following section examines some key elements of Zimbabwe's agricultural policies. Due to its great importance, land reform is treated in more detail in section 3.7.

#### *Marketing of agricultural commodities in Zimbabwe*

Marketing of agricultural commodities in Zimbabwe consists of two main channels: the official (and often controlled and restrictive) and the open (usually formal and informal small-scale) market channel. There is also a third channel which can be viewed as part of the second. This is the parallel market channel and arises when there are severe restrictions on the movement of commodities along any of the marketing channels. Agricultural marketing institutions are key determinants of efficiency in agricultural production and consumption. During the 1980s, agricultural marketing was dominated by four parastatals,<sup>20</sup> which bought agricultural products from both smallholders and LSC farmers. These include the

<sup>20</sup> The initial design of the then Maize Control Board was aimed at stabilising the industry and making domestic consumers subsidise producers (Muir and Takavarasha, 1988).

- **Grain Marketing Board (GMB)**, which is responsible for the marketing of white maize, soybeans, wheat, sunflower seed and coffee (controlled products) plus red sorghum, white sorghum, pearl millet, groundnuts, edible beans and rice (regulated products);
- **Cotton Marketing Board (CMB)**;
- **Dairy Marketing Board (DMB)**, which bought milk and butterfat; and
- **Cold Storage Commission (CSC)**, which handled beef and sheep products.

The Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) supervised the operations of marketing boards and operated through commodity committees. The policy of a single-channel marketing system was designed to guarantee State procurement and disposal of surplus produce. Producer and selling prices for controlled commodities were fixed by Government following recommendations by the Ministry of Agriculture and negotiations with producers. Export commodities were priced at close to border prices but generally cost-plus pricing was the main method used to arrive at the final price. Set prices were both pan-seasonal and pan-territorial.

The Government's main objectives of controlling prices were largely to achieve a greater control over supply, thereby improving price and income stability. The twin aims of this approach were promotion of food self sufficiency and satisfying demand for agricultural raw materials. Unfortunately, achievement of these objectives was very costly. In the 1980s huge deficits in the four marketing boards created viability problems that led to calls for reform of these institutions and deregulation of markets. Subsequently the CMB was commercialised in 1994 while the DMB was privatised in 1997. Although restructuring of the GMB in the 1990s reflected acceptance by Government of the need to withdraw from direct price intervention and indirect marketing subsidies to allow the market to set prices, the State never really completely withdrew from intervention in the staple maize sector. After 2000, failure by the State to set domestic producer policies above import parity prices affected production of maize and partly explained the rising food import bill. In 2006, for example, maize producers were paid up to US\$30 when the GMB was landing imported maize in Harare at between US\$240-340 a tonne (Mano and Marimo, 2007). Poor producer prices discouraged commercialisation of the average small farmer who are presently not achieving the target yield of 1.5 tonnes per hectare that the Ministry of Agriculture assumes in their maize crop budgets. The resettled farmers got free inputs from the GMB input schemes but began to cut back on maize, opting instead for free market traded crops such as tobacco, cotton and increasingly soybeans.

The implementation of agricultural market liberalisation programmes in the 1990s left smallholder agriculture paralysed with very limited marketing options for maize through GMB and a few opportunistic private traders with market power. In the cotton sector, only COTCO and Cargill (the big two cotton traders who offer same prices) offered reasonable returns to farmers. However, their impact on economic rights and livelihoods is still a subject of debate (Mano, 2006). In contrast, for the commercial sector liberalisation heralded new competitive international agribusiness and marketing opportunities, with many service providers competing to offer a complete range of agricultural marketing and support services including commercial lines of credit for new export-oriented ventures.

This competitive marketing system did not extend to the small-scale sector because of the sector's lack of enabling public infrastructure and agribusiness culture among smallholders, which created a vacuum quickly filled by predatory market players. This severely restricted the rural smallholder farmers' price and income realisations from available free marketing options. Government marketing institutions have therefore had to spearhead smallholder marketing innovations to demonstrate to the private sector the

inherent potential of smallholder agricultural commodity value chains. For private capital the small farm enterprises are perceived as risky due to their lack of business record. Their size is often seen as increasing transaction costs, while lack of collateral assets limits their credit worthiness as their farming environment is deemed too risky without irrigation infrastructure. This has mainly affected production of maize and other food crops.

In cotton the story is different because the CMB played a path finding role for COTCO, which has maintained the practice of extending growers contracts to all types of farmers. As Mano (2006) points out the established presence of COTCO then convinced competitor Cargill to follow COTCO's lead, with the snowballing effect bringing in a rush of new players in response to high profits. This self-correcting market mechanism has entrenched competitive structure, reducing market concentration and freeing cotton producers from the non-competitive market system, where a few buyers determine prices. In the food grain sector the GMB could play the same role that COTCO played for cotton and co-ordinate pilot schemes on alternative ways of nurturing the development of value chains for maize and other grains. Government through GMB could underwrite the initial agribusiness learning costs for private players interested in providing farmers with growers' contracts for promoting maize production for merchant trading and agribusiness processing.

The establishment, in 1994, of the Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ZIMACE) was a significant institutional response to the general deregulation of agricultural trade in the 1990s. ZIMACE was a private sector initiative, which brokers trade in all agricultural commodities with the exception of tobacco and horticultural products. During the 1990s, volumes of commodities traded at ZIMACE increased by an average of 35 per cent per year, reflecting the growing popularity of the exchange as commercial farmers took advantage of the partially liberalised agricultural marketing system. Initially, the main products were grain, cotton, soybeans and coffee. However, in 2001 through statutory instrument 235A maize and maize products and wheat and wheat products were declared to be controlled products within Zimbabwe in terms of the Grain Marketing Act. This effectively made it illegal to buy, sell or move maize or wheat (and their respective products) within Zimbabwe other than to and from the Grain Marketing Board.

#### *Agricultural support services*

From the 1980s the proportion of State funds allocated to agricultural service provision was considered low, given the significance of the sector to the Zimbabwean economy (Rukuni and Eicher, 1994; Eicher, 1995). The efforts of the Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) under the Ministry of Agriculture were considered a key factor in the rapid uptake of hybrid maize varieties by smallholder producers and AGRITEX also played a role in promoting smallholder horticultural production on State run smallholder irrigation schemes. With rapid expansion of service needed after 1980 AGRITEX managed to expand coverage by focusing on group extension in place of the previous Master Farmer training approach (Rukuni, 1994). Meanwhile, large scale commercial farmers were increasingly being serviced by the private sector and worked with AGRITEX on specific extension issues.

AGRITEX has a strong production- (as opposed to market-) orientation. The Marketing Section within AGRITEX, only established in 1998, is small and relatively ineffective. Where strong marketing advice has been needed, the department has struggled badly leading to problems of how the volumes of produce can be marketed profitably. This has been the case for smallholder horticulture on several AGRITEX - run irrigation schemes (Kydd et al, 2000). AGRITEX, however, continues to provide production

extension services to small-scale producers with the result that there are significant gains in production from visits by extension officers to farmers. The challenge has been how and from where to avail enough funding for this service so that it can meaningfully and widely provide for the newly expanded smallholder sector. This is particularly pertinent given that from the late 1990s real Government spending on all agricultural services in general and those of AGRITEX in particular, declined considerably. According to Chisvo (2000), by 1994/95 real per capita spending on agricultural support services was 26 per cent lower than the peak in 1990/91. In the 2004 fiscal year the AGRITEX national budget allocation was just enough to pay the salaries of the civil servants in the department and nothing else (Matshe, 2004). These AGRITEX budget cuts fell particularly heavily on other recurrent expenditures such as travel costs, significantly reducing the effectiveness of field staff. This meant that the staff that needed to travel from farm to farm did not have enough resources to extend their services. By the early 2000s Government expenditure which had risen to extend coverage of extension services across Communal Areas fell to the pre-1980 levels per farmer.<sup>21</sup> In 2002 AGRITEX merged with the Department of Research and Specialist Services to become the division of Agriculture Research and Extension Services (AREX). The idea of cost recovery mooted when AREX was launched proved problematic as few smallholder farmers can afford to pay for extension services. Introducing cost recovery has therefore been seen as an approach that could compromise uptake of modern farming methods and although making economic sense has proved politically untenable as this can easily be seen as a tax on the poor. AREX has since been desegregated again in to the former AGRITEX and Department of Research and Specialist Services

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<sup>21</sup>Government extension expenditure rose from 9.5 per cent of all agricultural expenditure prior to 1980 to 16.8 per cent during 1980-83.



***Smallholders need support to begin to diversify into high-value crops linked to global production chains***  
***(Photo © Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi).***

### *Agricultural research*

A much greater emphasis on agricultural research, particularly into the challenges facing low-medium potential areas, is necessary if Zimbabwe is to enhance the livelihoods of the majority of the population that still lives in communal areas. Part of the success of agriculture in Zimbabwe has been a well funded and integrated agricultural research effort whose outputs have gradually made it from the trial farms onto the smallholder farms. Prior to 1980, large scale commercial farmers lobbied the State for agricultural research funding and were successful, leading to the establishment of a strong research led agricultural development culture. It was felt, however, that most of this research did not make it onto the farms due to extension failure. This led to a rapid expansion in extension activities and major outputs including the hybrid maize varieties SR-52, R200, R201 and R215, plus breakthroughs against cotton pests and diseases made it onto the smallholder farms (Rukuni, 1994). By 1992 Government expenditure on extension were double that spent on research although from then on the budget declined in real terms into the late 1990s. Throughout the 1990s total Government spending on agricultural services declined (in real terms) and by 2003 there were barely enough funds to keep the department going.

### *Agriculture finance*

During the 1980s one of the Government's agricultural policy priorities was to increase the number of smallholders receiving credit from the parastatal Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). Recognising the inherent risk in providing small units of credit to a large number of clients scattered over a broad geographical area, Government agreed to underwrite any losses that the AFC incurred under its 'small loans scheme' and the net cost thereof (Agricultural Finance Corporation, 1986). Finance was provided to

commercial farmers at commercial rates. For them a pure market system was followed, where secured finance was based on the provision of security for the loans (which was mostly land title). However, in the early 1990s the AFC was 'commercialised' and its lending to smallholders declined, despite the introduction of a group lending scheme aimed at smallholders (Chisvo 2000). In the late 1990s the AFC was divided into a commercial company (Agribank) and a soft-loan company (ADAF) which aimed to increase lending to poor households primarily in communal areas. The functions of ADAF have now been taken over by the Reserve Bank. Since most of commercial farmers lost their land, the Agribank together with other financial institutions have been left facing huge losses, made worse by the fact that no meaningful new business has replaced the commercial farmers' business. The Agribank continues to be used by Government to channel funds to agriculture but its role is no longer as prominent as it was in the 1980s.

Other financial institutions and commercial banks continued to provide financing to farmers during the economic crisis but only to a select group of farmers. Most of this financing was preferential financing from the Reserve Bank and commercial banks were just used as conduits to pass the financing to farmers. Since 1998-99 the GMB has been advancing credit to some smallholder producers in an attempt to stimulate maize production (Tschirley et al. 1999). Some smallholder producers also gain access to credit through contract farming and outgrower schemes, but data for these is scarce. Meanwhile, during the 1990s there was a sharp rise in the number of savings clubs in rural areas, encouraged by organisations such as the Zimbabwe Self-Help Development Foundation, churches and even by agricultural input firms such as Windmill and Agricura. Unfortunately with the hyperinflationary environment of the late 2000s this ground to a halt.

#### *Agricultural inputs*

Government input policy has changed over the past decade. Most of the changes have been dictated by the fortunes of the nation given the many fluctuations in agricultural performance over that time. Government generally controls inputs, production and trade through multiple mechanisms, but marketing remains in private channels. For example, Government through the Ministry of Agriculture:

- allocated foreign exchange through trade associations for agricultural machinery, pesticides and seeds. These arrangements for the allocation of foreign exchange gave trade associations authority to organise and protect markets that did not foster efficiency. Imported machinery in the 1980s and 1990s was only suited for larger-scale farmers (Gisselquist and Rusike, 1997).
- subsidised inputs through under-priced foreign exchange. This helped maintain fixed parastatal fertiliser prices. This resulted in farmers having a limited choice of fertilisers, although this situation was better than the situation in most neighbouring countries.

The seed distribution system was previously 'the crown jewel of seed systems in Africa' (Eicher, 1995: 47) particularly the role of Seed Co-op Company of Zimbabwe, which has been compared to international seed firms such as Pannar and Pioneer. During the 1980s there was a rapid spread of hybrid maize varieties, with most of the maize area planted to hybrids by the early 1990s. Various factors together contributed to the adoption of these varieties – including promotion by AGRITEX, the availability of credit from AFC and the assured market provided by GMB. However a key success factor was the effectiveness of the seed distribution system. The Seed Co-op Company was very active in promoting hybrid seeds to smallholders and introduced small packs targeted at poor customers.

Adoption of hybrid maize and the expansion of smallholder cotton production (amongst other things) were associated with increases in fertiliser use by smallholders. Total fertiliser consumption by the smallholder sector rose from 27,100 tons p.a. in 1975-79 to 97,200 tonnes per acre in 1980-84 and 119,000 tonnes per acre in 1985-89. However during the economic crisis period fertiliser usage dropped to under 100,000 tonnes.<sup>22</sup>

### *Livestock*

Zimbabwe's total national cattle herd rose from 4.81 million in 1997 to a peak of 6.43 million in 2001. Livestock are a form of wealth and serve a multiplicity of functions which include provision of meat, milk, draught power, the use of livestock as a secure form of savings, as well as the use of livestock as a currency in a variety of cultural and social transactions such as bride price. Since Independence, there have been initiatives to support restocking of the communal livestock herd, following, first, the effects of the liberation war and, subsequently, the four main droughts. These have been run by then State owned Cold Storage which has lent or sold cattle cheaply to communal producers, and by NGOs. State efforts have focused on the eastern Lowveld. During the 1980s the State also sought to expand and improve the quality of veterinary services available to smallholder livestock owners. In the early 1980s, cattle dipping and vaccination were compulsory, but free or heavily subsidised. Although dipping is still compulsory, implementation is weak due to a number of serious constraints. The theory was that private veterinary services would augment State dipping and vaccination, but uptake rates are variable. The decrease in subsidised cattle dipping and vaccination services led to lower livestock survival rates and less investment in cattle beyond the basic number (four) necessary to ensure availability of draught power. Animal diseases have also become widespread in rural areas in the economic crisis period and the country could no longer fulfil its export quota to the European Union.

The data in Table 3.1 show the national cattle herd for the period 1997 to 2002 disaggregated by farming sub-sector, while Table 3.2 shows national cattle population data for 2002 disaggregated by farming sub-sector and by Province. The Tables show that the communal area cattle population is higher than that for commercial farms and that over the period 1997 to 2002 communal area cattle have accounted for 60 to 71 per cent of the national herd. Over 70 per cent of the beef cattle population is in communal areas. In the Midlands and Matabeleland North provinces 77 per cent of the beef cattle population are found in communal areas.

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<sup>22</sup> This is despite the introduction of a Crop Packs Programme to aid recovery.

**Table 3.1: Beef cattle<sup>23</sup> population trend between 1997 and 2002 (in million head)**

Year	LSCF	CA	SSCF	OR	A1	A2	CA per cent	Total
1997	1.20	2.89	0.49	0.20			60.1	<b>4.81</b>
1998	1.56	3.50	0.40	0.22			61.6	<b>5.68</b>
1999	1.68	3.69	0.47	0.23			60.8	<b>6.07</b>
2000	1.66	3.68	0.61	0.23			59.5	<b>6.18</b>
2001	1.30	4.40	0.51	0.22			68.4	<b>6.43</b>
2002	0.51	3.90	0.55	0.25	0.15	0.07	71.3	<b>5.43</b>

LSCF = Large scale commercial farms;

SSCF = Small Scale Commercial Farms;

CA = Communal Areas;

OR = Old Resettlement Areas;

A1 = A1 resettlement areas;

A2 = A2 Resettlement Areas;

CA per cent = Percentage of national herd in CA.

Source: Sibanda and Khombe (2006)

Zimbabwe had a national goat population of 2.9 million in 1999 all of which is found in the communal areas (Sibanda and Khombe, 2006). These percentage figures are significant when viewed against land area communal areas occupy. These high livestock densities are often associated with environmental problems in the communal areas.

**Table 3.2: Zimbabwe national cattle herd disaggregated by province and farm sub sector in 2002**

Province	CA	LSCF	SSCF	OR	A1	A2	CA per cent	Total
Masvingo	578,953	59,719	38,379	67,979	40,901	4,934	73.2	<b>790,865</b>
Manicaland	492,704	39,345	17,411	123,222	10,277	2,557	71.9	<b>685,516</b>
Matabeleland South	464,566	138,295	14,089	44,871	5,008	6,421	69.0	<b>673,250</b>
Mashonaland East	521,261	29,406	87,080	83,325	11,231	5,376	70.7	<b>737,679</b>
Mashoaland Central	358,898	49,226	28,469	32,054	21,419	7,540	72.1	<b>497,606</b>
Matabeleland North	413,685	50,454	17,376	35,779	9,323	5,536	77.7	<b>532,153</b>
Midlands	699,085	64,162	12,384	86,214	26,218	12,873	77.6	<b>900,936</b>
Mashonaland West	348,610	100,140	34,918	78,554	25,125	24,655	57.0	<b>612,002</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,877,762</b>	<b>530,747</b>	<b>250,106</b>	<b>551,998</b>	<b>149,502</b>	<b>69,892</b>		<b>5,430,007</b>

Source: Sibanda and Khombe (2006)

<sup>23</sup> The term 'beef cattle' is used here to refer to all cattle that do not fall into the category of commercial dairy cattle. Under this definition, all communal cattle are classified as beef cattle, even though in practice, communal cattle are used for milk production, drought power and other uses besides the supply of beef.



The high livestock numbers in communal areas are not surprising and arise from the importance of livestock in the social and cultural life of the African people in the communal areas. As noted earlier, livestock are a form of wealth and serve a multiplicity of functions. Thus, the desire by communal area inhabitants to have large livestock herds is in conflict with the need to limit livestock numbers to scientifically determined livestock carrying capacities that are intended to minimize land degradation. It has been difficult to persuade the farmers to comply with scientific carrying capacity recommendations; hence the current livestock numbers are in excess of scientific carrying capacity numbers. What emerges as an issue of concern, then, is the technically feasible, financially acceptable and environmentally sustainable livestock and land management systems that can be used in these areas.

The generally low numbers of cattle in the A1 and A2 resettlement schemes suggests that most of the settlers were without cattle and therefore poorly resourced for production. This might also mean that most of those who took advantage of the reform programme were not well established farmers in their original communal areas and who could therefore easily relocate. Another possible reason is that the land tenure system in the A1 and A2 schemes is not entirely clear and settlers have been known to be displaced after settlement. Consequently, settlers may have delayed relocating their cattle pending the clarification of the land rights and tenure in these schemes.

### **3.5. The continuing importance of agriculture**

The foregoing analysis has shown how the interaction between climate and land use imposes production limitations in the agricultural sector. It has also shown how a racialised spatial expression of land use meant that for most of the past 100 years smallholder farmers have played a variable, and mostly marginal, role in crop production, except for maize and cotton. With the decline of large scale commercial farming as it was known before 2000, it is clear that agricultural reconstruction will not be about reproducing the pre-2000 agricultural structure. It will have to be about putting smallholder farmers at the centre of the growth strategy, as they are now the main users of agricultural land. This places smallholder farmers in a good policy position which will hopefully translate into improved livelihoods.

About 70 per cent of Zimbabweans still derive a living off the land either directly as smallholder farmers or indirectly as employees on farms. We also know that about 77 per cent of Zimbabwe's poor and almost 90 per cent of its extremely poor people are found in rural areas. In fact some 2 million of the more than 2.1 million people in need of food aid are based in rural areas. A majority of these derive a livelihood from the smallholder farms in communal lands. The challenge is therefore to come up with a growth strategy that can transform the welfare conditions of a mainly rural constituency while contending with an also increasingly impoverished urban population.

Central to any future strategy targeting poverty is income growth. For the rural smallholder farmers, income growth will have to come from a resumption of farm operations and a revitalisation of commercial agriculture, while for the urban constituency it will have to be employment growth. A look at the economic history of the country suggests that these two have always been linked (see Figure 1.4). When agriculture does well, the economy grows and employment growth has been observed as manufacturing also tends to do well (up to 60 per cent of raw materials for manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe are derived from agriculture). We also know that historically when rural incomes rise, effective domestic demand for manufactured goods and services also rises. It is clear that an agriculture-led strategy could be the most direct way to address poverty via raising rural incomes and could ultimately indirectly enhance employment growth. Focusing on rural areas especially, agriculture-led growth is pro-

poor in that a majority of the population do not have to wait for the benefits of growth to trickle down to them via urban employment. The Government, therefore, needs to prioritise agricultural recovery as a major part of overall poverty reduction efforts. Below we suggest some key components of this strategy and what we think the entry points should be.

### **3.6. Some ideas for the future of agriculture in Zimbabwe**

The main focus for prospects of agricultural recovery in Zimbabwe will have to be about smallholder farmers. They are the new main agricultural sector both in terms of numbers and also in terms of the amount of land they hold. We are not suggesting a zero-sum game here with large scale commercial farming, but we recognise that it is the smallholder sector that would have to function well if the economy is to recover. Agricultural policy will now need to be reoriented towards the smallholder producer. We identify three priority areas for promoting agriculture.

*Some Quick Wins: Focus on smallholder farmers in communal areas, resettlement areas and irrigation settlements*

The initial focus should be on trying to get some quick wins in restoring agricultural production. We saw in Chapter 1 that along with adverse weather events, the decline in agricultural production can be explained not only by the disruptions to large scale commercial farming but by smallholders simply being ‘too poor to farm’, that is they are too poor to use their land to produce their own food. Clearly, therefore, a social protection scheme will need to be set up to get them producing again. We suggest here that the initial focus should be on smallholder farmers in communal lands. This is for three reasons:

1. This is where a majority of Zimbabweans still reside and where most of the poor are to be found. They have proved in the past that they can be productive.
2. Although much of the infrastructure is in decline, the communal and some of the old resettlement areas still have the basic agricultural infrastructure and services that could be revived in reasonable time at a reasonable cost. Agricultural infrastructure in fast track smallholder settlements (A1) is yet to be developed.
3. Land in communal areas, old resettlements and irrigation settlements is not contested. Some of the land acquired under fast-track is still being contested and it is also clear that donor may not be willing to support directly production on such land till the main issues are settled. This means communal and ‘old’ resettlement smallholder farmers can attract the substantial resources needed for such a programme without raising any concerns.

Historically, smallholder agriculture has rebounded quickly from adverse events if well supported. Smallholder farmers in communal areas will need to be well supported over several seasons – at least three seasons on a full package followed by graded reduction of support over two years. Taking a cue from Malawi and from past experiences in Zimbabwe, we know that providing a basic package of key inputs (draught power, seed and fertiliser) is required to kick-start communal lands agriculture. We do not think the assistance package should be means tested as such targeting can be potentially time and resource consuming and unnecessary. We suggest that the focus be on all smallholder farmers. If the weather conditions are favourable smallholder farmers can lead agricultural recovery not only through producing food crops and reducing the import bill, but also through the disposal of surplus production via markets.

Poverty among smallholder farmers is a function of low incomes. In order to climb out of poverty through agriculture, households' earnings have to improve. This can be done not only through productivity growth but also by ensuring that some of the more exclusive but lucrative markets work for the smallholder farmers. They will need to diversify into high value crops linked to global production chains. It is in identifying these markets and linking the smallholders with them that the State and other non-state sectors will need to be involved. We are thinking here about links to some of the global supermarket chains either directly or through out-grower schemes. By the time of the land redistribution in 2000 some of the large scale farms had already started some successful out-grower schemes that were working quite well. It is such initiatives that will create the income growth necessary for the economy to recover.

*Reviving large scale commercial agriculture*

Disruptions in commercial agriculture will not be easy to deal with, due in part to some outstanding issues on tenure reform and compensation of previous owners. However, because large scale commercial farming occupies some three million hectares of agricultural land, primarily in the better rainfall areas, it is imperative that productivity levels be restored. Apart from the demonstration effect this has on smallholder agriculture, the scale factor implies that large scale farmers can enhance agricultural productivity growth. Reviving large scale commercial agriculture will need private financial markets to begin lending again. For this to happen, the uncertainties surrounding ownership and tenure will need to be resolved. As long as these issues are not resolved, agricultural financing will continue to be difficult and the farmers will continue to rely on the cash constrained State for support. The following section therefore examines the complex issues of tenure and land reform in more detail.

### **3.7. Land reform**

Any prospects for sustainable poverty reduction at a large scale will have to depend on what happens with respect to agricultural and non-farm incomes in the short to medium term. A key determinant of whether a household is able to make a living and stay out of poverty in rural Zimbabwe is access to adequate stocks of assets, built around access to and ownership of land. Access to land and the conditions and terms under which it is accessed will influence the ability of households to produce food crops and other commercial crops for their own consumption and marketing. Two key issues generally dominate any discussion on land and poverty in Zimbabwe. These are land redistribution and tenure reforms. In this section we look at these two and consider the effects of the economic crisis on land use and emerging tenure arrangements.

Until the Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000-2003, land was divided unequally between races. This was a legacy of colonial occupation and the subsequent land alienation attendant to settler colonialism. We saw in Chapter one how areas of better farming potential were carved out for use by mainly settler white commercial farmers. This racial segregation meant that a majority of black Zimbabweans eked out a living on overcrowded communal lands with poor agricultural potential. In a way, most of the poverty in communal lands may have been created and can be explained by the marginality of the land from which they were supposed to make a living. Overcrowding and marginality combined to produce low incomes from agriculture and significant under-employment. Arrighi and Saul (1969) have argued that the communal lands were effectively a reserve army of labour created to service

the urban industrial economy and the large scale commercial farming areas and mining. To the extent that there was continuity after Independence in 1980 in part explains why poverty persists in rural Zimbabwe to date.

Table 3.3 shows the distribution of land at Independence in 1980 and after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The land reform process has transformed the structure of land use considerably with smallholder farmers now occupying the bulk of agricultural land. Small- to medium-scale farms and large scale commercial farms now occupy just a quarter of agricultural land.

**Table 3.3: Land distribution and holdings size (million ha) patterns (1980-2004)**

Farm Class	1980		1996		2004	
	Number of farms	Hectares (million)	Number of farms	Hectares (million)	Number of farms	Hectares (million)
Smallholder	700,000	14.4	1,000,000	16.4	1,312,866	24.34
Small to Medium Scale Commercial	8,000	1.4	8,000	1.4	21,000	2.83
Large scale Commercial	6,000	15.5	4,500	7.7	4,317	3
Corporate Estates			960	2.04	960	2.04

*Source: Moyo (2006).*

Land redistribution is often seen as a powerful tool in the fight against poverty in areas where a majority of people are rural based and make a living mostly, though not entirely, on land (de Javnry *et al*, 2001; El-Ghonemy, 2002; Jayne, *et al* 2003). Where ownership and access to land is unequal, redistribution is often seen as a way of helping land-constrained households out of chronic poverty through a significant ‘one off’ infusion of assets into the household (IFAD, 2001). We know from evidence elsewhere that countries with better distribution of assets like land tend to record significantly better rates of growth than those with skewed patterns (Birdsall and Londono 1997; Deininger and Olinto 1999; Mo 2003). Initial asset inequality hurts the poor through credit-rationing and limited investment ability (Deininger and Squire 1998). A more equal distribution of land has multiplier effects that have been observed to enhance income growth. Work by Gugerty and Timmer (1999), looking at 69 countries supported the view that equity in the distribution of both agricultural and non-agricultural assets can form the basis for poverty-reducing productivity growth. Better distribution of land in China is often used to explain why human development indicators in China are higher compared to India (Burgess 1999). In Zimbabwe there were both economic and political justifications for a fairer distribution of land. In the next sections we look at attempts to redistribute land since 1980 and some of the emerging outcomes with respect to poverty reduction.

### **3.8. Land reform and resettlement in post independence Zimbabwe 1980-1992**

Upon attainment of Independence in 1980 the State was committed to a planned programme of land resettlement in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement. With matching grants from the UK’s Overseas Development Administration (now DfID), the State launched the intensive resettlement programme in September 1980, with the declared aim of resettling 18,000 families on 1.1 million hectares of land over three years (Chitsike 1988:15). Land had been one of the core grievances that led to the war of liberation and as part of the Lancaster House settlement it had to be addressed somehow. During the

transition to independence (1977-80) the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia State had produced a rural development plan that sought to create a smallholder irrigation-based resettlement programme. During the 1979/80 financial year 86,000 ha of land had been acquired in the South Eastern Lowveld to resettle smallholders. This meant that at Independence the only plans that existed revolved around producing a new breed of capitalist farmer on modern smallholder farms quite distinct from the communal lands. This was at variance with campaign manifestos published in December 1979 that seemed to show that the main guerrilla movement, if elected, would 'promote on newly acquired land the establishment of collective villages and collective agriculture'. While the technocrats planned modern agricultural settlements, peasants emerging from the war wanted to spontaneously move onto white-owned commercial farmland to correct the land imbalance. In the end the programme announced by the State in September 1980 was driven by technocrats and sought to:

- Alleviate population pressure in communal areas.
- Extend and improve the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector through individuals and co-operatives.
- Improve standards of living among the poorest sector of the population.
- Ameliorate the plight of people affected by the war.
- Provide opportunities for people who had no land and no employment, who may therefore be classified as destitute.
- Achieve national stability and progress in a country that had recently emerged from the turmoil of war (GoZ, 1983).

The programme targeted returning refugees, those displaced by the war internally, the poor and unemployed, those displaced by large public projects and the landless. Purchases of 223,000 ha in the 1980/81 financial year and a further 1 million ha by the 1981/82 season increased the amount of land available considerably. By 1982 the targets for resettlement had been scaled up to 35,000 households, rising a year later to 162,000 on 9 million hectares in plans announced in the Transitional National Development Plan of 1983/84. The shift in the official target number of households to be resettled and even the basis for the targets is subject to different interpretations. What is clear, however, is that in the early stages of the new Zimbabwe State, the policy pronouncements that had initially been radical started to show a more neo-liberal tone. The first official economic policy document was published in February 1981 with the title 'Growth with Equity'. With regards to the rural areas, fair land distribution was deemed a priority. According to the policy 'land is a common heritage and no one should enjoy absolute ownership of it' (page 4). The policy document, however, still described the resettlement programme as having an 'emphasis on voluntary co-operative arrangements among peasants' (page 5).

While the policy document talked about 'building upon the traditional co-operative approach in the Zimbabwean culture', the technocrats at implementation level insisted that resettlement processes and procedures were in place to 'transform peasant agriculture, to remould society' and discourage any attempts to revert to traditional methods and systems of agriculture and administration' (Geza 1986: 37). What was clear at this point is that the college-trained professionals had ideals that differed fundamentally from the political leadership. The factional divisions between the professionally-trained technocrats concentrated in the economic ministries and the political leadership who wanted radical agrarian reforms to appease the peasantry would resurface again towards the 2000 elections with dramatic consequences. Four models were adopted for implementation. Table 3.4 gives an outline of the main features of the models and the number of households resettled by 1998.

**Table 3.4: Models for resettlement in Zimbabwe during the 1980s**

<b>Model Name</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Number Resettled by Nov 1998</b>
Model A – Normal Intensive Resettlement	Individual settlement in nucleated villages with individual arable land allocation and communal grazing. Each settler is allocated 5 ha arable land and a grazing right to pasture 4 to 10 livestock units depending on agro-ecological region. Households reside in nucleated village settlements. State provided the basic infrastructure before the settlers moved in. In the variant of model A, the Accelerated Intensive Resettlement Model, households moved in before infrastructure was in place. After 1992 some model A2 were introduced with self contained residential and grazing units.	51,006
Model B – Cooperative Farming	Cooperative ventures on farms suitable for specialised enterprises. State assistance in the form of establishment grants for equipment and technical assistance. Households resided in nucleated villages with basic infrastructure provided by the State.	7,936
Model C – Specialised Crop Farming	Resembled model A in individual plots except that it was based around a central estate that mentored the specialised farmers. Settlers contributed labour in return for free tillage, training and extension support. Used for sugar, tea and tobacco estates.	636
Model D – Livestock Ranching	Applicable to drier parts of the country. Initial version involved resettling households on commercial ranches with a minimum of arable land. A later variant the Three Tier System involved nucleated villages where basic services were provided, then grazing for five livestock units (subsistence use) and, the third layer had scope for 10 livestock units per household for commercial livestock production.	19,048

*Source: Government of Zimbabwe 1998c: 6.*

As Table 3.4 shows, the majority of beneficiaries were resettled in Model A schemes that emphasised individual smallholder agriculture. Minimum infrastructure and service standards were also set for these settlement models. A borehole was planned for each village of 20-25 households. A clinic was planned for every 500 families, while a primary school classroom and a teacher's house were envisaged for every 20 families. Further, each herd of 1,400 cattle was to be provided with a dip tank. It was also envisaged that it would be feasible to effect physical separation between each resettlement scheme and surrounding communal areas through the use of fencing. Within each resettlement scheme, fences would also separate residential, grazing and arable land use zones. The State planned to spend about Z\$3,086 (the equivalent of about US\$12,000 in 2008 dollars) in resettling each of the 162,000 households planned (Government of Zimbabwe 1982b). At the time (in 1981) planners set an annual income target of Z\$400 (about US\$1,420 in 2008 dollars) for each settler household. This was double the incomes obtained in the communal land areas at the time.

### **3.9. Land reform and resettlement December 1992-2000**

Several key policy developments make this a defining decade in land resettlement in Zimbabwe. The first was the introduction of a programme of economic reform launched in 1990. The ESAP of 1991-1995 was launched to make the economy more 'competitive and productive' by 'moving away from a highly regulated economy to one where free market forces are allowed to play a more decisive role' (GOZ 1990).

This was a significant shift in economic policy and put an end to the socialist rhetoric of the 1980s. Key components of the programme relating to agriculture concerned deregulation of agricultural prices and marketing. It was hoped this and other measures elsewhere in the economy would yield agricultural growth of 3.2 per cent a year. For the land resettlement programme, however, at the Paris Donors meeting which came up with the ESAP aid package, agreement was reached that extra-judicial approaches to property redistribution would have to be renounced. This meant that seizure of land would not be possible under the new dispensation. The Second Five Year National Development Plan published in December 1991 also endorsed this shift, maintaining that: ‘...land redistribution and resettlement programmes are not lasting solutions for over-population problems in the communal areas’ (GOZ 1991). This represented a significant shift in the conceptualisation of land resettlement. It was announced that the emphasis would now be on ‘communal reorganisation, population planning and establishment of agro-industries and other off farm activities’ (GOZ 1991).

Although under ESAP the need for land reform was acknowledged, it was stated that ‘the large scale commercial farming sector is of critical economic importance and will continue to be one of the pillars of economic growth’ (GOZ 1990). The programme therefore advocated for a market-based mechanism of transferring land, and more focus on re-organising production in communal areas. By the time ESAP was initiated, the land resettlement programme had been going on for ten years and had missed most of its targets, resettling only 52,000 households by 1991 against a target of 162,000 households. As Table 3.5 shows, the amount of land available was falling over the years and there was a corresponding decline in the average number of households resettled per year between 1985 and 1997.

**Table 3.5: Land acquired for resettlement and households resettled, 1980-1997**

Period	Land Acquired	Households Resettled	Average per year	
			Land Acquired	People Resettled
1980-1984	2,147,855ha	28,568	429,571	5,714
1985-1990	447,791ha	19,110	74,632	3,822
1991-1997	789,645ha	23,322	157,929	3,332
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,385,291</b>	<b>71,000</b>	<b>211,581</b>	<b>4,438</b>

*Source: GoZ (1998c: 11), GoZ (1993a)*

Several other factors apart from ESAP can help to explain the decline in the amount of land and the number of households resettled. The First Five Year National Development Plan (1986-1990) published in April 1986 had identified dwindling financial resources for land purchase, along with drought. In addition there was less land on the market, largely because those farmers who had wanted to sell off their land had done so. Although the State attempted to get more land available on the market by introducing the Land Acquisition Act in 1986 to give it the right of first refusal in all rural land transactions, not much land became available as a result (Moyo 1997). Donor funds had all but dried up. Although the promised grant from the UK Government had not yet been exhausted, there was an unannounced policy shift in the UK Government in the late 1980s. The thinking was that resettlement was expensive and was benefiting fewer people (Cusworth 2000). It was felt that more could be achieved through donor aid by focusing on the communal lands which were still home to the majority. In addition, some internal shortcomings in the programme were identified, especially a lack of capacity to implement the programme following the disbandment of the then Department for Rural Development and its merger with the District Development Fund. Further, there was a perception that a lack of transparency in land

allocation had crept in as most of the land acquired for resettlement remained unallocated but was being leased to selected State officials. In reality, most of this land in Matabeleland remained unallocated in part because of security problems in the region at the time and also because the types of models being suggested were unpopular with beneficiaries.

Apart from helping to de-emphasise rapid land resettlement the ESAP had a more direct impact on the land resettlement policy. Two developments are worth noting. Firstly, the target beneficiaries gradually changed from the poor and landless to those with the capability to make the land productive. Although on paper the programme professed to be pro-poor, in reality members of the bureaucratic elite began to benefit more. This in itself affected donor funding as donors did not wish to fund commercial farming that was not linked to poverty alleviation. Secondly, the technical models also changed significantly. A new variant of Model A was introduced. This offered ten times the amount of land in the original A1 model. Clearly, the resettlement programme was being oriented toward the non-poor households. We can say therefore that the ESAP programme significantly influenced the resettlement policy. A further policy factor to emerge in the 1990s was the changes to the land policy following the expiry of the constitutional restraint clause. We look at this in the next section.

### **3.10. Land reform and resettlement after the restraint clause: 1990-present**

#### *Land reform and resettlement phase one, 1990-1999*

As part of the settlement negotiations at the Lancaster House in 1979 a constitutional clause was included that called for a moratorium on constitutional reforms during the first ten years of independence. This means clauses that limited the nature and form of land resettlement could not be altered in the first ten years. The restraint clause in the Lancaster House Constitution came to an end in 1990. All along this had been blamed for the slow pace of resettlement. It was therefore not inconceivable that substantial changes would take place. Effectively this meant the Government could radically alter its approach to land if it so wished. A precursor to changes in the offing came towards the end of the 1980s when a draft Land Policy paper was circulated. This was published officially in December 1990. It contained proposals for the new policy regime to replace the one agreed at the Lancaster House talks. Three fundamental changes were proposed. The first was that the State could designate land for resettlement. This meant that the State could get all the land it wanted but still pay compensation at market rates. This does not seem to be a radical departure from the provisions of the 1986 Land Acquisition Act. It was just the element of compulsion that appeared to be new in this Act. However, even this was not new since the State could easily have used clauses in the Regional Town and Country Planning Act of 1976 to compulsorily acquire land.

Secondly, the policy made known for the first time the final land use arrangement the State envisioned. Table 3.6 shows the final determination of land use that was envisaged. We can see from Table 3.6 that the intention of the policy was to expand considerably the amount of land under resettlement. More significant, however, is the fact that most of the land would come from the large-scale commercial farms. This was a major sore point in the late 1990s as most of the farmers were unwilling to sell and the Government was broke.



**Table 3.6: National strategic land holding structure**

Tenure category	Area (Million Hectares)		
	Actual in 1980	Targets of 1990 Land	Actual 1997
Large scale Commercial	15.5	6.0	12.1
Small-scale Commercial	1.4	1.4	1.4
Communal	16.4	16.4	16.4
Resettlement	-	8.3	3.6
National Parks and other	6.0	6.0	6.0
State Land	0.3	1.5	0.1
Total	39.6	39.6	39.6

*Sources: Government of Zimbabwe 1998c; Government of Zimbabwe 1998d.*

A third element of change introduced by the land policy was a shift in the objectives of land reform and resettlement. Following a well-publicised scandal in which Government farms were being leased to the bureaucratic elites, the new policy reflected a limited mission to the poor and a significant gain for the bureaucratic elites. It has been shown that the bureaucratic elite became a major interest group in the resettlement programme in the late 1980s and 1990s, a factor that affected the poverty orientation of the programme (Bratton 1987; Alexander 1994). From the largely social, justice-based objectives of the 1980s, the new objectives became more to do with creating a new class of black large scale commercial farmers. The criteria for selection of beneficiaries also changed remarkably to emphasize interest, resources and most importantly, skill. For most donors there seemed little justification in using public funds to buy farms that would benefit non-poor individuals.

#### *Launch of land reform and resettlement phase 2*

By 1996, the land resettlement had virtually ground to a halt. Apart from declining capacity to plan and implement the programme, donor support had all but ceased cutting off much needed resources. With political pressure for more transfer of land, the State sought to revive planned resettlement through a reformulated programme that would be acceptable to major donors (Moyo 2001). At the same time, the then Overseas Development Administration (ODA) dispatched a mission to assess how the UK Government could help revive a programme of planned resettlement. The ODA team produced a report that suggested a new programme could be piloted over a two-year period before a major programme got under way. When a new Government took over in the UK in 1997, the programme stalled as new priorities for international development assistance were worked out. Impatient to start the programme the Zimbabwe state went ahead with a donors' conference in September 1998 at which it announced the launch of Phase 2 of the land resettlement programme.

The policy document for Phase 2 outlined the main target beneficiaries as:

1. Poor households from the communal areas;
2. Displaced farm workers; and
3. Special groups such as women, ex-combatants, agricultural graduates, master farmers and persons of means and ability who intend to engage in agriculture.

The target beneficiary groups reflected the mixture of social and economic objectives in the new policy and programme. Four different models of resettlement were introduced for the different social groups, outlined in Table 3.7.

**Table 3.7: New models of land resettlement proposed in land reform and resettlement programme 2**

<b>Model Type</b>	<b>Land Area</b>	<b>Number of Households</b>	<b>Design Characteristics and Tenure</b>
A1	2,470,000	68,314	Family has title over homestead and arable blocks (3-6 ha). Common grazing land under group title
A2	800,000	15,827	Individual family plot 50-350 ha depending on region -Each family has consolidated title.
Three-Tier	1,730,000	2,811	180 ha communal grazing, 3 ha arable and homestead allocations, individual titles.
Irrigation	-	4,050	Each family has title over homestead and arable blocks. Common land is registered under group title
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,000,000</b>	<b>91,000</b>	

The new programme integrated tenure reform into land resettlement. The beneficiary households would now hold individual title over arable land and group title for communal grazing land. An interesting observation is that in Phase Two, the co-operative model B schemes had been scrapped following adverse evaluations and were to be re-planned into the various individual plot schemes. The State still thought the 91,000 households could be resettled over ten years at a cost of US\$1.9 billion (GoZ 1998c: 6). This was unrealistic, especially when it was considered that the State had failed to resettle that number in almost twenty years. Donors on the other hand insisted on piloting the models and involving the beneficiary households in the design of the models. The State took this as procrastination. The failed donor conference marked a crucial turning point in policy, as from then the State announced it would go it alone. The policy had clearly changed and from then on the political context for a combination of extra judicial and quasi-legal expropriation of private commercial farmland had been set.

#### *Land reform and resettlement phase 3 2000-present*

Once the donors' conference had failed to raise the funds that the State needed to operationalise Phase Two and the State lost a referendum for constitutional reforms, it seemed as if prospects for an orderly transfer of land had all but disappeared. Although the World Bank and other donors came up with the idea of piloting innovative resettlement models over two years before trying to seek further support for a wider programme, the State saw this as too little too late. It was under pressure from restless peasants, and was facing urban unrest and a declining economy. Already in 1998 some villagers from Svosve Communal Lands had invaded neighbouring farms, only to be persuaded back with a promise that they would be resettled. In February 2000 when a group of veterans from the war of liberation invaded two farms that had been purchased by the State but had not been resettled, it looked like an isolated grievance over the slow pace of land resettlement. There are conflicting views on the complicity of the State or elements linked to the State in instigating the invasions but what is clear is that the State did not stop the invasions this time round.

Within months, however, the invasions had spread to all the commercial farming areas across the country, taking on a more violent turn. In the past the State had moved in to persuade the villagers to leave the commercial farmers to continue with their work and in cases where this was not done, the courts came in to enforce property rights. It was at this point that the State decided that it was taking all land without paying. It would only pay for improvements when able to. This was the most controversial component. When the mainly white commercial farmers sought relief from the courts of law, it was felt that judicial activism by judges was stalling expropriation of land, and constitutional amendments were passed to ensure that the State could nationalise all land and redistribute it. Table 3.8 shows the key legislative changes that enabled expropriation to take place.

**Table 3.8: Key enabling legal instruments for fast track land reform**

Legal Instrument	Effect
Constitutional Amendment 16 of 2000	State will pay for improvement on farms but liability to pay compensation for expropriated land shifted to the UK.
Land Acquisition Act 15 of 2000	Allowed the State to delay payments on improvements to land for up to five years and gave the State right to pay in cash, bonds or other securities.
Statutory Instrument 288 of 2000	Maximum farm sizes according to region enforced.
Land Acquisition Amendment Act number 1 of 2004	Allowed State to seize more land beyond the court sanctioned Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme. State would now target most of the remaining commercial farms.
The Acquisition of Farm materials Act No 7 of 2004	State allowed to take possession of movable assets belonging to evicted farmers (agricultural machinery).
Constitutional Amendment 17 of 2005	Nationalised all land gazetted for resettlement.
Gazetted Land(Consequential Provisions) Act 2006	Made it illegal to remain on acquired land unless former owners secure a State lease.

Apart from changing the law, the State also embarked on a programme to reform the judiciary. The net effect of both programmes was that the programme that started off as a spontaneous invasion of farms was regularised in July 2000 into a state programme of land reform now mostly referred to as Fast Track Land Reform. Done under a very decentralised approach, only two programme elements of Phase Two were adopted, the A1 and A2, although later the three tiers model began to resurface in discussions while a wildlife version was also launched. Though implementation differed from province to province, the key elements of the Fast Track Land Reform were:

- Compulsion. Once land was targeted it was speedily acquired. Often farms were invaded and occupied before the legal processes even got under way and there was little recourse to the courts of law for protection under private property laws.
- Simultaneous resettlement in all provinces meant that this was done at a scale never seen before. The fact that 5 million hectares were acquired inside six months suggests a massive programme was undertaken.
- Accelerated planning and demarcation and resettlement on acquired land. Technocrats were encouraged to use alternative field methods to allow for quick demarcation and resettlement. This was often a big task for most planning professionals who for years had worked in a system that allowed them to take as much time as was required to get it right.

- Limited basic infrastructure and support. This was resettlement on a shoestring and so the settlers moved onto land before the social and economic infrastructure was in place. This made the initial process of getting started quite difficult. Figures on how much was spent per capita are difficult to compute but it is clear that this is nowhere near the US\$12,000 spent to resettle each household under the 1980-1998 programme. This factor among others explains the decline in farm production as a result of the resettlement programme.

At the end of the programme in 2003 Zimbabwe's land holding structure had been transformed dramatically. Apart from legislating for maximum farm sizes (see Table 3.9) three quarters of all the agricultural land became smallholder farming areas (24.34 million hectares). All land acquired for resettlement became state property and 99-year leases were offered.

**Table 3.9: Maximum farm sizes for A2 resettlement**

Natural Region	Maximum Farm Size
I	250
IIa	350
IIb	400
III	500
IV	1,500
V	2,000

There have been two audit commissions already to look at who got what land and these have brought out some key issues with respect to multiple farm ownership and low uptake of land by the A2 farmers. The Utete Commission started work in May 2003 and produced its report three months later. The report showed that 127,192 households had accessed land under the A1 scheme and recorded an uptake rate of 97 per cent. This contrasted with the A2 farm allocations where only 66 per cent of the 7,260 beneficiaries had taken up offers.

Apart from changing the land holding structure, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme effectively extended communal areas as all acquired land under A1 scheme was put under the jurisdiction of the Rural District Councils under provisions of the Rural District Council Act (Chapter 29:13). This was in addition to traditional chiefs being given oversight on these areas via the Traditional Leaders Act (Chapter 29:17).

### **3.11. Emerging outcomes of land reform and resettlement**

To examine the success or failure of the resettlement programme we have to look firstly at what the official evaluations have said. Some of these have focused on specific elements of resettlement and others on the realisation of stated goals and objectives. Their main distinguishing feature is that usually they are requested by donors that use them as a tool for assessing realisation of intended objectives. Official evaluations have either been done internally as part of monitoring or by external experts. Such studies tend to use mainstream project planning tools and measures of project success or failure. Core among these are cost- benefit analysis and related measures of project worth like the Economic Internal Rate of Return and the Net Present Value which look at returns on investment.

Conventional evaluations of the resettlement programme are given prominence because they became the official public record of achievement or failure. In the case of resettlement in Zimbabwe the conventional evaluations have become the basis for either further support of the programme or cessation of donor funding. They therefore wield unusually high significance and to a large extent become vital political capital. The evaluations, however, carry no statutory significance and Parliament, while taking note of them informally, does not necessarily debate the findings or call for action. Although the conventional evaluations are lumped together with ad hoc commissions, it should be noted that the ad hoc commissions have largely functioned to influence policy and are of statutory standing. Unlike conventional evaluations, however, the State is obliged to take note of the reports where the contents are of interest to Parliament. As an official report, it becomes subject to Cabinet discussion that usually generates feedback for implementation to line ministries. Both conventional evaluations and ad hoc commissions form a public record of the state of resettlement at the time of the study. In this discussion we have distinguished between the two for ease of analysis. We will start with the ad hoc commissions, summarised in Table 3.10.

**Table 3.10: Ad Hoc commissions that have commented on resettlement in Zimbabwe**

Year	Commission Report	Findings and Recommendations.
1981	Report of the Commission of inquiry into incomes, prices and conditions of service- <b>Riddell Commission</b>	Landlessness acute in the communal areas Need to resettle at least 218,000 families Acquire land using bonds if necessary
1982	Report of the Commission of inquiry into the Agriculture Industry- <b>Chavhunduka Commission</b>	Resettlement should not jeopardise productivity of large scale commercial farms. High cost of Z\$4,000 may not justify the ends if not properly planned Focus should also be on communal areas Set up a Commission to look into land tenure systems Land acquisition should continue on willing buyer-willing seller basis
1993	Value for Money Project (Special Report) of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Land Acquisition and resettlement Programme <b>Harrid Report</b>	Government has failed to meet land acquisition targets neither has it met its resettlement target. Resettlement programme has failed to decongest the communal lands Model B and D have been unsuccessful while model A and C have been impressive (for descriptions of resettlement models see Table 3.4). Government should recoup part of resettlement expenditure from beneficiaries to maintain scheme infrastructure Improve efficiency by resettling experienced farmers and introducing tenure that encourages optimum use
1994	Report of the Commission of inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural land tenure systems. Vol 1 and 2 <b>Rukuni Commission</b>	Model A Resettlement Schemes are efficient producers but should be re-planned into self contained units. Model B has been a failure to be re-planned to model As. Permit system is insecure and gives more rights to the Minister than to the land user. Offer long-term leases (99 years) with option of freehold title after 10 years.

Two of the Commissions in the 1980s were set up before major changes were made to the Lancaster House constitutional provisions that limited land transfers, while the other two reports relate to the period after 1990 when the restrictions on changes to land law had expired. The reports are examined in greater detail below.

#### *The Riddell commission*

The Riddell Commission was set up in June 1980 to look into income disparities in the country. The Commission, headed by Roger Riddell then of the Catholic Institute for Race Relations, found that there was acute landlessness in the communal areas. It reported that although the tribal areas had capacity for 275,000 farming units, by 1980 they carried up to 675,000 farming units (Riddell 1980: 3). Up to 40 per cent of the young men aged between 16 and 30 years were reportedly landless at a time when up to 60 per cent of the European land was being under-utilised (ibid: 5). The Riddell Commission recommended the need for a massive resettlement programme of 218,000 families if poverty in the communal areas was to be abated. While other recommendations of the Commission relating to rural incomes found their way into Government policy, those directly relating to resettlement do not seem to have had as much impact. For example, the number of people to be resettled was whittled down to 162,000 families. We shall return to the significance of this Commission later in this chapter. This report became one of the major poles in the debate for or against massive land transfers.

#### *The Chavhunduka commission*

The Commission of Inquiry into the Agriculture Industry was sworn in on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1981 and presented its findings on 21 June 1982. Chaired by Professor Gordon Chavhunduka a Zimbabwean sociologist, the Commission was set up to give an accurate picture of the state of the agricultural industry just after the war. Out of the thirteen terms of reference, one was specifically focused on the land resettlement programme. The Commission was tasked to report upon 'the present extent (of occupation) and utilisation of land and, having regard to the Government's land resettlement policies, ways and means by which Government could acquire commercial properties for resettlement purposes' (GOZ 1982: 1). While acknowledging the mal-distribution of land and congestion in the communal lands the Commission was of the view that there was also 'the need to face the immediate problems of food supply and land rehabilitation in the many degraded communal lands in this country' (ibid: 67). The Commission seems to have been more concerned about the effect of massive land transfers on productivity. It responded specifically to the Riddell Commission's recommendation of the need to resettle 218,000 families by declaring that; 'it should be remembered that there are 800,000 families living in the communal lands who need attention' (GOZ 1982: 66). In its view, 'No land redistribution in Africa has yet managed to relieve the incremental growth in population, much less to achieve real redistribution' (ibid: 7).

The Commission advised against large scale appropriation of under-utilised land arguing that the definition of under-utilisation was value laden and difficult to operationalise. Citing the constitutional bottlenecks, its main recommendation was for the Government to stick to the willing-buyer-willing-seller approach it had been using. The Chavhunduka report also recommended the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry into Land Tenure. Land tenure was seen as being one of the stumbling blocks to increased productivity in the communal lands. There does not seem to have been an immediate follow up to this specific recommendation as it was not until November 1993 that the Land Tenure Commission was sworn in. However, it is clear that its recommendation for more focus on the majority in the communal areas was responded to after a two-year gestation period. This came in the form of the variously named

Communal Lands Development Plan, drawn up in 1984 and 1985 but made public in the First Five Year National Development Plan (1986-1990). This essentially was an attempt to 'restructure and reorganize the existing dispersed and isolated peasant settlement' into 'more clearly defined land use patterns, more intensive use of the land, thus resulting in higher productivity' (GoZ, 1986: 53-54).

The word attempt is used here as in reality the programme never went beyond the pilot programme following massive resistance from the communal area dwellers that did not wish to be moved into consolidated villages. Only 287,549 hectares had been re-planned and 9,430 families moved into consolidated villages by January 1998 (GoZ, 1998c: 9).

So, these two ad hoc commissions sought to influence the direction of land resettlement in quite different directions. While the former advocated a radical programme of substantial land transfers, the latter put greater focus on improving productivity and living standards in the communal areas. The prevailing policy environment tipped the scale in favour of the Chavhunduka's minimalist approach. What is also significant, as we argued earlier, is the effect of institutional inertia in policy transfer within the bureaucracy to provide solutions to the communal area problem. The consolidated villages that were central to the Communal Lands Reorganization Programme had striking similarities with the measures of the Land Husbandry Act of 1952 in the then Rhodesia.

#### *The comptroller and auditor general value for money report*

The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) in Zimbabwe performs audit functions for the State. The head of this office reports directly to the President and Parliament and is not a civil servant. The office's involvement in special assignments is meant to restore public confidence in the systems of public accountability. Through a special project supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency that sought to introduce and institutionalise value for money audits, the C&AG's office carried out an audit of the resettlement programme.

The reasons for selecting the resettlement programme are not clear since this is already a statutory duty of the C&AG office under section 9(1)(b) and 17(1) of the Audit and Exchequer Act Chapter 168. Officially, the audit was prompted by 'the fact that Zimbabwe's economy is dependant on agriculture and land plays a pivotal role in the development of the country' (GoZ, 1993a: 5). However, it has been suggested that the study was in part prompted by reports in the media that the land purchased for resettlement was being leased out to senior civil servants and party officials. Instead of benefiting the intended groups, State funds were thought to be benefiting a few well-connected and rich people. This, it was claimed, was stalling the programme as the influential civil servants and politicians were reluctant to let go of the land. This scandal had made other donors shy away from any further support for the programme. The value for money audit was therefore supposed to allay fears of impropriety on the part of the civil servants.

The audit report was presented to Parliament on the 25<sup>th</sup> March 1993 and generated considerable debate. While acknowledging the success of the resettlement Models A and C, (for descriptions see Table 3.4) the report outlined a catalogue of failures at several levels of the programme. Three areas of criticism stand out. The first area highlighted is the failure to meet the targets for both land acquisition and resettlement. Out of the land acquisition target of 5 million hectares by 1985, the State had managed 2.78 million hectares. Of this amount, 52,438 hectares were being leased out while 235,998 hectares were lying idle due either to the unsuitability of the land or lack of technical planning capacity. Similarly, out of the resettlement target of 162,000 families by 1990, the State had only managed to resettle 52,000 families.

Several reasons for this were given. Key among these was the security situation in Matabeleland and the Midlands, lack of suitable groups to take over Model B farms, the unsuitability of existing models for the drier parts of the country, limited technical planning capacity, and the unsuitability of the farms for resettlement (GoZ 1993a: 15).

A second finding, identified as a major failure by the report, is the resettlement programme's failure to reduce land pressure in the communal lands, echoing the findings of the external evaluations discussed in later sections. An interesting contradiction in the report, however, was that it seemed to minimize the importance of resettlement in reducing overcrowding in the communal areas. The report expressed the view that: 'even if the targets for land to be acquired and the number of families to be resettled were met, resettlement alone cannot achieve the Government's objective of reducing land pressure in the communal area' (ibid: ii). The implication here was that the Government was not getting value for money from resettlement or that it was using the wrong tools for a correctly identified problem.

A third area highlighted by the report is the significant under-utilisation of land particularly in the Model B schemes, which it describes as 'unsuccessful' with a utilisation rate ranging from 14 to 33 per cent. Detailed case studies of the Model B schemes showed that most of them had multiple problems including poor selection, inadequate skills and capitalization, poor monitoring and political interference (ibid). The audit report recommended that efficiency could be improved by introducing 'tenure which encourages optimum use' in the resettlement areas. Also, it called for the resettlement of experienced farmers with resources and recommended that the costs of resettlement could be cut through recouping some of the costs from the settlers and renovating old farm structures instead of building new buildings. More importantly, the report called for land purchase to be matched with planning capacity to avoid land lying idle. Political interference in planning, settler selection and managing interface with communal lands was also seen as a negative factor affecting the successful implementation of the programme.

#### *The land tenure commission*

The Rukuni Commission was sworn in during November 1993 and presented its report in October 1994. The Commission was set up specifically to look at land tenure issues in rural Zimbabwe. The reasons for the timing of this Commission are not clear since this was close to a decade since the Chavhunduka Commission had made the recommendation. Several reasons seem to have prompted the setting up of the Commission. Firstly, the new Land Policy that had been approved by Cabinet in 1991 had indicated the need for such a review. Secondly, there were increasing calls for freehold title as an incentive for further investment. This view had gained momentum due to the economic reform programme that was under way. A third reason was the release of the Value for Money Audit Report in 1993, which indicated that the uncertainty surrounding land ownership in the resettlement areas was affecting investments. The result of this combination of factors was the Commission of Inquiry into Land Tenure Systems in Zimbabwe. Headed by Professor Rukuni, a Zimbabwean agricultural economist, the report of the Land Tenure Commission came out in support of further resettlement based on an analysis of agricultural efficiency indicators.

While ticking off the cooperative based Model B as 'very inefficient', the Commission's overall view of Model A schemes, which had been deemed efficient producers, was that 'the conventional wisdom that Resettlement Areas are not productive is therefore not objective and contrary to the facts on the ground particularly in Natural Regions I, II and III' (Rukuni Commission Report 1994: 66). The report further recommended 'a more secure form of tenure'. In other parts of the report this is a recommendation to



move towards a free hold title from the permit system in place. The report also called for a re-organisation of the Model A villages into self contained units and the re-integration of the resettlement schemes into the local government planning system. This was in response to the increase in 'squatter' families that had taken advantage of the ubiquitous grazing in the Model A schemes to illegally set up homes.

Four main points can be drawn from these Commissions. First, that Commissions have largely been used to shape the broad policy environment and strategic importance of resettlement rather than alter its content and form directly. Secondly, except for the Chavhunduka report and the Value for Money report which urged caution about proceeding with resettlement, the other ad hoc Commissions have largely endorsed the necessity of large scale implementation of the programme. A third point is the role of the ad hoc Commissions in influencing decision making and policy. We now turn to a discussion of the conventional evaluations. For ease of discussion a distinction has been drawn between external and internal evaluations.

#### *Officially commissioned evaluation studies*

At least six internal and three external evaluation studies of the land resettlement programme have been conducted so far. These have yielded a lot of information about the outcomes and impacts of the programme. Table 3.11 is a summary of these key reports and their main findings and recommendations.

**Table 3.11: Main findings of external and internal evaluation reports**

Year and Type	Title of Report	Main Findings
1984 Internal Evaluation	Report of the National Survey of the Normal Intensive Resettlement Programmes, Harare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Productivity in Model A schemes higher than in communal areas</li> <li>• Increased use of AFC credit facilities</li> <li>• Infrastructure bottlenecks affecting social life</li> <li>• Emerging social differentiation based on initial assets</li> </ul>
1988 External Evaluation	Cusworth, J. and Walker, J. - ODA Evaluation Report EV434. Land Resettlement in Zimbabwe a Preliminary Evaluation. Sept 1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project did better than expected. ERR of 21 per cent vs. the appraisal expectation of 14 per cent</li> <li>• Significant increase in productivity and crop income but a lot of farmers are in debt</li> <li>• Some households benefiting more than others and women are disadvantaged</li> <li>• No impact in decongesting the communal lands</li> <li>• Productive institutional support could be better</li> </ul>
1988 External Evaluation	GFA-EEC Evaluation of EC Co-funded Resettlement Schemes in Zimbabwe. Final Report Sept 1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ERR of 14.8 per cent to 44.4 per cent depending on region</li> <li>• Farmers heavily in debt and lending system has collapsed</li> <li>• Increasing productivity and cropping intensity</li> <li>• Not replicable because of amount of land needed</li> <li>• Pay more attention to underutilised land in the SSCFA</li> <li>• Integrate schemes with CL in planning infrastructure.</li> </ul>
1991 Internal Survey	CSO-Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey 1990/91	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resettlement households with a Theil index of 0.25 in food expenditure are the least differentiated vs. National Average of 0.32 and 0.33 for CL</li> <li>• RA have the least diversified income portfolio</li> </ul>
1991 Internal Evaluation	DDF Progress Report up to 1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Productivity fluctuating but rising</li> <li>• 1990 77 per cent of AFC's resettlement loan portfolio in arrears. Drop in loans from 70 per cent in 1984 to 10 per cent in 1990</li> <li>• Increasing and substantial permit violations rising from 9 191 in 1987 to 13,756 in 1990</li> </ul>
1992 Internal Evaluation	Evaluation Report of Model B Resettlement Schemes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most are under performing due to poor selection, skills, extension advice and lack of access to loans</li> <li>• Some are no longer operating as co-operatives</li> </ul>
1995 Internal Evaluation	DDF-Review of the Land Resettlement Programme 1980-1995.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Background of settlers has a bearing on productivity</li> <li>• Communal grazing problematic and needs changing</li> <li>• Inappropriate models for the drier regions. Models B and D have been a failure, Model A successful</li> <li>• Need to scale up productivity in the resettlement areas which is still lower than the envisaged productivity for the models</li> </ul>
1996 External Evaluation	Cusworth et al –ODA Report of the Land Appraisal Mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Land redistribution now benefiting the black elite rather than the poor</li> <li>• Land shortage not necessarily delaying resettlement as there is still unallocated land</li> <li>• Scale down resettlement to 3,000 families per year</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Return to the willing-buyer-willing-seller</li> <li>• Introduce other players NGOs, private sector</li> </ul>
1998 Internal Report	Report on Squatting in the Resettlement Schemes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 7,000 illegally resettled farmers in Schemes</li> <li>• Re-plan the villagised schemes into self contained units to get rid of communal grazing area which squatters see as vacant land.</li> </ul>

The resettlement programme operated largely without a formal evaluation unit until 1984 when through an agreement the ODA provided technical assistance for setting up such a unit. Internal ad hoc monitoring arrangements had been in existence however since 1982 with monthly meetings and annual reviews (ODA, 1988). The establishment of this unit meant that on going and continuous monitoring of the project could be established largely as a requirement of the ODA reporting arrangements. It was when this unit was established that it was realized that two separate project documents had been drawn up. One was drawn up by the ODA while the other was the operational document for the Government of Zimbabwe. Although the objectives outlined in the two documents were similar, the modalities and targets differed significantly. A key area of difference was on the numbers to be resettled. Further, UK public funds would only support Model A schemes. Through annual surveys and reviews, the evaluation unit built up a database of the Model A schemes. It is this database that has formed an important baseline for most of the evaluation studies to date.

### **3.12. Lessons from external evaluations and ad hoc commissions**

Although there is evidence that prior to these evaluations the donors (and particularly the ODA) were involved in monitoring the programme activities through monthly meetings of the Inter-ministerial Committee in charge of resettlement and annual reviews, the 1988 evaluation study was the first formal external evaluation of the programme. By the time of this evaluation, significant alterations to the original proposal had been made unilaterally by the Government of Zimbabwe. The most significant was the change in the targets for resettlement from the 17,500 families to the 162,000 families (ODA, 1988). The evaluation was therefore being made based on the original funding agreements. This in itself is significant because it places into context the problematic relationship between the Government of Zimbabwe and the UK Government that has dogged this programme to date. Key findings raised by the evaluations included:

- That the programme had resettled more than 40,000 families at a cost of Z\$3,642 (£2,106 at 1986 rates) per household against the original project target of 17,500 families. (While this is a remarkable result in terms of the original proposal targets, for the Zimbabwe Government this was way below the 162,000 families it had hoped to resettle).
- The programme did better than expected, achieving an Economic Internal Rate of Return of 21 per cent, significantly higher than the original forecast of 14 per cent in the ODA appraisal document. The EEC evaluation study showed variations in returns according to agro-ecological regions and emerged with a range of 14.8 per cent for those in marginal areas to 44.8 per cent for the farmers in better rainfall areas.
- These significant increases in productivity and crop income had taken place but some of the gains were threatened by the collapse of the AFC lending scheme due to the high rate of defaulting.

- The cash crops economy had seen most households moving away from subsistence crops with implications for food security.
- Increased incomes or proceeds from improved yields were being invested in the unproductive build up of large herds.
- The programme could result in increased social differentiation as some households had benefited more than others. Female-headed households were singled out as a particularly disadvantaged group.
- The programme had not made an impact in decongesting the communal lands. Evidence of this was provided by increased spontaneous resettlement.

It is apparent from these findings that the programme was a qualified success. The ODA report put it succinctly saying 'it must be a source of satisfaction that such a complex and politically oriented programme that was required to achieve a range of, in some cases apparently conflicting objectives, has not been in economic terms a waste of resources' (ODA, 1988: 191). This endorsement is however qualified by a further statement that 'it is however questionable whether future formal resettlement can generate comparably high rates of return' (Ibid: 194). The EEC evaluation deemed the programme results 'not replicable' owing to the costs involved (EEC, 1988: xiii).

At the time of its submission, the ODA Evaluation Study Report was well received by the Zimbabwe Government as it vindicated its original position that resettlement could result in economic prosperity. For the ODA, though the report showed that the use of the funds had not been in vain, it presented a dilemma on the way forward. Since the results were largely positive, the expectation was that land redistribution could continue. After a few years of little engagement, an external mission was dispatched in 1996 by the ODA to look at the programme again and see how it could be moved forward. Several changes had occurred by then. Chief among these is that the constitutional constraint for compulsory land purchase had elapsed and a new policy regime was in place. The programme had also shifted focus with a new set of objectives that focused on the black elite farmers. The 1996 mission came up with the findings:

- The programme had significantly slowed down and was now benefiting the black elite rather than the poor, (something that the major donors would find difficult to support).
- Land shortage was not necessarily delaying resettlement as there was still unallocated State land. Constraints related to planning capacity were partly responsible for the delay in allocating land.
- There was need to refocus any donor supported programme on the poor and to scale down resettlement to 3,000 families per year.
- The return to the willing-buyer-willing-seller would be the best way forward in land acquisition.
- It was necessary to introduce more players into the resettlement programme, specifically NGOs and the private sector.
- A more participatory approach should be used, rather than the heavily technocentric, top down approach of the past.

The mission also recommended that a donor's conference be convened to look at the way forward. The conference was subsequently held in November 1998. However, there had been a change of government in the UK.

### 3.13. The internal evaluations

A look at Table 3.11 shows that most of the internal evaluations have been based on the same dataset on which the external evaluation studies were derived. It is, therefore, not surprising that the findings are largely similar. The internal evaluations show:

- Resettlement targets set out in GoZ official documents had not been met. This was in marked contrast to the external reports, which based their achievements on the original targets they had agreed on with the Government of Zimbabwe or the funding of specific schemes.
- Land resettlement had managed to provide households with viable agriculture-based livelihoods, despite increased risk to covariant factors –such as weather and the fluctuations in world markets.
- Increasing accumulation of assets, with the 1992 Survey finding higher levels of resource ownership than the 1988 survey. This was accompanied by increasing social differentiation although this is lower than in the communal areas.
- Increasing violations of the terms of permits, has risen from 9,191 in 1987 to 13,756 in 1990.
- Poor coordination among the implementing agencies.
- Collapsing support services, especially credit facilities and extension services.
- Resource-use conflict between the communal and resettlement farmers, especially over wood and other land-based resources.
- Increased incidence of squatting on land set aside for grazing schemes within resettlement areas. By 1999 there were 8,000 families ‘squatting’ in resettlement areas.

In addition to the above issues distilled from the internal evaluations, several official documents have also made evaluative comments on aspects of the resettlement programme and especially on land acquisition. The Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II Policy Framework and Project Document published in September 1998 isolates three lessons from the resettlement experience. While stating that the programme ‘learnt that land redistribution can have high financial and economic returns’, it concedes that ‘shifting the focus to better-off peasants from 1990 to 1995 meant the virtual neglect of the land needs of the landless majority in communal areas, and an unresolved land question’ (GoZ, 1998c: 7 and 9). A further area of learning singled out is the careful management of the environment.

The National Land Policy Framework paper released in December 1998 was more explicit in its assessment of issues that needed attention in the programme. While isolating the land supply constraints emanating from the legal and constitutional framework, the report identifies ‘the weak co-ordination of policy; archaic and top down physical planning rather than socially grounded and democratic principles of planning; rigid and thus ineffective land use modelling; the weak legal definition of the main implementation procedures and land rights of settlers; and the undue efforts by the State and party to control the land redistribution programme’ (GoZ, 1998d:27) as major flaws in the programme. It is clear from the official evaluations that they see the land resettlement programme as having improved the livelihoods of the resettled farmers. While ad hoc Commissions have sought to influence the strategic role of resettlement in the macro-policy arena, the evaluations have sought to provide information that could form the basis for improvements in the programme.

It is quite clear from available evidence that land reform when well planned and executed can produce positive results. These include findings that:

- Resettlement gave the (mostly poor) households a livelihood. Planned resettlement allowed careful and generally transparent selection of households from among the target groups. Resettled households were able to increase their land asset base to about 5 ha. This allowed them to produce more and earn farm-linked incomes substantially higher than their communal area peers in some areas. We know, however, that this increased income did not necessarily translate into better education and nutrition for children due to some design flaws in the settlements (Kinsey 1997).
- The success of agriculture in resettlement areas spurred on the development of the local non-farm sector and most of the planned resettlement areas from the 1980s have become fully fledged settlements, with a full range of services. These had begun to create local employment opportunities by the time of the crisis.
- The newly created settlements worked well as long as State support was available (during the first four years the settlements were run as projects with a resident officer, but from year four they were handed over to local administration). We know that once the resident manager was withdrawn some of the settlements floundered. Again this was a design flaw that followed a standard model that suggested that after about five years resettled households should be able to thrive – yet we know that this is not necessarily so in rain constrained settlements like the ones in Zimbabwe.
- Most households increased their net worth by year 10 of being resettled, even if one in every four years was a drought year – in Nyamakate the value of productive and other assets increased by as much as 253 per cent over 10 years (Chimhowu and Hulme 2006). Most of this increase in net worth was in the form of investment in cattle that in all cases accounted for more than 50 per cent of household assets. In fact it is clear from several studies that access to land, if done well, is one of the best ways to create wealth among mainly agrarian societies.
- Inequality and social differentiation were reduced as newly created communities in the resettlement areas are more equal than those in communal lands of Zimbabwe. Equal access to land and support meant that each household had more or less equal chances of making a livelihood on land.

However, not all impacts were positive. It was also found that:

- Land settlement schemes based solely on rain-fed agriculture were less diversified and very vulnerable to drought and other external factors that affected agricultural markets. With up to 88 per cent of some households' income derived from crop income alone, this made the households vulnerable to the vagaries of the weather and volatile markets. One of the effects of the crisis has been to reduce this reliance on farm activities for a living. Non-farm activities, especially artisanal mining and remittances, have emerged to rival farm production as a means of a living in some parts of rural Zimbabwe, especially those endowed with alluvial minerals and closer to international borders.
- Availability of aid meant that settlements were planned as projects rather than as areas that needed long-term State support. This meant that in some cases once the project period elapsed the settlements went into decline.
- Inter-generational issues have begun to resurface and key among these are: inheritance problems as the children of the original farmers fight over who takes over the farm; subdivision has

reduced the amount of land available to the multiple households (mostly of children and close relations) to a point where densities may rival those of communal areas.

### **3.14. Land tenure**

Land tenure refers to the rules that govern land and property rights. This involves issues of land administration, land transfers (inheritance, sequestration and land marketing) as well as the security contained in these rights. Prior to Independence in 1980, the tenure system operational in Zimbabwe was clearly defined and consisted of freehold tenure in the commercial agricultural sector and communal tenure in the communal areas. When farmers were resettled in former commercial farmland, the land tenure system changed from freehold to a special type of permit equivalent in conditions and terms to communal areas. However, there were slight but distinct differences between the resettled areas and communal areas. Firstly, unlike in traditional communal areas where the society was organised under a traditional leadership system, and where the chief provided credible leadership and exercised control over his subjects in land matters, there is no such traditional leadership in resettlement areas. Chiefs had been replaced by elected leaders from amongst the settlers. Passage of the Traditional Leadership Act restored the jurisdiction of chiefs over resettled lands.

Secondly, even though the inhabitants did not have freehold tenure in the communal areas, they had secure usufruct rights that are permanent and almost equivalent to freehold tenure and in some cases land even changes through what some have termed vernacular markets operating in these communal areas (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2002). Since their rights included permission to bequeath land to the family in inheritance, communal farmers were compelled to exercise a high level of stewardship over their land and to protect it in trust for their descendants. In addition, the traditional leadership structure also compelled the inhabitants to protect their land and resources in trust for future generations since the land was traditionally 'owned'. This has not changed with some villagers considering land as a commodity that can be bought or sold irrespective of what the law says.

To deal with these issues, late in 2006 the Government developed a system of permits for A2 farmers (referred to as 99-year leases). These permits were supposed to guarantee farmers a certain level of security of tenure and to be useful as collateral security for those farmers who might wish to borrow money from financial institutions. The leases were particularly useful for the Government to try and counter accusations that land appropriation was at the core of the crisis (Richardson, 2005). These leases were only going to work in resettled areas and have met with scepticism by both the farmers and the financial institutions.

Security of tenure, then, remains one of the challenges of land policy in Zimbabwe. Matshe *et al* (2006) have shown the complex problems that can arise when farmers have doubts about security of tenure. Very little investment occurs and depletion rates of natural resources on such land are much higher than in areas where tenure is more secure. The situation in resettlement areas where there is no secure tenure and an absence of a controlling traditional leadership can lead to a system of laxity in accountability. Emerging evidence suggests increased tree cutting and selling of the timber for firewood in resettlement areas, as well as the opening up of land for agriculture without erosion control structures.

The State has decided to maintain the dualism in tenure structure. By recognising A2 resettlement as being superior to A1 and worthy of commercial leases while the latter are not, the State may have undermined the ability of the A1 smallholders to realise the full potential of land, their new asset. This is

one of the areas that may need to be revisited especially if the State makes smallholder farmers the drivers of economic recovery. It is to the post-crisis recovery that we now turn in the next section.

### **3.15. Future prospects for land reform**

Land reform has been closely linked to Zimbabwe's economic crisis and the expectation is that some of the problems that potentially can affect the ability of beneficiaries to grow their way out of, and stay out of, poverty will be ironed out. We see three main issues as priorities with respect to land.

#### *The unfinished business: tenure reform*

Although land redistribution is all but done, one area that still needs revisiting is tenure reform particularly for smallholder farmers. Apart from nostalgia, there does not seem to be any logical justification for continuing the dual tenure regime in Zimbabwe. This creates two classes of citizens. On the one hand are over 800,000 smallholders occupying some 14 million hectares of land under communal tenure, while on the other are nearly 230 000 resettled households occupying land on conditions that are more favourable than their communal land peers, namely with permits, offer letters and leases. The GNU may need to revisit this and perhaps look at innovative ways other countries in the region, especially Mozambique and South Africa, have dealt with tenure reforms.

#### *Re-planning A1 units*

Most of the nearly 130,000 beneficiaries resettled on A1 units lack basic social services and infrastructure since most of the large scale commercial farming areas did not have social infrastructure as they were privately owned. This may affect beneficiaries ability to utilise the land they have received through the programme. It is important that these be 're-planned' along the lines of the old 'accelerated' resettlement programme of the 1980s. This would involve planning them as new settlement projects with full costing for social and physical infrastructure. This will not be cheap. We know from the 1980s that it can cost up to US\$12,000 per household to provide the basic infrastructure, training and initial input support needed for a typical agricultural settlement. To support the 130,000 A1 beneficiaries would require an investment close to US\$1.6 billion. Planning them as individual projects has the advantage that it can allow the State to solicit for support for individual 'bite' size projects that donors might wish to support. Similarly donors can choose which projects they wish to support. However, it will still be the responsibility of the State to provide the overall connecting infrastructure. This multi-speed approach has the downside that certain regions may become more popular than others, which could easily create political problems.

As much as possible the re-planning needs to recognise the symbiotic relationship between these new units and the adjacent communal lands. It is, therefore, important that planning be integrated and coordinated with existing physical and social infrastructure in the communal lands.

Given that A2 beneficiaries have more land and better terms and conditions of access, the State needs to explore private sector partnership to provide commercial loans to this group, perhaps at subsidised rates. Like the former large scale farmers it should be their responsibility to develop local physical infrastructure although the State can help organise provisioning of social infrastructure.



### *A2 land audit*

The Global Political Agreement that formed the basis for a thaw from the crisis foreclosed any discussions about reversing the land redistribution exercise. This means that the GNU can only refine and iron out emerging problems from the exercise. We know from the Utete and Buka Reports that there are still issues of multiple farm ownership under A2 schemes. In addition the actual uptake of A2 farms needs to be established. It is therefore imperative that an independent audit of what is happening on these farms be undertaken with a view to reallocating underutilised land.

### *Land registry*

The resettlement process created new farm units that will need to be properly mapped and registered. It is therefore crucial that the land information management system be revamped so that it can cope with the increased land units that will need to be registered. It may be necessary to decentralise and simplify this function to districts. Since District Land Committees hold the most accurate information a Land Information Management Unit could be set up to run from these institutions and possibly even at ward level. To improve user interface the registration process will need to be as accessible, less costly and as simplified as possible. This might mean creating and training a new cadre of paralegals to operate at district or ward levels.

### *Enhancing land use through taxation*

One of the ways in which the State can ensure that beneficiaries use the newly acquired land is to begin to implement the land tax, as there has already been an initial grace period for the farmers. This would apply specifically to beneficiaries under the A2 scheme. A key advantage is that it forces the beneficiaries to utilise land, especially if the taxes are based on expected output. A downside to this is that it can potentially cripple already struggling nascent black commercial farmers. Given the political power of this group of beneficiaries it is unlikely that there will be political consensus on the issue.

### *Compensation fund for former land owners*

Although the former white commercial farmers cannot be compensated for land under the terms of Constitutional Amendment 16 of 2000, it may still be incumbent upon the GNU to consider a pool of funds, probably from donors, to compensate the farmers for the land. This of course is a controversial and potentially sore point as donors may not want to pay compensation and would rather use the resources to support poor smallholder farmers. We know from the cases like Japan, Taiwan and South Korea that it was the investment from deposed landowners in other areas of the economy that helped the economies to grow after the Second World War. Clearly things are different in Zimbabwe but under certain conditions this compensation fund could kick-start investment in selected areas of the economy and perhaps help with economic recovery. It may be worth exploring this avenue as a way of bringing closure to an issue that will likely rumble on in the courts of law for a long time.

## **3.16. Conclusions**

This chapter has examined the agricultural sector and the complex issue of land in Zimbabwe. It has argued that agriculture will need to be at the heart of a pro-poor, post-crisis recovery plan, since many of the poor rely on agriculture for a living. Furthermore, agriculture forms an important input into the

industrial sector, with growth in the industrial sector tied to the success of the agricultural sector. As such, restoring agricultural output is a prerequisite to improving the industrial sector. To achieve this, the focus must be on smallholder farmers, since they now dominate the sector. Any recovery of the agricultural sector will require that the issue of land redistribution be addressed. When well planned and resourced, land redistribution has been shown to speed economic growth and improve livelihoods. The new settlements created by Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Redistribution require significant assistance, through the provision of infrastructure and support services to farmers, if they are to be made functional. The tenure for smallholders on redistributed land remains insecure. This issue must be addressed in the next period. The former white owners of land appropriated in the resettlement process should be compensated in ways that this compensation could be channelled into kick-starting other areas of the economy.

For land to be fully productive, particularly in the low-rainfall areas, it requires water management. The agricultural sector cannot play the role envisaged in the post-crisis period unless it is made more productive, which will require strategies to manage water-use.

## CHAPTER 4: Water

### 4.1. Introduction

One of the key problems of agricultural development in Zimbabwe is that most of the smallholder producers rely on rain fed agriculture to make a living. Only one growing season per year is possible in Zimbabwe and most of southern Africa, compared with two or three in parts of Asia. Given that most of the smallholder farmers are in drought prone areas of the country, it is clear that farm livelihoods are a high risk venture dependent on good rainfall seasons. We saw earlier that a drought is expected once every four or five years. This implies that availability of water for agricultural use is a major limiting factor even after the land reform programme. According to FAO (2000), the total potential for further irrigation development in Zimbabwe using water from transboundary rivers and inland dams, is 240,000 ha. About 90,000 ha of this potential lies in the smallholder sector. Where available, irrigation potential transforms livelihoods possibilities and some estimates suggest internal rates of return of between 19-90 per cent when costs of drought relief foregone are included.<sup>24</sup> What is clear however is that good performance depends on:

- Active farmer involvement in scheme planning and management.
- Cultivation of high value crops, such as horticultural products (some of which can be grown almost continuously throughout the year).
- Existence of reasonable supporting infrastructure, especially roads, to facilitate scheme links with markets.

It is clear, however, that irrigation and related water harvesting technologies can offer greater opportunities for use of newly acquired land.

This chapter examines the experiences of water reform in Zimbabwe with a view to ascertaining both its challenges and achievements in meeting its intended objectives thus far and the prospects for water reform in the future. It argues that although the post-2000 period presented complex social, economic and political challenges to water sector reform, there were inherent limitations embedded within the concept of integrated water resources management which is central to water sector reform in Zimbabwe. There is need to review water reform policy so that it focuses on improving rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe. Such a review should consider 'old' and 'new' issues that undermine improved access to, and management of, water for rural livelihood improvement. The chapter concludes with some policy recommendations in light of the analysis.

### 4.2. Hydrological and historical context of water resources in Zimbabwe

There exists great variation in the spatial distribution of water resources in Zimbabwe. In Chapter 1 we saw how the country is divided into five agro-ecological zones based on rainfall potential. African irrigation schemes were developed to promote productive uses of water in selected 'native reserves' on small pockets of irrigable land partly with the objective to allow for resettlement of a larger population of people whose land had been 'alienated' (Weinrich, 1975).

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<sup>24</sup> Based on a review of ten smallholder irrigation schemes, five of which were performing well and five badly, (FAO, 2000)

With the dual division of land, the colonial State established a legal and administrative framework that governed access to, and control of, water in favour of certain sectional interests, namely urban areas, commercial agriculture, mining and manufacturing industries (Kambudzi, 1997; Mtisi and Nicol, 2003). From the 1890s up to 1927, water was governed by a set of loosely coordinated pieces of legislation which apportioned water to urban, mining, railway and agricultural sectors. Water for agriculture was apportioned and managed under the Water Ordinance of 1913, which was repealed by the 1927 Water Act, which was, in turn, repealed by the 1976 Water Act. The 1976 Water Act became the most comprehensive piece of water legislation that set the parameters of access, use and control of water from 1976 to 1997. Central to the water legislation was the denial of access to water for productive purposes to the majority of Africans.

Several key principles underlined the 1976 Water Act. Firstly, the Act set differential access to water based on whether one wanted to access 'private water' or 'public water'. 'Private water' was accessed by the owner of the land on which it was found who had its sole and exclusive use.<sup>25</sup> The Act allowed the owners, lessees or occupiers of any land to construct wells and drill boreholes. The amount of water abstracted was not controlled (cf. Matinenga, 1999). On the other hand, access to 'public water' was vested in the State and its use, apart from primary purposes, required that a water right be granted to the user by the Water Court. Right of access to 'public water' was based on the prior appropriation doctrine, which meant that access was based on the date on which an appropriation to the beneficial use of water was made. Simply put, earlier applicants had the first appropriation right of access to water.

Legal access to water and associated water rights were attached to land, and were granted in perpetuity. Thus, only individuals with title deeds to land could apply for, and be granted, water rights. This included groundwater, whereby rights to water were attached to the title deed of the land on which it was found. The granting of water rights under the 1976 Water Act took cognisance of the pre-existing rights to riparian owners, which meant that each riparian owner was entitled to claim all the water which he could have claimed under the previous water laws. This ensured continued privileged access and rights to water for earlier applicants.

The Act empowered the Minister responsible for water to appoint a Secretary for Water Development and other officers, and delegated to them the authority to manage water resources within the confines of the Act. The administration of the Act was the responsibility of the Water Court, which was empowered to determine applications for the use of water, and dealt with any disputes. Institutionally, the Act put in place a decentralised water management framework through the establishment of River Boards, which were tasked with 'regulating and supervising the operation of rights to the use of public water within an area fixed by the Minister'.<sup>26</sup> The area of jurisdiction of River Boards was based on hydrological boundaries or an area defined as Intensive Conservation Areas. The main functions of River Boards entailed the day-to-day management of water, levying of rates on persons who had rights to use public water, charging fees for services rendered by the board, and administering water rights granted by the Water Court.

In addition, River Boards provided technical advice to commercial farmers on water issues and on the application of water rights (Mtisi and Nicol, 2003). In terms of membership and representation, River Boards were constituted by water right holders, and as such, representation was exclusively drawn from

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<sup>25</sup> Section 32 (1), Water Act No. 41 of 1976.

<sup>26</sup> Section 9 (1), Water Act No.41 of 1976.

water right holders. Consequently, River Boards were composed of representatives from the commercial agriculture sector, town councils, manufacturing and mining industries. Placed within the colonial context, the 1976 Water Act had the attendant effects of denying the majority of Africans legal access to water for productive uses as well as excluding them from participating in the decision making process on water. This was attained mainly through limiting land rights to water rights, whereby rights to water were granted to landowners. Since a majority of Africans did not possess freehold title to land, the provisions of the Act prevented Africans from applying for water rights, essentially denying them a legal right to productive uses of water.

In addition, Africans were also effectively excluded from participating in any decision making on water on River Boards as they did not have land and water rights. The continued exclusion of Africans from River Boards post-Independence from 1980 could be attributed to government's failure to broaden representation on River Boards, since the 1976 Water Act provided the Minister responsible for water to appoint persons interested in water management, such as a representatives of a communal area, to a River Board.<sup>27</sup> Thus River Boards continued to represent commercial interests.

When applying for legal access to water, applicants were asked whether the water was going to be put to 'beneficial use'. At the core of this question lay a prejudice against communal and resettlement farmers because the term 'beneficial use' was interpreted as 'commercial use' (Bolding, 1998; Mohamed-Katerere, 1994). It was thus inconceivable from the Water Court's point of view that communal and resettlement farmers could use water 'beneficially' or rather 'commercially'. Communal and resettlement farmers' use of water was viewed as 'wasteful' (Mohamed-Katerere, 1994; Bolding, 1998). This situation was further compounded by the Stream Bank Regulations Act of 1952, which criminalised traditional wetland cultivation despite the fact that there was no 'scientific' basis for the prohibitions (Bell and Roberts, 1991; Scoones, 1998). In short, the use of the term 'beneficial use' as a synonym for 'commercial use' meant that productive uses of water among communal, resettlement and small-scale farmers were not recognised.

The granting of water rights in perpetuity on the basis of the prior appropriation doctrine and in recognition of previous rights to water was also a major weakness of the 1976 Water Act. This had the effect of limiting or denying water to latter applicants. Van der Zaag (1998) clearly illustrated this point in a study of Nyachowa catchment, where he observed that, a commercial farm, located on the upper end of Nyachowa valley had rights to water and thus drew the full amount stipulated on its water right. Yet, by so doing, the commercial farmer left less water for communal irrigators at the lower end of the valley, with the effect that the Nyachowa communal irrigators faced a *perpetual* and severe water shortage (van der Zaag, 1998:171), even in cases where there was no general water shortage.

One of the principal features of the institutional framework established by the 1976 Water Act was that the allocation authority was vested and centralised in the Water Court. All issues relating to the application of water rights and the adjudication of water disputes fell under the Water Court, which was located in Harare, the capital city. Any water user who wanted to apply for water or to seek redress in a water dispute had to travel to Harare (Manzungu, 1997). This form of centralization militated against poor water users located in remote rural areas of the country as they incurred high transactional costs, in terms of the time and cost of travelling to the Water Court. Thus the 1976 Water Act entrenched great inequalities to water access and the exclusion of communal, resettlement and small-scale farmers in

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<sup>27</sup> Section 70, Water Act No. 41 of 1976.

decision making on water. By 1980 the distribution of irrigation schemes told a story of deep seated inequality, as shown in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1: Distribution of irrigation schemes by sector**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Area Under Irrigation (ha)</b>	<b>As Percent of Total Area Under Irrigation</b>
Large Scale Commercial	98,400	82
State Farms	8,400	7
Out-grower Schemes	2,200	2
Smallholder	11,000	9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120,000</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: 1999 AGRITEX estimates, quoted in (FAO 2000)*

Of the total 120,000 hectares of irrigated land, approximately 82 per cent was on large scale commercial farms and about nine per cent in communal and resettlement areas. Communal smallholder farmers irrigated an estimated 8,461 hectares spread across 80 irrigation schemes. Each smallholder farmer had access to between 0.1 to about 1 hectare of irrigable land. Small-scale commercial and resettlement area farmers under out-grower schemes irrigated about 2 per cent, while 7 per cent was under State-owned irrigation estates, mainly under the management of the then Agricultural Rural Development Authority. By 2003 following the Fast Track Land Reform Programme there were an estimated 198 irrigation schemes in the smallholder (communal plus resettlement) sector.

The inequalities of access to water remained largely unchanged despite the land redistribution during the first 18 years of independence. Although approximately 78 000 families were resettled between 1980 and 1998, most of these families were resettled in areas that had limited water resources as ninety-one percent of the land purchased for resettlement was in areas that had limited water supply for both agriculture and domestic purposes (Herbst, 1990). In short, the continued inequitable access to water undermined productive uses of water for agriculture and livelihood improvement among communal, resettlement and small-scale farmers and irrigators. Persistent inequalities of access to water and land, continued use of the 1976 Water Act, and increasing levels of rural poverty combined to partly form a potent case for water sector reform. This coincided with the emergence, in the 1990s, of the concept of integrated water resources management in global discourses on water management, which emphasises the management of water on the basis of hydrological boundaries, decentralisation of water management, stakeholder participation and representation in water management processes, and the treatment of water as an economic good. How this shaped and defined the principles and objectives of the water reform in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s is the focus of the next section.

#### **4.3. Water sector reform in the 1990s**

The need for water reform emanated from two distinct concerns. One strand was partly rooted in the need to ‘redress colonial injustices in the water sector’ (Matinenga, 1999; Manzungu et al, 1999; Bolding et al, 1998). Continued privileged access to water by especially white large-scale commercial farmers meant that there was an urgent need to reform the water sector, and establish a legal framework that ensured equal access to water for all Zimbabweans. Equitable access to water was viewed as providing a basis for rural people to access water for productive uses which would contribute to the improvement of their livelihoods.


A second strand to water reform was rooted in what can be called policy transfers especially shaped by the global discourse of integrated water resources management (IWRM) which was being actively promoted by the Global Water Partnership in southern Africa. In essence, IWRM sought to 'promote the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximise the resultant economic and social benefits in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems' (GWP 2000:22). Arguments for adopting the concept of IWRM were founded upon an emerging 'water crisis' in Zimbabwe, attributed to the decline in water supply in a context of increased water demand due to population growth, increased urbanization and intensification of agriculture (Nilsson and Hammer, 1998). As such, IWRM was viewed as providing an effective and decentralised institutional framework for the management of competing water uses and interests, especially within a context of perceived 'water crisis'.

In many ways the water reform in Zimbabwe reflects the dominance and subsequent embedment of the concept of integrated water resources management. The water reform shifted fundamental principles and approaches to water management. Firstly, the concept of 'private water' was abolished. Ownership of water was vested in the State. Similarly, prior appropriation doctrine and the associated practice of granting water in perpetuity were removed. Instead, access to water was granted through a water permit issued for a specific time period and subject to renewal. This provided, in principle, a mechanism for equitable allocation of water across a diverse range of water users. More importantly, the issuance of water permit was not tied to land. The aforementioned principles marked a radical departure from the provision of the 1976 Water Act. Underlying the water reform were four key principles namely that:

- The State would own all surface and underground water. Except for primary purposes (i.e., domestic use of water) other uses of water would need approval by the State.
- All people with an interest in the use of water would be involved in making decisions about its use and management.
- Water would be managed by catchment areas as rivers do not match political and administrative boundaries.
- Water would be recognised as an economic good. This was viewed as the best way of achieving efficient and fair use of water, and also encouraging conservation and protection of water resources (WRMS, n.d.; GoZ, 1998).

Within this context, the 1976 Water Act was repealed by two pieces of water legislation, namely the Water Act and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) Act, both promulgated in 1998. The Water Act of 1998 set the parameters of access and use of water and provided for the establishment of Catchment and Sub-catchment areas based on hydrological boundaries. Catchment and sub-catchment areas formed the basis for water management. Seven catchment areas were established in Zimbabwe and are shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Catchments in Zimbabwe



The creation of catchment and sub-catchment areas led to the introduction of Catchment and Sub-catchment Councils, respectively. Broadly, Catchment Councils (CCs) are composed of elected representatives, mainly chairpersons and vice-chairpersons, of Sub-catchment Councils. Catchment Councils also include the Catchment Manager, and any other identified stakeholders.

The key functions of CCs include, preparing catchment outline plans for their respective area, determining applications and granting water permits, regulating and supervising the use of water, and supervising the performance of functions of Sub-catchment Councils (Water Act, 1998). Further, CCs serve as a forum for participation and decision making for water users represented by elected Sub-Catchment Council officials.

Below the CC, there are Sub-catchment Councils, which are constituted by elected representatives from diverse water user groups, which include commercial, communal, small-scale and resettlement farming sectors, local authorities, traditional leaders, and mining and manufacturing sectors. The main functions of a Sub-catchment Council include;

- regulating and supervising the exercise of permits for the use of water within their area of jurisdiction,
- collecting sub-catchment rates, fees and levies,
- reporting as required to the Catchment Council on exercise of water permits in their area, and
- participating in the planning on water.



Sub-catchment Councils also serve as a platform for local level participation in water management.

The Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) Act of 1998, created the (ZINWA), a ‘parastatal’ tasked with the responsibility for providing a coordinated framework for planning, development and management of water resources. Additionally, ZINWA took over the commercial functions associated with water provision which were previously performed by the Department of Water Development. The functions of ZINWA vary depending on the level at which it is operating. At national level, ZINWA advises the Minister responsible for water on formulation of national policies, water pricing, water resource development and management. At catchment level, ZINWA’s role includes, inter alia, ensuring the Catchment Councils discharge their functions in accordance with the Water Act and assisting Catchment councils in planning and coordinating water development and management within a catchment area. Also, ZINWA has exclusive responsibility for selling, supplying and managing ‘agreement water’, that is water in dams which were previously owned by the government.

ZINWA, through the Catchment Manager, has the responsibility to provide technical assistance to the Catchment Council on water issues. According to the Water Act of 1998, the role of the Catchment Manager also includes the day-to-day management and administration of the affairs of the CC. In performing these functions, the Catchment Manager acts on the advice of, and in consultation with, the CC and ZINWA officials at national level.

At sub-catchment level, ZINWA sub-offices provide technical assistance as well as advice to the Sub-catchment Councils in carrying out their duty relating to water resources supply, development and management. Specifically, ZINWA sub-offices are legally mandated to:

- encourage and assist Sub-catchment Councils to discharge their functions in accordance with the Water Act, and
- operate and maintain any water works owned by the Authority and to sell water there-from.

The following section examines how the reform process has affected how water is accessed by the different stakeholders and assesses some of the emerging bottlenecks.

#### *De-linking access to water from the ownership of land*

One of the key aspects of the water reform was to open up access to water to all water users, particularly ‘new’ water users (i.e., communal and resettlement farmers). In the past, water was accessible to commercial interests, namely agriculture, mining and manufacturing industries, and was tied to land. The introduction of water permits and agreement water contracts, which are not legally tied to land, has provided a basis for broad-based access to water. Further, completed water permit application forms and/or a signed agreement water contracts, are submitted to the local sub-catchment council office and ZINWA sub-office respectively. This represents a significant achievement of the water reform as it untied land and water, and devolved the responsibility for water application from the Water Court in Harare to local sub-offices.

However, there are significant costs associated with the application of a water permit, as application forms have to be bought and an application fee to be paid. In addition, completing a water permit application form demands a level of technical knowledge that ‘new’ water users may not possess. For

instance, an applicant must indicate the amount of water in megalitres per second that one intends to abstract. This is rarely common technical knowledge among communal and resettlement farmers.

#### *Multiple institutional routes of access to water*

Institutional access to water depends on the type of water an individual wants to obtain. For surface and ground water, a water user goes to the Sub-catchment Council, while for 'agreement water' an individual goes to the ZINWA sub-office. Although the classification of water and division of institutional roles suggests a neat institutional design the reality is rather complex, revealing contradictory and parallel institutional processes within the water reform.

Recent work<sup>28</sup> suggests that some water users were not aware of the institutions to consult over their water needs. Consequently, water users were finding it 'confusing' to gain access to water as they are referred from one institution to another. This is made worse in cases where there is lack of coordination between ZINWA and the CCs in performing their respective functions. Often ZINWA officials fail to attend Catchment Council Meetings. Underlying the lack of coordination between the two decentralised institutions of water management is the parallel lines of institutional responsibility and accountability in water management, since ZINWA officials report to the Irrigation Officer at catchment level, and are accountable to the Irrigation Office and not the CC. There consequently therefore exists little or no coordination in local level water management.

#### *Recentralisation of water management*

While the water reform was aimed at empowering water users in the decision making process on water through elected catchment council officials, the central role that the Catchment Manager plays undermines the participatory nature of the Catchment Council, since the water legislation vests decision making powers in the Catchment Manager rather than the Catchment Council. It can be argued that the current water legislation provides the legal basis for the disenfranchisement of water users and their elected representatives by placing decision making powers outside the realm of democratic control. Further, due to the powers that a Minister of Water can exercise through the Catchment Manager, and since the Catchment Manager is upwardly accountable to ZINWA head office, it can be argued that the water legislation provides a basis for the recentralisation of power and authority on water management.

#### *Participation: issues and challenges*

The water reform introduced radical changes regarding the participation and representation of water users in the management of and decision making on water. By identifying a broad range of water users as stakeholders in water management, the 1998 Water Act provided a legal basis for the representation and participation of previously excluded water users, namely communal, resettlement and small-scale commercial farmers. The new politics of inclusiveness and participation, at least stated formally, have encouraged local level participation in water management at the Sub-catchment Council level.

Yet, the participation and representation of new water users have been fraught with problems. Participation at sub-catchment level is often weighted against new water users who lack financial resources to travel to attend Sub-catchment Council meetings. Identification and classification of water

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<sup>28</sup> See Mtisi 2008.

user groups from which representatives are elected to the Sub-catchment Council is problematic, in spite of what the Water Act of 1998 provides for. For example, the Act provides for inclusion of ‘communal farmers’ as a separate group of water users, however, they lack expertise, and their contribution is often ignored. Even the local level water committees in communal areas barely function and most are formed around ground water resources that barely get mentioned at Catchment Council meetings.

In cases where communal areas have irrigation schemes, representation at catchment level is organized under the aegis of the Irrigation Management Committees. However, these do not extend beyond the irrigation schemes for which they are established. Therefore, there is no sub-catchment wide organisation of, and for, communal irrigators to provide a basis for electing a representative of communal irrigators to the Sub-catchment Council. In reality ‘representatives’ of the communal irrigation sector who sit on the Sub-catchment Council are elected representatives of their particular schemes and not of the sector as a whole.

Genuine participation in water management can only occur when water users and their representatives are informed and knowledgeable about the water reform. Yet, new water users have little knowledge about the reforms and the legislation that set the parameters for their participation. As such, a lack of knowledge about the water reform makes it difficult for new water users to effectively participate and make informed decisions on water management processes at Sub-catchment level.

#### **4.4. Conclusions and recommendations**

The thrust of this section is not to dispute the merits of Zimbabwe’s water reform in improving access to water to previously disadvantaged water users and providing a decentralised framework for water management and possibilities for positive livelihood outcomes. Rather, it is to point out the contradictions embedded in the current water reform, and then to suggest how the water policy can be improved so that it can better contribute to participatory processes in water management, poverty alleviation and the improvement of rural livelihoods. As such, this section will first draw conclusions on the basis of the evidence presented, and then suggest recommendations emanating from specific findings. Secondly, a broader set of recommendations will be suggested premised upon a broad understanding of the implications of the water reform policy.

Of crucial importance to note in Zimbabwe’s water reform is that, while the water reform was built around neo-liberal principles couched within the concept of integrated water resources management, the implementation coincided with a radical transformation in State governance, partly as a consequence of the implementation of the fast track land reform programme. Such developments from 2000 onwards, provided a challenging context for the water reform, because the transformation of the State and the narratives that informed the fast track land reform, were unsuited to the neo-liberal approaches embedded in the water reform. Consequently, policy recommendations suggested in this section take into account the intrinsic limitations of the underlying principles of the water reform itself, as well as the challenging political and socio-economic context within which the water reform was implemented.

The analysis in the previous sections has shown that the water reform in Zimbabwe was mainly driven by the global IWRM discourse. This was achieved at the expense of local historical grievances of past denial of access to water. Therefore, the proponents of IWRM paid insufficient attention to the historical and political dimensions of water resources in Zimbabwe. Broadly, the historical colonial construction of communal areas (the then ‘native reserves’) and communal irrigation schemes of being in marginal agro-

ecological areas, characterised by limited water resources, poor soils, susceptibility to drought, high population densities and degraded environmental conditions, is what still defines rural areas, and their access to water for productive agriculture.

Within this context, the water reform was implemented and overlaid on top of an underlying maze of inequality of water access and skewed distribution of land to the extent that the reform continued to provide privileged access to water to those who already enjoyed better access to water and land. As such, the water reform provided limited possibilities for increased productive uses of water for people residing in communal and resettlement areas.

Stemming from the above findings, this chapter contends that any attempt to reform the water sector with the view to improve productive uses of water in rural areas, must confront the historical legacy of inequalities of access to land and water. Therefore, we suggest that a future water reform policy, must first seek to adapt the concept of IWRM to the local context, and promote aspects of the concept which articulate local struggles for improved access to, and control of, water resources for livelihood improvement. One way of attaining this is to promote wide-scale participation of all people in the debate about the water reform, its principles and objectives. This will also entail seeking policy suggestions from all stakeholders, particularly the poor, on how water policy can be improved. Such an approach will break the stranglehold that government and donors have on the water policy-making process.

In keeping with the need to adapt IWRM to the Zimbabwean context, this chapter suggests that the water reform must be linked, in innovative ways, to the land reform programme, which is aimed at providing access to productive land to rural people for livelihood improvement. The combined access to productive land and water can be productively used to alleviate poverty and to contribute to economic growth.

However, although access to fertile land is crucial to productive uses of water, resettlement farmers need access to a broad portfolio of other assets central to the productive use of water. These include, among many others, functioning irrigation technology and infrastructure. Evidence from communal irrigators in Lower Save East sub-catchment has shown that a dilapidated irrigation infrastructure and malfunctioning boreholes can result in limited access to water. Water reform policy may need to cover technological problems affecting the smallholder irrigation sector, and new water users more generally. Accordingly, a new water policy should focus on various issues related to irrigation technology, such as the development, provision and maintenance of relevant low-cost irrigation schemes for communal farmers.

One of the key aspects of the water reform has been the creation of parallel institutional processes of water management, which are contradictory to each other. Although ZINWA institutions provide technical assistance and advice to catchment and Sub-catchment Councils, they are under government control and represent a 'deconcentrated' system of water governance. On the other hand, Catchment and Sub-catchment Councils are constituted by elected representatives and represent the democratic aspect of the water management. Yet, analysis in previous sections has shown that ZINWA tends to undermine decision making at catchment level, and the viability of Sub-catchment Councils that rely on agreement water. Further, the separation of technical and participatory aspects of water management, which lie at the heart of the parallel institutional process, has resulted in the compartmentalization of water services, which does not augur well with livelihood improvement goals.

Perhaps one way of resolving the contradictions and parallel processes that are embedded in the water reform is to better integrate the functions of ZINWA catchment officials and Catchment Council

representatives. Rather than the Catchment Manager being wholly accountable to ZINWA national office, it may be better if the institutional structure is reformed in such a way that the Catchment Manager is accountable to Catchment Councils, and, by extension, to the local constituency of water users.

Similarly, officials from ZINWA sub-offices should be held accountable to their local Sub-catchment Council and the water users. This can be achieved by reforming the water legislation which provides the basis for the establishment of two parallel institutional processes. In addition, the legislative reform during the post-crisis recovery period should empower Catchment and Sub-catchment Councils in decision making on water, and thus repeal the current provisions of the Water Act and ZINWA Act which systematically reduce the democratic content of local level water management.

Fostering greater cooperation and coordination among ministries responsible for land, water and agriculture may result in coherence in policy processes aimed at reforming the three sectors for positive livelihood outcomes. This may provide a basis for institutional linkages between institutions representing 'new farmers' with those of local level water governance (i.e., ZINWA, Catchment and Sub-catchment Councils), and, to a certain extent, land governance at local level. For water reform policy, local level institutions of water management must be dynamic and flexible enough to engage and incorporate these 'new' institutions representing 'new farmers' but also robust enough to ensure that there is effective communication and debate on water issues.

With regards to the water user pays principle, the findings in this chapter have indicated that classification of agreement and raw water, and associated responsibilities for the collection of water fees, has led to contestation between ZINWA sub-office and the Sub-catchment Council in Lower Save East sub-catchment, which has adversely affected the Sub-catchment Council. Although there are merits in the distinguishing between raw and agreement water fees, this study suggests that, in sub-catchment areas which predominantly have agreement water, the water legislation should provide for such Sub-catchment Councils to obtain a certain percentage of the agreement fees so that they will be able to fund their administrative and participatory functions.

Given that the treatment of water as an economic good was partly aimed at raising revenue for water development, this chapter suggests that water reform should seek ways of using locally-generated revenue for specific water development programmes or to resolve local problems to water access. As currently conceived, water charges appear as government-driven 'water taxes' extracted from local water users for government funds. This remains the case despite the existence of the Water Fund and Public Sector Investment Programme, which, in principle, were aimed at functioning local water development programmes. Future water reform policy should provide greater local control of water charges by Catchment and Sub-catchment Councils for local level water development. Revenue raised could also be used in funding water development projects and repair and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure within communal irrigation schemes.

However, the chapter acknowledges that local control of revenue can only exist in sub-catchment areas with significant water development and a significant number of water users actively using water for irrigation. In sub-catchment areas where there is little water development, government and other actors (e.g., private sector, NGOs and other development agencies) should fund water development since there might be inadequate local revenue to fund such activities, and the functioning of decentralised institutions of water management.

Broadly, there is need for sequencing and prioritizing policy issues within the water sector. The current IWRM-based water reform seems to place more emphasis on water management, at the expense of water development. Therefore, a future water policy in Zimbabwe must prioritise water and irrigation development in communal, small-scale commercial, and resettlement areas – both new and old schemes. Such water and irrigation development can be conducted by private, public and non-governmental organizations.

Moreover, the development of, and improved access to, markets for irrigated produce should lie at the core of a reformed water policy. Although this falls outside the scope of this paper, markets play a crucial role in poverty alleviation and rural livelihood improvement. Given the long history of limited engagement with markets among communal, small-scale commercial and resettlement farmers, and the related differentiation of access to markets among new water users, there may be need for the government, private sector and non-governmental organisations to actively intervene and promote the engagement of new water users with markets, in ways that encourage genuine pro-poor market approaches to socio-economic development.

In sum, it is apparent that there were challenges and opportunities in Zimbabwe's water reform, some embedded within the IWRM concept, while others were linked to the post 2000 economic and political developments. The Water Act of 1998 and its provisions need to be reviewed to adapt to the situation created by land reform. The Sub-Catchments and Catchment Councils do not have sufficient capacity at present to implement technical aspects and still require input from ZINWA. By identifying such distinct challenges, it is hoped that the analysis in this chapter contributes to an understanding of the opportunities and challenges for continued improvement of the water reform policy.

## **CHAPTER 5: Environment and Development**

### **5.1. Environment and development issues in Zimbabwe, since 2000 and beyond**

The current state of Zimbabwe's environment is not known as the last State of the Environment Report was published in 1998. The first State of the Environment Report was produced in 1992. Zimbabwe started preparations for its third State of the Environment Report for 1998 to 2004 by contracting teams of consultants who produced draft chapters in 2005. However, these were later revised, and the current 'Zimbabwe Environment Outlook: Our Environment, Everybody's Responsibility' Report covering the years from 1998 to 2007 has been finalised and is about to be published. What is known, however, is that by 2000 Zimbabwe had made commendable progress in resolving some of the major tensions between the need for developing the country and that of caring for the environment. In 1980 the country had inherited environmental policies that gave privileged access to natural resources to certain groups and sectors while penalising others. Rural communities in communal lands were criminalised for consumptive utilisation of certain natural goods by a State that sought to protect the environment from people rather than promoting sustainable use. Most of the interventions to protect the environment targeted livelihood pursuits, especially farming, mining, forestry and wildlife within communal lands.

Since the interventions were seen as interfering with how people already living in marginal environments made a living, they were often resented even though they were meant to benefit the inhabitants of communal areas.<sup>29</sup> Some of the legislation was so restrictive that if the State had attempted to enforce some elements, most of the people in communal areas would have fallen foul of the law.<sup>30</sup> The cost of looking after the environment in this way was clearly unsustainable and up to a point the approach did not meet the development aspirations of those who lived with nature, nor the environmental protection desired by all. After some initial continuity with these policies, the post-colonial State sought to shift its approach to the way it dealt with environment issues in the mid 1980s. The first coherent response came in the form of a Natural Resources Strategy Paper supported by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as part of multi-country initiatives in the region. Although never formally presented to Parliament it gave a reference point to all on matters to do with natural resources and laid the foundation for further initiatives. Key among these are the emergence of community conservation in the late 1980s, and production of Zimbabwe's take on Sustainable Development presented to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. It was Zimbabwe's response to the UNCED conference that perhaps produced the first coherent response to environmental challenges. In the following sections we look at environment and development issues with a focus on how the economic crisis affected the progress that had been made in some of the local initiatives. We also then consider institutional policy and institutional changes and some of the ways to restore the balance that had begun to be realised before the year 2000.

### **5.2. Zimbabwe's environmental policy and institutional framework**

Zimbabwe has in place enabling policies and legislation to support sustainable development. In 2003-4, the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, in collaboration with the Institute of Environmental Studies, began developing an Environmental Policy through wide stakeholder participation and consultations at all

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<sup>29</sup> For example the 'contour ridges' introduced as a way to address soil erosion

<sup>30</sup> For example the Forest Produce Act and the Wildlife Act

levels, including at community-level, and also with different sectors and interest groups such as industry and resettled war veterans. The Environmental Policy, which was launched in 2009, outlines the agreed broader intentions and aspirations on the environment. The policy is comprehensive, covering: maintaining environmental integrity; social and economic issues; environmental management; organisational responsibilities and institutional arrangements; and financing mechanisms. The vision of the policy is to alleviate poverty and improve the quality of life of the people of Zimbabwe and acknowledges the importance of the need to ensure the sustainability of the benefits arising from the use of the environment.

There were also other areas of progress especially with respect to Environmental Impact Assessment Policy and harmonisation of Environmental Laws. For example, one of the major outcomes of the UNCED-inspired law reform programme in the 1990s in Zimbabwe was the enactment of the Environmental Management Act (Chapter 20:27) in 2002. The purpose of the Act is to provide for the sustainable management of natural resources and protection of the environment and the prevention of pollution and environmental degradation. The Environmental Management Act consolidates fragmented environmental policies and issues under one piece of legislation and institution, and provides guiding principles for the management of the environment. These principles embraced most aspects of sustainable development including: responsibility to protect the environment for the benefit of present and future generations; an integrated approach to the management of the environment; recognition of the importance of placing people and their needs first; promotion of the participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental governance; and that development must be socially, environmentally and economically sustainable. The Environmental Management Act is generally regarded to be a sound, powerful and progressive piece of legislation. However, implementation has been weak due to lack of financial and human resources.

Although a policy since the 1990s the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) became a legal requirement under the Environmental Management Act. Clause 97 of the Act states that no person shall carry out any project which affects the environment without first having submitted an environmental impact assessment prospectus and carrying out a full EIA if required. Under the Act, periodic environmental audits of these projects are to be carried out to ensure compliance. Furthermore, Clause 96 of the Act requires that environmental management plans be developed and submitted by ‘...any government agency, person or class of persons that exercises functions, or engages in operations, which may affect the environment or which involve the management of the environment’. Interestingly, the opening up of agricultural land and agricultural activities are not included in the schedule of projects requiring EIAs, although they did appear in earlier drafts of the Environmental Management Bill. Although the requirement for EIAs is progressive and sound, implementation has been perceived to be weak, inadequate and ineffective, particularly during the economic crisis due to lack of resources which constrained monitoring and enforcement of the legislation.

Under Statutory Instrument SI007 of 2007: EIA and Ecosystems Protection EIA consultants are required to have knowledge of the environment, but the level of this knowledge is not specified. There is need for standardisation of approved EIA companies that are recognised by the Agency so as to maintain quality and professionalism. There is need to define the role of developers who commission EIAs, consultants who carry out the EIAs and produce reports, and officers who are responsible for reviewing, approving and monitoring, so as to avoid any conflict of interest.



More education and awareness on the concept of environmental management and protection is needed by all stakeholders, so that compliance is viewed as a positive contribution, not only to enhance environmental quality but also that greener production can result in higher profits and better social conditions. The achievement by companies of the 'triple bottom line', namely economic, social and environmental sustainability should be promoted, where the Environmental Management Agency is regarded as a partner in economic development rather than a watchdog. There is an international shift away from depending on EIAs as an environmental management tool towards a more strategic approach which incorporates larger scales and cumulative effects, rather than the focus on individual projects.

#### *Environmental management institutions*

The Ministry of Environment and Tourism is the lead ministry for the development and implementation of environmental policy, and mandated to coordinate all other ministries and agencies on environmental matters. The policy-making and coordinating unit for the Ministry is relatively small, usually under-staffed with a myriad of environmental issues to deal with, including international obligations. Generally national level policy makers are often too busy to reflect and learn from experiences on the ground. The mandate for the Ministry of Environment and Tourism is executed via its departments and parastatals, namely the Environmental Management Agency, the Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, the Forestry Commission, and the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority. Although the Ministry of Environment and Tourism has a coordination role regarding environmental issues, in practice, there is still need for more collaboration between sectors.

The Department of Natural Resources was transformed into the Environmental Management Agency in January 2007, five years after the passing of the Environmental Management Act under which the transformation was directed. The Environmental Management Agency has offices at provincial and district levels, but representation by one or two officers in each district is deemed inadequate. Furthermore, in most districts the Agency does not have vehicles and the situation has further deteriorated due to unavailability of fuel and spare parts. Being launched in the middle of an economic crisis meant that the Agency has not yet been able to achieve its potential as an independent, self-financing, professional, dynamic environmental management and protection agency. Salaries and other incentives are low, resulting in the Agency losing some experienced qualified staff, creating not only a vacuum, but loss of institutional memory.

At the district level, environmental management is the responsibility of the district councils, through their District Development Committees comprised of elected leaders and technical officers from line ministries. The district councils are empowered to make by-laws, including environmental regulations. Revamping existing by-laws and developing new ones in conjunction with local communities could provide a useful tool for enhancing environmental management in the future. At local level the village assembly or its headman are empowered by the Traditional Leaders Act of 1999 to be responsible for the management of local resources and their use. Headmen are charged with the enforcement of all environmental planning and conservation by-laws on behalf of the chief, the district councils and the State.

#### *Local environment and development non-governmental organisations*

Zimbabwe has a number of environment and development programmes being spearheaded by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Environment Africa, Southern Alliance for Indigenous

Resources (SAFIRE), Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) Association, Africa 2000, Zambezi Society and Wildlife and Environment Society that continue to be active despite the economic crisis and its accompanying challenges. These NGOs work mainly at local level and have adapted their operations to suit local conditions, and often, environmental components are off-shoots of poverty reduction and livelihoods programmes. As one environmental NGO director put it, 'We concentrate on food and livelihoods first and then environment comes later as a spin-off of our work'. Environmental NGOs partner with district councils and government environmental agencies, such as the Forestry Commission, Agricultural Research and Extension Services (AREX), the Environmental Management Agency and Parks and Wildlife Management Authority. Environmental NGOs have a variety of community programmes, including recycling of waste, tree nurseries, natural product enterprises, herb and nutrition gardens as well as training, and capacity building. Some local environmental NGOs partner with schools and colleges spearheading environmental awareness and education. For example, as part of their holistic approach to sustainable development, Environment Africa have initiated and supported the Policy and Environmental Management for Schools programme for more than ten years. In the following section we consider how Zimbabwe has engaged with the international environment agenda before looking at the local initiatives.

### **5.3. International sustainable development initiatives**

Zimbabwe participates in the international sustainable development arena and has espoused a number of internationally-inspired initiatives which come with funding and support. These include the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention to Combat Desertification, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, and the Stockholm Convention that aims to phase out or severely restrict the use of and trade in persistent organic pollutants (POPs). Zimbabwe has domesticated the provisions of these multilateral environmental agreements in its legislation. Often these programmes are parallel processes, with different funders and conditionalities. The national focal points for these multi-lateral environmental agreements, namely the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, and the Environmental Management Agency in the case of the Convention to Combat Desertification, are tasked with the harmonisation of these international initiatives so as to avoid duplication and to maximise benefits for nationally identified priorities.

In recognition of Zimbabwe's leadership in the sustainable use and management of natural resources, Zimbabwe's Minister of Environment and Tourism was elected to chair the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development in 2007. This Commission was established in 1992 to promote sustainable development, review implementation of various environmental agreements, and provide policy guidance to local, national, regional, and international levels.

#### *The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)*

Zimbabwe's Ministry of Environment and Tourism prepared a Report to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), or Rio Plus 10, held in Johannesburg, 2002, detailing Zimbabwe's progress since the UNCED Rio Earth Summit of 1992, in which the country had participated. The WSSD Project ran for four years, 2002 to 2006, with UNDP funding. After WSSD, through extensive consultation, a national response to the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation was prepared. Multi-sectoral stakeholders at national, provincial and district levels prioritised key issues and challenges for sustainable development. The culmination of this consultation process was the formulation of the

‘Zimbabwe National Sustainable Development Strategies’ published in 2004, which pays particular attention to integrated land management as the key to addressing poverty in Zimbabwe (Mutepfa and Marongwe, 2005). Copies of the Strategies document have been distributed to all provinces, but due to lack of funds, the strategies have not yet been mainstreamed into the routine activities of the different implementing agencies. At a policy level, the WSSD strategies have been overtaken by newer sustainable development initiatives, such as the Millennium Development Goals and the Environment and Energy Programme which is being implemented with funding from UNDP. The various components of this programme include water pricing, renewable energy and water and land issues.

#### *Millennium development goals*

Zimbabwe has also adopted the MDGs as a planning framework for a strategy to achieve sustainable development. The initiative is being spearheaded by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. National time-bound targets and indicators for the eight goals were set through a consultative process. Zimbabwe has chosen three of the MDGs as the national priority goals which underlie the achievement of the MDGs in Zimbabwe, namely: Goal One: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger; Goal Three: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women; and Goal Six: Combat HIV and AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases. Zimbabwe’s main concerns under MDG One include the need to consolidate land reform into agrarian reform that embraces issues of productive resources, provision of inputs, market access and infrastructure. However, little progress has been made on Goal One in reducing poverty in Zimbabwe. On Millennium MDG Seven: Ensuring Environmental Sustainability, again not much progress has been made due to the lack of capacity to gather data and limited statistical tracking of environmental data due to weak technical and financial resources (Mutepfa and Marongwe, 2005). However, regarding access to improved water source and sanitation, according to the World Development Indicators database, by 2004 Zimbabwe had recorded an increase in both areas to 81 per cent and 53 per cent respectively of the population.

#### *Trans-boundary natural resource management*

Trans-boundary natural resource management is a process of cooperation across national boundaries that aims to enhance the management of shared or adjacent natural resources to the benefit of all parties in the area. Generally, local people have been left out of the planning processes. There has been a substantial channelling of funds into trans-boundary natural resource management initiatives in the southern African region by a variety of donors, notably the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the German Development Bank.

Currently, Zimbabwe is pursuing six TFCA initiatives with its neighbours (Table 5.1). These are at various stages of development.

**Table 5.1: Trans-frontier conservation areas in Zimbabwe**

<b>Trans-frontier Conservation Area (TFCA)</b>	<b>Countries included</b>	<b>Former name of the trans-boundary initiative</b>
Chimanimani	Zimbabwe and Mozambique	
Kavango Zambezi	Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia, and Botswana	Four Corners TFCA
Greater Mapungubwe	Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana	Limpopo/Shashe TFCA
Mana/Lower Zambezi	Zimbabwe and Zambia	
The Great Limpopo Trans-Frontier Park	Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Mozambique	Gonarezhou/Kruger/Gaza TFCA (GKG)
ZIMOZA	Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia)	

Whereas there may be positive environmental gains from these trans-boundary developments, there are many unresolved issues of sovereignty and national security, immigration and customs controls, veterinary concerns, land tenure, and whether participation by local people will really be equitable and beneficial in the long term. The trans-boundary nature of these initiatives provides a regional rather than national focus and thus with the onset of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, allowed donors to channel money into the region that they were politically unable or unwilling to give to Zimbabwe alone (Wolmer, 2003). Nevertheless, overall, Zimbabwe's continuing political isolation has disadvantaged its access to international funding for developments in the Zimbabwean region of the trans-frontier parks. In the case of the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park, to which Zimbabwe is signatory, which covers Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, Kruger in South Africa and Limpopo, Zinave and Banhine Parks in Mozambique, this isolation has tended to sideline Zimbabwe's participation and potential benefits from trans-boundary initiatives while Mozambique and South Africa appear to be pursuing a more bi-lateral agenda. Kruger National Park, which was rapidly approaching saturation, is seen as being in a better position to benefit economically, at the expense of its partners. South Africa, along with international donors are perceived to be the main drivers of the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park (Wolmer, 2003).

#### **5.4. Local sustainable development initiatives**

Irrespective of the long and close engagement at policy level, local-level natural resource managers have yet to reap significant and long-lasting benefits from the various international environmental initiatives. On the other hand, locally-inspired environment and development programmes have proved to be more effective. For example, institutions created through CAMPFIRE, considered one of the pioneer initiatives in the devolution process, remain resilient even amid current challenges.

*Communal areas management program for indigenous resources (CAMPFIRE)*

Over the years, Zimbabwe has been a leader in devolution of authority over wildlife and other natural resources which have increased economic opportunities for the rural poor. CAMPFIRE, implemented in Zimbabwe since the late 1980s, is an innovative community-based rural development and conservation programme which has resulted in sustainable use of natural resources and biodiversity conservation and has also contributed to poverty alleviation for marginalised rural people. The primary methodology used in CAMPFIRE is through promoting local community proprietorship and management of natural resources on communal land as an environmentally sustainable development strategy. However, this philosophy is not always appreciated by local people who live in CAMPFIRE areas as they view CAMPFIRE as 'merely another means of enforcing unpopular natural resources conservation legislation (Wolmer et al., 2003:5).

In the 1990s, CAMPFIRE experienced growth and progress. However, since 2003, CAMPFIRE has been characterised by a cessation of major funding from the principal funder, USAID, and the termination of most NGO and donor support, which coincided with adverse macro economic conditions after 2000. Generally, small-scale, communally managed ecotourism projects dependent on a strong foreign clientele have folded up, whilst safari hunting involving elephant, buffalo, lion, and leopard, has not, although operations with only plains game are currently unsuccessful. Off-takes for each species are calculated scientifically and quotas set through a consultative process with the relevant stakeholders. Different property holders or concessions submit returns and estimates of wildlife populations in their properties. In communal areas village communities also carry out surveys on a monthly basis to estimate wild animal populations. The Parks and Wildlife Management Authority uses these estimates together with those from aerial counts to come up with the basis to set hunting quotas for each individual concession in the country. Quotas for protected species such as elephant, cheetah, leopard and crocodile are set and granted by CITES every year.

CAMPFIRE has not yet been mainstreamed as a development approach. It has also failed to broaden its narrow focus on large mammals to incorporate successfully other resources such as forests and minerals. Non-wildlife resources generally do not have a high market value, particularly non-timber forest products such as thatch grass, invertebrates (particularly Mopane worms or *macimbi*), timber, bark, fruits and fish. On the other hand, minerals are of higher value and have the potential to provide significant economic benefits to local communities, where they occur. However these have not yet been successfully exploited under the CAMPFIRE model.

Despite these problems and setbacks, CAMPFIRE has proved to be resilient and continues to be a significant player in environment and development issues in Zimbabwe, as shown by the revenues accruing from CAMPFIRE projects in **Error! Reference source not found.**<sup>2</sup> The majority of the revenue is from wildlife and hunting ventures.

**Table 5.2: CAMPFIRE income from all sources**

<b>Year</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
<b>Revenue</b> (000s US\$)	1,800	2,750	2,100	2,400	4,600	2,750	1,450	750	2,600

*adapted from Jonga 2008*

Those CAMPFIRE programmes that did not collapse with the withdrawal of external funding, primarily those with hunting operations, have flourished as new methods of benefit sharing have been developed, such as revolving funds and direct payment systems. Some current CAMPFIRE initiatives are the safari hunting model in Mahenye and Mutandahwe wards, Chipinge; joint ventures in crocodile farming in Chiredzi, Mbire and Nyaminyami districts; and the Gairezi Community Tourism project in Nyanga, which generated nearly US\$7,000 in 2006. CAMPFIRE is still contributing to combating poverty in some areas through: incomes and job creation; empowerment; assets, security and future options; and diversification of livelihood activities.

The administration of CAMPFIRE income is done in accordance with Parks and Wildlife Management Authority guidelines. Initially CAMPFIRE income was allocated in the ratio 80:20 to producer communities and Rural District Councils respectively. Payment was to be made to the respective Rural District Council which would then disburse it to producer communities. However as CAMPFIRE is an adaptive management system the payment is now made directly to producer communities with the Rural District Councils taking a monitoring and advisory role as to the use of the income by communities. In this arrangement Rural District Councils are accountable to the government via the Parks and Wildlife Management Authority. Under the direct payment arrangement, safari operators retain 50 per cent of the hunting proceeds and the other 50 per cent is shared between the CAMPFIRE Association (2 per cent), the Rural District Council (23 per cent) and the community (25 per cent). However the direct payment system is still at the formative stage and therefore not binding. Nevertheless, the introduction of the direct payment system has seen a dramatic increase in revenue earnings through direct payments to at least one community, Masoka Ward in Guruve District of the Zambezi valley (Murphree and Taylor, 2008). Revenues paid to Masoka had dropped from over US\$100,000 in 2000 to less than US\$25,000 in 2005. Then, influenced by the direct payment system, revenues shot up to over US\$130,000 in 2006 (Murphree and Taylor, 2008).

Up to 2000, Mahenye CAMPFIRE project in Chipinge District was frequently cited as a successful model, both from its stable and participatory governing institutions and its diversification of revenue sources. However, research by Balint (2006) found that by 2004 the project performance had deteriorated sharply from previously reported conditions. Villagers were receiving annual income from the project of less than US\$1, community infrastructure improvements had stalled and leadership institutions were no longer accountable. Community confidence in the project was low and residents were bitter and disillusioned. This situation was attributed to the cessation of major international funding and the ongoing economic crisis since 2000 (Balint, 2006). Further research by Rihoy et al (2007) found a different story where the local traditional leadership now monopolised CAMPFIRE benefits sidelining the rural district council. Rihoy et al (2007) also found that despite the problems within Mahenye, CAMPFIRE had a positive impact in terms of empowering local residents, providing them with incentives, knowledge and organisational abilities to identify and address problems and identify when external interventions are required. Rihoy et al (2007) concluded that community based natural resource management is a process of applied and incremental experiments in democracy, which is of particular

value because of the interaction of tiers of governance over time in an adaptive process. More recent investigations indicate that governance issues in Mahenye have improved and benefits to the community have increased. The Mahenye story illustrates the dynamic and multivariable nature of local sustainable development initiatives.

#### *Natural products enterprises*

Community-based natural product enterprises are commercial ventures which seek to supply markets with value-added natural products in order to bring greater benefits to communities that manage and use natural resources. The Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources (SAFIRE), an NGO, develops businesses that use natural resources, mainly from plants, the rationale being that these plants will be conserved since they are essential to income generation. These community-based enterprises include a wide range of products, such as honey, oils, tea and pulp. Trade in natural products has shown the potential to be more profitable than agriculture in southern Africa, and Zimbabwe in particular (see **Error! Reference source not found.**3). In ten southern African countries, current trade in baobab products is over US\$11 million a year, while potential trade has been projected at over US\$961 million a year (Bennett, 2006).

**Table 5.3: Potential natural products trade compared with agriculture exports from Zimbabwe (US\$)**

Tobacco Exports (2004)	Meat (frozen, and fresh) Exports (2004)	Total Agricultural Exports (2004)	Current Trade in Natural Products	Potential Trade in Natural Products
438,915,000	106,000	845,783,000	2,824,492	1,061,412,403

*(Adapted from Bennett, 2006)*


#### **5.4. Environmental issues in Zimbabwe**

The deterioration of the economy drove most Zimbabweans to rely more on nature and natural goods than ever before. We know globally that poverty normally drives those that can access nature to 'mine' resources with little regards to what may prove to be a non-existent future. The decline in visibility of State institutions also creates spaces for other private interests to take advantage and seek to exploit natural products for individual gain. Environmental management efforts were affected in several ways. Firstly, we know that staff attrition made environmental regulation ineffective due to a decrease in enforcement capacity (forest encroachment and gold panning seem to be two clear examples of this failure). Thus the good environmental policies were weakly implemented on the ground.

Secondly, the rural restructuring occurring as a result of fast track land reform presented new opportunities to utilise natural resources products in ways that had not been possible before when the farms were considered private property. Deforestation has significantly risen due to clearing of often virgin land for agricultural purposes as well as increased demand for fuel wood as paraffin and electricity become less available. While the exact figure for the rate of deforestation in Zimbabwe is unknown, estimates suggest that deforestation ranges between 100,000 and 320,000 hectares per year (GOZ, 2004).

Perhaps the most alarming evidence of the failure to address environmental problems is illustrated by the current level of illegal gold panning and small scale mining which is widespread throughout most river systems in the country (see map in Figure 1.1). Gold panning mushroomed since 2000 and involves an estimated one million people who operate along more than 5,000 km of Zimbabwe's rivers. Panning is carried out unsustainably and unsystematically usually in river beds, banks and flood plains with no concern for the environment. Trees are cut down haphazardly, pits several metres deep are dug and alluvial soil is removed resulting in erosion and siltation as the soil and rocks are washed into streams. Chemicals such as mercury and cyanide are used, which are harmful to human health and pollute the environment. In mid-2007 the Government of Zimbabwe initiated the nation-wide Operation *Chikorokoza Chapera* (stop gold panning), spearheaded by the Zimbabwe Republic Police, to address the menace of uncontrolled gold panning. The operation was short-lived and generally deemed ineffective as in many instances panners were tipped off before police raids.

Figure 5.1: Small scale and artisanal gold mining (panning) in Zimbabwe



(adapted from Shoko and Love, 2003)



In general, we can say that, as a result of the economic crisis, local resource management was now driven by:

- A failure of agricultural productivity (due to the lack of inputs, especially fertiliser) so that extensive staple cereal farming is scarcely viable. This drove people towards environmental goods, especially those available freely.
- The search for other natural resources-based livelihoods: gold panning, wildlife (hunting) tourism, timber extraction (encroachment on commercial plantations), and processing of baobab products are all identified as remunerative.
- Reliance on ‘mining’ environmental goods upon access to markets where payment is in foreign exchange.

Since 2000, irrespective of the official policies and rhetoric about environmental management, implementation has been fraught with challenges. This has created a ‘free-for-all’ open access situation that is being driven by the socio-economic crisis and poverty and is causing massive environmental degradation.

### **5.5. Toward poverty focused environment and development**

Despite the situation described above there are important opportunities for rectifying the situation in future with an improved enabling environment characterised by good governance and accountability. Zimbabwe has rich natural resources, particularly minerals, land and biodiversity, which, if managed wisely by adding value and developing good market linkages, could significantly contribute towards sustainable development. A sound policy framework exists, together with structures that can be easily revived. Experience has shown that to be effective, action needs to be concentrated at local level, empowering district councils, district-level government agencies, local NGOs and community-based organisations. These local institutions need support, training and capacity building to make them competent and effective in implementing policies and legislation, and to be accountable downwards as well as upwards. A people-centred, participatory approach is required that marries local knowledge with professional science. An integrated, multi-sector holistic approach to the environment that recognises the linkages between environment and all aspects of development could be facilitated by the formation of a sustainability framework with a few basic principles for Zimbabwe, recognised at the highest level and implemented by all on the ground, coupled with increased environmental awareness and education. While not all proposed recovery programmes include environmental sustainability, the UNDP (2008) discussion document on Zimbabwe’s economic recovery emphasises sustainability and includes under strategic objective three the need to reduce poverty and improve environmental management. Below, we look in more detail at some of the potential opportunities for increasing economic opportunities for people through better natural resource management.

#### *Promotion of community based natural product enterprises*

Local-level management of resources remains an important option for creating opportunities for people to manage and benefit from wildlife and other natural resources. During its evolution, the CAMPFIRE model has proved to be versatile and robust, and has encouraged local entrepreneurship as well as partnership with the private sector. Greater emphasis placed on private sector-community partnerships below the level of the rural district council can improve expertise to run viable community based

enterprises, strengthen financial resources and provide marketing capacity. In recent years the development of natural resource-based enterprises that are part of the local and global economy have been recognised as providing significant economic incentives and creating opportunities for local communities to be more involved in natural resources management. This has seen the development of a wide range of community-based enterprises ranging from establishment of simple producer groups to sophisticated joint ventures and partnerships.

Key factors for the success in the community-based enterprise model include the availability, quality and quantity of the resource, availability of markets and tangible benefits to the community. Product research and development is needed together with creating incentives to invest in the products. Market linkages are crucial and must be maintained. Communities should understand the market context and be able to raise awareness within the market of a new product.

The utility of natural capital in securing rural livelihoods comes into sharper focus when viewed against the background of fragile agricultural systems and frequent crop failures that characterise the communal lands of southern Africa (Gondo and Mugweni, 2007). Most of its rural population still live in areas of marginal agricultural potential. Under these conditions, and in the context of livelihood diversification, commercialising natural resources can have poverty reduction outcomes.

#### *Sustainable gold panning*

The present situation regarding gold panning is out of control. Conventional methods of control such as imposing fines and clamp-down operations and raids have little impact and are not a deterrent as they provide short-term temporary solutions to the problem. The challenge is how this valuable natural resource can be mainstreamed into the economy without causing environmental degradation so that gold panning and small-scale mining can contribute towards sustainable development. The legal framework exists in Statutory Instrument 275/1991 of the Mines and Mineral Act, which allows for panning under certain conditions, and under the Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Management Plans requirements of the Environmental Management Act which provide for environmental sustainability frameworks for economic activities.

A number of models and pilot schemes using more sustainable panning techniques already exist (see Shoko and Love, 2003). An organised set up would be required with an integrated approach which mainstreams the panning activities incorporating them into formal, legal, administrative and economic structures, managed at district and ward levels. If control is devolved to the local level, management of small scale mining and panning would be more effective, resulting in reduced environmental degradation and better rehabilitation. Furthermore, this would ensure that local communities benefit from the proceeds of alluvial gold panning. The CAMPFIRE programme has shown that natural resources are better conserved when they are controlled and managed by local communities. The advantages of such an approach to alluvial gold resources would be that: communities could benefit directly from their natural resources providing an incentive to conserve those resources; communities would monitor and police themselves, thereby reducing the costs of policing and making it more effective; rehabilitation would be ensured; and control over selling gold would be more effective.

An Action Plan, 'Integrated Management of Small Scale and Artisanal Mining of Gold for Sustainable Economic, Social and Environmental Development' was developed by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism through consultation with relevant stakeholders, including Ministries of Mines, Local

Government, and Finance, and CAMPFIRE Association. The Action Plan was presented to the Cabinet Economic Action Committee where it was approved in principle in 2003 and remains a sound and acceptable plan that, if implemented, could provide the basis of a future scenario for a lucrative sustainable development initiative. Recognising its importance, the Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Zimbabwe, has included sustainable mining as one of its strategic choices for addressing national environmental concerns 2008-2012 (Institute for Environmental Studies, 2008).

#### *Land reform for sustainable development*

Land reform is a long-term process that aims to enhance agricultural production and has potential to reduce poverty (Cliffe, 1988; DfID, 1999). There are opportunities for land distribution to benefit poor rural households, especially if they are given better quality land than they have at present and have the necessary inputs and support. However, to be successful land reform programmes should incorporate environmental sustainability together with social and economic viability. Environmental considerations of land reform are generally inadequately conceptualised, despite being a central consideration of sustainable land use (Manjengwa, 2006). In Zimbabwe, the emphasis is on redistribution with little reference to formal rights as tenure reforms are not high priority in the land reform process.

Both the pattern and process of environmental change through land reform tend to be complex rather than simple, linear or uni-directional. The nature and scale of environmental degradation as well as conservation measures adopted will be diverse and dynamic. While there is need in the long term for the re-establishment of official systems of data collection and monitoring of social, economic and environmental changes, in the short term there is need for a small sample of high quality rapid appraisal exercises, using tools such as aerial photographs, mini-surveys, key informant interviews and focus group discussions, in a small number of representative areas to corroborate anecdotal evidence and to guide priority actions. Work already done can be updated, such as Matondi's (2005) five-volume comprehensive study of the impacts of accelerated land reform in Mazowe District.

Concerning lucrative forest resources, the timber producers who had high stakes in plantations, realised their dilemma regarding the land reform programme and the need for resettlement and subsequently made several representations to government. A multi-stakeholder technical committee developed a policy paper entitled 'Proposals for the Land Reform Programme and Indigenisation of the Forestry Industry by Forestry Companies'. The proposals included guiding principles for land reform in forests, compensation mechanisms, generic land reform options and details of the timber industry's contribution to land reform, mainly offers of forestland, for resettlement. The Forest-based Land Reform Policy has been finalised (but not yet passed by Cabinet), and provides a viable scenario for future sustainable plantation management. Similarly, the Wildlife-Based Land Reform Policy provides potential options for conservancies and resettled farms with game. Some conservancies were invaded during the Fast Track and their operations affected by poaching and some changes in land use from game to agriculture.

#### **5.6. Funding opportunities**

With the current preoccupation by the international community with climate change, there will be a number of funding and other opportunities for support available. International finance is already available for promoting sustainable development, cleaner technology and the reduction of carbon emissions. The global concept of the Green Economy and the transition to a low carbon economy and renewable energy sources present opportunities for economic growth. The challenge for developing countries, such as

Zimbabwe, is to position themselves in order to take advantage of the new economic interaction and international capital flows such as the World Bank Clean Technology Fund and the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. Zimbabwe ratified the Kyoto Protocol in April 2009 and is eligible for funding.

A further challenge will be that of translating future international funding into locally-owned, long-term, sustainable initiatives on the ground that produce real benefits to both people and the environment. Recipient governments are inclined to accept concepts with associated funding without questions. Therefore, when adopting internationally-inspired sustainable development initiatives it is necessary to scrutinise them in order to determine whether the concepts are appropriate, necessary, relevant, affordable and sound for each situation or whether they incur unnecessary and expensive conditionalities which developing countries, such as Zimbabwe, can ill afford. Furthermore, it is important to identify whose agenda the initiatives are satisfying and to ensure that they reflect and are compatible with the wider socio-economic situation, and fit into national legal and institutional frameworks.

In future international support would be more effective if it were channelled to domestic action implemented by local actors who have experience of what works and what does not, as well as having structures established at various levels. A number of local environment and development NGOs and community-based organisations proved resilient in maintaining a presence on the ground despite serious challenges of the economic crisis. Some local NGO personnel expressed fears of being sidelined by an influx of foreign NGOs when the situation improves. These fears may be understandable as Todd and Patrick (2006) in their paper on applying post-conflict recovery lessons to Zimbabwe refer to the World Bank and other donors 'springing into action' once transition occurs. Although the authors acknowledge that the main impetus for recovery should come from within Zimbabwe itself, they assert that international donors will have to play a role in supporting the locally owned recovery strategy. There is need for caution over the introduction of another layer of externally-devised and driven international initiatives which may not be all that useful in the long-term in effectively addressing the environmental problems that have arisen during the socio-economic crisis. Rather, the approach should be to support and augment initiatives that are already in place, scale up what already works, forming partnerships with government, NGOs, research institutions and the private sector, and encourage implementation of already existing policies and legislation.

### **5.7. Recommendations**

In light of the discussion in this chapter, the following recommendations are put forward as priority areas for contributing towards a sustainable development programme for Zimbabwe.

1. Revitalise and re-establish visibility of State environmental institutions. It is clear that most of the work will have to be to re-establish long-term programming with a functioning bureaucracy starting with the Ministry downwards. Key posts that had become vacant will need to be filled. There will be a need to restore some of the lost institutional momentum and in the interim it may be necessary to re-engage some of the retired capable senior staff. This will help to create the lost capacity and facilitate engagement with some of the emerging policy discourses, especially the climate change agenda.
2. Priority should be on providing resources, incentives, training, capacity building and instilling accountability and transparency among staff. This would create a motivated, competent and

committed civil service with the capacity and resources to tackle development in the environment sector and effectively implement existing policies. Furthermore, implementation can be further enhanced by providing support and resources to local environmental NGOs and community based organisations that have a proven track record thereby enabling them to continue and expand the work that they have been doing at local level. More resources would enable them to replicate and scale up what works.

3. An audit of the state of the environment in Zimbabwe is overdue. Perhaps this could be one of the first confidence-building measures the Ministry can do to maintain its control over the environment agenda. The audit could form the basis for a new vision on the environment and provide the State with reasonable entry points for other actors.
4. Document and disseminate examples of 'good practices' in natural resource management, particularly those with a focus on enhancing livelihoods and reducing poverty, and provide a platform for networking and facilitating an integrated approach to sustainable development.
5. Support environmental education for sustainable development at all levels in order to increase the capacity of communities to address environmental issues and engender values, attitudes, skills and behaviour consistent with good environmental management.

## CHAPTER 6: Education

### 6.1. Introduction

Education and health are the two sectors where the post-colonial State invested the most after Independence. They became the main conduits of social development aspirations and for the most part the results showed massive changes for the better. In this chapter we consider the first of these two key social sectors, education, and look at how it has fared during the economic crisis. We also put forward recommendations for the future.

### 6.2. Zimbabwe's education sector, from independence to economic crisis

#### *Primary education*

After inheriting a two-tier education system that did not provide equally across the races the new Government sought to transform education provisioning by making it a universal good. The State legislated to make primary education compulsory, although this was because of good intentions rather than imperatives. The concept of equal quality education at all levels was promoted. Until the mid-1990s Zimbabwe was recognised as relatively successful in providing quality education for all. It had achieved primary education for all and innovative secondary education for the majority (65 per cent) by the late 1980s. This was a remarkable achievement given that at independence in 1980, only a third of Zimbabwe's children had access to primary education, and only four per cent attended secondary school. Table 6.1 shows the changes in education infrastructure, enrolment and staffing. It shows a doubling of primary schools, a three-fold increase in primary school teachers and a fourfold increase in pupils enrolment. There was a tenfold increase in secondary schools to match a more than tenfold increase in secondary school enrolment.

**Table 6.1: Number of schools and teachers and school enrolment, 1980-2007**

Year	Primary school	Teachers	Pupils Enrolled	Secondary Schools	Teachers	Student Enrolment
1980	2,411	28,455	819,566	177	-	66,215
1999	4,723	59,973	2,460,323	1,548	30,572	834,880
2004	5,007	69,461	2,464,682	1,680	37,871	866,399
2005	4,830	66,186	2,531,508	1,606	35,894	861,343
2006	4,842	66,220	2,493,260	1,642	36,175	883,267
2007	5,056	69,858	2,256,318	1,803	37,631	863,267

*Source: Ministry of Education Sport and Culture, 2007a*

There were qualitative improvements as black primary school children, who previously received a markedly inferior quality of education as compared to European primary school children, were accorded equal priority. Massive investment led to massive gains in literacy and by 1990 literacy rates for the 15-24 years age group had risen to 98 per cent whilst for adults this rose to 85 per cent. Even after years of

economic crisis, Zimbabwe is still a high flyer as it overtook Tunisia as having the highest literacy rate in Africa in 2010, at 95 per cent).

Its net primary enrolment in 2004 was 82 per cent, while net secondary enrolment was 34 per cent. Its gross tertiary enrolment in 2003 was 3.9 per cent, and primary school dropout (2003/04 figures) was 37.9 per cent. More worryingly, in 2001/02 of every 100 pupils that started primary school only 62 were expected to make it through to the last year of primary school. This reflected the impact of the socio-economic crisis on human capital formation as more and more children dropped out of classes to help with family survival or became simply too poor to attend school. In fact, about 30 per cent of children aged 5-14 are engaged in child labour whilst an estimated 12,000 street children in urban areas are not catered for in the school system (USA Department of Labour, 2001). As the economic crisis set in, there has been a small but steady decline in primary enrolments. Although the attrition rate of about three per cent is small, it is noticeable in comparison to the previously high enrolment record. For example less than 70 per cent of pupils completed Grade 7 in 2006, as compared to 75 per cent previously (Kiernan, 2008:45).

The area of pre-primary education showed significant achievement as 64 per cent of Grade ones in Zimbabwe had preschool background in 2006. There were rural-urban differentials with 67 per cent of all urban Grade one pupils having attended pre-school, compared with 63 per cent for rural areas. This is a relatively favourable figure that ranks Zimbabwe as sixth in the provision of pre-primary education within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This is somewhat surprising given that all other figures showed a decline. The main explanation for this is that although the State provides the curriculum, this level of education tends to be highly dependent on parental initiative and control, with a very small subsidy from the State, particularly in urban areas.

Although the rate of transition to secondary rate was 69.7 per cent in 2003-2004 there is a greater erosion of enrolments at secondary level, with 827,820 enrolled in Forms 1-4 in 2001 and only 774,921 in 2006, a drop of 9.4 per cent. The number of students sitting for the 'O' level examinations also showed fluctuation, with the highest number of candidates of 159,700 in 2000 as compared to 149,263 in 2005, a drop of 6.8 per cent (Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture, 2007a:136). Lack of school fees and examination fees, combined with the large number of orphans, mainly due to HIV/AIDS deaths, have led to high dropouts. However enrolment in the 6<sup>th</sup> form continued to increase from 31,505 in 2001 to 56,566 in 2006, an 80 per cent increase. A similar trend is found at the tertiary level, with a doubling of the number of universities, and enrolments increasing to 56,637 in 2006 (Tichagwa, 2007:2) as compared to 48,781 in 1999 (CSO, 2001a:76), an increase of 16 per cent. As noted in the section on Investment into Education below, investment into higher education increased after 2000, whilst the investment into primary education shrank considerably.

Although beginning to falter, quantitatively it is clear that the country made great strides. It is imperative, however, to look at the quality of human capital formation emerging from this system. This can be looked at in a number of ways: through specific monitoring and evaluation studies; examination results; the quality of the curriculum and textbooks; the availability of textbooks; the availability and quality of teachers; the quality of planning, supervision and Ministry support; and external indicators such as the employment potential of school graduates. In this report quality will include the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) monitoring and evaluation study of 1999; examinations results; some evaluation of the curriculum and textbooks; the availability of textbooks; the availability and quality of teachers; and some observations regarding Ministry support. There have

been no studies regarding external indicators in terms of the employment potential of school, college and university graduates. However, the exodus of more than two million Zimbabweans, mostly young people, indicates that there is a serious disjuncture between the needs of the Zimbabwean economy and the graduates of the education system. On the other hand, since these same graduates appear to do relatively well in the diaspora, it may be surmised that the education system prepared them for work outside of the country. However, the dysfunctional nature of the Zimbabwean economy over the last decade makes it all the more difficult to evaluate the relevance of the education system to the economic situation.

The quality of primary education, with specific emphasis on Grade 6 achievement, was studied in 1991 and 1995, by SACMEQ (Machingaidze et al, 1998). There is no similar study for the quality of secondary and tertiary education. For primary schools the SACMEQ study covers the socio-economic characteristics of Grade 6 pupils and teachers; educational financing; the teaching conditions in primary schools; the conditions of school buildings and furniture; the availability of teaching and learning materials; the academic and professional qualifications of teachers and school heads; the English language test results; and practical suggestions for policies and actions. Table 6.2 reproduces the list of teaching materials and classroom furniture in Grade 6 classrooms found in the study.

**Table 6.2: Percentage of grade 6 pupils in classrooms with selected teaching materials and classroom furniture in 1995**

Item	Percentage with Item
<b>Teaching Materials</b>	
Chalk	92.8
A wall chart of any kind	89.0
A map of Zimbabwe	76.6
A map of Africa	62.7
A world map	49.9
A classroom library or book corner	46.6
An atlas	83.6
An English dictionary	73.1
<b>Classroom furniture</b>	
A usable chalk board	92.3
A cupboard	48.6
One or more bookshelves	39.3
A teacher table	79.5
A teacher chair	79.2

*Source: Machingaidze et al, 1998: 34.*

This study showed impressive provisioning in terms of education infrastructure although there was need for more classrooms and other facilities, such as a school library (58.2 per cent of schools had one); staff room (30.3 per cent of schools had one); piped water (37.9 per cent of schools had this); well or borehole (71.1 per cent of schools had one); electricity (23.6 per cent of schools had electricity); telephone (33.6 per cent of schools had a telephone). 95.9 per cent of teachers had at least 11 years of academic education, whilst 77.4 per cent had at least three years of teacher training. An impressive 90 per cent of school heads had suitable professional and academic qualifications.



If we take a look at the Grade 7 public examinations as a proxy for the quality of value addition in education the decline in achievement is evident. Table 6.3 indicates that the percentage of passes has been shrinking over the period 1997- 2000.

**Table 6.3: Grade 7 examination percentage pass by subject, peak performance year compared to 2000**

Subject	Peak Year Result	2000 Result	2000 Result as percentage of Peak Year Result
English	83.3 (1997)	73.0	87.6
Mathematics	73.4 (1997)	62.3	84.9
Shona	90.6 (1997)	89.5	98.9
Ndebele	86.0 (2000)	86.0	100.0
General Paper	81.2 (1998)	78.0	96.1

*Source: CSO, 2001b:30. Unfortunately we could not obtain more recent Grade 7 results.*

Except for African languages, pass rates have declined compared with the peak year for results. This is somewhat surprising given the fact that even up to 2006 only 3.4 per cent of primary school teachers were unqualified, comprising 2,184 out of a total of 65,098 (Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture, 2007a:146). A possible explanation for the decline in pass rates may be the deterioration in infrastructure over time. This trend is also reflected when we consider the quality of reading comprehension in English reflected in the SACMEQ study. This shows that only 56.4 per cent of grade 6 pupils attained the minimal level of mastery, whilst only 37.0 per cent reached the desirable level of mastery (Machingaidze 1998: 70). While these findings indicate that quite a lot had been achieved in primary education, there was still a great deal of work to be done by the end of the 1990s. Sadly there was little difference between the results in 1995 as compared to 1991, showing that already the rate of improvement was beginning to slow down. Read together with the grade seven public examinations results given in Table 6.3, we could say this reflects some systemic issues in the education system.

Although there were no significant gender differences in primary school attendance reflected in the data (50.4 per cent boys as compared to 49.6 per cent girls in 2006), fewer girls attended secondary school, with 51.9 per cent boys and 48.1 per cent girls in 2006 (Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture, 2007a:44). Although the gap has been gradually decreasing at secondary level these data do suggest that the economic crisis may have affected girls' attendance of secondary education more than it did boys.

#### *Secondary education*

The impressive improvements in secondary education infrastructure and enrolments raised expectations of the quality of human capital formation and indeed Zimbabwe became recognised for its achievements in education. If we use quality of secondary education as measured by the "O" and "A" level examinations we can get an idea of the value addition within this system. Table 6.4 shows that whilst the number of candidates who passed five or more subjects at "O" levels increased from 535 in 1980, to 31,246 in 2006, the percentage who passed five subjects reached its peak in the 1990s at 23 per cent. By 2000 the percentage pass had shrunk to 14 per cent of the total, while those who passed between one and three subjects comprised another 40 per cent between 1981 and 1990 (Chung, 2008:36).

**Table 6.4: “O” Level results 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of Candidates</b>	<b>Number with 5 Cs or More</b>	<b>Per cent with 5 Cs</b>
1980	8,351	535	6
1990	201,555	12,201	21
1995	197,512	12,238	23
2000	264,056	36,659	14
2005	251,755	31,246	12
2006	223,968	31,246	14

*Sources: CSO, 2001b:42 for 1980 - 1995, and Zimbabwe School Examination Council, August, 2008, for 2000-2006.*

The fact that only 13-23 per cent of students pass 5 “O” levels, implying a failure rate of between 77 and 87 per cent, is a serious reflection of the education system. Given that by 2000 only 2.8 per cent of secondary teachers were unqualified out of a total of 34,163 this high failure rate is somewhat surprising and may also point to systemic failures within the education system. It has been suggested that “O” levels are basically a preparation for university work and unsuited to 96 per cent of the age group that do not make it into university. It does suggest that secondary school students are not being educated and trained to take advantage of the opportunities and challenges they will face.

The “A” level results were much better (Table 6.5) showing marked improvement from 46 per cent passing 2 or more subjects in 1980 compared to 75 per cent in 2006. The number who obtained two passes had increased from 527 to 25,106. The results at this level are due to the high level of selection for “A” levels (Compare number of candidates for “O” levels in Table 6.4 to the number for “A” levels in Table 6.5).

**Table 6.5: “A” Level results, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of Candidates</b>	<b>Number with 2 Es or better</b>	<b>Per cent with 2 Es or better</b>
1980	527	242	46
1990	14,722	9,984	58
1995	17,803	13,163	70
2000	19,541	18,044	75
2005	36,854	26,415	72
2006	33,516	25,106	75

*Sources: CSO, 2001b:43 for 1980 – 1995, and Zimbabwe School Examination Council, August, 2008, for 2000 – 2006.*

#### *Tertiary education*

At university level in 2006, male students comprised 62.6 per cent of the total. Although there has been a narrowing of the gender gap over the decades, there are serious gender gaps at tertiary education level both in terms of staffing and student enrolments, and these gaps are linked to specific subject specialisations (Tichagwa, 2007). This is an area that requires more concerted and practical policies and

strategies to redress this imbalance. Table 6.6 indicates an enormous increase in the enrolment of students at university level, caused in some part by the increase in the number of universities from one in 1980 to four in 1994, to eleven in 2006. A noticeable change was the emergence of five private universities by 2006. These five universities comprised 4,650 students out of a total of 53,560 students in 2006, 8.7 per cent of the total. There appears to be room for further expansion of private universities, although there is also need for monitoring the quality and relevance of the education they provide. Interestingly, the private universities have a much lower gender divide, with 51.8 per cent male students and 48.2 per cent female students in 2006. In comparison the State universities had 62.6 per cent male students.

**Table 6.6: Tertiary education enrolments, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2006**

Area of training	1990	1995	2000	2006	Index of Increase/Decrease 2006 Cf. To 1990
University	9,017	12,442	(1999 figures) 13,696	53,637	595
Agricultural Colleges	667	303	390	173	26
Teachers' Colleges	17,802	17,466	16,392	18,297	103
Technical Colleges	11,683	13,612	16,306	19,337	166
Vocational Training Colleges	340	824	1,203	1,083	319
Nurses	908	1,038	(1999 figures) 1,208	(Not available)	133
Total	40,417	45,685	49,195	94,002	233

*Sources: CSO, 2001b: 45 – 48; Tichargwa, 2007; Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education for 2006 data.*

To understand the patterns of human capital formation through tertiary education we analyse the specialist areas of study at university level and find under-representation in areas that we expect the country to be investing in. Whilst Zimbabwe's tertiary enrolment is relatively high, 3.9 per cent of the age group as compared to 2.5 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, it is low compared to developing and developed countries. For example, tertiary enrolments in East Asia are 16.8 per cent, and in Europe and North America it is 57.7 per cent. Malaysia has a gross tertiary enrolment of 29.3 per cent whilst South Korea has gross enrolment of 85.4 per cent (UNESCO, 2006: 346-50).

In 2006 only 2.3 per cent of students in higher education were pursuing engineering training. Commerce and business appear to be well developed at university level, comprising 31 per cent of the student enrolment while agriculture, engineering, medicine, science and veterinary students altogether comprise 26.6 per cent of the total. Agriculture enrolments numbered a significant 2,276 in 2006, or 4.3 per cent of the total enrolments. By contrast, the number of students at agricultural colleges has been shrinking from 667 students in 1990 to 273 in 2007.<sup>31</sup> This is surprising in view of the fact that agriculture has been lauded as a key economic sector since the Fast Track Land Reform. It may reflect dislocation between training and the economic policy decisions as the land resettlement programme would require more qualified agriculturalists.

<sup>31</sup> From Ministry of Agriculture, Dept of Agricultural Education, Student Statistics, 2003 – 2007.

Medical students comprise 3.6 per cent of the total. Given the severe shortage of medical personnel both within Zimbabwe and worldwide, it may be judicious to expand this area. Veterinary students are even fewer, comprising only 228 or 0.4 per cent of the total. Zimbabwe has a strong livestock industry, therefore, this faculty needs to increase its enrolment as well as provide different levels of training to suit the different community needs. There were quite a large number of science students, comprising 15.8 per cent of the total.

#### *Non-formal education*

The non-formal education system has scored a major success in lowering the illiteracy rate to 9.08 per cent in 2002 as compared to 63 per cent at Independence. About a quarter of a million people participate in the non-formal education system as shown in Table 6.7.

**Table 6.7: Enrolments in non-formal education courses, 2007**

<b>Programme</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
Correspondence	81,894	83,015	164,909
Secondary education or Part time Continuing Education Classes (PTCEC)	11,162	13,712	24,874
Basic literacy	4,910	13,167	18,077
Functional literacy	3,203	10,025	13,305
Primary Education or Zimbabwe Adult Basic Education Course (ZABEC)	1,824	6,562	8,386
<b>Totals</b>	<b>102,993 (44.9 per cent)</b>	<b>126,481 (55.1 per cent)</b>	<b>229,551</b>

*Source: Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture, 2007b: 7.*

The high proportion of women enrolled in these courses may indicate that more women need non-formal education than men, as they may have failed to find educational opportunities within the formal system. Recent work suggests that much of the focus and curriculum remain those of the early years of independence, without sufficient regard for the changing needs of learners over the last three decades. Two areas which require attention are those of civic education and introduction to technologies, especially computers and new business technologies.

#### *Investment into education*

In the 1980s the education budget varied from between 20.9 per cent to 26.1 per cent of the State budget, with an average annual expenditure of 22 per cent.<sup>32</sup> This compares to 11.3 per cent to 26.3 per cent

<sup>32</sup> Sources: *Ministry of Finance Estimates of Expenditure, 1980/81 – 1990/91*, presented to the Parliament of Zimbabwe, and the Ministry of Education and Culture, Annual Report of the Secretary of Education and Culture, 1980 – 1990, presented to the Parliament of Zimbabwe.

between 2000 and 2006, with an average annual expenditure of 14.2 per cent (Kiernan, 2008:35). Since the 1990s, the State abandoned socialism as its ideology and in its place adopted elements of neo-liberalism. Apart from other policy impacts, the cost cutting measures that came along with the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) meant that the education budget had shrunk from about 22 per cent in the 1980s to about 15 per cent between 2000 and 2006. Table 6.8 gives an estimate in US\$ of the amount spent on education during the period 2004-2007, based on averages of monthly Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) exchange rates. It shows that the investment into Education and Training is both variable and diminishing.

**Table 6.8: Expenditure on education (Millions of Z\$ and US\$) for selected years**

	1980-81	1990-91	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Education Budget in Z\$ millions	218.43	1,532.21	1,952,539	7,473,706	23,616,697	721,949	1,148,986,634
Index of Increase of ed. Budget in Z\$	100	701	894	3,421	10,812	331	526,004
RBZ exchange rate values, Z\$: US\$			5,127.07	17,404.98	66,392.81	15,125	3,761,807,147
Education budget in US\$ millions			380.83	429.40	355.71	47.732	0.30543
Index of Increase of Ed. Budget in US\$	100	171	2,299	8,799	92,692,197	7,083,803	11,274
Total State Budget in Z\$ millions	978	6,850	8,747,727	28,363,608	127,913,772	6,233,879	7,905,314,086
Education budget as per cent of Total State Budget	22.3	22.4	22.3	26.3	18.5	11.6	14.5

*Notes: The Education Budget adds together the budget for Ministries of Education and Culture and Higher Education. Exchange rate 1980 from World Bank, Zimbabwe – A Strategy for Sustained Growth, 1987; for 1990 from CSO, 1997: 214.*

**Table 6.9: Average annual education staff salary 1990-91 compared to 2008 in Z\$s and US\$s**

	Average Salary 1990-1991	Average Salary July 2008
Z\$	12,032	*43,176,000,000,000
Index of increase in Z\$	100	358,843,085
US\$	4,565	**560.73
Exchange rate used	US\$1:Z\$2.636	US\$1:Z\$77,000,000,000
Index in US\$	100	12

Number of Staff in 1990, 104,962. Source: *Estimates of Expenditure for Year ending 30, June 1991*: 141. Number of staff in 2008, 117,612. Source: *Estimates of Expenditure for Year ending December 31, 2008*: 220. In both years the staff includes all staff in both Ministries.

The 2008 salary figures from the *Estimates of Expenditure for Year ending December 31, 2008*: 220 are obviously invalid due to the extraneous zeros. Therefore, to be accurate, the salary figures used come from information from the Zimbabwe Teachers' Association, ZIMTA in August 2008. Teachers were given the salary level in January, June and July 2008. The salary level includes basic salary, transport allowance and housing allowance, as of July 2008.

The exchange rate used is the Interbank Exchange Rate of 1 August 2008 of US\$1:Z\$77,000,000,000. Note this had changed to US\$1:Z\$100,980,000,000 by 1 September 2008 (Source: Merchant Bank of Central Africa, MBCA website). On 1 August 2008, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe slashed off ten zeroes from the Z\$ note. However this study has retained the July 2008 figures in order to retain some coherence.

**Table 6.10: Primary school private school per capita grants, 1990-91 and 2006, Z\$ and US\$**

	1990-1991	2006
grants for private registered primary schools in Z\$	35,000,000	11,896,263,000
grants as per cent of total education budget	2.28	0.07
grants for private registered primary schools in US\$	13,277,694	*396,542

rate used	US\$1:Z\$2.636	*US\$1:Z\$30,000
of private primary school children (calculated as 88 per cent of total enrolment of children)	2,119,865	2,152,058
amount per child in US\$	6.26	0.18

*estimates of expenditure for year ending 30, June 1991: 87; estimates of expenditure for year ending December 31, 2006: 184. For exchange rates .*

and exchange rate of US\$1:Z\$30,000 provides inappropriate figures and distortions. This would mean that the actual average per capita grant is likely to be around US18 cents. The Education Statistics for 2007 and 2008 statistics have not yet been published, so 2006 is the latest year available.

It is clear from Table 6.9 and Table 6. that after 2000 the level of investment into staff salaries and into per capita grants was variable from year to year, but it was severely eroded by inflation. A return to the 22 per cent of the total State budget pattern of investment into education and training as a target would be a salutary first step in any new dispensation. A second step would be to try and ensure that staff salaries are reasonable enough to satisfy basic needs. By the time the GNU was formed staff salaries in US\$ terms were a paltry 12.3 per cent of the average salary in 1990. The poor working conditions accounted for the brain drain of teaching staff, many of whom are not able to utilise their academic and professional skills in the jobs they hold outside the country.

Per capita grants had shrunk to less than one US cent per child in 2008 as compared to US\$6.26 in 1990-91 (see Table 6.), and this explains why schools were unable to purchase textbooks and other teaching/learning materials. Note that the average textbook in Zimbabwe costs about US\$7, very high by regional and international standards. It may be useful to utilise 1990-91 as a benchmark. At that time the investment into education was US\$581 million, of which about US\$456 million, 78.5 per cent of the total, was for staff salaries. Whilst it may not be possible to return very quickly to this level of real investment, it will nevertheless be essential to plan a closer approximation.

Another clear trend is that the percentage of the budget spent on higher education has increased, relative to that spent on primary and secondary education (see Table 6.). Whereas 86.7 per cent of the budget was spent on primary and secondary education in 1990-91, this had shrunk to 69.5 per cent by 2008. Meanwhile the percentage spent on higher education had increased from 13.3 per cent to 30.5 per cent (see Table 6.). The ratio of the unit cost of primary to secondary to university education was roughly 1:1.54:17.59. From these figures it appears that secondary education in Zimbabwe is relatively low cost, costing only about 54 per cent more than primary education. University education is expensive, costing about 18 times more than the unit cost of primary education.

The increasing importance of higher education relative to primary and secondary education may reflect a number of concerns and problems. Lower investment into primary and secondary education may mean that unit costs as well as quality may have been lowered. The higher investment into tertiary education may reflect the fact that tertiary education lecturers demand salaries that are closer to international salaries, if they are to be retained. The rapid increase in enrolments of universities may reflect a higher demand for university education as a result of the expansion of secondary education over the previous two decades.

**Table 6.11: Comparison of the budgets of the ministries of education and culture and higher education, 1990-91 and 2008**

Ministry	1990-1991	Per cent	2008	Per cent
Education and Culture	1,329,074,000	86.7	798,244,383,122,000	69.5
Higher Education	203,141,000	13.3	350,742,252,286,000	30.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,532,215,000</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,148,987,635,408,000</b>	<b>100</b>

*Sources: Ministry of Finance Estimates of Expenditure, 1990-91 and 2008.*



**Table 6.12: Investment into primary, secondary and tertiary education, 1990-91 and 2008**

	1990-1991	Per cent	2008	Per cent
Primary Education	809,715,000	52.7	470,604,822,479,000	41.0
Secondary Education	452,474,000	29.4	245,748,428,678,000	21.4
Teacher Education	24,968,000	1.6	28,577,551,514,000	2.5
Technical Vocational Education and Training	30,275,000	2.0	24,877,603,846,000	2.2
University Education	91,835,000	6.0	181,565,697,500,000	15.8
Other	128,948,000	8.3	197,613,532,391,000	17.2
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,532,215,000</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,148,987,636,408,000</b>	<b>100</b>

*Sources: Ministry of Finance Estimates of Expenditure, 1990/91 and 2008.*

Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 indicate that in addition to the need to increase the percentage of the budget allocated to education from 14.5 per cent in 2008 to bring it closer to the percentage of 22 per cent that was prevailing in the earlier years of Independence, there is also a need to consider the importance of providing a higher allocation for primary and secondary education. Another noticeable factor is the increase in the percentage of the budget for 'other' costs covering areas such as administration. This amount doubled from 8.4 per cent in 1990-91 to 17.2 per cent in 2008. This may indicate that there are increased inefficiencies in the present system of administration.



*Investment in education is one of the key ways of moving and staying out of poverty (Photo © Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi).*

### 6.3. Recommendations for the future

Given the drastic changes which have taken place nationally, regionally and globally, there is urgent need to re-examine the educational policies and strategies. Some of the changes required are examined below.

#### *Basic education*

It is necessary to ensure that all children are able to access nine years of free, compulsory and quality basic education. This is the agreed minimum level of basic education accepted by SADC. It is also the recommended minimum level made by the Nziramasanga (1999) Commission on Education. Basic education is a human right which Zimbabwe needs to respect. At the same time, having a substantial number of its citizens deprived of primary and junior secondary education creates serious developmental problems. Presently about 100,000 children out of about 400,000 who enter primary schools do not complete Grade 7. A further 70,000 do not enter secondary school. Thus about 170,000 a year do not gain the requisite nine years of compulsory education that is deemed to be important for social, political and economic development. These school leavers will find it difficult to find jobs or to create jobs for themselves. Unless Zimbabwe returns to its original policy of free primary education, and even extends it to cover two years of junior secondary education, it is likely to continue to have a substantial percentage of its population having a sub-standard level of basic education.

**1. Linking education and training more closely to economic development.** The urgent need for economic development and expansion within the country and the region, as well as globally, requires a serious adjustment of the education system at all levels, but particularly at secondary, technical/vocational and tertiary education. This would include:

- 1.1 Inclusion of more science and technical/vocational orientation into primary education, in particular the scientific approach to problem solving and the entrepreneurial skills that are required in a private sector dominated economy. It is noticeable that changes which have taken place in science and technology since the 1980s are absent from the primary and secondary school curriculum. These include genetically modified food crops, the advent of bio-fuels, genetic engineering as a whole, the use of computer and other information and communications technologies in the work place, etc.
- 1.2 Providing more technical/vocational training at secondary school level. Whilst Zimbabwe presently possesses a good quality technical and vocational education and training at tertiary level, with an enrolment of more than 19,000 into technical colleges and about 1,000 into vocational schools, this will be totally inadequate if Zimbabwe is to become more industrialised and if the economy is to expand. A larger number of secondary school graduates who can operate at middle and lower technician levels can fill this gap in practical terms. At the same time, Zimbabwe can supply some of the skilled human resources needs of the region. This change can be effected through the provision of nine years of free basic education for all, followed by some degree of specialisation after the 9<sup>th</sup> year of schooling. The present situation is that the formal economy provides less than 1 million jobs, whilst the communal agricultural system provides employment for another 1.8 million. With a population of about 14 million there are estimated to be 7 million adults, so the percentage of unemployed would be about 60 per cent, or about 4.2 million adults. These estimates do not take into account

those who are in the informal urban sector, such as handicrafts and petty commerce; those employed in cross-border trading; and the diaspora. Lack of employment is the main reason for the flight of the young into foreign countries. For more employment to be created there is need for a much larger number of personnel with technical/vocational education and training, with particular emphasis on entrepreneurial training. One way of tackling this serious deficit of secondary school graduates with technical/vocational training would be to introduce technical/vocational streams after the 9<sup>th</sup> year of schooling within the secondary education system.<sup>33</sup> It is possible to provide a two to three year technical/vocational specialisation programme in selected secondary schools. Students in such streams will still do some academic subjects, such as Language, Mathematics, Natural Science and Social Science, but could spend three days a week on technical/vocational training. This would be along the lines followed in Thailand, where agriculture graduates from such courses are trained to run a 12 acre farm (about five and a half hectares), to establish a nursery or to work in the garden of a large hotel. The high flyers can proceed to college and university. The same approach can be used for other practical and technical subjects, such as woodwork, metalwork, fashion and fabrics, catering, etc.<sup>34</sup> As the introduction of some level of technical/vocational training is likely to be more expensive than concentration on classroom and book learning, one out of ten schools could initially be selected, making a total of about 160 secondary schools. This could gradually be increased to one out of five schools.

- 1.3 Another less expensive but more important strategy in the short term is providing 'one skill' vocational training. This will provide an important stop-gap solution to the rampant unemployment of the young without adding high costs to the education and training budget.
- 1.4 The number of training places in agricultural colleges needs to be drastically increased because there is urgent need for more graduates with these skills. This training should be directly linked to the Land Resettlement Programme and graduates of these training programmes should be given priority for purchasing farms.
- 1.5 The number of students at technical colleges needs to be boosted, as their specialisations are critical for development. A key aspect of their training should be internship in existing enterprises. The State should put in place financial and other packages to persuade industries to take on trainees. Graduates can work both within Zimbabwe and within the region.

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<sup>33</sup> This is a common pattern in many European and Asian countries, where pupils are provided with 9 years of general education, and are able to choose from different courses in the 10<sup>th</sup> year. For example in Sweden there are some 25 different courses in the 10<sup>th</sup> grade, offering a variety of academic and technical/vocational courses of various levels.

<sup>34</sup> One of the challenges facing developing countries, including Zimbabwe, is the need for varying levels of technical/vocational knowledge and skills, as the country's development needs vary from the most basic to very sophisticated skills. It would be appropriate for the secondary school system to provide basic levels of technical/vocational knowledge and skills which were not available to the parents' generation, but which are now essential for higher development of agriculture and small home based industries.

- 1.6 The very small enrolments of the vocational training centres and colleges are a matter for serious concern. This sector provides technicians who have a more practical orientation than the polytechnics and technical colleges. It therefore serves a very important function for the 170,000 students who leave school each year with only some level of primary education. Zimbabwe had extensive experience in the 1980s of providing technical/vocational training to war veterans, with the basic requirement of literacy only in some cases. This was done through the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production, ZIMFEP. This valuable experience should be harnessed, and this sector strengthened. There are already a number of underutilised and even vacant training centres which could be revived to provide this essential type of training. Due to the high demand for technical/vocational training, such centres are now demanding a minimum of five “O” levels.
  - 1.7 Tertiary education as a whole needs to increase enrolments, improve the quality and relevance of the education provided. In this regard, an increase in the private sector involvement from the present 8.7 per cent to about 50 per cent of enrolments would be desirable, with equal inputs from both the State and the private sector as is the case in primary, secondary and teacher education. At present private universities and technical colleges receive reduced State support. State and private sector partnerships should be seen as a key strategy for education expansion and educational relevance. Zimbabwe already has very successful experience of such partnerships.
  - 1.8 At tertiary level, the science, technology and engineering sectors need to be given much greater emphasis than at present, as these areas are exceptionally important for our present stage of development.
2. **Education and training for the region.** The brain drain of doctors, teachers and nurses indicates that these specializations should also be boosted within the educational system, as such staff are in high demand within the region. There is a need for Zimbabwe to recognise that its education and training facilities should be promoted to SADC, and that such an approach is useful both for Zimbabwe and for the region. Given that Zimbabwe has demonstrated comparative advantages in education and training, it is advantageous to open up its tertiary education and training facilities to the region, and to increase the education and training at this level with a view to contributing well trained and experienced human resources in specific areas to regional development. In addition, by opening up training facilities to the region, Zimbabwe will earn much-needed foreign exchange to enable these institutions to improve themselves to internationally recognised standards.
  3. **Linking education to real life challenges.** The education system does not deal adequately with many real life challenges that school students will face both during their school career and after they leave school. Challenges which face these young people include: the prospect of unemployment; the dangers of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases; dealing with the intergenerational divide that has developed as a result of the educational and economic changes which have taken place after Independence; and the challenges of and opportunities for working in Zimbabwe and the region. The economic crisis has created new issues that need attention at school including dealing with conflict, partisanship, intolerance of differing views, and polarisation of political views and greater understanding of economics, such as the

money supply. There is need to link education more closely to environmental care and improvement. This has been a concern of the Ministry of Education in the form of the Tree Care and Growing Programme, but more environmental education is needed.

4. **The development of values, principles and moral education.** One of the challenges facing Zimbabwe today is that of developing personal as well as national values and principles. To some extent this has been done through religious education within the family and school situations. The education system needs to play an important role in this development, both in terms of personal development, inter-personal development, and the development of national standards of values and behaviour.
5. **Improvement of the quality of education.** There has been some deterioration of the quality of education, and it is essential that practical as well as conceptual steps be taken to improve the situation. Areas which require attention include:
  - 5.1 School construction. Movement of the population into urban areas and into resettlement areas means that new school planning and construction are required.
  - 5.2 School maintenance, furniture and equipment. School buildings have largely been neglected for the past decade, and need maintenance and refurbishing. A system of maintenance and furniture grants from the State and from donors to School Development Committees can assist the school communities to take greater responsibility for this task.
  - 5.3 Whilst pre-primary education appears to be doing relatively well, it is also important for a return to training teachers for this level. Presently the centres are generally staffed by under-qualified teachers. Though it is understandable that the State may not wish to extend its already over-stretched resources to cover this level of education, nevertheless staff in this sector need to receive appropriate training. Better off communities are able to pay for qualified teachers. A programme that will enable practising teachers to upgrade themselves through in-service training studies is desired.
  - 5.4 The curriculum at all levels needs renewal. Whilst the Zimbabwean curriculum is of a high standard, it does not take into consideration many of the challenges faced by its students during and after their schooling.
  - 5.5 Textbooks and other teaching/learning materials are no longer sufficiently available due to inadequate funding. Increased funding is required, but this could be complimented by utilising donor funds to provide free or subsidised paper for publishers and printers, who can then ensure that the cost of books becomes affordable. The programme of the 1980s of providing 20 copies of some essential textbooks per school, funded by donors, should be restored.
  - 5.6 Narrowing the gender gap will help to improve tertiary education in many ways, including in providing better leadership from women and increasing the pool of talented human resources.
  - 5.7 Distance education has played an important role in upgrading and updating teachers and other personnel, in particular through the Zimbabwe Integrated Teacher Education Course (ZINTEC) and through the Zimbabwe Open University, ZOU. More support should be given to this sector.
  - 5.8 The inspectorate needs to be fully staffed and equipped in order to cope with the challenges of a more decentralized system of education.

- 5.9 The examinations system requires renewal and State funding. The concept of total dependence on market forces has had a detrimental effect on poorer students, who have not been able to afford to take examinations.
6. **Involvement of the community and decentralisation.** One of the most important policies and strategies which has enabled the education system to survive as well as it has done so far is the involvement of the community, in particular the parents, in the education of their children. Parents have been very closely involved in the construction, maintenance and administration of their children's schools since Independence, and this has strengthened the education system immeasurably. Steps should now be taken to consolidate and further strengthen this partnership.
  - 6.1 More resources need to be decentralised to the school level, with greater School Development Committee responsibility.
  - 6.2 Education supervision needs to be decentralised to district level. Presently district education offices have been weakened by lack of staff and equipment.
  - 6.3 How resources are provided and utilised needs to be re-examined. There are serious policy issues such as the need for pro-poor budgeting, as under the present system the privileged and wealthier communities receive more than the less endowed communities.
  - 6.4 The issue of school fees needs to be addressed. The present system excludes the very poor and destitute from both primary and secondary education.
7. **Non-formal education.** Non-formal education provides an opportunity to link education and training to the changing needs of society. Large numbers of young people are not being adequately catered for within the formal education system: new challenges have emerged such as the advent of computer use in all aspects of the economy, the need for more specialized job training, etc.
8. **Strengthening policy and strategy development.** There has been substantial weakening of the Ministries of Education capacities in the past decade, due to the loss of key staff and general lack of funding. This weakening of the central and provincial education institutions needs to be urgently redressed if Zimbabwe's education system is to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.
9. **Financing of education.** This is an area which requires some more detailed work, including the development of new frameworks to guide future planning and budgeting. Some of the areas which require attention include:
  - 9.1 Ensuring that education and training receive adequate financing to be effective. A return to allocation of about 22 per cent of the State budget to education and training would be a first step.
  - 9.2 Ensuring that teachers' and lecturers' salaries are not eroded to the extent that they are not able to survive. This will stem the loss of personnel to the diaspora and into petty trade. Salaries should be in line with regional salaries.
  - 9.3 Ensuring that the per capita grant for school materials is commensurate with the cost of basic school materials.
  - 9.4 Providing adequately for construction, maintenance, school furniture and equipment. In particular a new framework would be needed to enable the community owned schools

such as district council schools to obtain fixed State subsidies for this area, including for maintenance. At present State subsidies are limited to construction, and are painfully inadequate.

- 9.5 Ensuring a better balance between investment into primary, secondary and tertiary education. Analysis of recent budgets appears to show some *ad hoc* variations, in particular with greater emphasis on university education than on primary, secondary, technical and vocational education. Whilst university education is undoubtedly important, under-investment in other sectors will have deleterious effect on educational development as a whole.
  - 9.6 Ensuring that pre-primary and non-formal education are catered for in the budget.
  - 9.7 Developing a pro-poor budgeting framework, so that the disadvantaged and lower income communities are better catered for than at present. In particular it is important that funds reach the school and community level.
  - 9.8 Financing increased decentralized support for the school system by providing more resources and decentralized decision making responsibilities to provincial and district levels.
  - 9.9 Lowering the cost of administration as compared to the cost of implementation. One important move will be to have one Ministry of Education rather than two, to ensure better coordination between sectors that need to work very closely together. Moreover, having two Ministries more than doubles the administrative costs, and may account for the increasing cost which appears to be combined with lowered efficiency rates.
- 10. The challenges of donor aid.** Donor assistance played an important role in the funding of education in the 1980s and 1990s. Currently the State receives little or no donor assistance. Although there is some donor support directly to schools, this is generally not co-ordinated. While the direct provision of assistance at school level has important advantages, and should be maintained in the future, the lack of planning and coordination means that such assistance cannot be utilised to best effect. On the other hand, returning donor assistance to the State without carefully thought out and agreed frameworks can be fraught with dangers. With the likelihood that there will be many new decision-makers both at the national political and bureaucratic levels, as well as among donors, this additional funding needs to be handled in such a way as to strengthen the system in replicable ways. A framework for donor funding will need to be devised that will ensure that the poorest sections of the community can benefit, whilst also ensuring that the quality of education is improved.
- 11. Research and development.** There is need for much more work in this area, particularly in terms of providing utilizable analysis which can help to improve the education system. Some of the areas include:
- 11.1 Linking education and training to development needs, including economic development needs and employment creation.
  - 11.2 Enabling data collected at school level to be utilised expeditiously for school improvement. Presently data is collected, but not utilised. Examination results can be utilised to ensure that schools can aim at higher levels of achievement within a planned programme.

- 11.3 There is need for closer monitoring and evaluation at all levels of education using SACMEQ studies as indicators. This will enable the Ministries to track quality and take timely steps when necessary.
- 11.4 Curriculum research is required particularly into the needs of present as well as emerging economic issues, so as to ensure that the curriculum is up-to-date as well as relevant. It will remain a challenge to have curricula which bridges present with future needs.

#### **6.4 Stakeholders and priorities**

In addition to identifying the eleven main policy and strategic areas, it is also necessary to identify who will be responsible for implementing these policies and strategies. The main players and stakeholders include the State, in particular the Ministry of Education (MOE); the private sector; the parents and community; and the donors.

##### *The state*

The State remains the key player in the rehabilitation of the education system. Its role is critical: it can help to rehabilitate the education system within a short period of time if it plays a visionary and proactive role, and provides the much needed leadership to all the stakeholders. It must demonstrate unequivocally that it is determined to prioritise education and to link it to the country's development strategies. It is the main funder of the education and training systems. It must also put into place technically and professionally sound policies and strategies that will benefit the poor as well as the rich.

The State system has weakened considerably and shows a marked inability to handle many of the new and sometimes daunting challenges. Some of these challenges could be dealt with even within the present constraints, if there was better coordination of existing players and resources. Donors can play an important role in supporting the strengthening of the State capacities by providing matching support for policies and strategies which are clearly beneficial to the development of the country as a whole, and which provide for a qualitative and equitable system.

Some forms of donor support, such as salary supplement support for district level staff of the Ministry of Education, would be reasonably low cost, but this can only be a stop-gap measure lasting 12-18 months, with clear bench marks and deadlines.<sup>35</sup> In addition to the stop-gap approach to assisting the State to carry out its functions, it is important to provide modest donor funding which can kick-start some of the important functions related to the efficiency of the education system. One important area is that of enabling the private publishers to rehabilitate their capacities to provide primary and secondary school textbooks. Presently publishers face the following constraints:

- Customs duties on inputs such as paper, plates, toner, ink, etc.

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<sup>35</sup> There are about 250 education officers at district level, assisted by about 500 support staff. A small salary supplement of US\$20-100 per month could provide enough for basic food and transport for such staff. This would give an estimate of about US\$360,000 per annum, a very modest amount in real terms for rehabilitating the district education support system.



- Requirements by the Ministry for full colour textbooks for some grades, raising the cost to about US\$7 per textbook (when the State is providing less than US\$0.18 per child for school materials grant). The State should ensure that textbooks are affordable, at about US\$1-2 per textbook.
- Shortage of paper.

As noted previously, a simple solution which can be implemented immediately is for donors to collaborate with the State to provide paper to publishers and printers for the purpose of producing textbooks. Such State-private sector-donor collaboration would enable the Ministry of Education to negotiate on quality and price. Without State agreement, such a scheme cannot go forward, yet it does not require any outlay of funds by the State itself, and would strengthen the private sector's ability to provide textbooks to schools.

The most important part the State can play is in terms of policies and strategies. Critically, it is largely up to the State, working in partnership with donors where possible, to provide the finance necessary to achieve the challenges set out in the previous section, particularly to provide for free primary education; sufficient pay for teachers; and sufficient materials for schools. As noted previously, historically, Zimbabwe was able to implement its education policies effectively when it was allocating 22 per cent of the State budget to education. The target should be to return to this level. It is the responsibility of the government to implement many of the policies outlined in the previous section, including those on decentralisation; ensuring that the education and training systems are more linked to the development plans of the country; improving teacher training services; improving education curricula; implementing greater cooperation between the State and private sector in the provision and processes of education, through linking education more closely to the needs of the private sector and improving data collection and school evaluation.

### *The private sector*

More than 90 per cent of Zimbabwe's primary and secondary schools are termed 'private' schools. The term covers more than 40 high fee-paying schools serving the elite; about 240 mission schools which are still amongst the best schools in the country; more than 5,600 local authority schools run by municipalities, district councils and town boards serving the poorer sections of the population; over 50 mine schools; and more than 200 primary schools run by commercial farmers. Mines have traditionally operated schools for the children of the miners. There are three 'private' teachers' colleges run by churches. There are also a few technical vocational colleges which have responded to public demand. The private sector has pioneered the utilisation of distance education in the pre-Independence period when the colonial governments restricted educational access to blacks, and the only way they could further their education was through the private sector, in particular the correspondence education sector. Over the last decade the private sector has played an important role in establishing private universities: there are presently five private universities. Primary and secondary schools and teachers' colleges received generous grants from the Ministry of Education in terms of teachers' salaries, per capita grants for learning materials, and building grants.

Zimbabwe used to have some vibrant private sector industries which served the education sector such as publishing, printing, technical and science equipment companies, furniture and

construction companies. While these still exist, they need to be strengthened and supported so that they can once again provide service to education.

The private sector is a key player in development, and it is essential for the State, private sector and donors to work closely together. The development of private sector institutions, whether these be factories and companies which produce educational materials or establishments which provide education, is important in order to provide the diversity and the quality which are characteristic of more developed systems of education. This needs to be systematized especially for long-term collaboration.

### *Parents and communities*

Parents and communities are a rich resource of human capacities which can be tapped to enrich and improve the education of children. Already the School Development Committees (SDCs) have demonstrated their ability to keep schools operating. These capacities can be further tapped to enable SDCs to repair and maintain existing facilities, and to establish new facilities, provided that the State provides grants and supervision. Systems were set up after Independence to enable parents and communities to contribute to the education of their children. These systems have proven to be sufficiently robust to enable most schools to survive a decade of deprivation. Parents and dedicated teachers have played a critical role over the last decade in ensuring that primary and secondary schools continue to provide their services under very trying circumstances. No doubt they will continue to play this role, as they have a vested interest in ensuring the continuity and quality of education for their children.

The State has also been unable to pay its 100,000 teachers a living wage, sufficient to provide food for their family and for transport. This problem became more acute after September 2008 when the devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar accelerated further, resulting in urban areas teachers not being able to afford the bus fares to school. One stop-gap strategy to enable schools to function would be for donors to provide a foreign exchange salary supplement to teachers in the same way as they have done for nurses and doctors. Such payment would need to be done at school level to avoid bureaucracy. One good outcome of recent problems is the empowerment of the School Development Committees (SDCs) comprising parents, the school head, and one teacher representative, to solve the schools problems. A joint donor-SDC programme in support of teachers could help to re-start schools in 2010 as a stop-gap measure.

It is evident that the system of parental responsibility for schools requires renewal, as some problems have become conspicuous. Poorer children have been forced to leave schools because of their inability to pay relatively modest fees. Furthermore, some children have been unable to pay examination fees, so could not write examinations. As a result they lack the certification that will enable them to continue with further education or to join employment.

All of these problems can and should be solved by collaboration between the State, parents and communities, the private sector and donors. This lack of coordination is problematic. The State and donors can play a catalytic role in enabling such contributions to be directed towards greater quality and equity. For example, scholarship programmes can be provided both at elite and other schools to cater for those parents struggling to pay school and examination fees. A system by which about 20 per cent of places in every school are scholarship places provided for by a

combination of State, donor and community funding can assist in bringing education to the poor sections of the community who have been excluded. Parents in agricultural communities have been providing basic foods to teachers, and such contributions should continue. A very substantial number of school children are suffering from stunting and malnutrition. This is an area of intervention through which schools, together with parents, private sector and donors, can assist in establishing supplementary feeding programmes.

### *Donors*

Donors are already playing an important role in providing funding directly to schools through NGOs, particularly in terms of providing food, fees and textbooks for an estimated 1.8 million HIV/AIDS orphans. However there are major problems with the system of donor funding, including the following:

- Donors have set up alternative and overlapping administrative systems through NGOs. NGO workers are paid considerably more than MOE officers: NGO salaries average about US\$300-3,000 per month. In contrast civil servants may be paid less than US\$100 per month, and were paid in Zimbabwe currency which was subject to daily devaluation. As a result the State system became depleted of competent staff, whilst NGO staff are amongst the most privileged of the new elite. Donor funding has thus contributed directly to the weakening of State capacities.
- Donor and NGO contributions are often uncoordinated with each other, and almost completely with the Ministry of Education. As a result inputs may not be sustainable or replicable, and may reflect donor priorities rather than national or community priorities.
- Donor contributions are in the 'emergency' rather than 'developmental' mode. This means donor funds come in the form of 'charity', and may not develop local, sustainable capacities. A good example is food provision, where food is brought from the US and the EU and donated to the poor, but little attempt has been made to provide seeds and fertiliser to enable peasant farmers to be self-sufficient. This approach has also been demonstrated in education: there is little or no coordination with the Ministry of Education which is responsible for education, with donors dealing with the Department of Social Welfare or directly with schools. In order to overcome these problems there is need for better coordination between donors, NGOs and the Ministry of Education in identifying priorities and setting up improved systems that are sustainable. The system of direct contribution to the schools is a good one, and should be retained, provided there is more policy and strategy coordination.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

Zimbabwe's education sector was once a regional leader, but has suffered greatly in the economic crisis years with declining budgets and large scale loss of personnel. It will be essential to revive the education system, by restoring human capital and in the longer term as a source of foreign exchange. This chapter has examined both the impacts of the economic crisis on the education sector and detailed a range of recommendations for future development. In the next chapter we turn to another key social sector, that of health.

## CHAPTER 7: Health

### 7.1 Rebuilding health services and infrastructure

*'When you go to the clinic, you are told there are no drugs, so they refer you to the Murewa hospital. When you get there, if you are lucky you will get X-rayed, but the chances are that they will have to refer you to either Chitungwiza or Parirenyatwa hospital. All these journeys need money and you are not even guaranteed that you will get what you are looking for. So the referral system is getting longer and more expensive and still, I won't see a doctor and I will not get the drugs' (Makuto and James 2008).*

After independence Zimbabwe inherited a public health service system that was geared to provide mostly for a few. Rural areas were severely underserved and the health provisioning that existed was by Christian missionary groups (Agere 1986). The State embarked on an ambitious programme to provide health for all. Using the slogan 'Health for All by the year 2000', the strategy revolved around both preventive and curative health care provisioning. It also set into motion an infrastructural development programme linked to these strategies. This massive health infrastructure programme was linked to service delivery targets of a health facility within walking distance (eight kilometres) for every person including rural areas. By the late 1990s up to 85 per cent of Zimbabweans lived within 10 kilometres of a health facility. Table 7.1 shows the infrastructure situation as of 2006.

**Table 7.1: Public health facilities as of 30 April 2006**

Provinces	Primary level	1 <sup>st</sup> Referral level	2 <sup>nd</sup> Referral level	3 <sup>rd</sup> Referral level	Total
Harare	45	0	0	7	52
Manicaland	253	36	1	0	290
Mashonaland Central	130	13	1	0	144
Mashonaland East	168	22	1	0	191
Mashonaland West	128	22	1	0	151
Matebeleland North	92	17	0	0	109
Matebeleland South	105	18	1	0	124
Midlands	106	28	1	0	135
Masvingo	170	23	1	0	194
Bulawayo	34	0	0	7	41
Total	1,231	179	7	14	1,431

*Source: Draft national health strategy 2008*

#### Key

Primary level	= Clinics and Rural Health Centres
1 <sup>st</sup> Referral level	= District, Mission and Rural hospital
2 <sup>nd</sup> Referral level	= Provincial Hospital
3 <sup>rd</sup> Referral level	= Central hospital and infectious diseases hospital

The State also embarked on an impressive health professional training programme to match this expansion. Until the 1990s, Zimbabwe committed as much as seven per cent of GDP to support

the strategy before ESAP induced cuts in public expenditure began to affect investment in health. Since the economic crisis began there has been rapid deterioration in health provisioning that culminated in a breakdown of the public health system. An outbreak of cholera had by May 2009 infected 98,424 people of which 4,276 died.<sup>36</sup> In the next section we look at the effects of the economic crisis on the country's health delivery system.

### *Demographic and socio-economic developments*

The country's population grew from 7.6 million in 1982 to 10.4 million in 1992 and 11.3 million in 2002. It is currently estimated to be around 13.4 million. Although the population grew rapidly between 1982 and 1992 it slowed down considerably in the 1990s and into the new millennium. The slow down has been attributed to a combination of factors. High mortality rates from an AIDS epidemic (in 1997 infection rates were 36 per cent but fell to 15.3 per cent by 2007<sup>37</sup>) decimated the population, while declining fertility rates as a result of a successful reproductive health campaign helped slow down growth. This was coupled with unprecedented levels of migration, especially since 2000. Table 7.2 shows the key trends in vital social statistics.

**Table 7.2: Main demographic feature of Zimbabwe 1982-2008**

Aspect	1982	1992	2002	2008
Population (millions)	7.6	10.4	11.6	13.4
Growth Rate (per cent)	3.0	3.1	1.15	0.8
Life Expectancy (years)	Male: 56.2 Female: 57.1	Male: 58 Female: 62	Male: 43 Female: 46	
Literacy Rate (per cent)	48.0	80.4	88.7	
Crude Birth Rate (per 1000)	39.5	34.5	33	31.6
Crude Death rate (per 1000)	10.8	9.5	18	17.3
Total Fertility Rate	6.20	5.91	4.1	3.8
Infant Mortality (per 1000)	86	66	65	68
Aids Infection Rates Adults (15-49yrs) (per cent)	-	-	24.6	15.6

*Source: GOZ, 2000; 2001; UNAIDS, 2008.*

We can also see from Table 7.2 that some of the initial gains made during the first decade have been lost, especially with regards to life expectancy which declined from a high of 61 years in the early 1990s to about 43 years by 2006. This decline has also been reflected in other areas of socio-economic development since the late 1990s. From this brief introduction to Zimbabwe's health situation, we can say that after initial progress in socio-economic development during the first decade of independence, the country has been in decline since the late 1990s. Repeated droughts,

<sup>36</sup> Figures from WHO.

<sup>37</sup> It is estimated that rates have dropped even more to about 11 per cent.

an AIDS epidemic, and an unstable economic environment continue to influence the setting in which the people make a living.


### *Health funding*

One of the first areas to be hit by the economic crisis was funding for public health care provisioning. As the budget deficit grew in the early 1990s the health budget in real terms also began to shrink. What information is available suggests that by 2007 the per capita allocation of health in the budget had declined to less than US\$0.19 per year.

By the year 2007 the allocation was inadequate and people had been left to their own devices to provide for their health care. With declining budgets one of the main casualties became long term programming that was necessary at the time when the country was confronting an HIV/AIDS pandemic that at its peak in the late 1990s had infection rates running over 30 per cent. The government's AIDS levy strategy together with donor support ensured that long term programming continued in the area of HIV/AIDS although for the most part national programming in most of the other preventive health care areas declined. A further consequence of cuts in budgets was that health infrastructure, equipment and supplies that had been set up over nearly two decades began to decline. Similarly, the staffing situation began to deteriorate as health professionals left for greener pastures in the region and abroad. Health training that had also reached impressive levels declined markedly and by November 2008 the main college of Health Sciences had reduced operations. A detailed look at the effects of this decline on selected health indicators can put into perspective the nature and form of post-crisis work that will need to be done.

Figure 7.1 shows the deterioration in Zimbabwe's health status. After initial improvements during the 1980's, from the early 1990s crude death rates rose as the impact of HIV/AIDS mortality and cuts in public health expenditure began to affect health delivery. The crude death rate dropped from 10.8 in 1982 to 6.1 in 1987 then rose to 9.49 in 1992 before nearly doubling to 17.2 per 1,000 of the population in 2007.

**Figure 7.1: Crude death rate trends**



*Source: GOZ, 2008*

Similarly infant mortality that had declined to 53 per 1000 live birth had risen to 68 per 1000 by 2008. Although this is nowhere near the rates reached by countries emerging from conflict (for example, Sierra Leone had rates of 170 per 1000 at the end of the war in 1999 while rates in Mozambique had reached 269 per 1000 by the time the civil war ended in 1991<sup>38</sup>) it is the reversal of gains that is worrying here. A look at life expectancy at birth reflected in Table 7.3 also shows a dramatic decline from 62 in 1990 to the current 43 years.

**Table 7.3: Life expectancy at birth**


	1984	1986	1988	1990	1995	2000	2002	2006
Male	60	61	61	58	52.6	44	43	44
Female	61	61	63	65	57.2	46	46	43
Total	60	61	62	62	55	45	45	43

*Source: Zimbabwe Inter-Censal Demographic Survey (ZICDS), CSO World Health statistics*

Most of this decline has been attributed to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and deterioration in health services programming and delivery. Zimbabwe is one of the countries that has been hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Figure 7.2 shows trends in the adult prevalence and incidence of HIV/AIDS between 1980 and 2007.

<sup>38</sup> See Keane (1996) for Mozambique and World Bank (2002) for Sierra Leone.

**Figure 7.2: Trends in HIV and AIDS prevalence and incidence, 1980-2007**



*Source: GOZ, 2008*

Figure 7.2 shows an impressive decline in prevalence rates from 24.5 per cent in 2004 to 15.6 per cent by 2007. The incidence rate is also down to two per cent from a peak well above four per cent in the mid 1990s. Success in HIV/AIDS has been due to a combination of behaviour change and migration. Most significant however is the fact that this is one of the few areas where continued long term programming has been maintained through dedicated funding from the State and donor support. It is partly this sustained and co-ordinated effort that has delivered the decline.

These indicators of the state of health do not tell the whole story as some of the hidden and long-term impacts of a prolonged socio-economic crisis will not be known until much later. For example, long-term nutrition induced deficiencies that affect a whole generation of children will not be known for some time. Data from the Zimbabwe National Nutrition and Food Security Assessment of October 2007 show significant increases in the prevalence of underweight children (17.4 per cent), wasting at 4.1 per cent and stunting at 28.9 per cent. The long term impacts on life chances and true costs of current poor nutrition and immunisation coverage on a generation of children that has grown up under such difficult situations will need to be taken into account in planning for health recovery.

#### *Health facilities, equipment and transport*

Health infrastructure capital investment has not kept pace with population expansion, notably, a big gap continues to exist in secondary care facilities in urban areas. This situation has resulted in Provincial and Central Hospitals, being used as first referral centres leading to congestion and a fall in the quality of services offered. Since the Family Health Project financed by the World Bank in early 1990, there has been limited capital injection in the building of new facilities in urban areas, while lack of repair and maintenance has led to considerable deterioration in most of the rural infrastructure. Although the deterioration in infrastructure can also be explained by the staff cut backs of the mid-1990s it is also clear that once the State became cash-strapped during the economic crisis regular maintenance and timely repair of buildings and equipment also suffered.

Similarly the Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ART) review of 2008 showed that one of the major problems facing the communities in Zimbabwe and leading to their failure to access health



services is transport to get to the hospitals. Where this is available it has become expensive and beyond the reach of many. The review showed that some of the ambulances are in a state of disrepair and most have outlived their economic life span. The few vehicles that were being procured under different Programmes did not last long as they were overused given that they were the only reliable vehicles available for use in the districts.



***Health infrastructure capital investment has not kept pace with population expansion, notably, a big gap continues to exist in secondary care facilities in urban areas (Photo © Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi).***

#### *Medical equipment and laboratory and supplies*

Zimbabwe used to have such medical equipment and laboratory services in the decentralized health delivery service that it was unknown for patients from the rural areas to come to the central hospitals unless it was for major surgical operations. District hospitals had all the services that would meet the priority diseases in the country. During the crisis the medical equipment had slowly ground to a halt, with most of the contract holders for servicing the machines having left the country and there being no budget to pay them. Similarly, the radio and telecommunication system in most of the districts, especially the rural ones, virtually collapsed. This meant that patients were moved from one point to another without earlier knowledge of whether the service they require would be available where they were being referred to. In addition, a breakdown in communication made it difficult for health centres to share working equipment and medicines.

Laboratory services were negatively affected by the hyperinflationary economic environment prevailing in the country. Since most laboratory services (such as equipment and spares/accessories) required scarce foreign currency, most remained unrepaired as maintenance routines were severely curtailed to save foreign currency. This saw a general deterioration of laboratory services where the tiered system failed to provide the standard package of laboratory

tests in support of the health delivery system at each level of healthcare. The result was that patients sought services from the private sector where the costs were unaffordable and beyond the reach of most of the patients. Tests such as CD4 count (to measure the stage and prognosis for HIV patients), liver function and some related tests for screening patients before enrolment into the national ART programme continued to have logistical challenges in that the reagents required to perform the tests were not always available. Where there was external support, in districts supported by the Global Fund and the Expanded Support Programme, some new pieces of equipment were procured which are being used when there is requisite staff to man them, but the equipment also runs the risk of quick wear and tear due to high demand of use.

One of the major challenges the health delivery system faced was a severe shortage of medical and surgical items. Table 7.4 shows the stock status at the central pharmaceutical supplies.

**Table 7.4: Stock status of VEN (Vital, Essential and Necessary) items from NatPharm**

	2004	2005	2006	2007
Vital (per cent)	63	72	82	42
Essential (per cent)	21	56	62	23
All drugs (per cent)	41	65	68	31

Availability for the first half of 2008, shows a declining trend. The VEN stock classification system in the Essential Drug List of Zimbabwe of medicines and surgical sundries was made on the following criteria:

**Vital items** - life saving, non availability may result in serious or death, optimum availability to be 100 per cent;

**Essential items** – non availability may result in pain or discomfort to the patient, optimum availability to be 80 per cent;

**Necessary items** – required but of a lower priority than V and N, optimum availability to be 60 per cent.

Although ART commodities were provided through the Global Fund, US government, UNDP's Expanded Support Programme and some NGOs, these could not meet the needs of the over 300,000 patients who needed ART. In the end people relied on private pharmacies if they could afford the high costs charged.

#### *Human resources*

Health delivery service in Zimbabwe is generally labour intensive as some of the new technologies are too expensive for a developing economy. Although the State embarked on a sustained programme of health and auxiliary staff training, this sector and the education sector were the ones hardest hit by brain drain. Given the conditions that obtained during the economic crisis it was not surprising that most of the staff trained, at very substantial costs to the State, simply left for greener pastures. Officially the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare declared a vacancy rate of 29 per cent, but this average hides the fact that the situation on the ground was always much worse. Part of the problem of establishing the vacancy rate was that most professionals just walked out of their posts and did not officially resign. So although on paper they still appeared on the books, they were not physically turning up for work. This affected

health service delivery significantly. A look at Table 7.7.5 shows that most of the core functions of the services were heavily depleted by the brain drain.

**Table 7.5: Staffing situation in the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare 2005-2007**

Vacancy status: December 2007							
Category	Required Personnel	In Post 2005	Per cent Vacant Posts	In Post 2006	Per cent Vacant Posts	In Post 2007	Per cent Vacant Posts
Top Management	74	10	86	7	91	14	81
Doctors	1,761	695	61	668	62	667	62
Nurses	19,338	13,078	32	13,495	30	14,768	24
Environmental Health Department	2,395	1,217	49	1,293	46	1,220	49
Pharmacy	578	336	42	338	42	318	45
Radiography	459	140	69	158	66	154	66
Laboratory	631	293	54	324	49	320	49
Administration	5,759	4,950	14	4,960	14	4,960	14
Records and Information	416	335	19	335	19	335	19
Program Managers	34	8	76	8	76	8	76

*Source: GOZ, 2008.*

Table 7.5 shows an average vacancy rate of 81 per cent among the senior positions in the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare. This means that the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, as at December 2007, was operating with 19 per cent of its approved establishment of senior management positions. Loss of experienced managers and senior health staff at all levels resulted in a leadership vacuum and reduced management capacity. Programme management was operating at 24 per cent, which resulted in the decline in national programming. There was therefore no capacity to formulate and set out strategies at national level to ensure that the limited resources were better deployed.

Due to the shortage of senior staff, newly qualified doctors deployed to the districts could not receive adequate clinical and supportive supervision from experienced doctors. The high vacancy rates of 73 per cent amongst consultants at central hospitals affected the quality of services and training programmes. The high failure rate recorded amongst medical graduates in 2006 and 2007 was directly attributed to the shortage of consultants whose other responsibility is that of training and supervision of health professionals. A similar situation prevailed for nurses training. The vacancy rate for tutors of 68 per cent suggests that the trainees were increasingly being trained by inexperienced and less qualified tutors, compromising the quality of output. A high failure rate was also experienced in the nurse training schools. It is therefore clear that the health related human capacity building had serious problems by the time the Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed. An over-stretched, understaffed, under equipped health system manned by poorly remunerated staff attempted to provide health care under difficult conditions.

We can see from the foregoing that the GNU inherited a health system fraught with difficulties and where there was:

- Inadequate funding to support the growing needs of a population going through a protracted socio-economic crisis.
- Little long term strategic thinking, and programming. What little long term programming existed was restricted to areas with ring fenced funding like HIV/AIDS. Although the MDGs still provided scope for long term programming there were challenges of such an exercise in such a challenging environment.
- Deteriorating infrastructure, equipment and supplies. These had declined drastically up to the point that the service barely functioned.
- Inadequate primary care provisioning. This had deteriorated, especially in rural areas, and what little activity remained was restricted to the upper tiers that survived in some of the major urban centres, especially organised around programme areas like HIV/AIDS.
- Reduced State capacity to provide health for its citizens. Church and missionary organisations remained significant actors in health provisioning as State health facilities declined.
- An increasing frequency of epidemics (e.g. cholera, malaria), which imposed a high burden of disease on an already compromised health system.
- An increasing level of non-communicable diseases.
- An increase in the crude death rate, mainly due to a failing health care system.
- A static or worsening gap in the level of health care delivery between urban and rural areas.

Faced with these challenges, the GNU will not only need to respond to these with speed but also sequentially if the health sector is to be stabilised. A key advantage of Zimbabwe's health sector is that it is a decentralised system. This allowed community based programming to continue, although at a very low level. Unlike post conflict situations where community based programming collapses, in Zimbabwe structures built around the response to HIV/AIDS helped maintain local level programming and avoided complete disintegration of institutions. Further, through support of donors and other partners like the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV/AIDS related disease surveillance never really ceased. This aspect became crucial during the outbreak of cholera as international partners were able to link into this existing system. In the next section we look at what could be health sector priority areas for the GNU.

## **7.2 Priorities for the health sector**

Standard post-conflict models do not apply wholesale in Zimbabwe for the simple reason that although there was conflict it did not culminate in a civil war. This means that recovery is likely to be much easier to manage, as there is still infrastructure and a health system can be revived.

If we understand a health system as constituted by organisations, institutions and resources it is clear that the government will have to stabilise and restore them before any long term programming can take place. We saw earlier that organisational challenges affecting the health delivery system in Zimbabwe related mostly to staff attrition rates and how this affected the capacity of the Ministry to deliver health services. We also established that there was reduced per capita spending and a decline in infrastructure during the economic crisis. Clearly the government will have to look into these important areas of health service delivery.

Most post-conflict countries use a standard three stage model<sup>39</sup> and we suggest that elements of this model be considered and adapted for use.

*Phase 1 basic emergency and curative health services*

During the first phase the specific focus should be on dealing with immediate health needs, especially the basic emergency curative health services to save lives. In the case of Zimbabwe this was already predetermined by the cholera epidemic that was inherited from the economic crisis. Although this is now under control, the arrival of the rains might bring in new challenges and possibly a recurrence of the cholera epidemic if the GNU fails to restore basic water supply and sanitation services. What is also crucial is the resumption of related curative health services, such as obstetrics and immunisation, dealing with other communicable and seasonal illnesses, similar to what Zimbabwe did in the 1980s. The most vulnerable are the under fives, pregnant women and those with underlying health conditions. These will need to be at the front of the queue and specific needs would need to be clinically determined. Basic emergency curative services include immunisations for under-fives, tetanus jabs for expectant mothers, vitamin A for high risk groups and a de-worming of children. This phase is usually resource intensive and costs vary according to what will need to be done. A substantial rise in health expenditure from the current US\$0.19 is clearly needed. It is also imperative in the immediate term to:

- Arrest the brain drain through retention schemes. Reasonable remuneration based on regional rates will be needed to retain skilled health workers and attract back those that had left.
- Revitalise training facilities, especially capitalisation of the College of Health Sciences. This is an absolute priority as this is the only way to begin to fill the skills gap. Experience from other States suggests that health professionals that migrate are unlikely to return and settle. Although mechanisms may be needed to utilise health professionals in the diaspora to restore health services (like short term voluntary work or consultancies), there is no substitute for augmenting health training.
- Refocus attention to child health, maternal health, nutrition, communicable diseases including HIV, malaria and tuberculosis and non communicable diseases.
- Rebuild management capacity in strategic planning, expenditure management and budget planning.
- Establish reliable medical and surgical supplies.
- Improve health information and systems. Though this had managed to reach international standards it has gone into decline and will need to be prioritised in the short term to facilitate the identification of gaps. This can then feed back to the Ministry and donors to identify key areas on which to work.
- Gather information on the status of health infrastructure.

While it is notable that in the short term there is unlikely to be any capital injection that will be used on infrastructural development, there is a need to invest in the collection of information on the state of health infrastructure. This will influence how best to tackle this particular issue.

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<sup>39</sup> See Waters et al (2009).

#### *Phase two: medium term restoration of essential services*

Once immediate health risks have been addressed, systematic delivery of essential health services can be contemplated. Phases one and two overlap. Phase one will require significant involvement of outside agencies, while phase two is about asserting the authority of the State again. It is about making sure that there is a set of functional structures and institutions around essential health service delivery. For Zimbabwe, this will mean restoration of health programming and a return to the primary health and curative health care strategies, with a focus on quick win areas or quick impact programmes. Crucially, it is about making sure that there is enough funding available to deliver the service.

#### *Phase 3: rehabilitation*

During phase three long-term planning can begin. During this phase effective health information systems are a necessity.

### **7.3 Conclusion**

This chapter has shown how far the health system has declined and clearly a lot of investment will be required to restore it to its pre-crisis levels. While the ideas on what needs to be done first are easy to outline, the ability to pay for the cost of restoring the health system will prove the more difficult. On the one hand the user-pays principle established under ESAP will make health inaccessible to a majority of impoverished Zimbabweans. On the other, free universal health will not be possible for the cash-strapped government given the state of the productive sectors.

In the last five years there has been a move by the international community to channel their resources through civil society rather than through the government treasury. While donors might chip-in to support specific programmes, in the end there will need to be a compromise that allows cost recovery, especially from among those income groups that can afford it. For the majority, while the economy recovers, it might mean reliance on a social protection system to provide for basic health services. It is to this that we now turn.



## CHAPTER 8: Social Protection in Zimbabwe

### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at social protection reforms and priorities that Zimbabwe will have to consider for the future after the economic crisis. It is divided into five sections. The first section defines social protection and its constitutive parts: social insurance, labour-market regulation and social assistance. The second section describes Zimbabwe's social assistance system as it developed in the 1980s. The third examines what happened to this system of welfare during the reform decade of the 1990s, while the fourth section sketches out the main welfare challenges in present-day Zimbabwe. The final section considers possible responses to the social assistance challenges in a post-crisis Zimbabwe.

### 8.2 What is social protection?

Social protection has often been seen as actions to protect citizens against livelihood risks, promote the livelihoods and capabilities of the vulnerable, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised (Wutete, summarised by Manjengwa, 2008: 4). Importantly, social protection is not limited to *reactive* welfare handouts in the event of shocks, but also involves *proactive* action taken to build human capital to enhance the capacity of individuals to survive adverse situations (Stewart, 2008). The *responsive* and *preventive* dimensions of the concept are evident in contemporary discourses on social protection and are used to shape policies. Following Conway et al., (2000), Barrientos and Hulme (2008) link public actions undertaken to address vulnerability, risk and deprivation to social protection for the poor, and group policies into three categories: social insurance, labour-market regulation and social assistance. Each of these aspects of social protection differs from the other in its objectives and how it is normally funded.

Social insurance provides protection arising from work-related shocks (e.g. unemployment or sickness) and life-course changes (e.g. old-age pensions) and is typically financed by worker and employer contributions. Because the welfare of workers is not just about protection from life-cycle and work-related contingencies but also fundamentally determined by the conditions of work they face, a second important aspect of social protection involves government regulation of the labour-market. Specifically, the welfare of workers is connected to the basic standards of work they enjoy and the overall rights workers have to organise and voice their concerns (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008). If the first two aspects of social protection address the welfare concerns of those individuals in formal employment, the third, social assistance, speaks more generally to the rest: the unemployed or poor. Broadly, social assistance provides support for those in deprivation. Social assistance programmes are generally funded by the State with the aim of supporting those living in poverty. Table 8.1 summarises each of these aspects of social protection.



**Table 8.1: Aspects of social protection**

<i>Aspect of Social Protection</i>	<i>Objective</i>	<i>Normal Source of Support</i>
Social Insurance	Protection from life-cycle and work-cycle changes	Employer and Employee Contributions
Labour-Market Regulation	Provides standards at work	Public – legislation
Social Assistance	Protection from poverty	Public – tax-financed

In this section the focus is on questions around the reconstruction of Zimbabwe's social assistance system (namely, health, education, agriculture, and famine relief), but its intent is to spur discussion on what an integrated social protection system ought to look like. Though not directly addressed, the chapter recognises that a comprehensive social protection regime in Zimbabwe would require the stabilisation of the economy, such that privately purchased social insurance schemes re-establish themselves as viable options.

### **8.3 Social Assistance in the first decade, 1980-89**

When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, it faced dire economic conditions and an immense welfare gap produced by years of colonial rule and a bitter war of liberation. However, the end of the conflict, the removal of sanctions, the strong wage-induced consumer demand and a stellar agricultural harvest in 1980-81 led to the initial growth of the economy (Sanders and Davies, 1988). With respect to the welfare gap, especially for rural Zimbabweans, the new government adopted a 'state socialist approach which actively sought to reduce poverty' (Marquette, 1997: 1142).

The comprehensive approach that the government pursued contained five major social assistance programmes. First, the government sought to improve the wellbeing of unskilled and semi-skilled labour through minimum wage legislation. During the early 1980s, minimum wages for domestic workers, agricultural workers, industrial workers and mine workers were increased by the government in an attempt to address aspects of the welfare gap produced by colonialism (see Table 8.2). The Government augmented its minimum wage policy by gaining control of the inherited price control system, to implement additional social assistance programmes. Through the price control instruments, the government kept the price of basic food commodities (maize meal, cooking oil, bread, etc) relatively low by subsidising producers.

Second, in the 1980s Zimbabwe made significant welfare improvements by providing free health care to those earning less than Z\$150 per month and their families,<sup>40</sup> erecting and upgrading hospitals and rural health centres,<sup>41</sup> expanding the immunisation programme to cover pregnant women and children against the six major childhood diseases, and initiating the National Village

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<sup>40</sup> In September of 1980 when this programme was announced, the average minimum wage in the country was about Z\$70.00 a month. This meant that majority of Zimbabweans had access to free health care.

<sup>41</sup> By 1989, over 323 rural health centres or clinics had been erected (Sanders & Davies, 1988).

Health Worker (VHW)<sup>42</sup> and the Traditional Midwives Programmes (TMP) to train local village-based health-care providers (Ministry of Health, 1984; Agere, 1987). In addition to these health care programmes, the Government also declared diarrhoea a national priority by launching the Diarrhoeal Disease Control Programme (DDCP). This programme also trained mothers to properly prepare the oral hydration therapy solution (Cutts, 1984). Finally, through the newly created National Nutrition Unit, the Government adopted a host of nutritional programmes, including the Child Supplementary Feeding Programme (CSFP). Through this programme, over 250,000 under-nourished children in over 8,000 communal area feeding points were provided an energy-rich meal (Working Group, 1982; Ministry of Health, 1984).

**Table 8.2: Legislated monthly minimum wage (nominal Z\$), 1980-1986**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Domestic Workers</i>		<i>Agricultural Workers</i>		<i>Industrial Workers</i>	<i>Mining Workers</i>	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)		(a)	(b)
1 July 1980	30	(c)	30	(c)	70	43	70
30 Dec. 1980	30	(c)	30	(c)	85	58	85
1 May 1981	--	--	--	--	--	(d)	85
1 Jan. 1982	50	62(e)			105		105
1 Sep. 1983	55	67	55	65	115		110
1 July 1984	65	77			125		120
1 July 1985	75	93	75	93	143		143
1 July 1986	85	--	85	--	158		158

*Source: Sanders and Davies (1988: 725).*

- Notes: (a) For those workers who also received payments in kind  
 (b) For workers who did not receive payments in kind  
 (c) Benefits were to be added to cash wage  
 (d) Mineworkers not paid in kind after this date  
 (e) Different grades of domestic workers recognized after this date

As numerous scholars have noted, 'education has always been in the forefront of politics in Zimbabwe...' (Zvobgo, 1987: 319). During the colonial period, restricting African access to education was one of the policies used by the settler State to protect, defend and reproduce white privilege. After independence the new government aggressively reformed the educational system. Significantly, the government sought to achieve universal primary school education by abolishing fees for primary education (Zvobgo, 1987; Sanders and Davies 1988). During this period, there was an average annual increase in school enrolments of over 20 percent: from 892,668 in 1979 to 2,727,162 by 1985 (CSO, 1986).

<sup>42</sup> According to Stoneman & Cliffe (1989: 173), by 1987 this programme had trained 7,000 out of the target 15,000 village health workers.

Gains were not just limited to primary education. As bottlenecks in the educational system inherited from the colonial period were removed, there were dramatic increases in enrolments at secondary schools and technical colleges. Comparing enrolments in 1988 with those in 1980, du Toit (1995) concludes that attendance at secondary schools was up by 771.5 per cent and technical college enrolments were 623.7 per cent higher. In addition to expanding student access to education, the government also committed itself to addressing the quality of education. This began with a 1982 decision to nationally standardise student-teacher ratios at 1:40 for primary education, 1:30 for secondary education and 1:20 for sixth-form students (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989). To capture adults, the government also adopted an adult literacy programme. These changes had a double effect on the welfare status of the population: they contributed to the general welfare of the population through the intrinsic value of education; and free primary education increased in real incomes for households with school-age children (Sanders and Davies, 1988).

Similarly to the education system, the new government in Zimbabwe inherited an agricultural sector characterised by a highly skewed land ownership pattern (see Mandaza, 1987; Moyo, 1987, 1995.). Estimates put white ownership of prime agricultural land at well over 70 per cent, compared with less than 30 per cent owned by 90 per cent of the population. Although the government's policies with respect to redressing unequal land ownership fell well short of rural expectations, the new government took advantage of the Agricultural Marketing Authority and its marketing organs, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) and used them as major instruments for transferring income, and some opportunity for social advancement to the rural population (Mumbengegwi, 1987; Herbst, 1990). By offering generous prices for many of the crops grown by peasants (maize, mhunga, rapoko, sorghum, and to some extent groundnuts and cotton) the new government provided welfare-improving incomes to the rural population.<sup>43</sup> However, as discussed by Herbst (1990) and Mumbengegwi (2002), these positive incentives came at a very high cost to the Government. Progressively, the transfer of income to the rural population through reasonably attractive crop prices produced significant losses for the GMB. For instance, the bumper harvest in 1981 saw the GMB deficit increase from Z\$20 million to Z\$43 million (Herbst, 1990).

Finally, in the 1980s the Government provided protection from absolute deprivation through drought relief programmes. Beginning in 1981, the country was hit by a drought that lasted about three years. In regions 4 and 5,<sup>44</sup> the maize crop was a complete failure throughout the drought years. In the worst hit region, Matabeleland, local papers reported that women were risking arrest by illegally crossing into apartheid South Africa in search of water (*The Herald*, 28 April 1982). Officials in the region estimated that close to 1 million people were in need of government assistance if starvation was to be averted (*The Herald*, 27<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> April 1982).

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<sup>43</sup> The positive price incentives offered to agriculture were motivated by the Governments' desire to become self-sufficient in food by removing the reliance on food imports from apartheid South Africa (see Rukuni & Eicher 1994; Herbst 1990) together with political pressures to transfer visible benefits to the rural population (Bratton 1987).

<sup>44</sup> Zimbabwe is divided into five agricultural regions based on rainfall patterns. Region 1 is categorized by intensive livestock production and diversified crop production; Region 2 by intensive grain crop production supported by livestock production; Region 3 by semi-intensive mixed production; Region 4 by semi-extensive livestock production; and Region 5 by extensive beef production.

In response to the food crisis of 1982-84, the Government adopted a drought relief programme that lasted about two years. The main elements of the Government of Zimbabwe's 1982-84 response involved large-scale distribution of take-home food rations to the adult population,<sup>45</sup> a supplementary feeding for children under five and lactating mothers, a significant water supply scheme, cattle protection and input provision for the communal sector (see Munro, 2001; Munemo, 2008b). In 1982-83 about 850,000 people received a ration of 10.34 kg each month. The following year, in 1983-84, 1,462,226 people received a ration of 9.9 kg each month.

In 1987-88 the Government was once again called on to protect citizens from a drought-induced famine. This time around the Government changed its response from one predicated on food aid to one that relied on self-selection into public works programmes. Thus, the new relief policy adopted by the Government of Zimbabwe had two components: limited free food distribution (FFD) for households that did not have an able-bodied adult and food-for-work (FFW) for households with an able-bodied adult. Projects for FFW were drawn from existing projects under Provincial and District Development Plans, with some on-the-spot invention of projects in some places.

**Table 8.3: Beneficiaries and cost of drought relief programmes**

Year	Form taken by drought relief	Average beneficiaries per month	Average grain distributed (Mt/month)	Average ration (kg/person/month)	Nominal Cost of the Programme (Z\$) Yearly Average
1982-83	Free food aid	847,930	8,767.26	10.34	22,228,827
1983-84	Free food aid	1,462,226	14,480.75	9.9	41,800,652
1987-88	Labour-based	1,082,213	10,576.98	9.77	34,976,648

\* Net Cereal Exports

*Source: Munro (2001); Herbst (1990)*

This expansion in social spending immediately after independence resulted in government expenditure rising by an average rate of 24 per cent per year between 1980 and 1984 (Sanders and Davies, 1988).<sup>46</sup> Overall government spending on the social sector rose from about 26 per cent

<sup>45</sup> Initially, all members of households in which the head of household earned an income less than the statutory minimum wage were eligible for food aid. However, such a broad eligibility criterion essentially meant that the majority of rural households were eligible to receive the 20 kg of un-milled maize per person per month under the drought relief program. In the end, it was estimated that as many as 2.3 million people from a rural population of about 5.7 million benefited from this policy.

<sup>46</sup> However, the early growth was undercut by a 3-year drought (1981-84), a world recession and South African destabilization. In response to the shrinking economy (and tax base from which to fund social spending) the Government attempted to control its spending by removing some food subsidies, freezing wages, being less aggressive in adjusting agricultural prices and adjusting the maximum wage below which Zimbabweans were entitled to receive free health care and education. Sanders & Davies (1988: 724) suggest that removal of food subsidies and wage freezes had direct consequences on nutritional

of the total budget in 1980-81 to just under 35 per cent by 1990-91 (Alwang et al., 2002: 4). Thus, by the end of the 1980s Zimbabwe had admirable social welfare indicators for a country at its level of development.

#### 8.4 Social assistance in the second decade

Stagnating macroeconomic performance and an increasing gap between government revenues and expenditures created problems that led to the adoption of market reforms in the 1990s (Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Mumbengegwi, 2002; Alwang et al., 2002). Market reforms in Zimbabwe were announced in 1990 with the expressed objectives of reducing government spending, deregulating the economy and lifting restrictions on trade, in the hope of promoting sustainable growth. Although reforming the civil service proved politically difficult to accomplish, the government removed price controls, reduced expenditures on subsidies, and relaxed import licensing and foreign exchange controls (Mumbengegwi, 2002). However, the removal of food subsidies and wage controls (Gibbon, 1995) and the introduction of cost recovery in education and health (Renfrew, 1992; Lennox, 1994) had tremendous effects on the social assistance system that had been built in the 1980s, prompting many to raise questions about the social cost of adjustment in Zimbabwe (see Silveira House, 1993; ZTWU and ZCTU, 1993).

**Table 8.4: Change in policy environment following adjustment in Zimbabwe**

	<i>Policy Position in 1980s</i>	<i>Policy Position in the 1990s</i>
Domestic Economy	Regulation of marketing of agricultural commodities, price control through food subsidies, nationalization of basic industries, centralised wage controls and regulation of employment	Deregulation of domestic markets, industry and labour
Public Sector	Government spending to expand public services – health and education	Reduction of public spending and deficit. Cost recovery in health and education
Trade	Regulation of foreign investment, exchange and imports/exports	Deregulation of foreign investment, exchange, and imports/exports

*Source: Adopted from Marquette (1997: 1143)*

Although the Government appeared to have a guiding economic blueprint, on the whole policy-making during the 1990s ‘was almost completely haphazard, characterized by policy reversals and re-reversals’ (Jenkins, 2002: 49). The jerkiness of the Government’s overall policy stance was transmitted to its social assistance programmes as some were cut altogether, others remained

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status. These changes placed many Zimbabweans under stress as food prices rose sharply in response to the removal of subsidies while wages and earnings from agriculture declined (Sanders & Davies, 1988; Herbst, 1990).

though in an altered form, and new ones were adopted in hindsight as the social costs of adjustment were grudgingly recognised. This is most evident in programmes like the Social Dimensions of Adjustment, the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (Nkum, 1998), the Public Assistance Programme (Munro, 2005) among others, which were adopted to cushion segments of the population from the costs of adjustment. However, as Munro's (2005) assessment of the Poverty Assistance Programme reveals, these were ineffective in supporting those living in extreme poverty.

Predictably, the increase and strict enforcement of user fees in the health sector in the 1990s produced negative welfare effects. For instance, data from the Sentinel Site Surveillance Surveys<sup>47</sup> suggested that the introduction of user fees kept a significant number of women from seeking prenatal care (MPSLSW, 1993). The data also revealed that the number of rural women having their babies delivered in hospitals or clinics dropped from 81.1 per cent to 69.5 per cent after the introduction of user fees (MPSLSW, 1994: 12). Other studies also report an increase in the rate of maternal mortality (Minot, 1994). To make matters worse, 'total real health spending, real per capita health spending, and real wages of health personnel all declined by a third or more during 1990-94 ...' (Marquette, 1997: 1144). This meant that health care became more expensive during a period when the quality of service provided was declining.

Specific to the agricultural sector, reforms brought cuts in government support for research and development in new crop varieties, producer prices, and extension services (Rukuni 2006, 11). These programmes had contributed to the agricultural growth of the first decade (Rukuni & Eicher 1994). Also put to the axe during the early reform years was government input support (ploughing, seeds and fertilizer) for communal/peasant farmers. More significantly, the prices offered for crops in the 1990s fell compared to those offered in the 1980s at a time when communal farmers were exposed to the full cost of inputs.

To add to the crises produced by reform programmes, in 1992 Zimbabwe suffered its most severe drought in a century (GOZ, 1993; Thompson, 1993; Benson, 1998). According to the Government of Zimbabwe, poor rains in 1991/92, measuring over 300 mm below the country average of 662 mm per year, resulted in communal farmers harvesting an abysmal 10 per cent of their normal grain output. The total cereal crop of 44.6 Mt per 1,000 capita was over 410 Mt per 1,000 capita below the 1981 harvest. Thus, by the mid-1990s, the misplaced exuberance over Zimbabwe's agricultural revolution gave way to a grim reality of, at best, stagnant food production through much of the early 1990s and, quite worryingly, declining food production towards the end of the decade.

In spite of the scaling back of Government spending in other sectors in the 1990s, the Government initially proved willing to continue with its drought relief programmes. The Government of Zimbabwe continued with a labour-based policy during its third drought relief programme in 1992-93.

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<sup>47</sup> These surveys were administered biannually by the MPSLSW to approximately 4,000-5,000 households and 40 representative communities.

**Table 8.5: Average maize, wheat and sorghum prices by decade**

Period	Average Price of Maize US\$/Mt	Average Price of Wheat US\$/Mt	Average Price of Sorghum US\$/Mt
1980-89	116.043	197.347	116.197
1990-99	95.698	168.628	70.786
Per cent Fall in Price	17.532	14.552	39.081

*Source: Munemo (2008b)*

The 1992/93 version of the FFW programme had three key components: ensuring adequate supply of grain to the domestic market; a supplementary feeding programme for children under five and primary school children;<sup>48</sup> a food-for-work programme for adults; and an agricultural recovery programme (Government of Zimbabwe, 1993; Munro, 2001, 2003; Munemo, 2008a, 2008b). However, in 1995 President Mugabe announced that all previous drought relief programmes (FFW and FFD) were to be replaced by a Grain Loan Programme.<sup>49</sup> This new form of relief was implemented in 1995/96 and again in 1997/98 following another nation-wide drought in 1994/95 and a severe regional drought in 1996/97. In this way, the concern with some element of cost-recovery had also penetrated how the Government protected citizens from drought-induced threats of famine.

### 8.5 Social assistance during the economic crisis period, 2000-present

What is clear from the forgoing discussion is that there are two distinct pre-crisis social welfare regimes in Zimbabwe: first, a decade of high commitment to the social assistance needs of the poor, and second, a period beginning in the early 1990s that progressively rolled back government assistance programmes in favour of the market. Scholars disagree about the impetus for the switch from a development strategy that stressed equity and the welfare needs of the poor in the 1980s, to one in which, by the early 1990s, government's social assistance was minimal.

One view places the blame for the shift on international pressures from the IMF and World Bank (Rukuni, 2006). According to Rukuni (2006), the austerity measures of the reform programme undermined all the advances the Government had made in the agricultural sector in the first decade. Cuts to agricultural research and development were made (Mashingaidze, 2006; Mariga, 2006), extension services had been streamlined (Pazvakavambwa and Hakutangwi, 2006), input support to communal farmers was lowered (Rusike and Sukume, 2006) and, above all, agricultural marketing was less aggressive (Muir-Leresche and Muchopa, 2006) during the reform years.

Another view suggests that international pressures alone are an insufficient explanation of the shift in Zimbabwe's development strategy (see Skalnès, 1995; Dashwood, 2000). According to one variant of this position, it was not the presence of international pressure but the progressive

<sup>48</sup> See Munro (2002), for an assessment of the component of the relief. Feeding points for children were set up across the country. Under five-year-olds were to be given rations which amounted to 40 per cent of their daily caloric needs (60 grams of maize meal and 20 grams of beans per day per child) through a system of over 18,819 feeding points across the country.

<sup>49</sup> See Munro (2001) and Munemo (2008b) for a comprehensive discussion of this programme.

tendency of creating bourgeois aspirations among the ruling elite that tipped Zimbabwe's development strategy (Dashwood, 2000: 4-12). Though scholars disagree on the reasons for the change in focus of the government, there is agreement that during the 1990s poverty in Zimbabwe increased in prevalence, depth and severity as a result of the significant cuts in social assistance programmes and the inadequacies of programmes adopted by the Government (Table 8.6 summarises these indexes).

Historically, agriculture in Zimbabwe has absorbed a significant proportion of the labour force. However, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme cut agricultural labour significantly and contributed to increasing rates of urbanisation across Zimbabwe. However, rapid urbanisation was occurring at a time when the formal economy was shrinking. These processes had two immediate outcomes. First, lacking the capacity to provide adequate housing for the increasing population, most city councils turned a blind eye to the numerous non-code dwellings erected by homeless Zimbabweans or non-permit additions to existing homes. Second, the death of the formal economy as a source of jobs led to the growth of a vibrant informal sector involving numerous flea markets in most of the major cities in the country. As noted by UN Special Envoy Tibaijuka (2005: 23), the impetus for the growth of the informal sector was provided by Government, which removed many of the obstacles to the operation of small-scale businesses.

**Table 8.6: Urbanisation, exchange rates, inflation and per capita income in Zimbabwe, 1985-2005**

	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
Total Population	8,392,000	10,241,000	11,190,000	12,627,000	13,805,000
Urban Population	2,116,000	2,797,000	3,556,000	4,387,000	5,370,000
Urbanisation Level	25.2	28.4	31.8	35.3	38.9
Exchange Rate (1 US\$ = Z\$)	1.64	2.64	9.31	55.07	9,896.02
Inflation	8.49	17.38	22.59	55.86	140
GDP Per Capita (const. Z\$)	1,995	2,099	1,998	1,986	--
Per cent GDP growth per capita	3	4	-2	-7	-7

*Source: Tibaijuka (2005)*

The position of the Government regarding the informal sector changed dramatically on 19 May 2005 when it launched Operation Restore Order or *Murambatsvina*. In statements that followed the launching of the operation, the Government's intention was to clean-up the cities of all the illegal homes, stores and vending stalls that had sprouted across the country. The ensuing demolitions and evictions began in Harare and quickly spread to Bulawayo, Gweru and Mutare and to all urban areas included in growth points. Operation *Murambatsvina* resulted in the destruction of countless informal roadside businesses and neighbourhoods that had developed throughout the 1990s.

The Operation had a negative welfare effect. Conservative data released by the Government in July 2005 indicated that it had demolished close to 92,500 housing structures and over 32,500



small and medium-size businesses across the country. However, in her report, Tibaijuka (2005: 32) estimates that close to 570,000 people lost their homes and an additional 98,000 lost their livelihood as a direct result of the demolitions and evictions.

Expectedly, the destruction of shelter under *Murambatsvina* had ripple effects in other sectors. For instance, because the operation was carried-out in the middle of the school year, education was immediately disrupted for children of families whose homes and informal businesses were demolished. Parents did not have time to enrol children in alternative schools, or the resources to do so in some cases given the destruction of sources of livelihood. Tibaijuka (2005: 41) estimates that about 222,000 school-age children (between 5 and 18 years old) were directly affected by *Murambatsvina*.

As the economy collapsed and State programmes were cut, post-2000 Zimbabwe has also been characterised by the increasing privatisation of social assistance. In particular, we have witnessed an increasing reliance on remittances from Zimbabweans living abroad. However, while the numbers of those relying on remittances is high and the size of the flows of money is impressive, Bracking and Sachikonye's (2008) suggest that this informal system cannot substitute for the formal sector. As noted by many of their respondents, remittances barely keep-up with eight-digit inflation.

## **8.6 Post-crisis options for social protection for the poor**

This section examines some options for future social protection policy in Zimbabwe. We have looked at the experiences of other States in Africa to draw some lessons on post-crisis determinants of social protection. We have also looked at emerging regional experiences to get a sense of regional discursive constructions on social protection, and have considered contemporary global discourses and practices on the State and social protection of citizens in coming up with these scenarios.

It is clear based on the foregoing discussion that by the time the GNU was established the systematic social assistance programmes had failed to offer social protection to those that needed it. The State run programmes that remained (mainly food aid and agricultural input support) were largely seen as partisan, politicised and inadequate and by the time the GNU was formed non-State actors played a more prominent role than the State in social protection for the poor. The analysis has also showed that the overall State run social assistance system had already been severely dismantled by economic reforms in the early 1990s. The programmes that survived ESAP were merely the remnants of a more integrated system of assistance developed by the State in the 1980s. These further deteriorated during the crisis period. There is, therefore, need to revisit the role of the State and markets in social protection during the post-crisis period. It is clear from experiences in Latin America and other African countries that the State is increasingly expected to take a lead in developing comprehensive social protection schemes for its citizens in ways that advocates of small government may not like. Given the fact that the protracted crisis left most Zimbabweans poor, there is a case to be made for a comprehensive review of social protection provisioning.

In the short term, the Government will need to rebuild a social assistance system and establish a minimal livelihood floor below which citizens will not fall. As the economic crisis occurred systematic central planning for social protection was severely affected by both staff attrition and lack of resources. This gave prominence and visibility to individual programmes run by non-State agencies. Although funded by donors and acting on behalf of the State, the non-state actors have become the face of social protection for the poor, perhaps even being seen as a surrogate State. While State capacity to manage large, complex programmes is restored and confidence is built among citizens that State institutions will be non-partisan, non-state actors will necessarily continue to play a significant role, especially during the GNU's tenure. However it is imperative that the State uses this time to carry out a comprehensive review of social protection for its citizens and come up with a more integrated and inclusive social protection system. Such a review would ensure the State regains the initiative and visibility. The suggestion here is not for dismantling the involvement of non-state actors in social protection. Rather, it is for a restoration of central planning and systematic social protection by the State.

*Basic income grants, conditional cash grants for orphans, vulnerable children and the elderly*

In the medium to long term Zimbabwe might consider the Basic Income Grant (BIG) as an ambitious new way to provide for the welfare of the population. The BIG is a grant paid to all citizens, without means testing. Naturally all of the practical and specific details of the BIG in the context of a post-crisis Zimbabwe, in which levels of structural unemployment are as yet unknown and knowledge of what the minimal wage might be, will take some time to establish and require rigorous and focused research, analysis and debate.

The universality of the BIG might be appealing in Zimbabwe for two reasons. First, a BIG removes the huge administrative burden of targeting that is involved in means tested programmes. Secondly, the universalism of the BIG minimizes the possibility that social assistance will be politicised, because local, provincial or national administration will no-longer have the discretion to rule on the eligibility of beneficiaries. A key constraint, however, is the affordability of the programme for a cash-strapped State emerging out of a protracted recession.

The economic crisis hit orphans, the elderly and adults with chronic illnesses the hardest. Although the State and some non-state actors have provided for some of their needs (medicine and food), available evidence suggests that not all those in need could be assisted and the programme was ad hoc in coverage and scope. It is clear that the Government will need to think of ways to extend coverage to these groups. As the supply situation improves countrywide, it is suggested that consideration be given to shifting from food packages to cash transfers predicated on some health and education conditionalities. Food packages, which have always been a regular feature of social protection for the orphans and the elderly because of frequent droughts, worked very well in the shortage prone hyperinflation environment prior to dollarization. Experience from Mozambique suggests that its continued use in situations where the supply situation has improved could undermine food markets and ultimately farm production itself (Tschirley, et al 1996).

We suggest cash grants, as there is evidence that giving cash can instil confidence and provide a level of independence that direct food aid may not achieve in some situations. Evidence from Malawi and Zambia suggest that cash programmes can be more effective than food packages. However, there needs to be a minimum level of organisation to get this to work, and in the case of Zimbabwe the wide system of rural banking networks that had developed has largely disappeared. Perhaps a cash grant scheme could provide the impetus to rejuvenate them. To prevent the obvious moral hazards, it is suggested that families be enrolled for no more than five years and that the national fiscus rather than donors take a lead in resourcing the programme in the long term. In the interim however, donor support, both technical to assist setting up the programme and financial in providing matching funds, might be what is required. Questions of affordability will be raised given the state of the national economy.

### *Workfare relief*

A major priority for the Government will be to ensure the distribution of food aid to vulnerable groups to guarantee food security to both the urban and rural poor. However, considering that famine relief will need to be sustained until people can rebuild their livelihoods, workfare relief might be a more sustainable medium for long term response to the severe food insecurity across the country. Labour-based relief for able-bodied adults, while keeping a streamlined food aid programme for primary school children and the elderly, would help stretch the Government's resources through the anticipated long relief period. With high unemployment and a situation in which a significant portion of the country's physical infrastructure (sewage systems, water systems, roads, rural schools, clinics, etc) is in a state of disrepair, trading famine relief for some level of employment and the renovation of physical infrastructure would be prudent. The success of labour-based relief in Zimbabwe will be predicated on adequate technical monitoring and supervision of projects. One of the shortcomings of food-for-work programmes in the late 1980s and early 1990s was poor conception, monitoring and supervision. These are critical and affected the quality of work done during the 1992-93 drought relief programme. To forestall these problems, technical support will be necessary at local implementation of the projects as well as their planning. Strengthened local State institutions could be given this supervisory responsibility.

## **8.7 Conclusion**

The severe poverty and high unemployment in a post-crisis Zimbabwe will require innovative ways to prevent social instability and provide for the welfare of the country that go beyond the standard programmes discussed so far. The traditional social assistance programmes discussed above will have to be augmented by a broader policy that captures all Zimbabweans and re-integrates them into the economy.

The social protection policy should not be designed in such a way that it is so costly it begins to undermine economic recovery. Experience from elsewhere in Africa shows that donors would be reluctant to fund a universal programme that guarantees basic income but rather to target certain groups of the population. Currently, donors have shown an interest in funding pilot projects on cash transfers targeting orphans and vulnerable children, however, there is still scepticism that this form of social protection actually works. This means that in all likelihood the BIG will remain a long term vision for the country and is unlikely to be considered in the immediate future.

## **CHAPTER 9: Harnessing mobile telephony for sustainable development and poverty alleviation**

### **9.1 Introduction**

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are now acknowledged to be enablers of social and economic development (G8, 2000). They are central to the promotion of the goals of the Millennium Declaration, and have the potential for bringing about poverty alleviation and improvements in the quality of people's lives (WSIS, 2003). The economic crisis experienced in Zimbabwe in the past decade negatively affected the growth of the ICT sector, as it did all other sectors of the economy. Growth of mobile telephony and services was low in Zimbabwe, even as the 'connectedness revolution' was under way in other African countries, which saw an average annual growth rate in mobile phone usage of about 50 per cent for the period 2000-2007 (ITU, 2009a). Due in part to the economic crisis, the country was somewhat behind and missed the opportunities and benefits that accrued to the other countries that harnessed ICTs for the wellbeing of their populations. Such potential benefits as the creation of employment, cementing of family ties, generation of greater social interaction, creation of business efficiencies, access to information and knowledge, largely escaped most Zimbabweans.

This chapter looks at how the economic crisis affected the development of ICTs in Zimbabwe and considers how Zimbabwe can be more connected in the future, in ways that will enhance the welfare of its citizens. It reviews mobile services as an ICT application, for reasons that are both technical and practical. Technologically, mobile handsets are fast becoming internet access devices. They are recognised as instruments of change in finance, agriculture, media and development work. Mobile phones and the internet have started to converge, enabling mobile phones to offer various services that were previously only available on the internet. Mobile technology can now provide data on food prices to farmers, patient information to remote medical clinics, and help track supplies and logistics. From a social and practical point of view, mobile services are more ubiquitous and accessible to the general public in Africa than any other ICT device. This is certainly the case in Zimbabwe, where fixed telephony simply does not exist for most people, particularly in rural areas. Mobile phones have had mass appeal that has cut across barriers of education, incomes and social status, which other ICT applications such as internet have not been able to achieve. Evidence from emerging markets suggests that at 526 devices per 1,000 people, mobile phones have penetrated some of the hitherto difficult-to-reach places. This compares with only 132 out of every 1,000 homes having access to a fixed line phone, and only 61 of every 1,000 people having access to a personal computer. There are almost 280 million mobile phone subscribers in Africa already, and the numbers are increasing rapidly. In this regard, mobile phones are a utility tool.


## 9.2 The ICT sector in Zimbabwe

Chapter 1 examined how the decline in the economy undermined investment in infrastructure, and how this in turn affected service delivery. During this period, the ICT sector also suffered. Available evidence suggests that the ICT sector has a strong positive correlation with private sector investment. Hence, since investment levels were low, the sector did not develop. The Global Information Technology Report (WEF and INSEAD, 2009) assessed Zimbabwe to be among the lowest of the world's information technology compliant countries. On the Networked Readiness Index, which measures a country's ability to harness information technologies for economic competitiveness and development, Zimbabwe ranked 132 out of a total 134 countries that were surveyed, surpassing East Timor and Chad only (WEF and INSEAD, 2009: xvii). The Africa Competitiveness Report 2009 notes:

As for telecommunications infrastructure [Zimbabwe] is significantly more underdeveloped [than the regional average]. In particular, mobile telephony, which in many countries provides a substitute for the fixed telephone lines, is underdeveloped. The regulatory environment in Zimbabwe is considered to be the poorest within the entire ETI (Enabling Trade Index) sample of countries, not surprising given the country's current economic and political situation (WEF, 2009a: 128).

Indeed, the growth of the mobile sector in Zimbabwe was disappointing. In 2000 Zimbabwe's three mobile operators had 266,441 subscribers. Eight years later, the total subscribers were around 1.3 million, indicating that only one million new subscribers were added in eight years. This contrasts with average annual growth rates of 102 per cent recorded in Nigeria since 2006. Growth in the mobile sector has, nevertheless, outperformed that of fixed lines (see Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1: Zimbabwe's subscriber growth, 2000-2008.



Source: Supplied upon request from POTRAZ (2009)

When the data are disaggregated further (see Table 9.1 and Figure 9.2) they reveal a market dominated largely by one player, with the others hardly registering any growth. By 2008 Econet Wireless had a 76 per cent market share of mobile subscribers and 60 per cent of total telephone subscribers, including fixed.


Accurate data on effective demand for telephony in Zimbabwe are not easily available, but it can be concluded that all the operators suffered capacity constraints. Demand for telephony has far outstripped supply, turning the market into a suppliers' market. Poor service quality, especially network congestion, has been a feature of telephony in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, since demand for services far outstrips supply this has generated a thriving black market for the few mobile phone lines available, with a line costing anything between US\$50 to US\$100 in 2009. This is exorbitant when compared with countries such as Uganda and Kenya, where mobile lines are ubiquitous and retail at less than a tenth these rates. Clearly the economic crisis created a service capacity gap that needs to be addressed.

**Table 9.1: Zimbabwe subscriber growth since 2000**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
ECONET	93,706	134,000	139,402	151,000	173,000	362,000	477,000	648,908	988,656
NET ONE	89,949	91,800	114,000	117,000	130,000	197,000	215,488	331,000	418,065
TELECEL	82,786	84,690	85,000	95,000	130,000	140,000	156,698	245,746	248,000
TEL ONE	238,956	249,400	257,777	300,921	317,000	328,000	335,561	344,502	364,281
Total	505,397	559,890	596,179	663,921	750,000	1,027,000	1,184,747	1,570,156	1,641,565
Total mobile	266,441	310,490	338,402	363,000	433,000	699,000	849,186	1,225,564	1,296,565
Per cent growth (F)	1	4	3	17	5	3	2	3	6
Per cent growth (M)	65	17	9	7	19	61	31	44	35

*Source: Supplied upon request from POTRAZ, 2009*

**Figure 9.2: Operators' subscriber growth in Zimbabwe, 2000-2008.**



*Source: Supplied upon request from POTRAZ (2009)*

The situation was not helped by The Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ), which tried to balance the legitimate demands by operators for a tariff structure that ensures their viability, with an equally legitimate obligation to ensure an affordable service for the consumer. Often, it failed to satisfy either of the parties. For example, pricing regulations implemented in July 2007 forced operators to charge the equivalent of US\$0.05 (half a US cent) per minute against an international average of US\$0.15. Operators were not happy with this suboptimum tariff, yet at the same time, that tariff was beyond the reach of many ordinary mobile users, whose incomes were no more than US\$10 per month. Operator viability was further hurt by the non-availability of foreign currency, with the only source being the thriving parallel (black) market, which was, however, criminalised. Financial results declared using the official exchange rate would show a deceptively rosy picture.

The poor performance of the Zimbabwean mobile sector is particularly noticeable when juxtaposed against the rapid growth elsewhere in Africa. Mobile usage was growing by an annual average of 52 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa. With only one million subscribers in 1996, the continent had registered 100 million by 2005, and a record quarter billion by December 2008 (ITU, 2009a: 13). Available estimates suggest that by June 2009 there were about 289 million subscribers in Africa.

### 9.3 Mobile growth: comparative analysis with selected countries

Table 9.2 compares the performance of mobile growth against economic growth with eight other regional countries. Kenya was similar to Zimbabwe in terms of the structure of the economy and the timing of the launch of mobiles and introduction of competition. Similar to Zimbabwe, Kenya initially had only two mobile and one fixed operators, but mobile subscribers grew from 180,000 in 2000, to 7.34 million by December 2007 (CCK, 2008).

**Table 9.2: Selected regional economies, mobile cellular subscriptions, 2003 and 2008**


Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	2003	2008	CAGR Per cent 2003-2008
Ghana	3.8	48.3	66.7
Kenya	4.9	42.1	54
Mozambique	2.3	20.2	54.6
Nigeria	2.5	41.6	75.4
South Africa	35.9	92.2	20.7
Tanzania	2.4	31.4	67.9
Uganda	2.9	26.8	56.1
Zambia	2.1	29.1	68.6
Zimbabwe	2.8	13.1	35.9

*Source: ITU 2009a.*



The economic crisis in Zimbabwe affected the uptake and provision of telephony in two main ways. Firstly, crisis created an unfavourable investment climate that stifled network expansion. Secondly, the ability of most Zimbabweans to make a living was affected, which brought about a significant decline in effective demand for telephone services. The net result was an inadequate mobile telephony service that lagged behind that of the other countries in the region (Figure 9.3).

**Figure 9.3: Selected regional economies' mobile cellular subscribers, 2000 and 2006.**



Source: *African Development Bank 2009: 59.*

#### 9.4 Growth in other ICT sub-sectors

##### *The internet*

Measuring internet use in Africa is highly speculative, but estimates suggest that by the end of 2007 more than half of the 50 million users were in North Africa and South Africa (ITU, 2008). In Zimbabwe, available statistics suggest the country had about 1,351,000 internet users. This gives an internet penetration of 11.9 per cent and would make internet penetration higher than mobile penetration for comparable time periods (Table 9.3). The figure of internet users in Zimbabwe is higher than that given for other countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, and Uganda, which, as we saw in Table 9.2, have experienced significant mobile telephone growth rates. The explanation for this is not clear, but it could be that in the absence of access to mobile telephony, people used the internet through cybercafés as an alternative communication channel, particularly when communicating with the diaspora community. The growth in internet and broad band connectivity in Zimbabwe for the period 2000-2008 is shown in Table 9.4.

**Table 9.3: Selected regional economies, internet and broadband users and penetration**

Country	Internet users	Internet penetration (Per cent)	(Fixed) internet subscribers	Broadband subscribers
Zimbabwe	1,351,000	11.9	100000	15,200
Zambia	500,000	4.3	12,578	2,300
Malawi	139,500	1.0	85,029	1,600
Namibia	101,000	4.5	90,000	300
South Africa	4,590,000	10.5	4,279,200	378,000
Tanzania	400,000	1.0		
Uganda	750,000	2.4	15,500	1,900
Kenya	3,000,000	7.9	186,801	17,700
Sudan	3,500,000	8.7		42,500

Sources: Extracted from Internet World Stats for 31 March 2009; ITU African Telecom Indicators 2008 (fig. 2007)

**Table 9.4: Zimbabwe internet and broadband, 2000-2008**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Internet subscribers (000s)	30.0	35.0	40.0	83.0	90.0	96.0	97.0	99.5	99.5
Internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants	0.24	0.28	0.32	0.66	0.72	0.77	0.78	0.80	0.80
Internet users (000s)	50.0	100.0	500.0	800.0	820.0	1,000.0	1,220.0	1,351.0	1,421.0
Internet users per 100 inhabitants	0.40	0.80	3.99	6.39	6.56	8.02	9.79	10.85	11.40
Broadband subscribers total (000s)	....	0.8	2.8	6.4	9.0	10.2	10.2	15.2	15.2
Broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants	....	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.12

Source: ITU ICT Eye, available at [www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Default.aspx](http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Default.aspx).

The number of personal computers per 100 people has risen from 1.5 per 100 in 2000 to 6.5 per 100 in 2007. This is higher than the average 1.8 per 100 for sub-Saharan Africa. This may have a correlation with the higher levels of literacy in the country and may be a good sign of the adoption readiness, should other inhibiting conditions be attended to.

The major impediment to internet usage in many developing countries, and in Zimbabwe, is cost. Because of the scarcity of broadband, most internet access is dial-up, and most countries charge for dial-up at conventional voice calling rates. A monthly usage of 20 hours of internet access costs almost US\$50 in Africa, almost twice as much as the next highest region, the Americas.


Internet pricing shows a very wide variation among African countries; but, more than one-third of the economies have monthly price baskets of more than 25 per cent of per capita income. The price basket for internet per month in Zimbabwe was 24.6 in 2007 – much lower than the 29.2 average for the lower income countries, and even lower than the 43.1 for the sub-Saharan countries (World Bank 2009 ICT at a Glance - [http://devdata.worldbank.org/ict/zwe\\_ict.pdf](http://devdata.worldbank.org/ict/zwe_ict.pdf)). This sounds like good news, but not when seen within the broader context of the low income of the population and of the inflation that eroded the value of the Zimbabwe dollar to an extent whereby every service looks cheap when denominated in US dollars.

### *Broadband*

When available, broadband in Africa is very expensive. The average price for an entry level broadband (256 kbps) is US\$100 per month, when the average for the OECD countries is US\$45. Price variations are widest in the broadband market, ranging from US\$18 per month in Morocco, to US\$40 in Senegal (ITU, 2008) to as much as US\$1,000 in Zimbabwe. There is no way that internet usage can be extensive when the costs are so prohibitively high. When comparing the three technologies of fixed telephones, mobile telephones and broadband in developing and developed countries it is clear that broad band is extremely expensive in developing countries (Figure 9.4).

The solution for lowering prices is to allow as many players into this market as possible to encourage competition. In addition, introduction of wireless internet will allow alternative ways of delivering broadband. It is hoped that planned undersea optical fibre projects in Africa, such as SEACOM's undersea cable connecting south and east Africa, the East African Submarine Cable System (EASSY) and the East African Marine System (TEAMS), will lead to a lowering of broadband prices in Africa.

**Figure 9.4: Difference in prices of ICTs between developing and developed countries, 2008.**




*Source: ITU, 2009b.*

### **9.5 ICT growth, development and poverty alleviation: conceptual reflections and implications for poverty-focused development in Zimbabwe**

A key conclusion of the two World Summits on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva in 2003 and Tunis in 2005 was the recognition that ICTs are not only drivers for economic growth, but a key component in addressing development challenges (OECD, 2009). Although there are still contestations on whether growth in ICTs causes economic growth or economic growth leads to ICT growth, some available evidence suggests that GDP and telecommunications growth have causal effects in both directions (Hardy, 1980; Cronin, 1991; Norton, 1992; Alleman et al, 1994). Investment in telecommunications infrastructure, such as backbone infrastructure, is considered part of productive spending, as it has an effect on long-run aggregate supply. Such investments were found to have significant effects on growth (Röller and Waverman, 2001). The impact is twice as large for those economies that already have a substantial network infrastructure in place, and/or have achieved universal coverage.

A study of OECD countries over the period 1985 to 1997 observed that a one per cent change in GDP corresponds to roughly an eight per cent change in investment, demonstrating large telecom investment sensitivity to the economic climate (OECD 2009). Indeed, the economic declines of 2000 in Europe saw severe declines in telecommunication investments. Work by Quiang and Rossotto (2009) shows that access to affordable, high quality broadband and mobile phone services promotes development across all levels of an economy. A ten per cent increase in high speed internet connections is shown to result in an increase of up to 1.3 per cent in overall economic growth. The evidence also shows that different ICT technologies have different impacts on growth, with fixed telephony having the lowest impact and broadband the highest impact (see Figure 9.5). Such evidence suggests that embracing new ICTs could enhance productivity growth and, depending on how the benefits of growth are distributed, could help reduce poverty.

**Figure 9.5: Growth effects of ICT**



Sources: Qiang, 2009; World Bank, 2009b.

Note: The y axis represents the percentage-point increase in economic growth per ten-percentage-point increase in telecommunications penetration. All results are statistically significant at the one per cent level, except for that of broadband in developing countries, which is at the ten per cent level.

### *Mobile phone growth and economic performance*

With respect to mobile telephony, which has greater relevance for Africa, the available evidence suggests that a ten per cent difference in mobile penetration levels translates to a 0.6 per cent difference in economic growth rates (Waverman, 2005: 2). When the same (Waverman) model was specifically applied to developing countries, it was found that the impact was in fact double the average: a boost in economic growth of 1.2 per cent for every ten per cent rise in mobile users (GSMA, 2007). Recent studies have concluded that, in fact, the development impact of mobile phone technology is understated by as much as 75 per cent, because analyses have tended to focus only on the direct impact on GDP, and have ignored the indirect impact on downstream industries and consumer benefits (McKinsey, 2006). Considered together, the impact of mobiles on economic development comes to eight per cent of GDP (Waverman, Meschi and Fuss, 2005; McKinsey, 2006). Empirical evidence from the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda shows that in 2006, a ten per cent increase in mobile penetration was estimated to have contributed as much as 1.25 per cent to GDP (Deloitte, 2007). A recent study by Deloitte and Touche (2007) covering Serbia, Bangladesh, Ukraine, Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan found that the contribution of mobile phone technology to GNP amounted to between 4.5 and six per cent, and had contributed to the creation of 36,000 jobs (in Serbia) and 244,000 (in Pakistan) (Focus, 2008). Mobile phones contributed as much as 24 per cent of the tax revenue of the countries studied.

In a GSM Association report (2008), it is estimated that for every dollar invested in the mobile industry in Africa between 2000 and 2012, US\$0.80 will be earned as tax revenues by governments, with more accruing indirectly. The report argues that lower tax will increase usage and in turn increase revenues, as more people can afford to be connected. It is further argued that the 'dead weight' loss caused by mobile taxation is likely to be more significant when demand is relatively elastic, and when industry has relatively high fixed costs and relatively low marginal costs (Hausman, 1997). Quite clearly, a case can be made for the growth-enhancing potential of telephony and ICTs in general. A key question, however, is whether this growth generated by ICTs and telephony can be linked to poverty reduction efforts in Zimbabwe.

### *Telecommunications and poverty alleviation*

There have been studies done to investigate if an increase in teledensity (i.e. more access to telecommunications per 100 people) is pro-poor in terms of its growth impacts (Forestier et al, 2002). Cross-country evidence suggests that, prior to the internet (and to mobiles) increased teledensity in fact led to greater inequality. However, emerging evidence indicates that newer technologies such as the internet and mobile phones can be a source of growth that diminishes income inequality, if appropriate policies are put in place for harnessing these technologies for the common good. This finding reinforces the important role of policy frameworks and regulatory regimes that place the sector's development within the macro-economic and social development sphere.

A Socio-Economic Impact of Mobiles (SIM) project launched by Vodafone in 2004 tracked these benefits through research conducted in Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa and Egypt. The project found three broad categories of benefits the poor may receive. Firstly, mobiles offer **incremental**

**benefits**, through enabling people to be more efficient in whatever they have already been doing. Fishermen in Kerala in India were able to coordinate supply and demand for their catch and respond more efficiently to market demand, thus reducing waste and minimising the risk and uncertainty of the market (Abraham, 2007). Fishermen's profits went up by eight per cent and consumer prices went down by four per cent, thus benefiting both the producer and the consumer (Jensen, 2007). In Kenya, the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange (KACE) provides prices to farmers through text messages, enabling them to decide whether or not to deliver, where and when to do so, and often avoiding costly trips. Mobiles have enabled traders to overcome the challenges associated with physical distances, and lack of information. Studies in Tanzania found mobiles remove the need to travel long distances to look for employment, enable friends and relatives to keep in touch and enable access to health and emergency services (Vodafone, 2004).

Secondly, there are **transformational benefits**, through new and innovative offerings that unlock opportunities that were not previously available. The most celebrated of such benefits is mobile banking (m-banking), which has enabled many rural people who have never had a bank account to access micro-financing, receive money remitted from their relatives in the cities, and to pay for goods and services without the need to travel or carry cash. Successful mobile banking projects in Africa have been undertaken in South Africa (WIZZIT) and Kenya (M-Pesa). There is now a stampede by operators to join this growing market.

The third cluster of benefits is **production benefits**, resulting from the creation of new livelihoods. The selling of phone cards and airtime is a common sight in Africa, and many small businesses sell second-hand mobile phones. These activities generate thousands of jobs (ID21, 2007; ODI, 2009). Mobiles have also created business opportunities, and increased profits for small traders in Egypt and South Africa. A review of the social and economic development impact of the Grameen Village Phone Program in Bangladesh established that incomes for phone operators averaged between 24 and 40 per cent of household incomes, and left the owners socially and economically empowered (Richardson et al, 2000). Up to a quarter of a million people in Bangladesh depend on the mobile industry for a living, either directly or indirectly. The success of any technology or innovation is judged by its rate of adoption (Agarwal and Prasad, 1998). If we use this measure to assess the benefits of mobile technology, it has passed the test of acceptance in the developing world, particularly in Africa.

#### *Mobile phones and financial services: mobile banking and remittances*

One transformational and developmental feature of mobile phones has been giving the poor access to financial services to which they would have not otherwise had access. Access to financial services is a public good that is important in enabling people to participate in the modern, market-based economy (Arun and Hulme, 2008). It is therefore a tool for social and economic inclusion and an important component of poverty alleviation. Demand for financial services in Africa is high, despite the low levels of income (UNCTAD, 2007b: 19), and research has shown that both the poor and rural people have the desire to save and will do so, given the opportunity (de Soto, 2000). The main reasons for the poor not having bank accounts is the unavailability of banking networks (due to the prohibitive costs for banks to open outlets in distant places) and the fragmented and segmented structure of the financial sector in Africa.

Other reasons include high transaction costs and stringent formalities for opening an account (Ivatury and Pickens 2006). Mobile banking brings all the benefits of a formal bank, minus the hassles and the costs, plus the advantage of mobility.

Globally there is a huge potential market for mobile banking. Only one billion of the world's 6.5 billion people have bank accounts, yet there are now more than four billion mobile phones. The World Bank estimates that in many developing countries, over half the population has never had a bank account. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor estimates that 80 per cent of the population in UN-designated least developed countries have no access to banking (CGAP, 2009). It is also estimated that only ten per cent of the recipients of remittances in Latin America have bank accounts (Smith, 2005), yet remittances are a growing global business, worth an estimated \$433 billion in 2008, that m-banking is in a position to service (World Bank 2009).

From a business point of view, figures from McKinsey and Company indicate that mobile money has the potential to deliver up to US\$5 billion in direct revenues for mobile operators, and US\$2.5 billion in indirect revenues per year by 2012 (GSMA, 2009). This is on the basis of the service being adopted by an additional 364 million unbanked customers. The market size growth projection is put at 1.7 billion people with mobile phones but no access to financial services in developing countries by 2012, up from the current one billion (CGAP, GSMA 2009).

Africa is an interesting proposition for mobile banking, because of the combined impact of rapidly increasing mobile telephone penetration and very low access to financial services, as well as the existence of large populations of people living abroad and supporting their families and relatives back home through remittances. With mobile penetration expected to grow, so will access to financial services that are mobile enabled. The weighted average percentage of population with access to financial services is approximately 23 per cent, which makes it comparatively lower than in other regions (GSMA, 2009). Mobile penetration levels and access to financial services for selected countries are shown in Table 9.5.

**Table 9.5: Selected regional countries, access to financial services and mobile penetration, 2008 and 2012**

Country	Access to financial services (per cent)	Mobile penetration (per cent)	
		2008	2012*
Tanzania	5	33	61
Kenya	10	49	101
Liberia	11	29	49
Mozambique	12	26	42
Sierra Leone	13	26	55
Zambia	15	31	63
Sudan	15	29	73
Nigeria	15	46	97

\* Projected

Sources: *Wireless Intelligence* ([www.wirelessintelligence.com](http://www.wirelessintelligence.com)), *World Bank* (2007).



Globally remittances continue to grow in size and significance to national economies. They are the second largest financial flow into developing country economies after foreign direct investment (Scott et al, 2004). Remittances are popular in Africa, with estimates of over US\$ 90 billion sent back home by migrant workers every year (Ericsson, 2007). Remittances through mobiles are up to ten times cheaper than other forms of remittances. This reason alone makes mobile banking an attractive alternative in Africa. Mobile banking was popularised in the Philippines (Porteous, 2006). In Africa, South Africa's WIZZIT, started in December 2004, is an example of this (Ivatury and Pickens, 2006). M-Pesa – a mobile banking service introduced by Kenya's leading mobile operator, Safaricom, in March 2007 – is another example offering money transfers, airtime top-up and transfers, and payments for utilities such as electricity bills. It competes very favourably in the money transfer market. Other money transfer platforms have lost market share and now control only three per cent of total transfers, from close to a tenth of the total transfers two years ago. A major selling point for the mobile operators is their relatively low transaction costs. Official data on cash movement in the Kenyan economy shows that nowadays 47 per cent of all money transfers take place through the mobile phone (*Business Daily*, 14 Sept 2009). A survey in Kenya done by Financial Sector Deepening on behalf of the Central Bank of Kenya, found out that nine out of ten users of mobile cash transfers say they are mainly attracted by convenience, almost instantaneous speeds, safety and relatively lower transaction costs.

#### *Lessons for Zimbabwe's recovery programme*

Based on this analysis, it is clear that recovery for the ICT sector will mean three key priorities. Firstly, there will be need to implement the 'National Information and Communication Technology Policy Framework' published by the Ministry of Science and Technology in 2006. The policy recognises the central role of ICTs in national sustainable development. The policy is based on a robust and coherent framework that responds to the cross-sectoral nature of ICTs, which will avoid contradictions and suboptimal resource utilisation. The establishment of a Ministry for ICT creates an institutional base, from which to direct a sound policy environment for the sector. This necessarily means looking at how the comparative experience can be adapted to suit the Zimbabwe setting. One advantage of the delay created by the economic crisis in Zimbabwe is that we can avoid mistakes made by the pioneers while promoting ICT development.

Secondly, promoting competition and public-private partnerships will be key. A recent ICT survey in Zimbabwe identified as priorities infrastructure development, finance mobilisation, and human resource development and capacity building. On infrastructure and financial resource mobilisation, the critical issue is to open the market to competition and create a policy and regulatory environment that is investor friendly. The growth of ICTs in African countries such as Nigeria is directly linked to creating a competitive environment, lowering barriers to entry, and allowing market forces to determine the pace of growth. Competition encourages investment and reduces access costs for consumers.

The third priority is capacity building. Countries that use the ICT industry as an export market have invested in human capital development. Simply implementing the right policies and regulatory environment will not produce the skills to run the sector, or attract back lost talent. In

the long term, there is a need to create an e-culture that extends to primary education, and promotes ICT use at an early age. At tertiary level it is essential to establish centres of excellence in ICT. The State can lead this, but private sector involvement is also needed.

## ***CHAPTER 10: Public services***

### **10.1 Introduction**

Public services translate political vision into implementable policies and programmes that transform the daily lives of people. They offer a range of services, such as health, education, public infrastructure, agricultural extension and personnel identification. As public services link the ordinary citizen with the State through the delivery of services, public servants are expected to demonstrate and display impartiality and a high degree of professional integrity in the discharge of their responsibilities. If, for whatever reason, the trust and relationship that citizens bestow on public officials and government diminish, a social crisis arises. In this chapter we look at developments in Zimbabwe's public services from 1980 to 2008. The chapter then identifies interventions to make public services more efficient and effective in service delivery. For the purpose of this discussion, the focus is on the civil service as public officials under the employment of the Public Service Commission. It therefore excludes the army, security agencies and the police.

### **10.2 Context and background**

At Independence in 1980, the country inherited a settler colonial administration, with socio-economic delivery in favour of a minority white settler community and urban areas. The primary function of the colonial administration was to maintain law and order. The post-Independence government put in place public service programmes to repair, maintain and construct a new public infrastructure, and increase agricultural development and marketing, particularly in the marginalised rural areas. The government developed policies to meet the expectations of its citizens and adopt administrative structures to deliver on the national agenda in many areas of development. In order to accelerate national development and acceptance of the public service by the majority, then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe issued a directive in 1981 that Africanised the public service. The public service was tasked with making the government vision and agenda of a socialist transformation of society operational, as articulated in the 'Growth and Equity' document, supplemented by the Three Year Transitional Development Plan. The State was not always able to develop and implement its own policies, due to imposed strictures and shortages of specialist skills in various sectors, such as education, health and engineering. Skills gaps were filled by employing expatriates, who often were not familiar with the political environment and value systems under which they were working.

Through Prime Minister Mugabe's directive the public service was transformed to deliver services that were in tune with the new social and economic environment. Hitherto marginalised groups, such as women and young people, were also targeted for development. Special ministries were created to promote and accelerate their development. Civil servants were trained at public service training institutes, in order to acquaint them with how government operated and to understand the rules and procedures governing service delivery. By the late 1990s the public service had grown to 192,000, from 10,570 in 1980. It had become the largest single employer and was also largely Africanised. The Prime Minister's directive of 1981 changed the face of

public service without necessarily transforming the rules and regulations governing public administration.

The civil service achieved most of the post-Independence successes in education and health that were presented in chapters 6 and 7. Things began to fall apart when budget deficits began to grow, following the rapid expansion in service provision. By the end of the 1980s, economic growth was slowing down and the economy failed to generate the 500,000 jobs per annum needed to absorb the school leavers being churned out by a highly improved education system. The private sector was only generating 50,000 jobs per annum. Chapter 2 on employment discussed the reasons for this sluggish growth. The poor economic performance began to affect service delivery. The introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) as a way of restructuring the economy also required the reorganisation of the administrative machinery. Reforms demanded that the public service redefine its role, to focus on providing an enabling environment and regulatory frameworks that allowed the private sector to thrive. ESAP also required public institutions to outsource non-core functions through commercialisation and/or privatisation. In addition, the civil service was required to exercise fiscal discipline in order to reduce government expenditure.

In general, ESAP was asking for less government, and as a result cuts in what the government provided were inevitable. There was a perception that the civil service had become bloated, with outdated management systems that were not responsive to the new social and economic challenges, leading to poor quality service delivery. Apart from the budgetary imperatives there were criticisms that public servants had assimilated bureaucracy that emphasised process rather than results, and that they were unable to think outside of the box in order to deal creatively and innovatively with the new situation. The capability of the bureaucracy was weakened as many competent and experienced public officials left, either to new opportunities in the private sector or elsewhere. Inexperienced and junior staff were left managing public institutions in an environment that required strong leadership and management skills to advance appropriate and necessary policy reforms.

Most of these issues were not new and had been raised in the late 1980s, when the government commissioned a review into the state of the public administration and civil service performance. The 1989 Public Service Review Commission, Kavran Report, revealed, inter alia, a bureaucracy characterised by: a lack of performance management culture; arrogance and poor attitudes to work; high staff turnover; and a bloated, centralised and secretive bureaucracy that was non-transparent, suffered poor communication of decisions and was inaccessible to the public. It further noted that the Public Service suffered from over-complicated rules and procedures, overlap and duplication of functions – facets not conducive to promoting a liberalised economy. These characteristics led to delays in service delivery and in responding promptly to public needs. Ineffective and inexperienced staff undermined professional integrity and commitment to duty. The emerging arrogance of civil servants compromised professional standards. Corruption and underhand dealing in service delivery were also observed. The hallmark of a professional civil servant was thus undermined. The administrative machinery was now used at times to service the interests of senior officials. State resources began to be diverted for personal gain. Discipline and commitment to duty were divided, as public officials were also now engaged in illegal private activities in order to supplement their meagre incomes. Public offices became market places where officials sold goods, such as vegetables, meat, bread and trinkets, and services such as the

issuing of licences, passports, and placements for nurse or teacher training. There was therefore a definite need to redefine the role of government to bring it in tune with the economic liberalisation taking place.

After the initial reforms, the public service commissioned a customer satisfaction survey in 1996. Although this was nearly ten years after the Kavran Report, the survey revealed that little had changed. The image that emerged from this survey was of an arrogant, impolite and self-serving public servant whose behaviour resulted in poor quality service delivery, and who behaved as if the public had no right to demand or enjoy a better service. There was therefore the need for a paradigm shift by the public service regarding the manner in which they rendered services, managed public institutions and related to the public.

The administrative restructuring that introduced cost-cutting measures to reduce the budget deficit led to social dissatisfaction, as retrenched civil servants joined the ranks of the unemployed. The public became the victim, as public services were now being rendered by newly formed companies that had no business experience, as part of the outsourcing advocated by the reforms. It was against this background of economic liberalisation that frequent labour and public servant strikes emerged. The poor perception of the civil servant, coupled with a decline in the quality of service, increased social disgruntlement. Civil society organisations became vocal in articulating the need for greater stakeholder engagement in policy, and programme design, and the promotion of openness and accountability in the management of government. This led to another round of managerial reforms in the public services.

#### *Public service reform programme (PSRP) 1997-2002*

ESAP had adverse social effects, as the intended outcomes (macroeconomic stabilisation, an expanding economy, increased employment creation resulting in improved standards of living, and a slim, effective and efficient public service) did not materialise in full. The social fabric was eroded because of high unemployment, rising costs, deterioration of infrastructure due to low investment, and revenue loss due to economic decline. A general decline in public services ensued and staff morale deteriorated further. Public officials adopted an 'I don't care' attitude to work, resulting in poor quality services for the public. Further measures were therefore required to restore quality of service and to strengthen the capability of the public service to sustain implementation of the reforms. There was also need to develop and adopt measures that linked economic policy to social development by incorporating socio-economic goals and sustainable development into the reform programme. This was articulated in the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) 1996-2000.

This new thinking required the government to restrict its role to that of supporting and facilitating private sector development, along with empowerment, economic expansion and civic participation in the decision-making process. These objectives were to be achieved through modernisation and a re-orientation of the public service to focus on results, by installing results-focused public management systems. The aim was to enable the administrative machinery to effectively meet the combined objectives of containing expenditure and of addressing the socio-economic imperatives of poverty reduction, improving people's living standards and promoting gender equality. In supporting private sector development, the public sector was expected to provide policy and regulatory frameworks and adopt an entrepreneurial approach to

management. This new thinking, termed 'the new public administration and management', was adopted from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The hope was that it could be replicated successfully in African countries, so that public services focused on results less than on process, paid attention to reducing costs and providing value for money in service delivery, and re-branded services to be customer focused.

Ongoing reforms continued to outsource non-essential services, such as cleaning and catering, to the private sector. Subcontracting reduced the number of posts by 10,520. Functions were streamlined in order to reduce duplication. Decision making was to be expedited by compressing the top level grades from six to three. Some government departments were commercialised, such as Custom and Excise, now the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), and Printing and Stationery, now Printflow.

Table 10.1 shows progress in the commercialisation and privatisation of public services. The net result of these measures was to reduce the number of posts by 15,595, making the administrative structure flatter. This should have resulted in quicker decision making, as reporting lines were reduced.

**Table 10.1: Progress in commercialisation and privatisation of public services.**

<b>Departments targeted for commercialisation</b>	<b>Commercialised departments to date</b>
Department of Water Development	Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) facing capability challenges to provide reticulated water to the public
Central Mechanical Equipment Department	Central Mechanic Equipment Department (CMED) Pvt Ltd
Department of Civil Aviation	Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
Hotel and Hospitality School	Hotel and Hospitality School
Department of Roads	Zimbabwe National Road Authority (ZINARA)
Department of National Parks and Wildlife	National Parks and Wildlife Management Authority
Printing and Stationery	Printflow Pvt Ltd. Performing reasonably well
Customs Excise and Tax	Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA). Performing reasonably well
Government Medical Stores	Government Medical Stores
Central Statistical Office	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTATS)
Registrar of Banks	Pending
Pensions and Provident Fund	Pending
Dental Services and Laboratory	Pending
Department of Natural Resources	Environmental Management Agency

The National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF) was launched in Parliament in 1997 to improve governance and the engagement of civil society in policy design and implementation. This think tank brought together key stakeholders, from government, industry, academia, professional bodies, activists, labour, gender groups and civic organisations, to contribute to reforms through open and transparent discussion of policies and strategies. This would enhance macroeconomic stabilisation, governance, job protection and conflict resolution. The NECF acts as a hub of smart partnerships and dialogue, and endeavours to create win-win situations, wherein recommendations from the various NECF subject-specific task forces contribute to policy analysis and programme development. This also enhances the capacity of public servants

to produce high quality policies and programmes through knowledge sharing between government officials and the citizens they serve.

The NECF does not implement projects or programmes – that is left to social partners – but it does act as a reservoir of critical analysis in areas of concern, through the creation of task forces. These task forces are well represented in terms of gender and specialist skills knowledge. The NECF is co-chaired by the Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet and a partner from the business sector, and it falls under the Ministry of Finance. This arrangement is replicated at the task force level, with requisite Permanent Secretaries representing the government. The effect of this forum has been to enhance civic participation in the decision-making process. For example, in 2006 the NECF Human Resource Task Force commissioned an ‘Analysis of the causes and effects of the brain drain in Zimbabwe’, which was sponsored by UNDP and conducted by the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre. This sought to determine the magnitude and extent of the brain drain and offered recommendations towards the retention and attraction of critical skills, required to sustain economic recovery for both the private and public sectors.

The study revealed that skills shortages were across the board. They ranged from high level technical, specialist and managerial expertise to lower level frontline grades in agriculture, construction, mining, education (science and maths teachers), health, transport, commerce, legal, finance and insurance. Reasons given for emigration included 56 per cent economic and 25 per cent self-advancement. Sixty-three per cent indicated that they would stay in Zimbabwe if macroeconomic stabilisation was achieved. In addition the report revealed that recipient countries offered career and economic opportunities and remuneration packages, enabling immigrants to afford decent housing and education for their families – opportunities which were no longer affordable in Zimbabwe due to the economic decline and inflation.

The NECF’s analysis recommended putting in place a package of incentives in order to retain and attract the required skills, such as topping up salaries, providing transport and housing allowances, incentives to establish business enterprises for those with technological and scientific expertise, the establishment of a skills retention fund to award critical allowances in key areas suffering human resource shortages, and developing a skills database that would match skills to critical economic sectors. These recommendations were adopted by the Cabinet but have not been implemented, due to a critical shortage of financial resources and technical skills. These ideas, if they were to be implemented, would strengthen the capacities of the public service to sustain reforms and contribute to the development of high-value policy analysis. This would attract back diasporans with requisite expertise and enhance the empowerment that comes from developing and implementing home-grown solutions.

As this example demonstrates, the deliberations of NECF task forces contribute to policy formulation. They offer an opportunity for public servants to do things differently by making policy formulation more accessible, responsive and accountable to the public through interaction with civil society.



### 10.3 Public service reform programme 2002-2008

The first phase of public service reforms discussed above focused on downsizing, implementing cost-saving measures to reduce the wage bill, and public expenditure measures to improve performance. The second phase, whilst building on the first phase, concentrated on 'enhanced performance and service delivery, putting citizens first and promoting good governance' (GoZ, 1998e). Efforts to downsize government through reforms paid off. The civil service was downsized from 192,000 in 1990 to 161,101 by December 2007. Of the remaining posts, 144,015 posts were filled while 17,086 vacancies existed due to high staff attrition. Frequent economic policy announcements were made during the economic crisis, even though they were not implemented.

Public service performance is a function of the policy environment, including its capacity to carry out high quality policy-making functions and implementation. In this respect, high standards in public servants' performance and behaviour relating to honesty, integrity and maintains ethical standards in service delivery must be adhered to and regulated by rules and procedures. From about 2003 these elements began to diminish, as public servants were disgruntled by their low wages and poor working conditions. However, ethical standards had to be maintained. To this end in 2005 the Public Service introduced a performance management system, in order to improve service delivery. Performance agreements were introduced for the permanent secretary, with individual work-plans, derived from the organisational strategic plan, used to assess individual officers at the operational level. Client charters and service delivery targets were also institutionalised as part of performance management, in order to make public servants more client-focused and accountable.

Senior public officials were expected to lead, own and manage the reform process by demonstrating strong leadership skills that focused on outlining the organisational vision and mission. This was complemented by ministry strategic plans focused on results, with specific targets, time-frames and budgets.

Permanent secretaries were expected to conduct regular performance reviews of their staff, in order to ensure that the intended objectives were met. They were also expected to promote and enable learning and knowledge management within their portfolio, and to lead and manage high-performing teams. However, no incentives were included to reward high performers or sanction poor performers. Furthermore, the role of the accounting officers in leading the process was not clear. During this period a code of conduct was also introduced and cascaded in all ministries. A computerised human resources information management system was introduced, initially at the Public Service Commission and subsequently (subject to resources) to be cascaded to line ministries, in order to facilitate appropriate staffing levels, career planning, promotion, staff appraisal and disciplinary action, incentives and time management.

The permanent secretaries are central to the effective implementation of the reforms. As accounting officers, they should provide leadership for the process. It is not clear whether the permanent secretaries accept this role. Performance appraisal of staff from ministries appears to be subjective, as they do not correlate with the poor quality of services delivered to the public by these officers. Leadership is critical to secure commitment to change. Executive management training is therefore important, to strengthen managers' capabilities to lead reforms and

command innovative teams. A clear communication strategy needs to be put in place to inform all staff on progress, as reports revealed that most operational level staff did not know or understand the mission or vision of their ministries. The staff frequently complained of slow decision making, despite the fact that top level reporting levels were compressed from six to three. This may be indicative of senior officials' reluctance to make decisions and to take risks on outcomes the results of which are not predictable in an unstable environment.

Recruitment and promotion to the public service was professionalised in the second phase of public service reforms. The process now uses open competition, rather than recruitment within and seniority in the service. Assessment and examination as well as interviews are used to recruit and promote competent people to the public service. Assessment centres are used to assess and examine potential candidates for recruitment into various positions in government, with a view to matching skills to jobs. Accompanying performance appraisals and reward systems are put in place. In order to have high-performing civil servants, specific capacity-building programmes are essential. Thus, the executive management development programme was instituted at the Zimbabwe Institute of Administration and Management (ZIPAM), targeted at middle managers and above. However, the commercialisation of ZIPAM de-linked it from the provision of adequate back-stopping services essential, such as training, research and consultants' services. ZIPAM needed to refocus its mandate to support the ongoing public service reforms. Specialist courses for economists, accountants and pension management were negotiated and conducted at other tertiary institutions on behalf of the Public Service Commission. The public service continued to identify specific training requirements for in-service training through bilateral and multilateral agreements. A computerised performance financial management information system was introduced, with the aim of supporting expenditure control and financial accountability by all ministries.

#### *Coordination of reforms*

To coordinate the reform process, change management units were established in each ministry and coordinated at the Public Service Commission by a national coordinator linked to the Office of the President and Cabinet Reform Unit. This Unit is well positioned to assume the role of policy oversight and coordination. It is paramount that policy cohesion and linkages are established and synchronised, to avoid the fragmentation associated with earlier reforms and in order to accomplish the intended socio-economic outcomes. Adequate timelines to implement the programme are needed, since reforms are not one-day events. It takes a long time to change people's attitudes, reduce resistance to change and to adopt new methods and technology. Political uncertainty has also contributed to an unstable policy environment, hampering the overall programme goal of creating an enabling environment for reforms. Corruption, though not quantified, is also leading to poor quality service delivery, lethargy and poor work ethics. The Anti Corruption Commission should disclose cases so far discovered, to indicate the prevalence, scale and type of illegal activities occurring in the public sector. The data would quantify the resources lost to government. One of the problems is also that the legal framework on corruption is weak, as it places the burden of proof on the prosecution instead of requiring the accused to prove how wealth was acquired.

### *Civic participation and gender mainstreaming*

Civic organisations are involved in policy and programme design. As noted earlier, this is conducted through the NECF and its various task forces. The client charter is also used to promote accountability and improve the standards of services, and suggestion boxes are used to capture public concerns for redress.

Gender mainstreaming mechanisms were put in place in all ministries and treated as a key result area. Affirmative action was adopted as a strategy for training women and promoting them to senior management positions, with the aim that by 2005 30 per cent, and by 2015 50 per cent, of decision-making positions would be held by women. By 2006, of the 32 permanent secretaries only six were women. Of the 13 State university vice chancellors, only one is a woman. This demonstrates that the strategies in place have not been sufficient to overcome the institutional and social barriers to meet the 2005 goal, which has already been missed.

### *Monitoring and evaluation*

The Monitoring and Evaluation Department Unit in the Office of the President and Cabinet was set up to coordinate, direct and give some control and oversight of policy reform initiatives. The electronic financial management system was introduced, by the Ministry of Finance, in order to improve financial accountability and expenditure control. Several other policy initiatives and measures were introduced, including job evaluation and job profiling to match skills to tasks, and institutionalisation of the capacity to conduct cost/benefit audits, with the purpose of improving the overall performance of the public service and its contribution to national development.

### *Status of the reforms*

Table 10.2 presents some of the measures implemented, their status and outcomes, including comments on the reforms.

**Table 10.2: Status of public service reforms**

Goal	Status	Outcome	Comments
Performance Management System	Performance agreements in place for Permanent Secretary's strategic and work plans. Permanent secretaries staff trained on the system	Most civil servants know their Ministry's vision and mission and have individual action plans.	No assessments done on impact of these systems in service delivery.
Public Service Behaviour: Rules and regulations applied for misconduct	-Customer Survey conducted at Immigration Border Posts. -Client Charter in all	Public satisfied with the sign posting. Benches to sit on exist but are few. Staff are courteous. Not all Ministry staff aware	Underhand activities perceived to occur at Border posts. Need to conduct

	<p>ministries.</p> <p>-Anti-Corruption Commission established in 2004 and several cases of misappropriation of State funds dealt with by Public Service Commission.</p> <p>-Inspectorate and Audit Agency investigations.</p>	<p>of client charter existence and purpose. Not all officials are familiar with client charter contents.</p> <p>Anti-Corruption Commission received 1,513 corruption cases, 60 cases completed in courts, 180 administratively completed and 310 awaiting prosecution.</p> <p>Officials in the Welfare Department discharged for misappropriating Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) funds.</p> <p>Grain Marketing Board and councillors arraigned for converting agricultural inputs to own use.</p>	<p>regular customer satisfaction survey in order to assess conduct of public officials.</p> <p>Corruption data not yet disaggregated to reveal public and private officials involvement.</p> <p>Need to further capacitate this agency in order to route out corruption in the public service.</p>
Human Resources Management	<p>-All organisational structures for Ministries captured in a data base at the Public Service Commission.</p> <p>-All personnel details for all Public Service Commission Secretariat staff also captured in the data base.</p>	<p>Delay in capturing personnel data from Ministries to complete programme.</p>	<p>Need to install compatible computer software in Ministries and set targets to complete exercise.</p>
Skills: best talent recruited and matched to functions. Continuous training	<p>-Job evaluation and profiling conducted for all public service positions.</p> <p>-Assessment and examination centre in place.</p> <p>-Staff development at internal and external</p>	<p>Better match between function and competence.</p> <p>Assessments and examinations conducted for promotion to middle and senior management grades.</p> <p>Human resources development plans submitted yearly by</p>	<p>No assessment carried out to determine whether exercise had resulted in improvement in service delivery.</p> <p>Need to cascade assessment to ministries for lower level positions.</p> <p>No assessment done to determine the impact of training to individual</p>

	training institutions.	ministries to the Public Service Commission	and organisational performance.
Incentives and merit: public servants are rewarded or sanctioned based on appraisal of their performance.	<p>- Compensation policy in place.</p> <p>-Transport and accommodation allowance provided for all grades incrementally according to grades.</p>	<p>Performance appraisals tend to still be subjective.</p> <p>Public service buses provided in major urban areas to bring public servants to work at subsidized fares.</p>	<p>Incentives put in place to retain operational staff. Public Service remains a training ground. Loss of operational staff continues to weaken service delivery.</p> <p>Moonlighting is rampant in order to supplement meagre salaries across the grades.</p>
<p>-Public Finance Management Information System</p> <p>-Results based value added and accountability promoted.</p> <p>-Treasury Instruction systematically applied.</p> <p>-Timely production annual accounts</p>	<p>-Incumbents trained in software.</p> <p>- Finance departments computerized.</p>	More accountability promoted.	<p>Evidence suggests that permanent secretaries use system on regular basis to monitor expenditure.</p> <p>Need to integrate programme to human resource management systems.</p>
<p>-Gender and HIV/AIDS mainstreaming.</p> <p>-Increase awareness on prevention measures of HIV/AIDS and provide counselling to the affected Public Servants.</p> <p>-Removal of barriers impeding gender equality at work places and women's promotion to senior decision making positions.</p>	<p>-Gender and HIV/AIDS focal points in place in all ministries.</p> <p>-Focal points trained.</p>	<p>No assessment carried out on impact of programme.</p> <p>Prevention and care of public servants increased though awareness.</p>	<p>Attrition data from ministries do not reveal HIV and AIDS situation because of privacy policy.</p> <p>Few cases of discrimination based on gender reported.</p> <p>Slow implementation of gender equality to Senior Management levels Policy.</p>

Monitoring and Evaluation Unit provides leadership and coordinates reform activities.	-Unit established needs to be fully capacitated. -Needs to be e-enabled.	The Integrated Results Based Management (IRBM) needs to be put in place. Includes Results Based Budgeting, Results Based Personnel Performance System, and Results Based Monitoring and Evaluation	Need to conduct regular impact assessment to capture impact, best practice. Need to provide coherence and synergy of the various reform initiatives
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#### 10.4 Conclusion and recommendations

This chapter has shown how the public service is a key player in the production and delivery of public goods. The public service also acts as a catalyst for promoting citizens' involvement in the public domain, thus enhancing accountability and openness in the management of government business. This chapter has shown, however, that in the absence of a strong command centre to allocate resources and to coordinate and provide political direction to reforms, the intended outcomes and benefits of the reforms may not be met. This section puts forward some recommendations for reinvigorating the public service in the post-crisis period.

The fundamental role of the Public Service Commission is to match skilled personnel with appropriate posts and compensation packages, as well as to ensure effective and efficient implementation of government policies. This would ensure that there is a stable service delivery to the satisfaction of citizens. Low salary levels impact negatively on job performance and skills retention, and on the overall performance of government. Sustained efforts need to be made to attract external assistance to support public reforms.

Policy initiatives and public service reform measures are in place, but need to be strengthened and refocused to provide policy coherence. Policy coherence is necessary for national development priorities especially poverty reduction and empowerment. Additional financial, material and technical resources, including the government's own resources and those from development partners are required to implement the reforms. Below are suggestions for strengthening the capacity of the public service to implement the reform programme sustainably, achieve the desired results and contribute to reducing the crisis:

1. The Office of the President Reform Unit should be strengthened in order to enhance its capacity to provide high value policy analysis and coherence across government. By virtue of its strategic location, it can take a long-term view, is able to commission studies of a cross-cutting nature and can conduct strategic audits on the performance of government in respect to reform.
2. An implementation committee should be established. This should comprise all permanent secretaries, be linked to the Office of the President and Cabinet and the Public Service Commission, have a clear mandate and be staffed by a high calibre personnel. This is critical if the challenges to implementation are to be addressed.

3. Strengthen and capacitate all the permanent secretaries to take a leading role in the reforms through targeted staff development programmes, especially in corporate planning, strategic management and the promotion of a culture of excellence.
4. Strengthen the HIV/AIDS mainstreaming mechanism, in order raise awareness of all civil servants and to provide sufficient counselling support to those affected.
5. Encourage the filling of skills gaps in critical areas through brain gain by attracting from the diaspora. Develop a database for this purpose, and implement measures to retain these skills. Through bilateral and multilateral agreements, arrange for in-service and placement training of public officials in appropriate public service institutions elsewhere.
6. Develop an effective internal communication strategy on progress made and best practice, and an external communication strategy to educate the public on the intention of the reform and to solicit their views.
7. Introduce information communication technology across the Public Service for management and service delivery.
8. Strengthen and capacitate the ZIPAM to refocus its mandate to develop and deliver cutting-edge training programmes that enhance public service performance.
9. Develop the capacity of the public service to monitor and evaluate reforms, in order to provide evidence on which inform the reform process.
10. Conduct regular customer surveys, in order to enhance accountability and assess the conduct of public officials in service delivery and to ensure that services offered are accessible and meet client needs.
11. Strengthen the gender mainstreaming mechanisms, in order to reach the 50 per cent target of women in decision-making positions by 2015.
12. Sustain the commercialisation of the remaining government departments, benchmarked and guided by those operating viably.
13. Conduct retreats and/or workshops to strengthen the relationship between ministers and permanent secretaries.

## **CHAPTER 11: Policy priorities: moving forward with an agriculture-led strategy**

After nearly a decade of decline, Zimbabwe now has an opportunity to move forward. This independent report outlines a strategy to hasten the recovery process by integrating policies to raise productivity, generate employment and directly tackle poverty. We are conscious of the fact that until a new constitution is formulated, Zimbabweans will be cautiously optimistic, while outside observers are likely to be tentative in their approach. And yet, during its tenure of office the Government of National Unity (GNU) is expected to deliver a better economy and services to citizens, a majority of whom have been left impoverished by the decade long crisis. It is with this in mind that this report has presented ideas on how to approach some of the key issues. In this concluding chapter we flesh out these ideas as a way to stimulate further debate and discussion rather than as cut and dried solutions.

### **11.1. Stabilising the economy and promoting poverty-focused growth**

The key pillars of the Zimbabwean economy, agriculture and industry, took most of the hammering during the decline. We saw in Chapter 1 how these two are like two sides of the same coin. Once some of the measures taken under ESAP had downsized non-agriculture related manufacturing, it was inevitable that a decline in agricultural productivity growth would see a concomitant decline in agriculture-linked manufacturing industry. This decline in manufacturing generated further feedback, reducing demand for agricultural products and increasing unemployment, which further limited the sources of agricultural financing, especially in the smallholder sector. In short, people became too poor to use their land to produce their own food, and policies skewed toward the new, black commercial farmers were not helpful. In trying to stabilise the economy it will be necessary to consider two possible pathways linked to the two lynchpins of the economy: these are the non-agricultural and the agricultural options.

#### *Scenario 1: the non-agricultural option*

The main premise of the non-agricultural approach is that agriculture as a sector is greatly affected and is unlikely to make a quick recovery. It therefore cannot make as significant a contribution to the economy as it did at its peak in the 1990s. This scenario also assumes that although many more people have access to land than at any time in the country's history, the market fundamentals for agricultural productivity growth (land, technology, labour, finance) are unfavourable and only urban industrial growth will drive the economy out of its current state. The non-agricultural option will require reviving the manufacturing sector, as well as take advantage of new opportunities available in resource extraction (especially mining) and the service sectors (especially finance and tourism). With a focus mainly on the urban economy, agricultural recovery would only emerge based on expanding demand for raw materials for the manufacturing sector. Growth would reduce poverty through employment creation and rising incomes that would trickle down to poor people in rural areas, many of whom may have to move to urban centres in search of employment.



This scenario is problematic in that it fails to take advantage of the resolution of the land reform programme that in part caused the decline. Since a majority of the people who now have access to land are still too poor to use it productively, they would continue to rely on food relief while the economy stabilises and recovers. Based on past experience, there would likely be movement of rural people into the cities in search of jobs.

### *Scenario 2: the agricultural option*

At its core, the agricultural option involves kick-starting the economy through a focus on agriculture and particularly small farmers. It has been shown in Chapter 3 that smallholder farmers now occupy nearly two thirds of agricultural land and that it is this sector that probably will define the role of agriculture in the reconstruction of Zimbabwe. Focusing on agriculture has the advantage that it is the most direct way to address the concerns of a majority of the poor in Zimbabwe. Their lives can only improve if rural incomes rise and the most direct way to bring this about, particularly following the land reform programme, is to increase agricultural incomes. Rising rural incomes can stimulate demand for manufactured goods and could therefore help revive the urban economy. This scenario takes advantage of the land reform to expand the economy. It also impacts directly on a majority of the poor and would therefore generate greater popular support. It is this scenario that we throw our lot behind.

With this scenario, quick wins can be achieved by enhancing agricultural production in communal lands, old resettlement areas and the ‘new’ A1 resettlement schemes by providing ‘full packages’ of agricultural inputs for at least the next three seasons. This should be followed by a managed reduction of support over a further two years. Agricultural support will not be all that is required – for many households a social protection scheme will need to be set-up to restart production. We do not think the assistance package should be means tested as this would not be cost-effective. Available evidence also suggests that public works or cash for work would not function well in the current context, as up to 60 per cent of the expenditure of such schemes is usually consumed by overhead costs. Perhaps, after a few years of free agricultural inputs, workfare relief programmes may be more feasible. In the medium to long term, agricultural recovery will depend on how some of the key outstanding issues affecting investment in agriculture are resolved. Below we highlight some of these.

## **11.2. Land reform: moving forward**

Land reform was closely linked to the economic crisis, and the expectation is that the transition process will iron out some of the problems that have prevented the beneficiaries of land redistribution from growing their way out of poverty. We see the main priorities following land redistribution as follows.

### *The unfinished business: tenure reform*

There does not seem to be any logical justification for a continued dual tenure regime in Zimbabwe. This creates two classes of citizens. On the one hand are over a million smallholders occupying some 16 million hectares of land under communal tenure, while on the other are nearly 230,000 resettled households, with permits, offer letters and leases, occupying land on conditions that are more favourable than their communal land peers. The government should

revisit this and look at the innovative ways in which other countries in the region, especially Mozambique and South Africa, have dealt with similar problems.

#### *Re-planning A1 units*

Most of the nearly 141,000 beneficiaries resettled on A1 units lack basic social services and infrastructure, since most of the large scale commercial farming areas did not have social infrastructure, apart from the occasional farm school. This affects the ability of A1 unit households to utilise the land they have received. It is important that these are re-planned along the lines of the old 'accelerated' resettlement programme of the 1980s. This would involve planning them as new settlement projects, with full costing for social and physical infrastructure. Doing so, however, will not be cheap. We know from the experiences of the 1980s that it can cost up to US\$12,000 per household to provide the basic physical and social infrastructure, training and initial input support needed for a typical agricultural settlement. To support the 141,000 A1 beneficiaries would require an investment close to US\$1.69 billion. Re-planning the A1 areas as a series of individual projects would have the advantage of allowing donors to support this programme in 'bite-sized' pieces and giving them the option to choose which projects they wish to support. However, it will still be the responsibility of the State to provide the overall connecting infrastructure. This multi-speed approach has the downside that certain regions might be more popular than others, which could potentially create political problems.

As much as possible the re-planning needs to recognise the symbiotic relationship between these new units and the adjacent communal lands. It is therefore important that planning be integrated and coordinated with existing physical and social infrastructure in the communal lands. Given that A2 beneficiaries have more land and better terms and conditions of access, the State needs to explore private sector partnerships to provide commercial loans to this group, perhaps at subsidised rates. Like the former large-scale farmers it should be their responsibility to develop local physical infrastructure, although the State can help organise provisioning of social infrastructure.

#### *Revitalising agricultural institutions*

The crisis took a heavy toll on agricultural institutions. Most of the extension and research activity had declined. Consequently, there is a need for an institutional audit to reconsider the roles of existing institutions and suggest new institutional arrangements to support the new structure of agriculture in the country. This is particularly true if the newly settled A1 smallholders are to get the support they need. Since the country now has many more small, medium and large-scale commercial farmers than before, there is a need to identify the training and other support they require in order to establish how these can be provided.

#### *A2 land audit*

The global political agreement that formed the basis for the GNU foreclosed any discussions about reversing the land redistribution exercise. This means that the GNU can only refine and iron out emerging problems from the exercise. We know from the Utete and Buka Reports that there are still issues related to farm ownership under A2 schemes. In addition, the actual uptake of A2 farms needs to be established. It is imperative that an independent audit of what is

happening on A2 farms be undertaken with a view to reallocating underutilised land. This needs to be seen as a technical exercise and should be led by a credible State agency.

### *Land registry*

The resettlement process created new farm units that need to be mapped and registered. The land information management system must be revamped so that it can cope with the increased land units that will need to be registered. It may be necessary to decentralise this function to districts, given the number of farm units that will need to be registered. Since district land committees hold the most accurate information, a Land Information Management Unit could be set up to run from these institutions and possibly even at ward level. To improve the user interface, the registration process will need to be as cheap, simple and accessible as possible. This might mean creating and training a new cadre of paralegals operating at district or ward levels, as a full legal approach to this problem will be financially unfeasible. If donor agencies are interested in supporting the reform and strengthening of the land registry they should ensure that there is a lead donor. A series of different donor support packages could create problems.

### *Enhancing land use through taxation*

One way of ensuring that beneficiaries use their newly acquired land is to ensure that after an initial grace period the owners have to pay land tax. Implementation of the land tax should apply particularly to beneficiaries under the A2 scheme. Zimbabwe cannot afford to have good land set aside without production. As such, a key advantage of the tax is that it encourages beneficiaries to utilise land, especially if the taxes are based on expected output. However, any scheme would have to be designed so as not to cripple struggling new black commercial farmers.

### *Compensation fund for former land owners*

Although the former white commercial farmers cannot be compensated for land under the terms of Constitutional Amendment 16 of 2000, it may be possible for the GNU or its successor to consider a pool of funds, probably provided by or matched by donors, to compensate the farmers. Available data suggests that less than five per cent of the nearly 5,600 former commercial farm owners have received compensation. Sooner rather than later this will need to be resolved. This is a controversial idea and donors might be unwilling to pay compensation rather than support poor smallholder farmers. However, we know from the cases of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea that it was the investment in other areas of the economy of compensation payments to dispossessed landowners that helped these economies to grow after the Second World War. Clearly things are different in Zimbabwe, but under certain conditions linked to the prevention of capital flight (for example payments through tax relief or bonds), such compensation could kick-start investment in selected areas of the economy and perhaps help with economic recovery. There is no denying that the former commercial farmers still remain a highly skilled group with extensive experience and knowledge of agriculture. Without land, and if given resources some may wish to venture into agribusiness – agricultural processing, market intermediation, supply of inputs and services etc – that would boost agricultural exports and create much needed off-farm but agriculture-related jobs. The government may wish to explore this avenue as a way of bringing closure to an issue that will otherwise rumble on in the courts of law for many years to come.

### *Enhancing agricultural incomes through high value crops and links to markets*

After the initial gains from a basic agricultural package have been achieved, smallholders need to improve their earnings through innovation. This can be done, not only through productivity growth but also by ensuring that some of the lucrative markets that have only been accessible to large-scale farmers in the past are made available to smallholder farmers. We are thinking here about links to some of the global supermarket chains, either directly or through outgrower schemes. Smallholders need support to begin to diversify into high-value crops linked to these global production chains. Both State and non-state actors (especially private companies with corporate social responsibility programmes) will need to be involved in identifying these markets and linking smallholders with them. By the time of the land invasions in 2000, some of the large-scale farms had already started some successful out-grower schemes that were working quite well. Re-activating such initiatives will create the income growth necessary for the economy to move beyond recovery.

### *Reviving large-scale commercial agriculture*

While small-holder farmers must be the priority, large-scale commercial agriculture will also need to be revived. This occupies about a third of all agricultural land, primarily in the better rainfall area, so productivity levels must be restored. Apart from the demonstration effect this has on smallholder agriculture, their larger size can enhance agricultural productivity growth. A key constraint is that reviving large-scale commercial agriculture will need the private financial markets to begin lending again. For this to happen, the uncertainties surrounding ownership and tenure will need to be resolved. As long as these issues remain unresolved, agricultural financing will continue to be difficult and the farmers will have to rely on the cash-constrained State for support. The commercial farm sector only indirectly impacts on poverty, via employment and other upstream and downstream effects. The implication, therefore, is that this sector should rely as much as possible on state-assisted financial markets to enhance their productivity. The government therefore needs to find ways of recapitalising the major agricultural lending institutions so that they can begin to support the commercial farmers.

## **11.3 Water reforms and agriculture**

Water is one of the major limiting factors (and often the major factor) for productivity in agriculture in Zimbabwe. Reforms undertaken in the late 1990s substantially altered the terms and conditions under which water for agriculture is accessed. While commercial farmers still get the bulk of the water, there is need to ensure equity in provisioning of water to the smallholder farming sector, especially if they are expected to play a more significant role in the revival of agriculture – as proposed in this report. The next stage in the agrarian reforms should look at how agricultural water is distributed and the inequality of access among land users, particularly given that some of the A1 farms are located in prime agricultural areas and could benefit from improved access to water. The 1990 water reforms established water equity by making all water belong to the State, where users of more than ‘primary water’ have to apply for a permit. There is need to review the implementation of this policy to determine if it is working properly to enhance agriculture on resettled land. It is only when combined with access to water that the

productivity of land can be enhanced, increasing earnings, alleviating poverty and contributing to economic growth.

#### **11.4 Moving forward on the environment: an environmental audit**

The decline of the economy drove most Zimbabweans to rely more on the environment and natural goods than ever before – timber, firewood, bush meat, wild vegetables, traditional medicines etc. We know globally that poverty can drive people to ‘mine’ natural resources. Environmental management efforts have weakened in several ways. First, we know that staff attrition and inadequate resources, particularly transport, made environmental regulation weak due to a decrease in enforcement capacity (deforestation and gold panning are two clear examples). There is need to focus on ensuring that State institutions are optimally resourced and work effectively. Particular emphasis should be placed on strengthening the capacity of the Environmental Management Agency to function at sub-national level, as it is in these areas that most of the work needs to be done.

Second, the rural restructuring that occurred as a result of Fast Track Land Reform has changed the dynamics of environmental stewardship, and attitudes and patterns of resource use. This change has affected both wildlife and forestry products directly. Deforestation has risen significantly due to reduced protection and increased demand for fuel wood as paraffin and electricity became less available. While the exact rate of deforestation in Zimbabwe is unknown, estimates suggest ranges between 100,000 and 320,000 hectares per year. An audit of the state of the environment in Zimbabwe is now needed. This would build confidence and strengthen the environmental agenda of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resource Management. The audit could form the basis for a new vision on the environment and provide entry points for other actors to promote sustainability.

Third, despite the involvement of the Government in global environmental debates, serious work on global environmental change in Zimbabwe – particularly how climate change will affect the country and adaptation strategies – desperately needs to be strengthened. If rainfall patterns in southern Africa are changing, research on issues such as drought resistant crop varieties and alternative land uses is urgently needed.

#### **11.5 Restoring Zimbabwe’s education sector**

The economic crisis had a major negative impact on the education sector. By the time the GNU was formed, about one quarter of primary school children (100,000 children out of about 400,000) were not completing Grade 7, and a further 70,000 did not enter secondary school. Therefore, around 170,000 children each year did not gain the nine years of education that is essential to fully participate in social, political and economic development. Most of these children not in education, employment or training will find it difficult to make a living and, even when conditions improve, they will have few opportunities to increase their productivity or obtain better jobs. Unless Zimbabwe returns to its original policy of free primary education, and extends it to cover two years of junior secondary education, a substantial percentage of its population will continue to have a sub-standard level of basic education and limited employment prospects.



*Around 170,000 children each year do not gain the nine years of education that is essential to fully participate in social, political and economic development (Photo © Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi).*

### *Linking education and training more closely to economic development*

Investment in education is one of the key ways of moving and staying out of poverty. Clearly there will be issues of affordability. Given a State that lacks resources and an education system that has not seen substantial investment in nearly a decade, a compromise will have to be struck between offering free universal education and recovering some costs. In addition to improving access to basic education, Zimbabwe should improve the quality of education. The need for economic development requires a serious adjustment of the education system at all levels, but particularly at secondary, technical/vocational and tertiary education. The post-independence focus on preparing people for the public sector needs to shift to providing people with the technical skills and entrepreneurial approaches demanded in the 21st century. These include:

- a. More science and technical/vocational content into primary education and ‘education for real life challenges’.
- b. Providing more technical and vocational training at secondary school level – the present output of 20,000 graduates each year is insufficient.
- c. Community involvement and decentralisation. These kept the education system running during the economic crisis and they are essential for accountability and sustainability in the future.
- d. Supporting young people not in education, employment or training. A large number of young people who lost out on education and are probably too old to be re-integrated into the formal education system will need to be provided for.

### **11.6 The health sector and post-crisis stabilisation**

The government needs to stabilise and restore the finances, staffing, systems and structure of the health service before any long-term programming can take place. A priority organisational challenge affecting the health delivery system in Zimbabwe is the high level of staff attrition. This has dramatically affected the capacity of the Ministry to deliver health services. Health budgets need to be restored – the current budget of US\$0.19 per capita per annum does not buy much care. A standard three-stage model for developing health systems after a crisis is suggested: first, prioritising basic emergency and curative services; second, restoring essential services; and third, rehabilitating health systems. Elements of this model, when suitably adapted, can guide stabilisation in Zimbabwe.

#### *Basic emergency and curative health services*

The priorities deal with pressing health needs, (especially the basic emergency and curative services to save lives) and provide low-cost preventative services (particularly immunisation). For Zimbabwe this was set in motion through the cholera epidemic inherited from the crisis. Although this is now under control, a recurrence could occur if the Government fails to restore basic water supply and sanitation services. Basic health services such as obstetrics, immunisations, and dealing with communicable and seasonal illnesses should be enhanced.

The most vulnerable are the under fives, pregnant women and those with underlying health conditions. These must be prioritised and specific needs should be clinically determined. Basic emergency service included immunisation for under-fives, tetanus injections for expectant mothers, vitamin A for high-risk groups and a systematic de-worming of children. This phase is usually resource intensive and costs vary according to what will need to be done. A substantial rise in health expenditure is needed.

Other actions demand immediate attention:

- a. Arresting the brain drain through introducing retention schemes. Remuneration packages based on regional rates will be needed to retain and attract back skilled health workers.
- b. Revitalisation of training facilities, especially capitalisation of the College of Health Science. This is an absolute priority as this is the only way to fill the skills gap. Although mechanisms may be needed to utilise the diaspora to restore health services (through short-term voluntary work or consultancies for instance), there is no substitute for enhancing training of health professionals.
- c. Focusing resources on child health, maternal health, nutrition and communicable diseases including HIV, malaria and tuberculosis.
- d. Rebuilding management capacity in strategic planning, expenditure management and budgeting.
- e. Re-establishing the medical and surgical supplies chains.
- f. Re-establishing the health information system.
- g. Auditing the status of physical infrastructure. While in the short term, any capital injection for infrastructural development is unlikely, there is a need to invest in collecting information for long-term planning.

#### *Medium-term restoration of essential services*

Once immediate health risks have been addressed, systematic delivery of essential health services can be contemplated. While in Phase 1 (outlined above) there is significant involvement of outside agencies helping to deal with life-threatening situations, Phase 2 is about returning authority for public health to the State and making sure that there is an accountable set of institutions around the essential health service delivery system. For Zimbabwe this will mean restoration of health programming and a return to the strategies – primary and curative health care strategies, with a focus on quick win areas or quick impact programmes. Crucially, it is about mobilising the funding to deliver the service.



### *Rehabilitation of the health system*

As Zimbabwe moves to the rehabilitation phase, long-term planning can begin, along with a detailed programme of infrastructural investment. During this phase, effective health information systems are essential. While it is easy to outline ideas on what needs to be done, the ability to pay for restoring the health system will prove the most difficult. On the one hand, the user-pays principle can generate resources, but makes health inaccessible to a majority of impoverished Zimbabweans. On the other, free universal health will not be possible for the cash-strapped government. Donors may help to support specific programmes, however, a political compromise that allows for some cost recovery is necessary, especially from salaried and higher income groups that can afford it. For the majority, while the economy recovers, it might mean reliance on a social protection system to provide for basic health services.

### *Other health issues: the role of civil society*

In the last five years there has been a move by the international community to channel some of its resources through civil society. This is likely to continue in the long term, as it is part of the donor development agenda to empower civil society and include civil society actors in decision making on social issues such as health.

## **11.7 Social protection for the poor**

Social protection is public action undertaken to address vulnerability, risk and deprivation within the population. After almost a decade of economic crisis, most governmental forms of social protection have declined and non-state actors (communities, local and foreign NGOs) have been doing most of the work to protect the vulnerable and poor. However, publicly funded social assistance still continued, though at a reduced rate. At the peak of the economic crisis, most food aid distribution was carried out by non-state actors, which targeted orphans and other vulnerable children and adults. With declining formal employment and hyperinflation, social insurance had all but become worthless, while there was little scope to enforce labour-market regulation.

By the time the GNU was formed, systematic social assistance programmes failed to offer adequate social protection to those who needed it. It is clear from experiences in Latin America and other African countries that the State is increasingly expected to take a lead in developing comprehensive social protection schemes for its citizens in ways that advocates of small government may not like. Given the fact that the economic crisis left most Zimbabweans poor, there is a strong case to be made for a comprehensive review of social protection provisioning.

### *Rebuilding social protection systems*

In the short term, the government will need to establish a minimal livelihood floor, below which citizens will not fall. While State capacity to manage large, complex programmes is being restored, non-state actors will necessarily continue to play a significant role. It is imperative that the State carries out a comprehensive review of social protection for its citizens and formulates a more integrated and inclusive social protection system. Such a review would ensure that the State regains initiative and visibility. The suggestion here is not to dismantle the involvement of non-

state actors in social protection. Rather, it is to restore central planning and systematic social protection by the State.

### *Workfare relief*

A major priority for the government will be to ensure food security to both the urban and rural poor. Workfare relief might be a sustainable medium to long-term response to the severe food insecurity across the country. Labour-based relief for able bodied adults, while keeping a streamlined food aid programme for primary school children and the elderly, would help stretch the Government's resources. With high unemployment and a situation in which a significant portion of the country's physical infrastructure (sewage systems, water systems, roads, rural schools, clinics, etc) is in a state of disrepair, trading famine relief for labour and the (re)construction of physical infrastructure would be prudent. The success of labour-based relief will be predicated on adequate technical monitoring and supervision of projects.

### *Conditional cash grants for orphans, vulnerable children and the elderly*

The crisis hit orphans, the elderly and adults with chronic illnesses the hardest. Although the State and some non-state actors have provided for some of their needs (notably medicine and food) the Government will need to find ways to extend coverage to these groups. As the supply situation improves, consideration should be given to shifting from food packages to cash transfers, perhaps based on some health and education conditionalities. Food packages worked very well in the shortage-prone hyperinflation environment prior to dollarisation. However, experience from Mozambique suggests that its continued use in situations where the supply situation has improved could undermine food markets and ultimately farm production itself. Cash grants can instil confidence and provide a level of independence that direct food aid may not achieve in some situations. Evidence from Malawi and Zambia suggest that cash programmes can be more effective than food packages. However, there needs to be a minimum level of organisation to get this to work, and in the case of Zimbabwe the system of rural banking that had developed has now largely disappeared. A cash grant scheme could provide the impetus to rejuvenate rural banking services. Questions of affordability will be raised given the state of the national economy. Our view here is that this is one of the ways Government can show commitment to its citizens.

### *The Basic Income Grant (BIG)*

Finally, the severe poverty and high unemployment in a post-crisis Zimbabwe will require innovative ways to prevent social instability and provide for the welfare of the country. In the long run, Zimbabwe might consider the Basic Income Grant (BIG) as a way of promoting inclusive citizenship. The BIG is a grant paid to all citizens, without means testing and financed through taxation.

The universality of the BIG might be appealing for two reasons. First, a BIG removes the huge administrative burden of targeting involved in means tested programmes. Second, the universalism of the BIG minimises the possibility that social assistance will be politicised, because local, provincial or national administration will no-longer have discretion on the eligibility of beneficiaries. A key constraint is the affordability of the programme for a cash-strapped State

emerging out of a protracted recession. This means that in all likelihood the BIG will remain a long term vision for the country and is unlikely to be considered in the immediate future.

### **11.8 Rebuilding the public service**

Zimbabwe's public service, one of the best in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, has been severely weakened by the economic crisis. Staff attrition and declining budgets to implement programmes have compromised service delivery to all citizens. Public management is one of the key areas that will need attention. In addition to rebuilding the bureaucracy through concrete tasks such as filling vacant posts, re-installing systems and re-establishing training institutions, there will be need to work on 'softer' aspects such as organisational culture. Improving the capacity of the bureaucracy to deliver services effectively, especially to poorer people, and develop a client orientation, are priorities.

Specific steps include:

- a. Ensuring that civil servants are fairly rewarded and are motivated to work.
- b. Strengthening the capacity of Permanent Secretaries to take a leading role in the reforms, through targeted staff development programmes, especially in corporate planning, strategic management and the promotion of a culture of excellence.
- c. Introducing regular and simple customer surveys in order to enhance accountability and assess the conduct of public officials in service delivery, and to ensure that services offered are accessible and meet client needs.
- d. Improving gender mainstreaming mechanisms in order to make this re-vitalisation of the public service an opportunity to challenge existing gender stereotypes and reach the target of having 30 per cent of decision-making positions filled by women by 2015.
- e. Strengthening mechanisms for detecting and dealing with corruption. Establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission is of paramount importance.
- f. Enhancing the capacity of government agencies, especially the Central Statistical Office, to produce accurate statistics for planning.

### **11.9 Connecting Zimbabwe through information and communication technologies**

During the period of crisis, the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector suffered like all the other sectors. Zimbabwe is ranked among the lowest countries in the world for information technology, placed 132 out of 134 countries in 2009. Compared to other countries in the region, Zimbabwe has been slow to embrace the commercial and governance potential offered by the new ICTs. This can be attributed to the poor investment climate that characterised the decade-long economic decline. Growth of the mobile sector in Zimbabwe was

disappointing, although the number of internet users grew at a faster rate and was estimated at 1,351,000 by 2009.

With respect to mobile telephony, which has greater relevance for Zimbabwe, there was little progress as the transformational benefits through new and innovative offerings, like mobile banking (m-banking), have not taken root at a scale like South Africa's (WIZZIT) and Kenya's (M-Pesa). The potential for this industry to generate jobs is already evident and the Government should embrace this technology. Three key priorities for connecting Zimbabwe will revolve around:

- a. Implementing the ICT policy, launched by the Ministry of Science and Technology, which recognises the central role of ICTs in national development. Policy should be based on a robust, coherent and internally consistent framework that is alive to the cross sectoral nature of ICTs. This is one way to avoid contradictions and suboptimal resource utilisation. The establishment of a Ministry for ICT has created an institutional base from which to direct sound policy environment for the ICT sector.
- b. Promoting competition and private partnerships. A recent ICT survey in Zimbabwe identified as priorities infrastructure development; finance mobilisation; and human resource development and capacity building. On the first two key issues, namely infrastructure and financial resource mobilisation, the critical issue is to open the market to competition and create a policy and regulatory environment that is investor friendly. The growth of ICTs in African countries such as Nigeria is directly linked to creating a competitive environment, lowering barriers to entry, and allowing market forces to determine the pace of growth. Competition encourages investment and reduces access costs for consumers.
- c. Capacity building. Countries that use the ICT industry as an export market have invested in human capital development in the sector. Putting the right policies and regulatory environment in place will not of its own produce the skills to run the sector, or attract back the lost talent. In the long term, there is a need to create an e-culture that extends to primary education, and promotes the use of ICT at an early age. At tertiary level the creation of centres of excellence in ICT is a necessity. The State can lead this but private sector involvement is also needed.

#### **11.10 Migration remittances and poverty focused reconstruction**

Major population movements have taken place as a result of the Zimbabwe crisis. There are no accurate data on migration but 'guesstimates' suggest anything between 1.5 and three million Zimbabweans may have emigrated over the ten years of economic decline. Most skilled professionals are within the region, especially South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, though a significant number emigrated to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. The selective nature (mostly able-bodied working age groups) has been a major human capital loss for Zimbabwe and is in part seen as responsible for the decline in productivity and service delivery. Evidence elsewhere suggests that in the short term it is unlikely that those that have settled and are gainfully employed will migrate permanently back to Zimbabwe once the situation stabilises.

The implication is that although potentially the migrants could help to rebuild lost human capital, there is a tendency to overplay their contribution as it is mainly those with less skill or who are educated but not in gainful employment who are likely to return permanently. Clearly there is a need to explore ways in which the Zimbabwean diaspora can help in the reconstruction of the country.

*We see three main possibilities*

First, they could be a source of investment capital if mechanisms are put in place to facilitate their participation. Available evidence suggests that most investments by migrants to date have largely played a reproductive role, i.e. sustaining relations rather than productivity enhancement, and where significant investment has occurred these have been in pursuit of conspicuous consumption. Elsewhere in Asia and South America, evidence suggests that migrants have made a difference when organised into hometown associations that have the support of the State. Clearly the State will need to move in this direction if it wants to effectively tap into the savings of the migrants. We caution, however, that the nature of savings behaviour among migrants is largely unknown, although some available evidence suggests that the ability to save among migrants is very limited and there may well be little amounts of money available for investment in reconstruction. The State could, however, work on schemes to encourage savings, perhaps through creating tax incentives for non-resident Zimbabweans, as India has done for its diaspora.

Secondly, some migrants working as professionals have gained valuable experience where they are. The government will need to think of ways to lure some of them back (even for short periods at a time) to share their skills and knowledge. It is probably through these non-financial remittances that Zimbabwe could gain the most. Evidence elsewhere suggests that through these short visits some may be enticed to return more permanently, once they are convinced that they can cope with life in what is now a very different country from the one they left. This is one area where the government, working with donors, can harness the human capital that probably benefited the most from post-independence investment in education. Targeting sectors like health and education seems most feasible as these are the areas hardest hit by the brain drain.

Thirdly, migrants need to feel that the Government values them as citizens and does not view them as individuals with divided loyalties. Confidence boosting measures would include allowing dual nationality, restoring voting rights of migrants who hold Zimbabwean citizenship and creating mechanisms and platforms for them to be heard. In exchange, migrants might be prepared to pay an annual tax for retaining the Zimbabwean nationality. Clearly the idea of taxing migrants will be controversial but could be one of the ways in which the migrants can also contribute directly to the fiscus.

### **11.11 What roles for development partners?**

Development partners from traditional donor countries and new players (China, India etc.) are unsure about how to respond to the opportunity created by the formation of the GNU. Most donors have a fairly good idea about what to do and what not to do: do not proliferate programmes; coordinate activities; identify lead agencies on issues so that transitional authorities do not get drawn into too many meetings; pool resources; and build on local capacities. If donors

look at the Paris Declaration, most of the things that would make their funding more effective in Zimbabwe are listed. They just need to follow their own agreement!

### **11.12 Conclusion**

None of the policies and actions recommended in this report will be easy to implement, but the opportunity to improve wellbeing, revitalise growth and be a proud people and a unified nation once again has opened up. As Zimbabwe moves out of the crisis, and the divisions of recent years begin to heal, the possibility of economic, political and social reform emerges. Openly deliberating about how to seize this opportunity is the first step in moving forward. This report seeks to contribute to that process, and to focus attention on how Zimbabwe's poor can be put at the forefront of the recovery through an agriculture-led strategy. Ultimately it is those in poverty who have suffered the greatest hardship over the crisis period, and it is through the effects on the poor that we should judge development.

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